Abstract
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to players having additive utility functions over the items. We consider allocations in which no player envies the bundle of items allocated to the other players too much. We present a simple proof that deterministic truthful allocations do not minimize envy by characterizing the truthful mechanisms for two players and two items. Also, we present an analysis for uniformly random allocations which are naturally truthful in expectation. These results simplify or improve previous results of Lipton et al.
This work is partially supported by the European Union under IST FET Integrated Project FP6-015964 AEOLUS and Cost Action IC0602 “Algorithmic Decision Theory”, and by a “Caratheodory” basic research grant from the University of Patras.
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Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, C., Kanellopoulos, P., Kyropoulou, M. (2009). On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations. In: Rossi, F., Tsoukias, A. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5783. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_10
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