Key recovery attack for PRESENT using slender-set linear cryptanalysis

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new n-round key recovery attack using modified slender-set linear cryptanalysis on PRESENT-like cipher with public S-boxes. In our attack, an effective method for distinguishing the right key from the wrong ones is presented. We apply our attack to PRESENT-80. The experiments show that we can recover the entire 80 key bits of 12-rounds PRESENT-80 with 2{sn32} data complexity, 2³⁶ time complexity, and negligible memory complexity. Furthermore, we investigate an (n+1)-round attack by extending the n-round key recovery attack. Our method can be used in most PRESENT-like ciphers where the linear layer is a bit-wise permutation.

摘要

创新点

本文利用slender集线性分析方法, 针对公开S盒的类PRESENT算法, 给出了一个新的n轮密钥恢复攻击, 并对减轮的PRESENT-80进行了实际攻击。攻击结果表明, 我们能以2^32的数据复杂度, 2^36的时间复杂度及忽略不计的存储复杂度, 恢复出12轮PRESENT算法的全部80比特密钥。在n轮密钥恢复攻击的基础之上, 我们进一步给出了(n+1)轮的密钥恢复攻击。该攻击方法对线性变换设计为比特置换的类PRESENT算法都有效。