Abstract
Computational social choice is an interdisciplinary field of study at the interface of social choice theory and computer science, promoting an exchange of ideas in both directions. On the one hand, it is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer science, such as complexity analysis or algorithm design, to the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting procedures or fair division algorithms. On the other hand, computational social choice is concerned with importing concepts from social choice theory into computing. For instance, the study of preference aggregation mechanisms is also very relevant to multiagent systems. In this short paper we give a general introduction to computational social choice, by proposing a taxonomy of the issues addressed by this discipline, together with some illustrative examples and an (incomplete) bibliography.
Some parts of this paper appeared in the proceedings of ECSQARU-2005.[62]
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Chevaleyre, Y., Endriss, U., Lang, J., Maudet, N. (2007). A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice. In: van Leeuwen, J., Italiano, G.F., van der Hoek, W., Meinel, C., Sack, H., Plášil, F. (eds) SOFSEM 2007: Theory and Practice of Computer Science. SOFSEM 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4362. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69507-3_4
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