Article

Ad hoc-VCG: a truthful and cost-efficient routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks with selfish agents

Authors:

Stephan EidenbenzAuthors Info & Claims

MobiCom '03: Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking

Pages 245 - 259

https://doi.org/10.1145/938985.939011

Published: 14 September 2003 Publication History

Abstract

We introduce a game-theoretic setting for routing in a mobile ad hoc network that consists of greedy, selfish agents who accept payments for forwarding data for other agents if the payments cover their individual costs incurred by forwarding data. In this setting, we propose Ad hoc-VCG, a reactive routing protocol that achieves the design objectives of truthfulness (i.e., it is in the agents' best interest to reveal their true costs for forwarding data) and cost-efficiency (i.e., it guarantees that routing is done along the most cost-efficient path) in a game-theoretic sense by paying to the intermediate nodes a premium over their actual costs for forwarding data packets. We show that the total overpayment (i.e., the sum of all premiums paid) is relatively small by giving a theoretical upper bound and by providing experimental evidence. Our routing protocol implements a variation of the well-known mechanism by Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves in a mobile network setting. Finally, we analyze a very natural routing protocol that is an adaptation of the Packet Purse Model [8] with auctions in our setting and show that, unfortunately, it does not achieve cost-efficiency or truthfulness.

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https://doi.org/10.1109/TMLCN.2024.3365420
Srinivasan VRajarajeswari PKumar T(2023)Techniques and Applications of Optimal Cluster Head Selection With Trusted Multipath Routing and MANET Intrusion DetectionHandbook of Research on Advanced Practical Approaches to Deepfake Detection and Applications10.4018/978-1-6684-6060-3.ch013(162-182)Online publication date: 3-Jan-2023
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Index Terms

Ad hoc-VCG: a truthful and cost-efficient routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks with selfish agents
1. Networks
  1. Network protocols

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cover image ACM Conferences

MobiCom '03: Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking

September 2003

376 pages

ISBN:1581137532

DOI:10.1145/938985

Conference Chair:
David B. Johnson
Rice University
,
Program Chairs:
Anthony D. Joseph
University of California, Berkeley
,
Nitin H. Vaidya
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Copyright © 2003 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 14 September 2003

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MobiCom03: Ninth Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking

September 14 - 19, 2003

CA, San Diego, USA

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MobiCom '03 Paper Acceptance Rate 27 of 281 submissions, 10%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 440 of 2,972 submissions, 15%

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Cited By

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https://doi.org/10.1109/TMLCN.2024.3365420
Srinivasan VRajarajeswari PKumar T(2023)Techniques and Applications of Optimal Cluster Head Selection With Trusted Multipath Routing and MANET Intrusion DetectionHandbook of Research on Advanced Practical Approaches to Deepfake Detection and Applications10.4018/978-1-6684-6060-3.ch013(162-182)Online publication date: 3-Jan-2023
https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-6684-6060-3.ch013
Yu YHsu SChen AChen YTang B(2023)Truthful and Optimal Data Preservation in Base Station-less Sensor Networks: An Integrated Game Theory and Network Flow ApproachACM Transactions on Sensor Networks10.1145/360626320:1(1-40)Online publication date: 27-Jun-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3606263
Moura JMarinheiro RSilva J(2022)Game Theory for Cooperation in Multi-Access Edge ComputingResearch Anthology on Edge Computing Protocols, Applications, and Integration10.4018/978-1-6684-5700-9.ch012(229-279)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2022
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Karthikeyan MPriya MKiruthika M(2021)File Distributed for Improving Data Accessibility in Adhoc NetworksInternational Journal of Advanced Research in Science, Communication and Technology10.48175/IJARSCT-2334(231-234)Online publication date: 31-Dec-2021
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Rajalakshmi DK. M(2021)An Efficient Selfishness Control Mechanism for Mobile Ad hoc NetworksHandbook of Research on Innovations and Applications of AI, IoT, and Cognitive Technologies10.4018/978-1-7998-6870-5.ch030(432-449)Online publication date: 2021
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Veeraiah NKrishna B(2020)An approach for optimal-secure multi-path routing and intrusion detection in MANETEvolutionary Intelligence10.1007/s12065-020-00388-715:2(1313-1327)Online publication date: 26-Mar-2020
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Ghosh UChatterjee PPathan A(2020)On the Secure Routing Protocols, Selfishness Mitigation, and Trust in Mobile Ad Hoc NetworksCombating Security Challenges in the Age of Big Data10.1007/978-3-030-35642-2_5(87-104)Online publication date: 27-May-2020
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