Redistribution, Voting and Clientelism: Evidence from the Italian Land Reform

Lorenzo Casaburi, Bruno Caprettini and Miriam Venturini

No 15679, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Many democracies around the world feature pervasive clientelist practices. Inequality is often considered a key determinant of these practices. By reducing inequality, redistributive policies may therefore undermine clientelism. However, by inducing gratitude and reciprocity among beneficiaries, redistribution may also initiate clientelist exchange. We study the long-term effects of a major redistribution policy: the 1950 Italian land reform. Using a panel spatial regression discontinuity and data for half a century, we show that the large-scale redistribution led to the emergence of a long-lasting clientelist system characterized by political brokers, patronage and targeted benefits. Within this system, the Christian Democratic party, which promoted the reform, experienced persistent electoral benefits.

Keywords: Redistribution; Voting; Clientelism; Land reform; Italy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 N44 P16 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Harvesting Votes: The Electoral Effects of the Italian Land Reform (2023)
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