Affiliations: [a] School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China
| [b] School of Business Planning, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing, China
Correspondence:
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Corresponding author. Wei Liu, School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, 400044, China. E-mail: [email protected].
Abstract: The technology adoption of a firm is endowed with complexity if the production technology upgrades continually and the price competition become intensified. This paper establishes a supply chain involving one technology supplier and two manufacturing enterprises. The supplier provides a kind of production technology and offers its upgraded versions for enterprises to produce products. On this basis, this paper studies the problem that whether or not to buy this kind of production technology in the perspective of each enterprise, explores the problem that when to buy an upgraded version of production technology in the perspective of each enterprise, and analyzes the price competition between two kinds of products. The results show that the asymmetric Nash equilibrium can effective avoid the prisoner’s dilemma of technology investment, and help to maximize the interest of the social welfare system that includes the technology supplier, manufacturing enterprises and consumers.
