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Electromagnetic Vulnerabilities of LCD Projectors

Published: 02 September 2019 Publication History

Abstract

This paper presents for the first time a study on the security of information processed by video projectors. Examples of video recovery from the electromagnetic radiation of these equipment will be illustrated both in laboratory and real-field environment. It presents the results of the time parameters evaluation for the analyzed video signal that confirm the video standards specifications. There will also be illustrated the results of a vulnerability analysis based on the colors used to display the images but also the remote video recovery capabilities.

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Cited By

View all
  • (2022)Unintentional Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations from IT Equipment: A Concept Map of Domain KnowledgeProcedia Computer Science10.1016/j.procs.2022.01.344200(1432-1441)Online publication date: 2022
  • (2021)The Possibility to Recreate the Shapes of Objects on the Basis of Printer Vibration in the Additive Printing ProcessApplied Sciences10.3390/app1111530511:11(5305)Online publication date: 7-Jun-2021
  • (2020)Method of Colors and Secure Fonts Used for Source Shaping of Valuable Emissions from Projector in Electromagnetic Eavesdropping ProcessSymmetry10.3390/sym1211190812:11(1908)Online publication date: 20-Nov-2020
  • Show More Cited By

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cover image ACM Other conferences
ECBS '19: Proceedings of the 6th Conference on the Engineering of Computer Based Systems
September 2019
182 pages
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 02 September 2019

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Author Tags

  1. TEMPEST
  2. compromising emanations
  3. video projector
  4. video recovery

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  • Research-article
  • Research
  • Refereed limited

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ECBS '19

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ECBS '19 Paper Acceptance Rate 25 of 49 submissions, 51%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 25 of 49 submissions, 51%

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Cited By

View all
  • (2022)Unintentional Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations from IT Equipment: A Concept Map of Domain KnowledgeProcedia Computer Science10.1016/j.procs.2022.01.344200(1432-1441)Online publication date: 2022
  • (2021)The Possibility to Recreate the Shapes of Objects on the Basis of Printer Vibration in the Additive Printing ProcessApplied Sciences10.3390/app1111530511:11(5305)Online publication date: 7-Jun-2021
  • (2020)Method of Colors and Secure Fonts Used for Source Shaping of Valuable Emissions from Projector in Electromagnetic Eavesdropping ProcessSymmetry10.3390/sym1211190812:11(1908)Online publication date: 20-Nov-2020
  • (2020)Assessing the Security of TEMPEST Fonts against Electromagnetic Eavesdropping by Using Different Specialized ReceiversApplied Sciences10.3390/app1008282810:8(2828)Online publication date: 19-Apr-2020

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