Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful Auctions,
Hu Fu and Tao Lin,
from arXiv.org
(2022)
School Choice Design, Risk Aversion, and Cardinal Segregation,
Caterina Calsamiglia, Francisco Martínez-Mora and Antonio Miralles,
from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(2020)
Keywords: school choice mechanisms, cardinal segregation, segregation, peer effects, local public goods
ASSORTATIVE MATCHING CONTESTS,
Chen Cohen, Ishay Rabi and Aner Sela,
from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics
(2020)
Keywords: Two-sided matching, Tullock contest
TWO-STAGE MATCHING CONTESTS,
Aner Sela,
from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics
(2020)
Keywords: Iatching, Tullock contest
ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH HETEROGENEOUS PRIZES AND PARTIALLY ASYMMETRIC PLAYERS,
Chen Cohen, David Lagziel, Ofer Levi and Aner Sela,
from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics
(2020)
Keywords: All-pay contests, multiple prizes, complete information
Matching with Compatibility Constraints: The Case of the Canadian Medical Residency Match,
Muhammad Maaz and Anastasios Papanastasiou,
from McMaster University
(2020)
Keywords: two-sided matching; medical residency match; CARMS
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness:median-voting over intervals,
Bettina Klaus and Panos Protopapas,
from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie
(2020)
Keywords: correspondences; generalized median correspondences; single-peaked preferences;strategy-proofness
Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism,
Battal Dogan and Lars Ehlers,
from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ
(2020)
