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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Article
An Evaluation of Game Theory With the Value Cluster Model in Logistics Service Providers
Author(s)
Chumpol Saichuer, Sataporn Amornsawadwatana, Wanchai Rattanawong
Full-Text PDF
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DOI:10.17265/1537-1514/2016.04.001
Affiliation(s)
Chumpol Saichuer, Ph.D. student in logistics, School of Engineering, University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, Thailand.
Sataporn Amornsawadwatana, assoc. prof., Dr., Department of Logistics Engineering, School of Engineering, University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, Thailand.
Wanchai Rattanawong, assoc. prof., Dr., Department of Logistics Engineering, School of Engineering, University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, Thailand.
ABSTRACT
Sole traders and other small businesses sometimes work together co-operatively to enhance their trade through joint activities such as purchasing and marketing. This approach, known as a co-operative consortium, can save money, spread risk, and enable the participating businesses to pool their resources, provide mutual support and learning and strengthen their business sector, while maintaining their business independence. In the logistics industry, value cluster may concern with Third Party Logistics Providers (3PLs). 3PLs are those entities that arrange shipments, as well as manage and provide advice on transportation and transportation-related services for shippers, freight carriers, and other related entities. 3PLs may include brokers, freight forwarders, rail transporters, consolidators, shippers, and air cargo agents. The logistics industry is changing rapidly due to the combination of a de-regulated transportation environment, together with 3PLs embracing the internet, e-commerce and other electronic means to provide their logistics services. To verify mutual benefit between two parties or in one cluster, game theory is used as a major method in mathematical economics and business for modeling competing behaviors of interacting agents. This research presents a proposed value cluster model in logistics service providers with game theory. It is an attempt to develop a new model to support a theory of partners’ model and game theory model in accompanied with various supporting concepts such as transportation, freight transportation, distribution, warehouse, custom procedure, and sourcing defined by this thesis. A process of developing, rationale behind, and explanation of the components on the model are described. The model has been developed throughout the period of this research study, and its components focus on the context of value cluster in logistics service providers as independent variables that reflect dependent variables used in an exemplary case study. The last section is a review and brief conclusion of the model. The objectives of this research are: 1) to investigate mutual benefit of logistics service providers cluster, 2) to propose the model of value cluster in logistics service providers, and 3) to quantify the value cluster model using the game theory that provide a mathematical description of a social situation in which two or more individuals, or players interact.
KEYWORDS
mutual benefit, logistics service providers, cluster, game theory
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