Abstract.
Strategy-proof allocation of a finite number of indivisible goods among a finite number of individuals is considered. The main result is that in a pure distributional case, a mechanism is strategy-proof, nonbossy and neutral if and only if it is serially dictatorial. If the indivisible goods are initially owned by the individuals, a mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto consistent if and only if it is the core mechanism.
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Received: 15 September 1997/Accepted: 12 May 1998
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Svensson, LG. Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods. Soc Choice Welfare 16, 557–567 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050160
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050160