Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions

Ahmet Ozkardas () and Agnieszka Rusinowska
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Ahmet Ozkardas: Turgut Özal Üniversitesi et Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by sequences of discount factors varying in time. We determine subgame perfect equilibria for three cases when the strike decision of the union is exogenous: the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement, the case when the union is committed to go on strike only when its own offer is rejected, and the case when the union is supposed to go never on strike

Keywords: Union; firm bargaining; strike; alternating offers; varying discount rates; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2012/12013.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions (2012)
Working Paper: Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12013

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