Abstract
An unprecedented growth in computer and communication systems in the last two decades has resulted in a proportional increase in the number and sophistication of network attacks. In particular, the number of previously-unseen attacks has increased exponentially in the last few years. Due to the rapidly evolving nature of network attacks, a considerable paradigm shift has taken place in the intrusion detection community. The main focus is now on Network Anomaly Detection Systems (NADSs) which model and flag deviations from normal/benign behavior of a network and can hence detect previously-unseen attacks. Contemporary NADS borrow concepts from a variety of theoretical fields (e.g., Information theory, stochastic and machine learning, signal processing, etc.) to model benign behavior. These NADSs, however, fall short of achieving acceptable performance levels as therefore widespread commercial deployments. Thus, in this paper, we firstly evaluate the performance of eight prominent network-based anomaly detectors under malicious portscan attacks to identify which NADSs perform better than others and why. These NADSs are evaluated on three criteria: accuracy (ROC curves), scalability (with respect to varying normal and attack traffic rates, and deployment points) and detection delay. These criteria are evaluated using two independently collected datasets with complementary strengths. We then propose novel methods and promising guidelines to improve the accuracy and scalability of existing and future anomaly detectors. Experimental analysis of the proposed guidelines is also presented for the proof of concept.
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Ashfaq, A.B., Ali, M.Q. & Khayam, S.A. Accuracy improving guidelines for network anomaly detection systems. J Comput Virol 7, 63–81 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-009-0133-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-009-0133-5