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Lexicographically maximal edges of dual hypergraphs and Nash-solvability of tight game forms

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Abstract

We prove a new property of dual hypergraphs and derive from it Nash-solvability of the corresponding (tight) game forms. This result is known since 1975, but its new proof is much simpler.

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Acknowledgements

The authors are thankful to Endre Boros and to an anonymous reviewer for many helpful remarks and suggestions. The article was prepared within the framework of the HSE University Basic Research Program.

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Correspondence to Mariya Naumova.

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Gurvich, V., Naumova, M. Lexicographically maximal edges of dual hypergraphs and Nash-solvability of tight game forms. Ann Math Artif Intell 92, 49–57 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-022-09820-3

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Keywords

Mathematics subject classification (2010)