Abstract
We analyze the dynamics of evolutionary games in which fitness is defined as an affine function of the expected payoff and a constant contribution. The resulting inhomogeneous replicator equation has an homogeneous equivalent with modified payoffs. The affine terms also influence the stochastic dynamics of a two-strategy Moran model of a finite population. We then apply the affine fitness function in a model for tumor–normal cell interactions to determine which are the most successful tumor strategies. In order to analyze the dynamics of concurrent strategies within a tumor population, we extend the model to a three-strategy game involving distinct tumor cell types as well as normal cells. In this model, interaction with normal cells, in combination with an increased constant fitness, is the most effective way of establishing a population of tumor cells in normal tissue.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Altrock P, Traulsen A (2009) Deterministic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. Phys Rev E 80:011909
Antal T, Scheuring I (2006) Fixation of strategies for an evolutionary game in finite populations. Bull Math Biol 68:1923–1944
Attolini C, Michor F (2009) Evolutionary theory of cancer. Ann NY Acad Sci 1168:23–51
Axelrod R, Axelrod DE, Pienta KJ (2006) Evolution of cooperation among tumor cells. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 103:13474–13479
Axelrod R, Hamilton WD (1981) The evolution of cooperation. Science 211:1390–1396
Bach L, Sumpter D, Alsner J, Loeschcke V (2003) Spatial evolutionary games of interaction among generic cancer cells. Comput Math Methods Med 5:47–58
Bach LA, Bentzen SM, Alsner J, Christiansen FB (2001) An evolutionary-game model of tumour-cell interactions: possible relevance to gene therapy. Eur J Cancer 37:2116–2120
Basanta D, Deutsch A (2008) A game theoretical perspective on the somatic evolution of cancer. In: Selected topics in cancer modeling. Modeling and simulation in science, engineering and technology. Birkhäuser, Boston, pp 1–16
Basanta D, Simon M, Hatzikirou H, Deutsch A (2008) Evolutionary game theory elucidates the role of glycolysis in glioma progression and invasion. Cell Prolif 41:980–987
Beerenwinkel N, Antal T, Dingli D, Traulsen A, Kinzler KW, Velculescu VE, Vogelstein B, Nowak MA (2007) Genetic progression and the waiting time to cancer. PLoS Comput Biol 3:e225
Bomze I (1983) Lotka–Volterra equation and replicator dynamics: a two-dimensional classification. Biol Cybern 48:201–211
Bozic I, Antal T, Ohtsuki H, Carter H, Kim D, Chen S, Karchin R, Kinzler KW, Vogelstein B, Nowak MA (2010) Accumulation of driver and passenger mutations during tumor progression. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 107:18545–18550
Cairns J (1975) Mutation selection and the natural history of cancer. Nature 255:197–200
Carmeliet P (2005) Angiogenesis in life, disease and medicine. Nature 438:932–936
Clarke M, Dick J, Dirks P, Eaves C, Jamieson C, Jones D, Visvader J, Weissman I, Wahl G (2006) Cancer stem cells–perspectives on current status and future directions: AACR workshop on cancer stem cells. Cancer Res 66:9339
Dingli D, Chalub FACC, Santos FC, Van Segbroeck S, Pacheco JM (2009) Cancer phenotype as the outcome of an evolutionary game between normal and malignant cells. Br J Cancer 101:1130–1136
Durrett R, Schmidt D, Schweinsberg J (2009) A waiting time problem arising from the study of multi-stage carcinogenesis. Ann Appl Probab 19:676–718
Fudenberg D, Nowak MA, Taylor C, Imhof LA (2006) Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation. Theor Popul Biol 70:352–363
Gatenby RA, Vincent TL (2003) An evolutionary model of carcinogenesis. Cancer Res 63:6212–6220
Gerstung M, Beerenwinkel N (2010) Waiting time models of cancer progression. Math Popul Stud Int J Math Demogr 17:115–135
Gokhale CS, Traulsen A (2010) Evolutionary games in the multiverse. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 107:5500–5504
Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1998) Evolutionary games and population dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (2003) Evolutionary game dynamics. Bull Am Math Soc 40:479–519
Karlin S, Taylor H (1975) A first course in stochastic processes. Academic Press, San Diego
Kimura M (1985) The neutral theory of molecular evolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Lessard S, Ladret V (2007) The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model. J Math Biol 54:721–744
Mansury Y, Diggory M, Deisboeck T (2006) Evolutionary game theory in an agent-based brain tumor model: exploring the ‘genotype-phenotype’ link. J Theor Biol 238:146–156
Maynard Smith J (1982) Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Michor F, Iwasa Y, Nowak MA (2004) Dynamics of cancer progression. Nat Rev Cancer 4:197–205
Moran PAP (1962) The statistical processes of evolutionary theory. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Mueller MM, Fusenig NE (2004) Friends or foes—bipolar effects of the tumour stroma in cancer. Nat Rev Cancer 4:839–849
Nowak MA (2006a) Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the equations of life. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Nowak MA (2006b) Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314:1560–1563
Nowak MA, Sasaki A, Taylor C, Fudenberg D (2004) Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428:646–650
Nowell PC (1976) The clonal evolution of tumor cell populations. Science 194:23–28
Ohta T (2002) Near-neutrality in evolution of genes and gene regulation. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 99:16134
Prügel-Bennett A (1994) Analysis of genetic algorithms using statistical mechanics. Phys Rev Lett 72:1305–1309
Schuster P, Sigmund K (1983) Replicator dynamics. J Theor Biol 100:533–538
Stadler PF (1991) Dynamics of autocatalytic reaction networks. IV: Inhomogeneous replicator networks. Biosystems 26:1–19
Stadler PF, Schuster P (1990) Dynamics of small autocatalytic reaction networks. I. Bifurcations, permanence and exclusion. Bull Math Biol 52:485–508
Taylor C, Fudenberg D, Sasaki A, Nowak MA (2004) Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. Bull Math Biol 66:1621–1644
Taylor C, Nowak MA (2006) Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates. Theor Popul Biol 69:243–252
Taylor P, Jonker L (1978) Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Math Biosci 40:145–156
Tomlinson I, Bodmer W (1997) Modelling the consequences of interactions between tumour cells. Br J Cancer 75:157
Tomlinson IP (1997) Game-theory models of interactions between tumour cells. Eur J Cancer 33:1495–1500
Traulsen A, Pacheco JM, Nowak MA (2007) Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics. J Theor Biol 246:522–529
Traulsen A, Shoresh N, Nowak MA (2008) Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity. Bull Math Biol 70:1410–1424
Van Loo P, Nordgard SH, Lingjærde OC, Russnes HG, Rye IH, Sun W, Weigman VJ, Marynen P, Zetterberg A, Naume B, et al. (2010) Allele-specific copy number analysis of tumors. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 107:16910–16915
Wicha M, Liu S, Dontu G (2006) Cancer stem cells: an old idea—a paradigm shift. Cancer Res 66:1883
Wu B, Altrock P, Wang L, Traulsen A (2010) Universality of weak selection. Phys Rev E 82:046106
Zeeman E (1980) Population dynamics from game theory. In: Global theory of dynamical systems, pp 471–497
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gerstung, M., Nakhoul, H. & Beerenwinkel, N. Evolutionary Games with Affine Fitness Functions: Applications to Cancer. Dyn Games Appl 1, 370–385 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0029-0
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0029-0