Degrees of Deception: How Score Manipulation Mitigates Temperature's Impact on Student Performance

Rosario Maria Ballatore (), Alessandro Palma () and Daniela Vuri ()
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Rosario Maria Ballatore: Bank of Italy
Alessandro Palma: Gran Sasso Science Institute
Daniela Vuri: University of Rome Tor Vergata

No 17643, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Using Italian data on the universe of mandatory tests conducted in a low-stakes setting without air conditioning, we investigate the effect of temperature on student performance, with a focus on how manipulation distorts causal estimates of temperature effects on test scores. While high temperatures adversely affect students' performance, we find that score manipulation also increases with temperature within a specific range. Leveraging the random assignment of inspectors to schools as a natural experiment, we estimate the effect of temperature on test scores net of manipulation. We find that achievement declines at lower temperature thresholds when manipulation is accounted for, implying a larger number of affected students than previously estimated. Additionally, individual survey responses collected during the tests indicate that very high temperatures induce shifts in students' emotional states, affecting self-esteem and anxiety levels.

Keywords: student performance; temperature; manipulation; cognitive ability; emotional stress (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J21 J24 O15 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
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