Abstract
This paper considers an acid rain differential game. Countries emit sulphur which is partly transferred to other countries. Depositions above critical loads ultimately destroy the soil. Countries face a trade-off between the costs of emission reductions and the damage to the soil due to the depletion of the acid buffers. Because of the transboundary externalities the outcome will depend on whether the countries cooperate or not. This paper presents the cooperative outcome and the open-loop and Markov-perfect Nash equilibria of the acid rain differential game. It will be shown that the depositions always converge to the critical loads but the steady-state levels of the buffer stocks differ. The theory is used to analyse the acid rain differential game for sulphur between Great Britain and Ireland. Finally, some results are given for the whole of Europe.
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Mäler, KG., De Zeeuw, A. The Acid Rain Differential Game. Environmental and Resource Economics 12, 167–184 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008273509255
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008273509255