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{{Infobox terrorist attack
| title = Khobar Towers bombing
| image_size = 300px
| image = AnschalgInZahran1996 KhobarTower.jpg
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}}
The '''Khobar Towers bombing''' was
A [[Car bomb|truck bomb]] was detonated adjacent to Building #131, an eight-story structure housing members of the [[United States Air Force]]'s [[4404th Wing (Provisional)]], primarily from a deployed rescue squadron and deployed fighter squadron. In all, 19 U.S. Air Force personnel were killed and 498 of many nationalities were wounded.<ref name="Ukaz newspaper">''Ukaz'' Newspaper (Arabic), 10 July 1996, p.1, col. 4. Then-Saudi Minister of Health, Dr. Osama Abdul Majeed Shobokshi, was quoted as putting the number of casualties at 498 and the number of deaths, all American, at 19. The report mentions no Saudi deaths. By this time, the minister said, 96% of those injured had left the hospital; the three remaining were recuperating from their injuries.</ref> The official 25 June 1996, statement by the United States named members of [[Hezbollah Al-Hejaz]] ({{
==The attack==
{{more citations needed|section|date=June 2017}}
On 13 November 1995, a car bombing in [[Riyadh]] outside the headquarters of the [[Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program|OPM-SANG]] killed six Americans and two Indian citizens and injured about 70 others.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.army.mil/article/241288/security_enterprise_marks_25th_anniversary_of_riyadh_bombing|title=Security enterprise marks 25th anniversary of Riyadh bombing|date=1 December 2020|access-date=23 April 2023|archive-date=23 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230423185241/https://www.army.mil/article/241288/security_enterprise_marks_25th_anniversary_of_riyadh_bombing|url-status=live}}</ref> This attack led the U.S. forces stationed at Khobar Towers to raise the threat condition to [[THREATCON]] DELTA. Days after this car bombing, military commanders briefed soldiers and airmen at Khobar that the U.S. had received anonymous communications from an organization claiming to have carried out the Riyadh attack. The attackers claimed their goal was to get the [[United States Armed Forces]] to leave the country, and that Khobar Towers would be attacked next if troop withdrawal did not begin immediately. It was at this time that surveillance and other suspicious activity near the perimeter fences of Khobar Towers was noted by [[United States Air Force Security Forces]]; however, the forces were forbidden by the Saudi government to act in any capacity outside the perimeter of the compound, and the surveillance continued with near impunity.
The attackers were reported to have smuggled explosives into Saudi Arabia from [[Lebanon]]. Al-Mughassil, Al-Houri, Al-Sayegh, Al-Qassab, and the unidentified Lebanese man bought a large latrine service [[tanker truck]] in early June 1996 in Saudi Arabia. Over a two-week period they converted it into a truck bomb. The group now had about {{convert|5000|lbs|kg}} of plastic explosives, enough to produce a [[shaped charge]] that detonated with the force of at least {{convert|20000|lbs|kg}} of TNT, according to a later assessment of the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The power of the blast was magnified several ways. The truck itself shaped the charge by directing the blast toward the building. Moreover, the relatively high clearance between the truck and the ground gave it the more lethal characteristics of an [[air burst]].<ref>{{cite journal|last=Grant|first=Rebecca|url=http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2006/June%202006/0606Desert.aspx|title=Death in the Desert|journal=Air Force Magazine|date=20 June 2006|access-date=3 September 2010|archive-date=17 October 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181017042916/http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2006/June%202006/0606Desert.aspx|url-status=live}}</ref>
It was originally estimated by U.S. authorities to have contained {{convert|3000|to|5000|lbs}} of explosives. Later the General Downing report on the incident suggested that the explosion contained the equivalent of {{convert|20000|to|30000|lbs}} of TNT. The attackers prepared for the attack by hiding large amounts of explosive materials and timing devices in paint cans and {{convert|50|kg|lbs|adj=on}} bags underground in [[Qatif]], a city near Khobar. The bomb was a mixture of [[petrol]] and explosive powder placed in the tank of a sewage tanker truck.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/khobar/khobarindict61901.pdf|title=''US v. Al-Mughassil'' (Khobar Indictment)|date=19 June 2001|access-date=3 September 2010|archive-date=28 August 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160828000621/http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/khobar/khobarindict61901.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>
Initially, the attackers attempted to enter the compound at the main checkpoint. When they were denied access by U.S. military personnel, at around 9:43 p.m. local time, they drove a [[Datsun]] scout vehicle,<ref name="threat">Hamilton, Dwight. "Terror Threat: International and Homegrown terrorists and their threat to Canada", 2007</ref> another car and the bomb truck, to a parking lot adjacent to building #131. A chain link security fence and a line of small trees separated the car park, used for a local [[mosque]] and park, from the housing compound. The perimeter of Building #131 was approximately {{convert|72|ft|m}} from the fence line, with a perimeter road between the fence and building which was often used by military personnel for jogging. The first car entered the car park and signaled the others by flashing headlights. The bomb truck and a getaway vehicle followed shortly after. The men parked the truck next to the fence and left in the third vehicle. The bomb exploded three to four minutes later at approximately 10:20 p.m. local time. The blast was so powerful that it was felt {{convert|20|mi|km}} away in the Persian Gulf state of [[Bahrain]].
A U.S. Air Force security policeman, [[Staff Sergeant]] Alfredo R. Guerrero, was stationed atop Building #131 when he witnessed the men, recognized the vehicles as a threat, reported it to security, and began a floor-by-floor evacuation of the building. His actions are credited with saving dozens of lives. Many of the evacuees were in the stairwell when the bomb went off. The stairwell was constructed of heavy marble and was located on the side of the building away from the truck bomb, perhaps the safest location in the building. For his actions, Guerrero was awarded the [[Airman's Medal]].<ref>[http://www.defense.gov/photos/newsphoto.aspx?newsphotoid=365 Defense.gov News Photos] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170711102937/https://www.defense.gov/photos/newsphoto.aspx?newsphotoid=365 |date=11 July 2017 }}. U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved 14 August 2011</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=http://usafeenlistedheritage.org/distinguished/decorated/criteria/?id=5 |title=Airman's Medal Criteria, History and Recipients |access-date=9 December 2017 |archive-date=9 December 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171209204121/http://usafeenlistedheritage.org/distinguished/decorated/criteria/?id=5 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
Another security measure is thought to have minimized damage; along the security fence were [[Jersey barrier]]s, concrete barriers commonly used along roadways. These deflected the blast energy upward, and away from the lower floors of the building, perhaps even preventing a total collapse of the structure.
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====Intelligence and security failures====
After the bombing of Khobar Towers, the U.S. military and intelligence community came under heavy criticism for their lack of preparation and foresight for what was considered an intelligence failure. According to the ''New York Times'', "significant shortcomings in planning, intelligence, and basic security left American forces in Saudi Arabia vulnerable."<ref name=nyt1>[https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/07/world/fatal-lapses-special-report-us-missteps-delay-opened-door-saudi-blast.html How U.S. Missteps and Delay Opened Door to Saudi Blast] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180815160542/https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/07/world/fatal-lapses-special-report-us-missteps-delay-opened-door-saudi-blast.html |date=15 August 2018 }} (7 July 1996). ''New York Times''</ref>
Numerous warnings had been made available to the intelligence community and military command, and up to "ten incidents [were] reported suggesting that the Khobar Towers are under surveillance" from April to June 1996.<ref>{{cite news|title=Many Warnings And Then the Bomb|date=6 December 1996|work=[[The New York Times]]|page=A10|id={{ProQuest|115931884}}}}</ref> These warnings came both before and after the beheadings of four Saudi nationals after their publicly confessed role in the November 1995 attacks in Riyadh. Clinton Administration officials admit that they "received a wave of threats against Americans and American installations in Saudi Arabia" in the weeks leading up to the attack, "but failed to prepare adequately for a bomb of the power that killed 19 American military personnel."<ref name=nyt2>{{cite news|author=Shenon, Phillip|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/27/world/bombing-saudi-arabia-security-officials-say-size-bomb-caught-military-surprise.html|title=Officials Say Size of Bomb Caught Military by Surprise|date=27 June 1996|work=New York Times|access-date=17 February 2017|archive-date=16 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190616062709/https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/27/world/bombing-saudi-arabia-security-officials-say-size-bomb-caught-military-surprise.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Threats were also downplayed by the Saudis when Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud characterized acts carried out by Saudi Islamic jihadists in 1995 as "boyish", and stated that the Saudi "Kingdom is not influenced by threats".<ref name=nyt2/> Senator [[Arlen Specter]] (R-PA) commented during a Senate intelligence committee meeting by saying "there was no intelligence failure ... there had been more than 100 intelligence reports on alerts of a general nature, and very specific reports" of an extant and present threat to the Khobar Towers complex.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/13/world/panels-fault-pentagon-on-fatal-saudi-bombing.html|title=Panels Fault Pentagon on Fatal Saudi Bombing|date=13 September 1996|work=New York Times|access-date=17 February 2017|archive-date=17 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180817022809/https://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/13/world/panels-fault-pentagon-on-fatal-saudi-bombing.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
The CIA was blamed for misjudging the bomb-making capabilities of Saudi militants, arbitrarily deciding that no bomb could exceed the size of that used in the November 1995 bombings in Riyadh (200 lbs). According to official U.S. government estimates, the Khobar bomb weighed in at approximately 5,000 pounds.<ref name=nyt1/> American commanders were also blamed, as they had not taken every precaution advised by the Pentagon; specifically, because "the project was deemed too costly",<ref name=nyt1/> they had failed to implement a recommendation to coat Khobar's windows with plastic to prevent flying glass.
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=== Operational relocation ===
As a result of the terrorist attack, U.S. and coalition military operations at Khobar and Dhahran were subsequently relocated to [[Prince Sultan Air Base]], a remote and highly secure [[Royal Saudi Air Force]] installation near [[Al-Kharj]] in central Saudi Arabia, approximately 70 miles from Riyadh. American, British, and French military operations would continue at Prince Sultan until late-2003, when French forces withdrew and American and British operations shifted to [[Al Udeid Air Base]] in [[Qatar]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.af.mil/|title=The Official Home Page of the U.S. Air Force|access-date=21 July 2016|archive-date=18 May 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130518003548/http://www.af.mil/|url-status=live}}{{nonspecific|date=September 2010}}</ref>
==Culpability==
===Initial blame===
The bombing of Khobar Towers, according to the Saudi government, was carried out by "Saudi Islamic militants, including many veterans of the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Afghan War]]."<ref name=nyt3>{{cite news|author=Ibrahim, Youssef M.|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/15/world/saudi-rebels-are-main-suspects-in-june-bombing-of-a-us-base.html|title=Saudi Rebels Are Main Suspects In June Bombing of a U.S. Base|date=15 August 1996|work=New York Times|access-date=17 February 2017|archive-date=12 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200112060744/https://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/15/world/saudi-rebels-are-main-suspects-in-june-bombing-of-a-us-base.html|url-status=live}}</ref> One U.S. official claimed that "it now seems it was not an isolated case. There is an organization of violent opponents whose members are loosely connected, organized in semi-independent cells like other violent fundamentalist movements in the Arab World."<ref name=nyt3/>
===Indictment===
In April 1997, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. [[John Shalikashvili]], said that the Pentagon did not have sufficient evidence about the bombers to consider retaliation against foreign countries that may have played a role.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/05/world/foreign-role-in-96-saudi-bombing-unproven-us-says.html|title=Foreign Role in '96 Saudi Bombing Unproven, U.S. Says|date=5 April 1997|work=The New York Times|access-date=21 July 2016|archive-date=14 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180814075636/https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/05/world/foreign-role-in-96-saudi-bombing-unproven-us-says.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
In June 2001, an indictment was issued in [[United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia]] in [[Alexandria, Virginia]] charging the following people with murder, [[conspiracy (crime)|conspiracy]], and other charges related to the bombing:<ref>{{cite web | url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB318/doc05.pdf | title=CRIMINAL NO: 01-228-A | publisher=UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | access-date=27 August 2015 | archive-date=19 July 2017 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170719123557/http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB318/doc05.pdf | url-status=live }}</ref>
* [[Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Mughassil]]
* [[Hani al-Sayegh]] who had been previously in U.S. custody but deported to Saudi Arabia, when charges against him were dropped due to a lack of evidence.
* [[Ali Saed Bin Ali El-Hoorie|Ali al-Houri]]
* [[Ibrahim Salih Mohammed Al-Yacoub|Ibrahim al-Yaqoub]]
* [[Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed Al-Nasser|Abdel Karim al-Nasser]]
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* John Doe (described as a Lebanese)
In July 2001, Saudi Arabia said that eleven of the people indicted in the US were in custody in Saudi prisons, and were to be tried in Saudi court, as the country refused to extradite any of them to the United States to stand trial.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/02/world/saudis-say-they-not-us-will-try-11-in-96-bombing.html | title=Saudis Say They, Not U.S., Will Try 11 in '96 Bombing | newspaper=The New York Times | date=2 July 2011 | access-date=26 August 2015 | archive-date=16 June 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190616062712/https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/02/world/saudis-say-they-not-us-will-try-11-in-96-bombing.html | url-status=live }}</ref> The government has not since made public the outcome of the trial or the whereabouts of the prisoners.<ref name="nytimes 2015"/>
In August 2015, Arab newspaper ''[[Asharq Al-Awsat]]'' reported that Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Mughassil, a leader of the gulf shia group [[Hezbollah Al-Hejaz]] found to be responsible for the bombing, had been arrested in Beirut and transferred to Saudi Arabian custody; an anonymous American intelligence officer told ''The New York Times'' that the Saudi government had not confirmed the arrest, but U.S. intelligence believed the report was accurate.<ref name="nytimes 2015">{{cite news | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/world/middleeast/saudia-arabia-arrests-suspect-khobar-towers-bombing.html | title=Saudi Arabia Said to Arrest Suspect in 1996 Khobar Towers Bombing | newspaper=The New York Times | date=26 August 2015 | access-date=27 August 2015 | archive-date=8 January 2020 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200108223405/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/world/middleeast/saudia-arabia-arrests-suspect-khobar-towers-bombing.html | url-status=live }}</ref>
===Attribution to al-Qaeda===
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{{Blockquote|In May 1996 Bin Laden and his entourage moved from Sudan to Afghanistan. As if to make the point that they might have been chased out of Sudan by Saudi Arabia and the US they were not leaving with their tails between their legs, al Qaeda struck again: The June bombing of Khobar Towers. The Saudi authorities were at pains to implicate Shi'i militants backed by Iran in this attack, since the embarrassing truth that they had their very own homegrown militancy problem was inadmissible; they did not want to give the impression that there was domestic opposition to the deployment of US troops on Saudi soil.}}
In 2004, the [[9/11 Commission]] noted that [[Osama bin Laden]] was seen being congratulated on the day of the Khobar attack, and stated there were reports in the months preceding the attack that Bin Laden was seeking to facilitate a shipment of explosives to Saudi Arabia. According to the United States, classified evidence suggests that the government of [[Iran]] was the key sponsor of the incident, and several high-ranking members of [[Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran|their military]] may have been involved.<ref>{{cite news|title=Terrorism and Iran: Washington's Policy Performs a Gingerly Balancing Act|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/23/world/terrorism-and-iran-washington-s-policy-performs-a-gingerly-balancing-act.html|author=Risen, James, Jane Perlez|newspaper=The New York Times|date=23 June 2001|access-date=17 February 2017|archive-date=9 February 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190209050552/https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/23/world/terrorism-and-iran-washington-s-policy-performs-a-gingerly-balancing-act.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>An Op-Ed piece by [[Louis Freeh]] in the 25 June 2006 ''[[Wall Street Journal]]'' alleges Iranian involvement.</ref> A U.S. federal court speculated that the Khobar Towers bombing was authorized by [[Ali Khamenei]], the [[Supreme Leader of Iran]].<ref>[http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/opinions/2006/2000CV2329-12036-12222006a.pdf Memorandum Opinion] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070614085928/http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/opinions/2006/2000CV2329-12036-12222006a.pdf |date=14 June 2007 }}, United States District Court, '' 22 December 2006''</ref>
[[William J. Perry|William Perry]], who was the [[United States Secretary of Defense]] at the time that this bombing happened, said in an interview in June 2007 that "he now believes al-Qaida rather than Iran was behind a 1996 truck bombing at an American military base."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2007/06/06/Perry-US-eyed-Iran-attack-after-bombing/UPI-70451181161509/ |title=Perry: U.S. eyed Iran attack after bombing |publisher=UPI.com |date=6 June 2007 |access-date=3 September 2010 |archive-date=4 August 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160804130201/http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2007/06/06/Perry-US-eyed-Iran-attack-after-bombing/UPI-70451181161509/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
On 22 December 2006, high court judge Royce C. Lamberth ruled that Iran and Hezbollah were directly and personally responsible for the attack, stating that the leading experts on Hezbollah presented "overwhelming" evidence of the group's involvement and that six captured Hezbollah agents detailed the role of [[Iranian intelligence]] and military officials in providing money, explosives, arms and weapons, plans, and maps.<ref name="Held Liable">{{cite news|last=Leonnig|first=Carol D.|url=
=== Implications for U.S.
Within days of the blast, counterterrorism officials on
By the time Saudi Arabia and the FBI concluded their investigations, Iranians had elected a new president, [[Mohammad Khatami]], in May 1997. Khatami surprised the international community by urging a
The prospect of an opening with Tehran, which intrigued many U.S. allies and even domestic critics of administration policy, drove
In June 1999, Clinton authorized what he later called a
The attempt backfired. Although Khatami was reportedly happy with the American initiative, especially because it was accompanied by an oral message of strong personal support from Clinton delivered by the Omani envoy, the Iranian
Beyond the Clinton
==See also==
*[[Riyadh compound bombings]]
* [[List of Islamist terrorist attacks]]
* [[1983 Beirut barracks bombings]]
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* [[Terrorism in Saudi Arabia]]
* [[Iran and state-sponsored terrorism]]
* [[Riyadh compound bombings]] (
* ''[[The Kingdom (2007 film)|The Kingdom]]''
* ''[[The Siege]]''
==References==
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[[Category:1996 in Saudi Arabia]]▼
[[Category:1996 in Iran]]▼
[[Category:1996 in the United States]]▼
[[Category:1996 crimes in Saudi Arabia]]
[[Category:Terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia in 1996]]
[[Category:Islamic terrorist incidents in 1996]]
▲[[Category:1996 in the United States]]
[[Category:Mass murder in 1996]]
[[Category:Car and truck bombings in
[[Category:Attacks on military installations in
[[Category:Building bombings in
[[Category:Car and truck bombings in Asia]]
[[Category:20th-century history of the United States Air Force]]
[[Category:Khobar]]
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[[Category:Iran–United States relations]]
[[Category:Iran–Saudi Arabia relations]]
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[[Category:1996 building bombings]]
[[Category:20th-century mass murder in Asia]]
[[Category:Islamic terrorism in Saudi Arabia]]
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