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Which is the fairest (rent division) of them all?

Published: 23 January 2018 Publication History
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  • (2020)A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach for Conflict Resolution in Multi-agent PlanningGroup Decision and Negotiation10.1007/s10726-020-09703-0Online publication date: 5-Sep-2020
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cover image Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM  Volume 61, Issue 2
February 2018
94 pages
ISSN:0001-0782
EISSN:1557-7317
DOI:10.1145/3181977
Issue’s Table of Contents
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Published: 23 January 2018
Published in CACM Volume 61, Issue 2

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View all
  • (2020)A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach for Conflict Resolution in Multi-agent PlanningGroup Decision and Negotiation10.1007/s10726-020-09703-0Online publication date: 5-Sep-2020
  • (undefined)3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting AlgorithmSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3126935

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