Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
Skip to main content
Springer Nature Link
Log in

Legal stories and the process of proof

  • Published:
Artificial Intelligence and Law Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper, we continue our research on a hybrid narrative-argumentative approach to evidential reasoning in the law by showing the interaction between factual reasoning (providing a proof for ‘what happened’ in a case) and legal reasoning (making a decision based on the proof). First we extend the hybrid theory by making the connection with reasoning towards legal consequences. We then emphasise the role of legal stories (as opposed to the factual stories of the hybrid theory). Legal stories provide a coherent, holistic legal perspective on a case. They steer what needs to be proven but are also selected on the basis of what can be proven. We show how these legal stories can be used to model a shift of the legal perspective on a case, and we discuss how gaps in a legal story can be filled using a factual story (i.e. the process of reasoning with circumstantial evidence). Our model is illustrated by a discussion of the Dutch Wamel murder case.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Similar content being viewed by others

Explore related subjects

Discover the latest articles, news and stories from top researchers in related subjects.

Notes

  1. This paper adapts and extends our (Bex and Verheij 2011b).

  2. There exist other formal approaches to coherence, e.g. (Hage 2001; Bench-Capon and Sartor 2001; Thagard 2004).

  3. We assume a rough distinction between “real-world” facts, which tell us something about the (physical) reality (e.g. Francis was angry with Kevin, Francis shot Kevin) and legal facts, facts which tell us something about the legal reality (e.g. Francis' killing of Kevin was premeditated, Francis is punishable for murder).

  4. In practice, there might be more alternative legal accounts in a case and the alternatives will be more specific.

  5. In this paper, we generally assume a Dutch legal framework. Even though the use of legal terms in different jurisdictions has many pitfalls, such terms will be translated more or less literally and where necessary we will briefly sketch the legal context. For example, a relevant distinction here is that the principal is the primary actor of a crime and the accomplice an active participant.

  6. See also David Poole’s work (e.g. (Poole 1998)) for a combination of causal and evidential reasoning.

  7. Factual story schemes are schemes about real-world facts. They are different from legal story schemes, which will be discussed in Sect. 4.2.

  8. This is important, as in criminal cases this sort of evidence is often provided (e.g. a forensic report stating that “the victim’s death was caused by a bullet”).

References

  • Alexy R, Peczenik A (1990) The concept of coherence and its significance for discursive rationality. Ratio Jurisd 3(1):130–147

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson TJ, Schum DA, Twining WL (2005) Analysis of evidence, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ashley KD (1990) Modeling legal argument. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Bench-Capon T, Sartor G (2001) A quantitative approach to theory coherence. In: Verheij B, Lodder AR, Loui RP, Muntjewerff A (eds) JURIX 2001: the 14th annual conference. IOS Press, Amsterdam, pp 53–62

    Google Scholar 

  • Bex FJ (2011) Arguments, stories and criminal evidence: a formal hybrid theory. Springer, Dordrecht

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bex FJ, Verheij B (2011) Solving a murder case by asking critical questions: an approach to fact-finding in terms of argumentation and story schemes. Argumentation, to appear

  • Bex FJ, Verheij B (2011) Legal shifts in the process of proof. In: The 13th international conference on artificial intelligence and law (ICAIL 2011). Proceedings of the conference, ACM, New York (New York), pp 11–20

  • Bex FJ, Walton D (2011) Burdens and standards of proof for inference to the best explanation: three case studies. Law, Probability and Risk, to appear

  • Bex FJ, Prakken H, Reed C, Walton DN (2003) Towards a formal account of reasoning about evidence: argumentation schemes and generalisations. Artif Intell Law 11:125–165

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bex FJ, van Koppen PJ, Prakken H, Verheij B (2010) A hybrid formal theory of arguments, stories and criminal evidence. Artif Intell Law 18(2):123–152

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bex FJ, Bench-Capon T, Verheij B (2011) What makes a story plausible? The need for precedents. In: Legal knowledge and information systems. JURIX 2011: the twenty fourth annual conference. Frontiers in artificial intelligence and applications 235

  • Console L, Dupré DT (1994) Abductive reasoning with abstraction axioms. Lect Notes Comput Sci 810:98–112

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Console L, Torasso P (1991) A spectrum of logical definitions of model–based diagnosis. Comput Intell 7:133–141

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dung PM (1995) On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming, and n-person games. Artif Intell 77:321–357

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Gordon TF (1987) Some problems with prolog as a knowledge representation language for legal expert systems. In: Arnold C (ed) Yearbook of law, computers and technology. Leicester Polytechnic Press, Leicester, pp 52–67

    Google Scholar 

  • Hage JC (1997) Reasoning with rules. An essay on legal reasoning and its underlying logic. Kluwer, Dordrecht

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hage JC (2001) Formalising legal coherence. In: Proceedings of the 8th international conference on artificial intelligence and law, ACM, New York, pp 22–31

  • Hage JC (2004) Law and coherence. Ratio Jurisd 17(1):87–105

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Israëls H (2006) Moord in Wamel (murder in Wamel). Boom Juridische Uitgevers, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Keppens J, Schäfer B (2006) Knowledge based crime scenario modelling. Expert Syst Appl 30:203–222

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCarty LT (1997) Some arguments about legal arguments. In: The 6th international conference on artificial intelligence and law, ACM, New York, pp 215–224

  • Pennington N, Hastie R (1993) Reasoning in explanation-based decision making. Cognition 49(1–2):123–163

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pollock JL (1995) Cognitive carpentry: a blueprint for how to build a person. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Poole D (1998) Learning, Bayesian probability, graphical models, and abduction. In: Flach P, Kakas A (eds) Abduction and induction: essays on their relation and integration. Kluwer, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Prakken H (2010) An abstract framework for argumentation with structured arguments. Argum Comput 1:93–124

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prakken H, Sartor G (1996) A dialectical model of assessing conflicting arguments in legal reasoning. Artif Intell Law 4:331–368

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (1951) Outline of a decision procedure for ethics. Philos Rev 60(2):177–197

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schank RC (1986) Explanations patterns: understanding mechanically and creatively. Lawrence Erlbaum, New Jersey

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle JR (1969) Speech acts: an essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Thagard P (2004) Causal inference in legal decision making: explanatory coherence versus Bayesian networks. Appl Artif Intell 18(3):231–249

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Verheij B (2005) Virtual arguments. On the design of argument assistants for lawyers and other arguers. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wagenaar WA, van Koppen PJ, Crombag HFM (1993) Anchored narratives: the psychology of criminal evidence. St. Martin’s Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Walker VR (2007) A default-logic paradigm for legal fact-finding. Jurimetrics 47:193–243

    Google Scholar 

  • Walton DN, Schafer B (2006) Arthur, George and the mystery of the missing motive: towards a theory of evidentiary reasoning about motives. Int Comment Evid 4(2):1–47

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computing, University of Dundee, Dundee, UK

    Floris Bex

  2. Humanities Computing, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Floris Bex

  3. Department of Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Bart Verheij

Authors
  1. Floris Bex
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Bart Verheij
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Floris Bex.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bex, F., Verheij, B. Legal stories and the process of proof. Artif Intell Law 21, 253–278 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-012-9137-4

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-012-9137-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation