Abstract
We consider repeated play of noncooperative games in which agents have more decisionsto consider at every stage than their attention allows. However, under a monotonicityassumption, if every variable is adjusted cyclically, as guided by marginal payoffs, thenmyopic steps lead to Nash equilibrium in the long run.
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Flåm, S.D. Restricted attention, myopic play, and thelearning of equilibrium. Annals of Operations Research 82, 59–82 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018987409039
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018987409039