Editing Rationality

{{Short description|Quality of being agreeable to reason}}
{{redirect|Rational|the mathematical property of some numbers|Rational number|other uses|text=Not to be confused with [[Rationale (disambiguation)|Rationale]]}}{{For|the use and formalization of rationality in [[economics]] and [[mathematics]]|decision theory}}{{Distinguish|Rationalism}}
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'''Rationality''' is the [[Quality (philosophy)|quality]] of being guided by or based on [[reason]]. In this regard, a person [[Action (philosophy)|acts]] rationally if they have a good reason for what they do, or a [[belief]] is rational if it is based on strong [[evidence]]. This quality can apply to an ability, as in a [[rational animal]], to a psychological [[process]], like [[Logical reasoning|reasoning]], to [[mental state]]s, such as beliefs and [[intention]]s, or to [[person]]s who possess these other forms of rationality. A thing that lacks rationality is either ''arational'', if it is outside the domain of rational evaluation, or ''[[irrational]]'', if it belongs to this domain but does not fulfill its standards.

There are many discussions about the [[Essence|essential features]] shared by all forms of rationality. According to reason-responsiveness accounts, to be rational is to be responsive to reasons. For example, dark clouds are a reason for taking an [[umbrella]], which is why it is rational for an agent to do so in response. An important rival to this approach are coherence-based accounts, which define rationality as internal coherence among the agent's mental states. Many rules of coherence have been suggested in this regard, for example, that one should not hold [[contradictory]] beliefs or that one should intend to do something if one believes that one should do it. Goal-based accounts characterize rationality in relation to goals, such as acquiring [[truth]] in the case of theoretical rationality. [[Internalism and externalism|Internalists]] believe that rationality depends only on the person's [[mind]]. Externalists contend that external factors may also be relevant. Debates about the [[normativity]] of rationality concern the question of whether one should always be rational. A further discussion is whether rationality requires that all beliefs be reviewed from scratch rather than trusting pre-existing beliefs.

Various types of rationality are discussed in the academic literature. The most influential distinction is between theoretical and practical rationality. Theoretical rationality concerns the rationality of beliefs. Rational beliefs are based on evidence that supports them. Practical rationality pertains primarily to actions. This includes certain mental states and events preceding actions, like intentions and [[Choice|decisions]]. In some cases, the two can conflict, as when practical rationality requires that one adopts an irrational belief. Another distinction is between ideal rationality, which demands that rational agents obey all the laws and implications of logic, and [[bounded rationality]], which takes into account that this is not always possible since the computational power of the human mind is too limited. Most academic discussions focus on the rationality of individuals. This contrasts with social or collective rationality, which pertains to collectives and their group beliefs and decisions.

Rationality is important for solving all kinds of problems in order to efficiently reach one's goal. It is relevant to and discussed in many disciplines. In [[ethics]], one question is whether one can be rational without being [[Morality|moral]] at the same time. [[Psychology]] is interested in how psychological processes implement rationality. This also includes the study of failures to do so, as in the case of [[cognitive bias]]es. [[Cognitive sciences|Cognitive]] and [[behavioral sciences]] usually assume that people are rational enough to predict how they think and act. [[Logic]] studies the laws of correct [[argument]]s. These laws are highly relevant to the rationality of beliefs. A very influential conception of practical rationality is given in [[decision theory]], which states that a decision is rational if the chosen option has the highest [[expected utility]]. Other relevant fields include [[game theory]], [[Bayesian epistemology|Bayesianism]], [[economics]], and [[artificial intelligence]].

== Definition and semantic field ==
In its most common sense, rationality is the quality of being guided by reasons or being reasonable.<ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Broome2021"/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rational|title=Definition of rational |website=Merriam-Webster  |access-date=24 September 2017|archive-date=17 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170817055716/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rational|url-status=live}}</ref> For example, a person who acts rationally has good reasons for what they do. This usually implies that they reflected on the possible consequences of their action and the goal it is supposed to realize. In the case of [[belief]]s, it is rational to believe something if the agent has good [[evidence]] for it and it is coherent with the agent's other beliefs.<ref name="Audi2004"/><ref name="Lord2018-1"/> While [[Action (philosophy)|actions]] and beliefs are the most paradigmatic forms of rationality, the term is used both in ordinary language and in many academic disciplines to describe a wide variety of things, such as [[person]]s, [[desire]]s, [[intention]]s, [[Choice|decisions]], policies, and institutions.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Mele2004a"/> Because of this variety in different contexts, it has proven difficult to give a unified definition covering all these fields and usages. In this regard, different fields often focus their investigation on one specific conception, type, or aspect of rationality without trying to cover it in its most general sense.<ref name="Rysiew2012"/>

These different forms of rationality are sometimes divided into [[abilities]], [[process]]es, [[mental state]]s, and persons.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Rysiew2012"/><ref name="Mittelstraß2005"/> For example, when it is claimed that humans are [[rational animal]]s, this usually refers to the ability to [[think]] and act in reasonable ways. It does not imply that all humans are rational all the time: this ability is exercised in some cases but not in others.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Rysiew2012"/><ref name="Mittelstraß2005"/> On the other hand, the term can also refer to the process of reasoning that results from exercising this ability. Often many additional activities of the higher cognitive faculties are included as well, such as acquiring concepts, [[judging]], [[Deliberation|deliberating]], planning, and deciding as well as the formation of desires and intentions. These processes usually affect some kind of change in the thinker's mental states. In this regard, one can also talk of the rationality of mental states, like beliefs and intentions.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/> A person who possesses these forms of rationality to a sufficiently high degree may themselves be called ''rational''.<ref name="Moser2006"/> In some cases, also non-mental results of rational processes may qualify as rational. For example, the arrangement of products in a supermarket can be rational if it is based on a rational plan.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Broome2021"/>

The term "rational" has two opposites: ''[[irrational]]'' and ''arational''. Arational things are outside the domain of rational evaluation, like digestive processes or the weather. Things within the domain of rationality are either rational or irrational depending on whether they fulfill the standards of rationality.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Nolfi |first1=Kate |title=Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why? |journal=Philosophical Issues |date=2015 |volume=25 |issue=1 |pages=41–63 |doi=10.1111/phis.12051 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/NOLWMS |access-date=2022-08-14 |archive-date=2021-06-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210605114441/https://philpapers.org/rec/NOLWMS |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Mele2004a"/> For example, beliefs, actions, or general policies are rational if there is a good reason for them and irrational otherwise. It is not clear in all cases what belongs to the domain of rational assessment. For example, there are disagreements about whether desires and [[emotion]]s can be evaluated as rational and irrational rather than arational.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/> The term "irrational" is sometimes used in a wide sense to include cases of arationality.<ref>{{cite web |title=The American Heritage Dictionary entry: irrational |url=https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=irrational&submit.x=58&submit.y=14 |website=www.ahdictionary.com |access-date=10 August 2022 |archive-date=12 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230812182349/https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=irrational&submit.x=58&submit.y=14 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The meaning of the terms "rational" and "irrational" in academic discourse often differs from how they are used in everyday language. Examples of behaviors considered irrational in ordinary discourse are giving into [[temptation]]s, going out late even though one has to get up early in the morning, smoking despite being aware of the health risks, or believing in [[astrology]].<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Grim |first1=Patrick |title=Philosophy of Science and the Occult: Second Edition |date=17 July 1990 |publisher=SUNY Press |isbn=978-1-4384-0498-1 |page=28 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5VewAkDw8h0C&pg=PA28 |language=en |chapter=On Dismissing Astrology and Other Irrationalities |access-date=3 September 2022 |archive-date=30 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142143/https://books.google.com/books?id=5VewAkDw8h0C&pg=PA28#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref> In the academic discourse, on the other hand, rationality is usually identified with being guided by reasons or following norms of internal coherence. Some of the earlier examples may qualify as rational in the academic sense depending on the circumstances. Examples of irrationality in this sense include [[cognitive bias]]es and violating the laws of [[probability theory]] when assessing the likelihood of future events.<ref name="Harman2013"/> This article focuses mainly on irrationality in the academic sense.

The terms "rationality", "[[reason]]", and "reasoning" are frequently used as synonyms. But in technical contexts, their meanings are often distinguished.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Moser2006"/> Reason is usually understood as the faculty responsible for the process of reasoning.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref>Mosterín, Jesús (2008). ''Lo mejor posible: Racionalidad y acción humana''. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2008. 318 pp. {{ISBN|978-84-206-8206-8}}.</ref> This process aims at improving mental states. Reasoning tries to ensure that the norms of rationality obtain. It differs from rationality nonetheless since other psychological processes besides reasoning may have the same effect.<ref name="Mele2004a"/> Rationality derives etymologically from the Latin term ''{{lang|la|rationalitas}}''.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

==Disputes about the concept of rationality==
There are many disputes about the essential characteristics of rationality. It is often understood in [[Relation (philosophy)|relational]] terms: something, like a belief or an intention, is rational because of how it is related to something else.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Moser2006"/> But there are disagreements as to what it has to be related to and in what way. For reason-based accounts, the relation to a reason that [[Justification (epistemology)|justifies]] or explains the rational state is central. For coherence-based accounts, the relation of coherence between mental states matters. There is a lively discussion in the contemporary literature on whether reason-based accounts or coherence-based accounts are superior.<ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Lord2018-1"/> Some theorists also try to understand rationality in relation to the goals it tries to realize.<ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Pinker2022"/>

Other disputes in this field concern whether rationality depends only on the agent's [[mind]] or also on external factors, whether rationality requires a review of all one's beliefs from scratch, and whether we should always be rational.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Harman2013"/>

=== Based on reason-responsiveness ===
A common idea of many theories of rationality is that it can be defined in terms of reasons. On this view, to be rational means to respond correctly to reasons.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/> For example, the fact that a food is healthy is a reason to eat it. So this reason makes it rational for the agent to eat the food.<ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/> An important aspect of this interpretation is that it is not sufficient to merely act accidentally in accordance with reasons. Instead, ''responding'' to reasons implies that one acts [[Intention|intentionally]] because of these reasons.<ref name="Broome2021"/>

Some theorists understand reasons as external facts. This view has been criticized based on the claim that, in order to respond to reasons, people have to be aware of them, i.e. they have some form of epistemic access.<ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Lord2018-1"/> But lacking this access is not automatically irrational. In one example by [[John Broome (philosopher)|John Broome]], the agent eats a fish contaminated with [[salmonella]], which is a strong reason against eating the fish. But since the agent could not have known this fact, eating the fish is rational for them.<ref name="Broome2007"/><ref name="Kiesewetter2017"/> Because of such problems, many theorists have opted for an internalist version of this account. This means that the agent does not need to respond to reasons in general, but only to reasons they have or possess.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Lord2018-1"/><ref name="Lord2018-3"/> The success of such approaches depends a lot on what it means to have a reason and there are various disagreements on this issue.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/> A common approach is to hold that this access is given through the possession of [[evidence]] in the form of cognitive [[mental state]]s, like [[perception]]s and [[knowledge]]. A similar version states that "rationality consists in responding correctly to beliefs about reasons". So it is rational to bring an umbrella if the agent has strong evidence that it is going to rain. But without this evidence, it would be rational to leave the umbrella at home, even if, unbeknownst to the agent, it is going to rain.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Lord2018-3"/> These versions avoid the previous objection since rationality no longer requires the agent to respond to external factors of which they could not have been aware.<ref name="Broome2021"/>

A problem faced by all forms of reason-responsiveness theories is that there are usually many reasons relevant and some of them may conflict with each other. So while salmonella contamination is a reason against eating the fish, its good taste and the desire not to offend the host are reasons in favor of eating it. This problem is usually approached by weighing all the different reasons. This way, one does not respond directly to each reason individually but instead to their [[weighted sum]]. Cases of conflict are thus solved since one side usually outweighs the other. So despite the reasons cited in favor of eating the fish, the balance of reasons stands against it, since avoiding a salmonella infection is a much weightier reason than the other reasons cited.<ref name="Broome2007"/><ref name="Kiesewetter2017"/> This can be expressed by stating that rational agents pick the option favored by the balance of reasons.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="McClennen2004"/>

However, other objections to the reason-responsiveness account are not so easily solved. They often focus on cases where reasons require the agent to be irrational, leading to a rational dilemma. For example, if terrorists threaten to blow up a city unless the agent forms an irrational belief, this is a very weighty reason to do all in one's power to violate the norms of rationality.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Moriarty2020"/>

=== Based on rules of coherence ===
An influential rival to the reason-responsiveness account understands rationality as internal coherence.<ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Lord2018-1"/> On this view, a person is rational to the extent that their mental states and actions are coherent with each other.<ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Lord2018-1"/> Diverse versions of this approach exist that differ in how they understand coherence and what rules of coherence they propose.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="McClennen2004"/><ref name="Broome2021"/> A general distinction in this regard is between negative and positive coherence.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Thagard1998"/> Negative coherence is an uncontroversial aspect of most such theories: it requires the absence of [[contradiction]]s and [[Consistency|inconsistencies]]. This means that the agent's mental states do not clash with each other. In some cases, inconsistencies are rather obvious, as when a person believes that it will rain tomorrow and that it will not rain tomorrow. In complex cases, inconsistencies may be difficult to detect, for example, when a person believes in the axioms of [[Euclidean geometry]] and is nonetheless convinced that it is possible to [[Squaring the circle|square the circle]]. Positive coherence refers to the support that different mental states provide for each other. For example, there is positive coherence between the belief that there are eight planets in the solar system and the belief that there are less than ten planets in the solar system: the earlier belief implies the latter belief. Other types of support through positive coherence include explanatory and [[Causality|causal]] connections.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Thagard1998"/>

Coherence-based accounts are also referred to as rule-based accounts since the different aspects of coherence are often expressed in precise rules. In this regard, to be rational means to follow the rules of rationality in thought and action. According to the enkratic rule, for example, rational agents are required to intend what they believe they ought to do. This requires coherence between beliefs and intentions. The norm of persistence states that agents should retain their intentions over time. This way, earlier mental states cohere with later ones.<ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Lord2018-1"/> It is also possible to distinguish different types of rationality, such as theoretical or practical rationality, based on the different sets of rules they require.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="McClennen2004"/>

One problem with such coherence-based accounts of rationality is that the norms can enter into conflict with each other, so-called rational [[dilemmas]]. For example, if the agent has a pre-existing intention that turns out to conflict with their beliefs, then the enkratic norm requires them to change it, which is disallowed by the norm of persistence. This suggests that, in cases of rational dilemmas, it is impossible to be rational, no matter which norm is privileged.<ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Mintoff1997"/><ref name="Priest2002"/> Some defenders of coherence theories of rationality have argued that, when formulated correctly, the norms of rationality cannot enter into conflict with each other. That means that rational dilemmas are impossible. This is sometimes tied to additional non-trivial assumptions, such that [[ethical dilemmas]] also do not exist. A different response is to bite the bullet and allow that rational dilemmas exist. This has the consequence that, in such cases, rationality is not possible for the agent and theories of rationality cannot offer guidance to them.<ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Mintoff1997"/><ref name="Priest2002"/> These problems are avoided by reason-responsiveness accounts of rationality since they "allow for rationality despite conflicting reasons but [coherence-based accounts] do not allow for rationality despite conflicting requirements". Some theorists suggest a weaker criterion of coherence to avoid cases of necessary irrationality: rationality requires not to obey all norms of coherence but to obey as many norms as possible. So in rational dilemmas, agents can still be rational if they violate the minimal number of rational requirements.<ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/>

Another criticism rests on the claim that coherence-based accounts are either redundant or false. On this view, either the rules recommend the same option as the balance of reasons or a different option. If they recommend the same option, they are redundant. If they recommend a different option, they are false since, according to its critics, there is no special value in sticking to rules against the balance of reasons.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="McClennen2004"/>

=== Based on goals ===
A different approach characterizes rationality in relation to the goals it aims to achieve.<ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Pinker2022"/> In this regard, theoretical rationality aims at epistemic goals, like acquiring [[truth]] and avoiding falsehood. Practical rationality, on the other hand, aims at non-epistemic goals, like [[moral]], prudential, political, economic, or [[aesthetic]] goals. This is usually understood in the sense that rationality follows these goals but does not set them. So rationality may be understood as a "[[minister without portfolio]]" since it serves goals external to itself.<ref name="Moser2006"/> This issue has been the source of an important historical discussion between [[David Hume]] and [[Immanuel Kant]]. The slogan of Hume's position is that "reason is the slave of the passions". This is often understood as the claim that rationality concerns only how to reach a goal but not whether the goal should be pursued at all. So people with perverse or weird goals may still be perfectly rational. This position is opposed by Kant, who argues that rationality requires having the right goals and [[motivation|motives]].<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Smith |first1=Michael |editor-first1=Alfred R |editor-first2=Piers |editor-last1=Mele |editor-last2=Rawling |title=The Oxford Handbook of Rationality |date=2004 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-514539-7 |url=https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195145399.001.0001/acprof-9780195145397-chapter-5 |chapter=HUMEAN RATIONALITY |doi=10.1093/0195145399.001.0001 |access-date=2022-08-14 |archive-date=2023-12-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142147/https://academic.oup.com/oxford-scholarship-online |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=O'Neill |first1=Onora |editor-first1=Alfred R |editor-first2=Piers |editor-last1=Mele |editor-last2=Rawling |title=The Oxford Handbook of Rationality |date=2004 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-514539-7 |url=https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195145399.001.0001/acprof-9780195145397-chapter-6 |chapter=KANT: Rationality as Practical Reason |doi=10.1093/0195145399.001.0001 |access-date=2022-08-14 |archive-date=2023-12-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142134/https://academic.oup.com/oxford-scholarship-online |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Kolb2008"/><ref name="Moser2006"/>

According to [[William Frankena]] there are four conceptions of rationality based on the goals it tries to achieve. They correspond to [[egoism]], [[utilitarianism]], [[Perfectionism (philosophy)|perfectionism]], and [[Ethical intuitionism|intuitionism]].<ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Frankena1983"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Gonzalez |first1=Wenceslao J. |title=New Perspectives on Technology, Values, and Ethics: Theoretical and Practical |date=8 October 2015 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-319-21870-0 |page=64 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1gO0CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA64 |language=en |access-date=14 August 2022 |archive-date=30 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142157/https://books.google.com/books?id=1gO0CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA64#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref> According to the egoist perspective, rationality implies looking out for one's own [[happiness]]. This contrasts with the utilitarian point of view, which states that rationality entails trying to contribute to everyone's [[well-being]] or to the greatest general good. For perfectionism, a certain ideal of perfection, either moral or non-moral, is the goal of rationality. According to the intuitionist perspective, something is rational "if and only if [it] conforms to self-evident truths, intuited by reason".<ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Frankena1983"/> These different perspectives diverge a lot concerning the behavior they prescribe. One problem for all of them is that they ignore the role of the evidence or information possessed by the agent. In this regard, it matters for rationality not just whether the agent acts efficiently towards a certain goal but also what information they have and how their actions appear reasonable from this perspective. [[Richard Brandt]] responds to this idea by proposing a conception of rationality based on relevant information: "Rationality is a matter of what would survive scrutiny by all relevant information."<ref name="Moser2006"/> This implies that the subject repeatedly reflects on all the relevant facts, including formal facts like the laws of logic.<ref name="Moser2006"/>

=== Internalism and externalism ===
An important contemporary discussion in the field of rationality is between [[Internalism and externalism|internalists and externalists]].<ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Langsam2008"/><ref name="Finlay2008"/> Both sides agree that rationality demands and depends in some sense on reasons. They disagree on what reasons are relevant or how to conceive those reasons. Internalists understand reasons as mental states, for example, as perceptions, beliefs, or desires. On this view, an action may be rational because it is in tune with the agent's beliefs and realizes their desires. Externalists, on the other hand, see reasons as external factors about what is good or right. They state that whether an action is rational also depends on its actual consequences.<ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Langsam2008"/><ref name="Finlay2008"/> The difference between the two positions is that internalists affirm and externalists reject the claim that rationality supervenes on the mind. This claim means that it only depends on the person's mind whether they are rational and not on external factors. So for internalism, two persons with the same mental states would both have the same degree of rationality independent of how different their external situation is. Because of this limitation, rationality can diverge from actuality. So if the agent has a lot of misleading evidence, it may be rational for them to turn left even though the actually correct path goes right.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Moser2006"/>

[[Bernard Williams]] has criticized externalist conceptions of rationality based on the claim that rationality should help explain what motivates the agent to act. This is easy for internalism but difficult for externalism since external reasons can be independent of the agent's motivation.<ref name="Moser2006"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kriegel |first1=Uri |title=Normativity and Rationality: Bernard Williams on Reasons for Action |journal=Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly / עיון: רבעון פילוסופי |date=1999 |volume=48 |pages=281–292 |jstor=23352588 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23352588 |issn=0021-3306 |access-date=2022-08-18 |archive-date=2022-08-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818102627/https://www.jstor.org/stable/23352588 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Chappell |first1=Sophie-Grace |last2=Smyth |first2=Nicholas |title=Bernard Williams: 5. Internal and external reasons |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/williams-bernard/#InteExteReas |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 August 2022 |date=2018 |archive-date=10 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220710193743/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/williams-bernard/#InteExteReas |url-status=live }}</ref> Externalists have responded to this objection by distinguishing between [[Motivation#Motivational reasons and rationality|motivational and normative reasons]].<ref name="Moser2006"/> Motivational reasons explain why someone acts the way they do while normative reasons explain why someone ought to act in a certain way. Ideally, the two overlap, but they can come apart. For example, liking chocolate cake is a motivational reason for eating it while having [[high blood pressure]] is a normative reason for not eating it.<ref>{{cite web |vauthors=Alvarez M |title=Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=13 May 2021 |date=2017 |archive-date=26 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210726142611/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |vauthors=Miller C |title=Motivation in Agents |journal=Noûs |date=2008 |volume=42 |issue=2 |pages=222–266 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00679.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MILMIA-2 |access-date=2022-08-18 |archive-date=2021-05-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210513123328/https://philpapers.org/rec/MILMIA-2 |url-status=live }}</ref> The problem of rationality is primarily concerned with normative reasons. This is especially true for various contemporary philosophers who hold that rationality can be reduced to normative reasons.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Broome2007"/><ref name="Kiesewetter2017"/> The distinction between motivational and normative reasons is usually accepted, but many theorists have raised doubts that rationality can be identified with normativity. On this view, rationality may sometimes recommend suboptimal actions, for example, because the agent lacks important information or has false information. In this regard, discussions between internalism and externalism overlap with discussions of the normativity of rationality.<ref name="Moser2006"/>

==== Relativity ====
An important implication of internalist conceptions is that rationality is relative to the person's perspective or mental states. Whether a belief or an action is rational usually depends on which mental states the person has. So carrying an umbrella for the walk to the supermarket is rational for a person believing that it will rain but irrational for another person who lacks this belief.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Precis"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Carter |first1=J. Adam |last2=McKenna |first2=Robin |title=Routledge Handbook to Relativism |date=2019 |publisher=London, U.K.: Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CARRAE-9 |chapter=Relativism and Externalism |access-date=2022-08-18 |archive-date=2022-08-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818103039/https://philpapers.org/rec/CARRAE-9 |url-status=live }}</ref> According to [[Robert Audi]], this can be explained in terms of [[experience]]: what is rational depends on the agent's experience. Since different people make different experiences, there are differences in what is rational for them.<ref name="Precis"/>

=== Normativity ===
Rationality is [[Normativity|normative]] in the sense that it sets up certain rules or standards of correctness: to be rational is to comply with certain requirements.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Pinker2022"/> For example, rationality requires that the agent does not have [[contradictory]] beliefs. Many discussions on this issue concern the question of what exactly these standards are. Some theorists characterize the normativity of rationality in the deontological terms of [[obligation]]s and [[Permission (philosophy)|permissions]]. Others understand them from an evaluative perspective as good or valuable. A further approach is to talk of rationality based on what is praise- and blameworthy.<ref name="Moser2006"/> It is important to distinguish the norms of rationality from other types of norms. For example, some forms of [[fashion]] prescribe that men do not wear [[Bell-bottoms|bell-bottom trousers]]. Understood in the strongest sense, a norm prescribes what an agent ought to do or what they have most reason to do. The norms of fashion are not norms in this strong sense: that it is unfashionable does not mean that men ought not to wear bell-bottom trousers.<ref name="Broome2021"/> 

Most discussions of the normativity of rationality are interested in the strong sense, i.e. whether agents ought always to be rational.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Kiesewetter2017"/><ref name="Broome2007"/><ref name="Salas"/> This is sometimes termed a substantive account of rationality in contrast to structural accounts.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/> One important argument in favor of the normativity of rationality is based on considerations of praise- and blameworthiness. It states that we usually hold each other responsible for being rational and criticize each other when we fail to do so. This practice indicates that irrationality is some form of fault on the side of the subject that should not be the case.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kiesewetter |first1=Benjamin |title=Précis Zu The Normativity of Rationality |journal=Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung |date=2017 |volume=71 |issue=4 |pages=560–4 |doi=10.3196/004433017822228923 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KIEPZT |access-date=2021-06-07 |archive-date=2021-06-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210607055013/https://philpapers.org/rec/KIEPZT |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Salas"/> A strong counterexample to this position is due to [[John Broome (philosopher)|John Broome]], who considers the case of a fish an agent wants to eat. It contains salmonella, which is a decisive reason why the agent ought not to eat it. But the agent is unaware of this fact, which is why it is rational for them to eat the fish.<ref name="Broome2007"/><ref name="Kiesewetter2017"/> So this would be a case where normativity and rationality come apart. This example can be generalized in the sense that rationality only depends on the reasons accessible to the agent or how things appear to them. What one ought to do, on the other hand, is determined by objectively existing reasons.<ref name="Littlejohn "/><ref name="Salas"/> In the ideal case, rationality and normativity may coincide but they come apart either if the agent lacks access to a reason or if he has a mistaken belief about the presence of a reason. These considerations are summed up in the statement that rationality [[supervene]]s only on the agent's [[mind]] but normativity does not.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Broome |first1=John |title=Rationality vs normativity |journal=Australasian Philosophical Review |date=nd}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kiesewetter |first1=Benjamin |title=Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness |journal=Australasian Philosophical Review |year=2020 |volume=4 |issue=4 |pages=332–342 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KIERAR-2 |doi=10.1080/24740500.2021.1964239 |s2cid=243349119 |doi-access=free |access-date=2021-06-07 |archive-date=2021-06-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210605114434/https://philpapers.org/rec/KIERAR-2 |url-status=live }}</ref>

But there are also thought experiments in favor of the normativity of rationality. One, due to [[Frank Cameron Jackson|Frank Jackson]], involves a doctor who receives a patient with a mild condition and has to prescribe one out of three drugs: drug A resulting in a partial cure, drug B resulting in a complete cure, or drug C resulting in the patient's death.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |title=Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection |journal=Ethics |date=1991 |volume=101 |issue=3 |pages=461–482 |doi=10.1086/293312 |s2cid=170544860 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/JACDCA |access-date=2021-06-07 |archive-date=2021-06-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210607055018/https://philpapers.org/rec/JACDCA |url-status=live }}</ref> The doctor's problem is that they cannot tell which of the drugs B and C results in a complete cure and which one in the patient's death. The objectively best case would be for the patient to get drug B, but it would be highly irresponsible for the doctor to prescribe it given the uncertainty about its effects. So the doctor ought to prescribe the less effective drug A, which is also the rational choice. This thought experiment indicates that rationality and normativity coincide since what is rational and what one ought to do depends on the agent's mind after all.<ref name="Littlejohn"/><ref name="Salas"/>

Some theorists have responded to these [[thought experiment]]s by distinguishing between normativity and [[Moral responsibility|responsibility]].<ref name="Salas"/> On this view, critique of irrational behavior, like the doctor prescribing drug B, involves a negative evaluation of the agent in terms of responsibility but remains silent on normative issues. On a competence-based account, which defines rationality in terms of the competence of responding to reasons, such behavior can be understood as a failure to execute one's competence. But sometimes we are lucky and we succeed in the normative dimension despite failing to perform competently, i.e. rationally, due to being irresponsible.<ref name="Salas"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Zimmerman |first1=Michael J. |title=Taking Luck Seriously |journal=Journal of Philosophy |date=2002 |volume=99 |issue=11 |pages=553–576 |doi=10.2307/3655750 |jstor=3655750 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ZIMTLS |access-date=2021-06-07 |archive-date=2021-06-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210607055016/https://philpapers.org/rec/ZIMTLS |url-status=live }}</ref> The opposite can also be the case: bad luck may result in failure despite a responsible, competent performance. This explains how rationality and normativity can come apart despite our practice of criticizing irrationality.<ref name="Salas"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sylvan |first1=Kurt L. |title=Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2020 |volume=178 |issue=10 |pages=3129–3156 |doi=10.1007/s11098-020-01573-1 |doi-broken-date=3 May 2024 |s2cid=225137550 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SYLRAT |doi-access=free |access-date=2021-06-07 |archive-date=2021-06-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210607055019/https://philpapers.org/rec/SYLRAT |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Normative and descriptive theories ====
The concept of normativity can also be used to distinguish different theories of rationality. Normative theories explore the normative nature of rationality. They are concerned with rules and ideals that govern how the [[mind]] should work. Descriptive theories, on the other hand, investigate how the mind actually works. This includes issues like under which circumstances the ideal rules are followed as well as studying the underlying psychological processes responsible for rational thought. Descriptive theories are often investigated in empirical [[psychology]] while [[philosophy]] tends to focus more on normative issues. This division also reflects how different these two types are investigated.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Sturm2021"/><ref name="Pinker2022"/><ref name="Over2004"/>

Descriptive and normative theorists usually employ different [[methodologies]] in their research. Descriptive issues are studied by [[empirical research]]. This can take the form of studies that present their participants with a cognitive problem. It is then observed how the participants solve the problem, possibly together with explanations of why they arrived at a specific solution. Normative issues, on the other hand, are usually investigated in similar ways to how the [[formal sciences]] conduct their inquiry.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Sturm2021"/> In the field of theoretical rationality, for example, it is accepted that [[deductive reasoning]] in the form of [[modus ponens]] leads to rational beliefs. This claim can be investigated using methods like [[rational intuition]] or careful deliberation toward a [[reflective equilibrium]]. These forms of investigation can arrive at conclusions about what forms of thought are rational and irrational without depending on [[empirical evidence]].<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Pust |first1=Joel |title=Intuitions |date=2014 |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/5802/chapter-abstract/148988403?redirectedFrom=fulltext |chapter=3 Empirical Evidence for Rationalism? |access-date=2022-08-18 |archive-date=2022-08-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818111248/https://academic.oup.com/book/5802/chapter-abstract/148988403?redirectedFrom=fulltext |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Daniels |first1=Norman |title=Reflective Equilibrium |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 February 2022 |date=2020 |archive-date=22 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220222215102/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

An important question in this field concerns the relation between descriptive and normative approaches to rationality.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Pinker2022"/><ref name="Over2004"/> One difficulty in this regard is that there is in many cases a huge gap between what the norms of ideal rationality prescribe and how people actually reason. Examples of normative systems of rationality are [[classical logic]], [[probability theory]], and [[decision theory]]. Actual reasoners often diverge from these standards because of [[cognitive biases]], heuristics, or other mental limitations.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

Traditionally, it was often assumed that actual human reasoning should follow the rules described in normative theories. On this view, any discrepancy is a form of irrationality that should be avoided. However, this usually ignores the human limitations of the mind. Given these limitations, various discrepancies may be necessary (and in this sense ''rational'') to get the most useful results.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Moser2006"/> For example, the ideal rational norms of decision theory demand that the agent should always choose the option with the highest expected value. However, calculating the expected value of each option may take a very long time in complex situations and may not be worth the trouble. This is reflected in the fact that actual reasoners often settle for an option that is good enough without making certain that it is really the best option available.<ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Bendor2009"/> A further difficulty in this regard is [[Hume's law]], which states that one cannot deduce what ought to be based on what is.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Cohon |first1=Rachel |title=Hume's Moral Philosophy: 5. Is and ought |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#io |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=21 May 2021 |date=2018 |archive-date=10 January 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180110170335/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#io |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bloomfield |first1=P. |title=Two Dogmas of Metaethics |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2007 |volume=132 |issue=3 |pages=439–466 |doi=10.1007/s11098-005-2509-9 |doi-broken-date=3 May 2024 |s2cid=170556071 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BLOTDO |access-date=2022-08-18 |archive-date=2022-08-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814062403/https://philpapers.org/rec/BLOTDO |url-status=live }}</ref> So just because a certain heuristic or cognitive bias is present in a specific case, it should not be inferred that it should be present. One approach to these problems is to hold that descriptive and normative theories talk about different types of rationality. This way, there is no contradiction between the two and both can be correct in their own field. Similar problems are discussed in so-called [[naturalized epistemology]].<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Rysiew |first1=Patrick |title=Naturalism in Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-naturalized/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 August 2022 |date=2021 |archive-date=17 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220817114504/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-naturalized/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Conservatism and foundationalism ===
Rationality is usually understood as conservative in the sense that rational agents do not start from zero but already possess many beliefs and intentions. Reasoning takes place on the background of these pre-existing mental states and tries to improve them. This way, the original beliefs and intentions are privileged: one keeps them unless a reason to doubt them is encountered. Some forms of epistemic [[foundationalism]] reject this approach. According to them, the whole system of beliefs is to be justified by self-evident beliefs. Examples of such self-evident beliefs may include immediate experiences as well as simple logical and mathematical [[axiom]]s.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Hasan2000"/><ref name="Christensen1994"/>

An important difference between conservatism and foundationalism concerns their differing conceptions of the [[Burden of proof (philosophy)|burden of proof]]. According to conservativism, the burden of proof is always in favor of already established belief: in the absence of new evidence, it is rational to keep the mental states one already has. According to foundationalism, the burden of proof is always in favor of suspending mental states. For example, the agent reflects on their pre-existing belief that the [[Taj Mahal]] is in [[Agra]] but is unable to access any reason for or against this belief. In this case, conservatists think it is rational to keep this belief while foundationalists reject it as irrational due to the lack of reasons. In this regard, conservatism is much closer to the ordinary conception of rationality. One problem for foundationalism is that very few beliefs, if any, would remain if this approach was carried out meticulously. Another is that enormous mental resources would be required to constantly keep track of all the justificatory relations connecting non-fundamental beliefs to fundamental ones.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Hasan2000"/><ref name="Christensen1994"/>

== Types ==
Rationality is discussed in a great variety of fields, often in very different terms. While some theorists try to provide a unifying conception expressing the features shared by all forms of rationality, the more common approach is to articulate the different aspects of the individual forms of rationality. The most common distinction is between theoretical and practical rationality. Other classifications include categories for ideal and [[bounded rationality]] as well as for individual and social rationality.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Knauff2021a"/>

=== Theoretical and practical ===
The most influential distinction contrasts theoretical or epistemic rationality with practical rationality. Its theoretical side concerns the rationality of [[belief]]s: whether it is rational to hold a given belief and how certain one should be about it. Practical rationality, on the other hand, is about the rationality of [[Action (philosophy)|actions]], [[intention]]s, and [[Choice|decisions]].<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Knauff2021a"/><ref name="Kolb2008"/> This corresponds to the distinction between theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning: theoretical reasoning tries to assess whether the agent should change their beliefs while practical reasoning tries to assess whether the agent should change their plans and intentions.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Knauff2021a"/><ref name="Kolb2008"/>

==== Theoretical ====
Theoretical rationality concerns the rationality of cognitive mental states, in particular, of beliefs.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Audi2004"/> It is common to distinguish between two factors. The first factor is about the fact that good reasons are necessary for a belief to be rational. This is usually understood in terms of evidence provided by the so-called [[sources of knowledge]], i.e. faculties like [[perception]], [[introspection]], and [[memory]]. In this regard, it is often argued that to be rational, the believer has to respond to the impressions or reasons presented by these sources. For example, the visual impression of the sunlight on a tree makes it rational to believe that the sun is shining.<ref name="Kolb2008"/><ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Audi2004"/> In this regard, it may also be relevant whether the formed belief is involuntary and implicit 

The second factor pertains to the norms and procedures of rationality that govern how agents should form beliefs based on this evidence. These norms include the [[rules of inference]] discussed in regular [[logic]] as well as other norms of coherence between mental states.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Audi2004"/> In the case of rules of inference, the premises of a [[Validity (logic)|valid]] argument offer support to the conclusion and make therefore the belief in the conclusion rational.<ref name="Kolb2008"/> The support offered by the premises can either be [[Deductive reasoning|deductive]] or [[Defeasible reasoning|non-deductive]].<ref name="Hintikka2006"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Backmann |first1=Marius |title=Varieties of Justification—How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction |journal=Acta Analytica |date=1 June 2019 |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=235–255 |doi=10.1007/s12136-018-0371-6 |doi-broken-date=3 May 2024 |s2cid=125767384 |language=en |issn=1874-6349|doi-access=free }}</ref> In both cases, believing in the premises of an argument makes it rational to also believe in its conclusion. The difference between the two is given by how the premises support the conclusion. For deductive reasoning, the premises offer the strongest possible support: it is impossible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true. The premises of non-deductive arguments also offer support for their conclusion. But this support is not absolute: the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. Instead, the premises make it more likely that the conclusion is true. In this case, it is usually demanded that the non-deductive support is sufficiently strong if the belief in the conclusion is to be rational.<ref name="Knauff2021a"/><ref name="Kolb2008"/><ref name="Hintikka2006"/> 

An important form of theoretical irrationality is motivationally biased belief, sometimes referred to as [[wishful thinking]]. In this case, beliefs are formed based on one's desires or what is pleasing to imagine without proper evidential support.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Mele2004b"/> Faulty reasoning in the form of [[Formal fallacy|formal]] and [[informal fallacies]] is another cause of theoretical irrationality.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Dowden |first1=Bradley |title=Fallacies |url=https://iep.utm.edu/fallacy/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=19 March 2021 |archive-date=29 April 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100429214410/https://iep.utm.edu/fallacy/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Practical ====
All forms of practical rationality are concerned with how we act. It pertains both to [[Action (philosophy)|actions]] directly as well as to mental states and events preceding actions, like [[intention]]s and [[Choice|decisions]]. There are various aspects of practical rationality, such as how to pick a goal to follow and how to choose the means for reaching this goal. Other issues include the coherence between different intentions as well as between beliefs and intentions.<ref name="Hampton1996"/><ref name="Wallace2020"/><ref name="Moser2006"/>

Some theorists define the rationality of actions in terms of beliefs and desires. On this view, an action to bring about a certain goal is rational if the agent has the desire to bring about this goal and the belief that their action will realize it. A stronger version of this view requires that the responsible beliefs and desires are rational themselves.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/> A very influential conception of the rationality of decisions comes from [[decision theory]]. In decisions, the agent is presented with a set of possible courses of action and has to choose one among them. Decision theory holds that the agent should choose the alternative that has the highest [[expected value]].<ref name="Hampton1996"/> Practical rationality includes the field of actions but not of behavior in general. The difference between the two is that actions are intentional behavior, i.e. they are performed for a purpose and guided by it. In this regard, intentional behavior like driving a car is either rational or irrational while non-intentional behavior like sneezing is outside the domain of rationality.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Wilson2002"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mele |first1=Alfred R. |last2=Moser |first2=Paul K. |title=Intentional Action |journal=Noûs |date=1994 |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=39–68 |doi=10.2307/2215919 |jstor=2215919 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2215919 |issn=0029-4624 |access-date=2022-08-14 |archive-date=2022-08-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814154359/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2215919 |url-status=live }}</ref>

For various other practical phenomena, there is no clear consensus on whether they belong to this domain or not. For example, concerning the rationality of desires, two important theories are proceduralism and substantivism. According to proceduralism, there is an important distinction between [[Desire#Intrinsic and instrumental|instrumental and noninstrumental desires]]. A desire is instrumental if its fulfillment serves as a means to the fulfillment of another desire.<ref name="Brad2004"/><ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/> For example, Jack is sick and wants to take medicine to get healthy again. In this case, the desire to take the medicine is instrumental since it only serves as a means to Jack's noninstrumental desire to get healthy. Both proceduralism and substantivism usually agree that a person can be irrational if they lack an instrumental desire despite having the corresponding noninstrumental desire and being aware that it acts as a means. Proceduralists hold that this is the only way a desire can be irrational. Substantivists, on the other hand, allow that noninstrumental desires may also be irrational. In this regard, a substantivist could claim that it would be irrational for Jack to lack his noninstrumental desire to be healthy.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Brad2004"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/> Similar debates focus on the rationality of [[emotion]]s.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

==== Relation between the two ====
Theoretical and practical rationality are often discussed separately and there are many differences between them. In some cases, they even conflict with each other. However, there are also various ways in which they overlap and depend on each other.<ref name="Hampton1996"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

It is sometimes claimed that theoretical rationality aims at truth while practical rationality aims at [[The good|goodness]].<ref name="Hampton1996"/> According to [[John Searle]], the difference can be expressed in terms of "[[direction of fit]]".<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Douglass |first1=Curran F. |title=Rationality in Action. By John Searle. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. 303 pages, ISBN 0-262-19463-5. Hardback $35.00. |journal=Auslegung: A Journal of Philosophy |date=1 June 2003 |doi=10.17161/AJP.1808.9520|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kissine |first1=Mikhail |title=Direction of Fit |journal=Logique et Analyse |date=2007 |volume=50 |issue=198 |pages=113–128 |jstor=44084854 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44084854 |issn=0024-5836 |access-date=2022-08-14 |archive-date=2022-08-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814154017/https://www.jstor.org/stable/44084854 |url-status=live }}</ref> On this view, theoretical rationality is about how the mind corresponds to the world by representing it. Practical rationality, on the other hand, is about how the world corresponds to the ideal set up by the mind and how it should be changed.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Harman2004"/><ref name="Moser2006"/> Another difference is that arbitrary choices are sometimes needed for practical rationality. For example, there may be two equally good routes available to reach a goal. On the practical level, one has to choose one of them if one wants to reach the goal. It would even be practically irrational to resist this arbitrary choice, as exemplified by [[Buridan's ass]].<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chislenko |first1=Eugene |title=A Solution for Buridan's Ass |journal=Ethics |date=2016 |volume=126 |issue=2 |pages=283–310 |doi=10.1086/683537 |s2cid=147175535 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CHIASF-2 |access-date=2022-08-14 |archive-date=2022-08-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814154359/https://philpapers.org/rec/CHIASF-2 |url-status=live }}</ref> But on the theoretical level, one does not have to form a belief about which route was taken upon hearing that someone reached the goal. In this case, the arbitrary choice for one belief rather than the other would be theoretically irrational. Instead, the agent should suspend their belief either way if they lack sufficient reasons. Another difference is that practical rationality is guided by specific goals and desires, in contrast to theoretical rationality. So it is practically rational to take medicine if one has the desire to cure a sickness. But it is theoretically irrational to adopt the belief that one is healthy just because one desires this. This is a form of [[wishful thinking]].<ref name="Harman2013"/>

In some cases, the demands of practical and theoretical rationality conflict with each other. For example, the practical reason of [[loyalty]] to one's child may demand the belief that they are innocent while the evidence linking them to the crime may demand a belief in their guilt on the theoretical level.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Harman2004"/>

But the two domains also overlap in certain ways. For example, the norm of rationality known as [[enkrateia|enkrasia]] links beliefs and intentions. It states that "[r]ationality requires of you that you intend to F if you believe your reasons require you to F". Failing to fulfill this requirement results in cases of irrationality known as [[akrasia]] or [[weakness of the will]].<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Mele2004b"/> Another form of overlap is that the study of the rules governing practical rationality is a theoretical matter.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Dreier2004"/> And practical considerations may determine whether to pursue theoretical rationality on a certain issue as well as how much time and resources to invest in the inquiry.<ref name="Harman2004"/><ref name="Mele2004b"/> It is often held that practical rationality presupposes theoretical rationality. This is based on the idea that to decide what should be done, one needs to know what is the case. But one can assess what is the case independently of knowing what should be done. So in this regard, one can study theoretical rationality as a distinct discipline independent of practical rationality but not the other way round.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/> However, this independence is rejected by some forms of doxastic voluntarism. They hold that theoretical rationality can be understood as one type of practical rationality. This is based on the controversial claim that we can decide what to believe. It can take the form of ''epistemic decision theory'', which states that people try to fulfill epistemic aims when deciding what to believe.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Greaves |first1=Hilary |title=Epistemic Decision Theory |journal=Mind |date=2013 |volume=122 |issue=488 |pages=915–952 |doi=10.1093/mind/fzt090 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GREEDT |access-date=2022-08-14 |archive-date=2022-08-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814154400/https://philpapers.org/rec/GREEDT |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Konek |first1=Jason |last2=Levinstein |first2=Ben |title=The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory |date=2017 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KONTFO-2 |access-date=2022-08-14 |archive-date=2022-08-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814154400/https://philpapers.org/rec/KONTFO-2 |url-status=live }}</ref> A similar idea is defended by [[Jesús Mosterín]]. He argues that the proper object of rationality is not ''belief'' but ''acceptance''. He understands acceptance as a voluntary and context-dependent decision to affirm a proposition.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mosterín |first1=Jesús |title=Acceptance without belief |journal=Manuscrito |date=2002 |volume=25 |issue=2 |pages=313–335 |url=https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644540 |access-date=2019-07-13 |archive-date=2019-07-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190713172627/https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644540 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Ideal and bounded ===
Various theories of rationality assume some form of ideal rationality, for example, by demanding that rational agents obey all the laws and implications of [[logic]]. This can include the requirement that if the agent believes a [[proposition]], they should also believe in everything that logically follows from this proposition. However, many theorists reject this form of logical omniscience as a requirement for rationality. They argue that, since the human mind is limited, rationality has to be defined accordingly to account for how actual finite humans possess some form of resource-limited rationality.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Moser2006"/>

According to the position of [[bounded rationality]], theories of rationality should take into account cognitive limitations, such as incomplete knowledge, imperfect memory, and limited capacities of computation and representation. An important research question in this field is about how cognitive agents use [[heuristic]]s rather than brute calculations to solve problems and make decisions. According to the [[satisficing]] heuristic, for example, agents usually stop their search for the best option once an option is found that meets their desired achievement level. In this regard, people often do not continue to search for the best possible option, even though this is what theories of ideal rationality commonly demand.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Bendor2009"/> Using heuristics can be highly rational as a way to adapt to the limitations of the human mind, especially in complex cases where these limitations make brute calculations impossible or very time- and resource-intensive.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Moser2006"/>

=== Individual and social ===
Most discussions and research in the academic literature focus on individual rationality. This concerns the rationality of individual persons, for example, whether their beliefs and actions are rational. But the question of rationality can also be applied to groups as a whole on the social level. This form of social or collective rationality concerns both theoretical and practical issues like group beliefs and group decisions.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Horodecka2021"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Townley |first1=Barbara |title=Reason's Neglect: Rationality and Organizing |date=24 July 2008 |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/6224/chapter-abstract/149856255?redirectedFrom=fulltext |language=en |chapter=Collective rationality |access-date=18 August 2022 |archive-date=18 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818103334/https://academic.oup.com/book/6224/chapter-abstract/149856255?redirectedFrom=fulltext |url-status=live }}</ref> And just like in the individual case, it is possible to study these phenomena as well as the processes and structures that are responsible for them. On the social level, there are various forms of cooperation to reach a shared goal. In the theoretical cases, a group of jurors may first discuss and then vote to determine whether the defendant is guilty. Or in the practical case, politicians may cooperate to implement new regulations to combat [[climate change]]. These forms of cooperation can be judged on their social rationality depending on how they are implemented and on the quality of the results they bear. Some theorists try to reduce social rationality to individual rationality by holding that the group processes are rational to the extent that the individuals participating in them are rational. But such a reduction is frequently rejected.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Horodecka2021"/>

Various studies indicate that group rationality often outperforms individual rationality. For example, groups of people working together on the [[Wason selection task]] usually perform better than individuals by themselves. This form of group superiority is sometimes termed "wisdom of crowds" and may be explained based on the claim that competent individuals have a stronger impact on the group decision than others.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Primicerio |first1=Kevin |last2=Challet |first2=Damien |last3=Gualdi |first3=Stanislao |title=Collective rationality and functional wisdom of the crowd in far-from-rational institutional investors |journal=Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination |date=1 January 2021 |volume=16 |issue=1 |pages=153–171 |doi=10.1007/s11403-020-00288-0 |doi-broken-date=3 May 2024 |s2cid=225536288 |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11403-020-00288-0 |language=en |issn=1860-7128 |access-date=18 August 2022 |archive-date=18 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818103340/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11403-020-00288-0 |url-status=live }}</ref> However, this is not always the case and sometimes groups perform worse due to conformity or unwillingness to bring up controversial issues.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

=== Others ===
Many other classifications are discussed in the academic literature. One important distinction is between approaches to rationality based on the output or on the process. Process-oriented theories of rationality are common in cognitive psychology and study how cognitive systems process inputs to generate outputs. Output-oriented approaches are more common in philosophy and investigate the rationality of the resulting states.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Broome2021"/> Another distinction is between relative and categorical judgments of rationality. In the relative case, rationality is judged based on limited information or evidence while categorical judgments take all the evidence into account and are thus judgments ''all things considered''.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Moser2006"/> For example, believing that one's investments will multiply can be rational in a relative sense because it is based on one's astrological [[horoscope]]. But this belief is irrational in a categorical sense if the belief in astrology is itself irrational.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

== Importance ==
Rationality is central to solving many problems, both on the local and the global scale. This is often based on the idea that rationality is necessary to act efficiently and to reach all kinds of goals.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Pinker2022"/> This includes goals from diverse fields, such as [[ethical]] goals, [[humanist]] goals, [[scientific]] goals, and even [[religious]] goals.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/> The study of rationality is very old and has occupied many of the greatest minds since ancient Greek. This interest is often motivated by discovering the potentials and limitations of our minds. Various theorists even see rationality as the essence of being human, often in an attempt to distinguish humans from other animals.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Rysiew2012"/><ref name="Mittelstraß2005"/> However, this strong affirmation has been subjected to many criticisms, for example, that humans are not rational all the time and that non-human animals also show diverse forms of intelligence.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

The topic of rationality is relevant to a variety of disciplines. It plays a central role in philosophy, psychology, [[Bayesianism]], [[decision theory]], and [[game theory]].<ref name="Mele2004a"/> But it is also covered in other disciplines, such as [[artificial intelligence]], [[behavioral economics]], [[microeconomics]], and [[neuroscience]]. Some forms of research restrict themselves to one specific domain while others investigate the topic in an interdisciplinary manner by drawing insights from different fields.<ref name="Knauff2021a"/> 

== Paradoxes of rationality ==
The term ''paradox of rationality'' has a variety of meanings. It is often used for puzzles or unsolved problems of rationality. Some are just situations where it is not clear what the rational person should do. Others involve apparent faults within rationality itself, for example, where rationality seems to recommend a suboptimal course of action.<ref name="Mele2004a"/> A special case are so-called rational dilemmas, in which it is impossible to be rational since two norms of rationality conflict with each other.<ref name="Mintoff1997"/><ref name="Priest2002"/> Examples of paradoxes of rationality include [[Pascal's Wager]], the [[Prisoner's dilemma]], [[Buridan's ass]], and the [[St. Petersburg paradox]].<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Sorensen |first1=Roy |editor-first1=Alfred R |editor-first2=Piers |editor-last1=Mele |editor-last2=Rawling |title=The Oxford Handbook of Rationality |date=2004 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-514539-7 |url=https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195145399.001.0001/acprof-9780195145397-chapter-14 |chapter=PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY |doi=10.1093/0195145399.001.0001 |access-date=2022-08-18 |archive-date=2023-12-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142129/https://academic.oup.com/oxford-scholarship-online |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Moriarty2020"/>

==History==
{{Expand section|with=subsections on ancient Greek philosophy and Kant|date=August 2022}}

===Max Weber===
[[File:MaxWeber1919FotoLeifGeiges.jpg|thumb|right|[[Germany|German]] scholar [[Max Weber]] notably articulated a theory of rationality that divided human capacity to think through things in four ways.<ref name=kalberg>{{cite journal|url=https://www.bu.edu/sociology/files/2010/03/Weberstypes.pdf|jstor=2778894|last1=Kalberg|first1=Stephen|title=Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History|journal=American Journal of Sociology|year=1980|volume=85|issue=5|pages=1145–1179|doi=10.1086/227128|s2cid=16388036|access-date=2020-04-08|archive-date=2020-11-14|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201114000510/http://www.bu.edu/sociology/files/2010/03/Weberstypes.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>]]

The German scholar [[Max Weber]] proposed an interpretation of [[Social actions|social action]] that distinguished between four different [[ideal type|idealized types]] of rationality.<ref name=kalberg/>

The first, which he called ''Zweckrational'' or purposive/[[instrumental rationality]], is related to the expectations about the behavior of other human beings or objects in the environment. These expectations serve as means for a particular actor to attain ends, ends which Weber noted were "rationally pursued and calculated."{{cite quote|date=June 2021}} The second type, Weber called ''Wertrational'' or value/belief-oriented. Here the action is undertaken for what one might call reasons intrinsic to the actor: some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other motives, independent of whether it will lead to success. The third type was affectual, determined by an actor's specific affect, feeling, or emotion—to which Weber himself said that this was a kind of rationality that was on the borderline of what he considered "meaningfully oriented." The fourth was traditional or conventional, determined by ingrained habituation. Weber emphasized that it was very unusual to find only one of these orientations: combinations were the norm. His usage also makes clear that he considered the first two as more significant than the others, and it is arguable that the third and fourth are subtypes of the first two.

The advantage in Weber's interpretation of rationality is that it avoids a value-laden assessment, say, that certain kinds of beliefs are irrational. Instead, Weber suggests that ground or motive can be given—for religious or affect reasons, for example—that may meet the criterion of explanation or justification even if it is not an explanation that fits the ''Zweckrational'' orientation of means and ends. The opposite is therefore also true: some means-ends explanations will not satisfy those whose grounds for action are ''Wertrational''.

Weber's constructions of rationality have been critiqued both from a [[Jürgen Habermas|Habermasian]] (1984) perspective (as devoid of social context and under-theorised in terms of social power)<ref>[[Jürgen Habermas]] (1984) ''The Theory of Communicative Action Volume&nbsp;1; Reason and the Rationalization of Society'', Cambridge: Polity Press.</ref> and also from a [[feminist]] perspective (Eagleton, 2003) whereby Weber's rationality constructs are viewed as imbued with masculine values and oriented toward the maintenance of male power.<ref>Eagleton, M. (ed) (2003) ''A Concise Companion to Feminist Theory'', Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.{{page needed|date=July 2019}}</ref> An alternative position on rationality (which includes both [[bounded rationality]],<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hawkins |first1=David |last2=Simon |first2=Herbert A. |title=Note: Some Conditions of Macroeconomic Stability |journal=Econometrica |date=July 1949 |volume=17 |issue=3/4 |pages=245–8 |doi=10.2307/1905526 |jstor=1905526 }}</ref> as well as the affective and value-based arguments of Weber) can be found in the critique of Etzioni (1988),<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Etzioni |first1=Amitai |title=Normative-affective factors: Toward a new decision-making model |journal=Journal of Economic Psychology |date=June 1988 |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=125–150 |doi=10.1016/0167-4870(88)90048-7 |s2cid=17871420 }} Republished in: {{cite book |doi=10.1007/978-3-662-03900-7_5 |chapter=Normative-Affective Factors: Toward a New Decision-Making Model |title=Essays in Socio-Economics |pages=91–119 |series=Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy |year=1999 |last1=Etzioni |first1=Amitai |doi-broken-date=3 May 2024 |isbn=978-3-642-08415-7 }}</ref> who reframes thought on decision-making to argue for a reversal of the position put forward by Weber. Etzioni illustrates how purposive/instrumental reasoning is subordinated by normative considerations (ideas on how people 'ought' to behave) and affective considerations (as a support system for the development of human relationships).

===Richard Brandt===
[[Richard Brandt]] proposed a "reforming definition" of rationality, arguing someone is rational if their notions survive a form of [[psychotherapy|cognitive-psychotherapy]].<ref>{{cite book|title=Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics|url=https://archive.org/details/ethicaltheorypro0000bran|url-access=registration|publisher=Prentice-Hall|author=Richard B. Brandt|year=1959}}{{page needed|date=July 2019}}</ref>

===Robert Audi===
[[Robert Audi]] developed a comprehensive account of rationality that covers both the theoretical and the practical side of rationality.<ref name="Precis">{{cite journal |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=Précis of the Architecture of Reason |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2003 |volume=67 |issue=1 |pages=177–180 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00031.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDPOT |access-date=2020-11-07 |archive-date=2021-04-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210414132814/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDPOT |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Architecture">{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality |date=2001 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTAO-3 |access-date=2020-11-07 |archive-date=2021-06-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210619215025/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTAO-3 |url-status=live }}</ref> This account centers on the notion of a ''ground'': a [[mental state]] is rational if it is "well-grounded" in a source of [[Justification (epistemology)|justification]].<ref name="Architecture" />{{rp|19}} Irrational mental states, on the other hand, lack a sufficient ground. For example, the perceptual experience of a tree when looking outside the window can ground the rationality of the belief that there is a tree outside.

Audi is committed to a form of [[foundationalism]]: the idea that justified beliefs, or in his case, rational states in general, can be divided into two groups: the ''foundation'' and the ''superstructure''.<ref name="Architecture" />{{rp|13,29–31}} The mental states in the superstructure receive their justification from other rational mental states while the foundational mental states receive their justification from a more basic source.<ref name="Architecture" />{{rp|16–18}} For example, the above-mentioned belief that there is a tree outside is foundational since it is based on a basic source: perception. Knowing that trees grow in soil, we may deduce that there is soil outside. This belief is equally rational, being supported by an adequate ground, but it belongs to the superstructure since its rationality is grounded in the rationality of another belief. Desires, like beliefs, form a hierarchy: intrinsic desires are at the foundation while instrumental desires belong to the superstructure. In order to link the instrumental desire to the intrinsic desire an extra element is needed: a belief that the fulfillment of the instrumental desire is a means to the fulfillment of the intrinsic desire.<ref name="Haji">{{cite journal |last1=Haji |first1=Ish |title=Review of The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality |url=https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-architecture-of-reason-the-structure-and-substance-of-rationality/ |website=Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews |date=9 March 2002 |access-date=7 November 2020 |archive-date=23 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201023025553/https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-architecture-of-reason-the-structure-and-substance-of-rationality/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Audi asserts that all the basic sources providing justification for the foundational mental states come from [[experience]]. As for ''beliefs'', there are four types of experience that act as sources: perception, memory, introspection, and rational intuition.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=71–94 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3 |chapter=The Sources of Knowledge |year=2002 |access-date=2020-11-07 |archive-date=2022-06-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220612112116/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3 |url-status=live }}</ref> The main basic source of the rationality of ''desires'', on the other hand, comes in the form of hedonic experience: the experience of pleasure and pain.<ref name="Commitment">{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=Rationality and Religious Commitment |date=2011 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDRAR-2 |access-date=2020-11-07 |archive-date=2020-11-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201113084347/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDRAR-2 |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|20}} So, for example, a desire to eat ice-cream is rational if it is based on experiences in which the agent enjoyed the taste of ice-cream, and irrational if it lacks such a support. Because of its dependence on experience, rationality can be defined as a kind of responsiveness to experience.<ref name="Commitment"/>{{rp|21}}

''Actions'', in contrast to beliefs and desires, do not have a source of justification of their own. Their rationality is grounded in the rationality of other states instead: in the rationality of beliefs and desires. Desires motivate actions. Beliefs are needed here, as in the case of instrumental desires, to bridge a gap and link two elements.<ref name="Architecture" />{{rp|62}} Audi distinguishes the ''focal'' rationality of individual mental states from the ''global'' rationality of ''persons''. Global rationality has a derivative status: it depends on the focal rationality.<ref name="Precis" /> Or more precisely: "Global rationality is reached when a person has a sufficiently integrated system of sufficiently well-grounded propositional attitudes, emotions, and actions".<ref name="Architecture" />{{rp|232}} Rationality is ''relative'' in the sense that it depends on the experience of the person in question. Since different people undergo different experiences, what is rational to believe for one person may be irrational to believe for another person.<ref name="Precis"/> That a belief is rational does not entail that it is ''true''.<ref name="Haji"/>

==In various fields==
=== Ethics and morality ===
The problem of rationality is relevant to various issues in [[ethics]] and [[morality]].<ref name="Mele2004a"/> Many debates center around the question of whether rationality implies morality or is possible without it. Some examples based on common sense suggest that the two can come apart. For example, some immoral [[psychopath]]s are highly intelligent in the pursuit of their schemes and may, therefore, be seen as rational. However, there are also considerations suggesting that the two are closely related to each other. For example, according to the principle of universality, "one's reasons for acting are acceptable only if it is acceptable that everyone acts on such reasons".<ref name="Harman2013"/> A similar formulation is given in [[Immanuel Kant]]'s [[categorical imperative]]: "act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kant |first1=Immanuel |last2=Ellington |first2=James W. (James Wesley) |last3=Kant |first3=Immanuel |title=Grounding for the metaphysics of morals ; with, On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns |date=1993 |publisher=Indianapolis : Hackett Pub. Co. |isbn=978-0-87220-166-8 |page=30 |url=https://archive.org/details/groundingformet000kant/page/30}}</ref> The principle of universality has been suggested as a basic principle both for morality and for rationality.<ref name="Harman2013"/> This is closely related to the question of whether agents have a duty to be rational. Another issue concerns the value of rationality. In this regard, it is often held that human lives are more important than animal lives because humans are rational.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Rysiew2012"/>

===Psychology===
Many psychological theories have been proposed to describe how reasoning happens and what underlying psychological processes are responsible. One of their goals is to explain how the different types of irrationality happen and why some types are more prevalent than others. They include ''mental logic theories'', ''mental model theories'', and ''[[Dual process theory|dual process theories]]''.<ref name="Knauff2021a"/><ref name="Schechter2013"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Johnson-Laird |first1=Phil |title=Deductive reasoning |journal=WIREs Cognitive Science |date=30 December 2009 |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=8–17 |doi=10.1002/wcs.20 |pmid=26272833 |url=https://wires.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/wcs.20 |issn=1939-5078 |access-date=19 August 2022 |archive-date=24 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230124120447/https://wires.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/wcs.20 |url-status=live }}</ref> An important psychological area of study focuses on [[cognitive biases]]. Cognitive biases are systematic tendencies to engage in erroneous or irrational forms of [[thinking]], [[judging]], and acting. Examples include the [[confirmation bias]], the [[self-serving bias]], the [[hindsight bias]], and the [[Dunning–Kruger effect]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Litvak |first1=P. |last2=Lerner |first2=J. S. |title=The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences |date=2009 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LITCB |chapter=Cognitive Bias |access-date=20 December 2021 |archive-date=2 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211102021835/https://philpapers.org/rec/LITCB |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Dunning-Kruger effect |url=https://www.britannica.com/science/Dunning-Kruger-effect |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=7 December 2021 |language=en |archive-date=30 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211130065643/https://www.britannica.com/science/Dunning-Kruger-effect |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gignac |first1=Gilles E. |last2=Zajenkowski |first2=Marcin |title=The Dunning-Kruger effect is (mostly) a statistical artefact: Valid approaches to testing the hypothesis with individual differences data |journal=Intelligence |date=1 May 2020 |volume=80 |pages=101449 |doi=10.1016/j.intell.2020.101449 |s2cid=216410901 |url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2020.101449 |language=en |issn=0160-2896 |access-date=20 December 2021 |archive-date=15 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220515000616/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289620300271?via%3Dihub |url-status=live }}</ref> Some empirical findings suggest that metacognition is an important aspect of rationality. The idea behind this claim is that reasoning is carried out more efficiently and reliably if the responsible thought processes are properly controlled and monitored.<ref name="Knauff2021a"/>

The [[Wason selection task]] is an influential test for studying rationality and reasoning abilities. In it, four cards are placed before the participants. Each has a number on one side and a letter on the opposite side. In one case, the visible sides of the four cards are A, D, 4, and 7. The participant is then asked which cards need to be turned around in order to verify the conditional claim "if there is a vowel on one side of the card, then there is an even number on the other side of the card". The correct answer is A and 7. But this answer is only given by about 10%. Many choose card 4 instead even though there is no requirement on what letters may appear on its opposite side.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Schechter2013"/><ref name="Evans2005"/> An important insight from using these and similar tests is that the rational ability of the participants is usually significantly better for concrete and realistic cases than for abstract or implausible cases.<ref name="Schechter2013"/><ref name="Evans2005"/> Various contemporary studies in this field use [[Bayesian probability theory]] to study subjective degrees of belief, for example, how the believer's certainty in the premises is carried over to the conclusion through reasoning.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

In the [[psychology of reasoning]], psychologists and [[Cognitive science|cognitive scientists]] have defended different positions on human rationality. One prominent view, due to [[Philip Johnson-Laird]] and [[Ruth M.&nbsp;J. Byrne]] among others is that humans are rational in principle but they err in practice, that is, humans have the competence to be rational but their performance is limited by various factors.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Johnson-Laird |first1=Philip N. |last2=Byrne |first2=Ruth M. J. |title=Corrigendum: 'If' and the problems of conditional reasoning |journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences |date=1 September 2009 |volume=13 |issue=9 |pages=282–287 |doi=10.1016/j.tics.2009.08.003 |s2cid=54389097 |doi-access=free }}</ref> However, it has been argued that many standard tests of reasoning, such as those on the [[conjunction fallacy]], on the [[Wason selection task]], or the [[base rate fallacy]] suffer from methodological and conceptual problems. This has led to disputes in psychology over whether researchers should (only) use standard rules of logic, probability theory and statistics, or rational choice theory as norms of good reasoning. Opponents of this view, such as [[Gerd Gigerenzer]], favor a conception of [[bounded rationality]], especially for tasks under high uncertainty.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sturm |first1=Thomas |title=The 'Rationality Wars' in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go |journal=Inquiry |date=February 2012 |volume=55 |issue=1 |pages=66–81 |doi=10.1080/0020174X.2012.643628 |s2cid=144877200 }}</ref> The concept of rationality continues to be debated by psychologists, economists and cognitive scientists.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Chater|first1=Nick|last2=Felin|first2=Teppo|last3=Funder|first3=David C.|last4=Gigerenzer|first4=Gerd|last5=Koenderink|first5=Jan J.|last6=Krueger|first6=Joachim I.|last7=Noble|first7=Denis|last8=Nordli|first8=Samuel A.|last9=Oaksford|first9=Mike|last10=Schwartz|first10=Barry|last11=Stanovich|first11=Keith E.|date=2018-04-01|title=Mind, rationality, and cognition: An interdisciplinary debate|url=https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1333-5|journal=Psychonomic Bulletin & Review|language=en|volume=25|issue=2|pages=793–826|doi=10.3758/s13423-017-1333-5|doi-broken-date=3 May 2024 |issn=1531-5320|pmc=5902517|pmid=28744767|access-date=2021-12-18|archive-date=2023-12-30|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142156/https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13423-017-1333-5|url-status=live}}</ref>

The psychologist [[Jean Piaget]] gave an influential account of how the stages in human development from childhood to adulthood can be understood in terms of the increase of rational and logical abilities.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of logic |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-logic |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=21 November 2021 |language=en |archive-date=28 April 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150428101732/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/346240/philosophy-of-logic |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Inhelder |first1=Bärbel |last2=Piaget |first2=Jean |title=The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence: An Essay on the Construction of Formal Operational Structures |date=1958 |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-0-415-21002-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=39cdDv2-PZkC |language=en |chapter=Part I: The development of propositional logic |access-date=2022-08-19 |archive-date=2023-12-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142129/https://books.google.com/books?id=39cdDv2-PZkC |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Parsons |first1=Charles |title=Inhelder and Piaget's the Growth of Logical Thinking† |journal=British Journal of Psychology |date=1960 |volume=51 |issue=1 |pages=75–84 |doi=10.1111/j.2044-8295.1960.tb00727.x |pmid=14430621 |url=https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.2044-8295.1960.tb00727.x |language=en |issn=2044-8295 |access-date=2022-08-19 |archive-date=2021-12-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211207184951/https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.2044-8295.1960.tb00727.x |url-status=live }}</ref> He identifies four stages associated with rough age groups: the sensorimotor stage below the age of two, the preoperational state until the age of seven, the concrete operational stage until the age of eleven, and the formal operational stage afterward. Rational or logical reasoning only takes place in the last stage and is related to abstract [[thinking]], [[concept formation]], reasoning, planning, and [[problem-solving]].<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

====Emotions====
According to A. C. Grayling, rationality "must be independent of emotions, personal feelings or any kind of instincts".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kumar |first1=Dr Binoy |title=Urban and Rural Sociology |date=22 January 2022 |publisher=K.K. Publications |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jn9aEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA114 |language=en |access-date=22 August 2022 |archive-date=30 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142126/https://books.google.com/books?id=jn9aEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA114#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref> Certain findings{{Which|date=August 2022}} in [[cognitive science]] and [[neuroscience]] show that no human has ever satisfied this criterion, except perhaps a person with no affective feelings, for example, an individual with a massively damaged [[amygdala]] or severe psychopathy. Thus, such an idealized form of rationality is best exemplified by computers, and not people. However, scholars may productively appeal to the idealization as a point of reference. {{Citation needed|date=August 2012}} In his book, ''The Edge of Reason: A Rational Skeptic in an Irrational World,'' British philosopher [[Julian Baggini]] sets out to debunk myths about reason (e.g., that it is "purely objective and requires no subjective judgment").<ref name="Radford and Frazier (2017)">{{cite journal |author1=[[Benjamin Radford|Radford, Benjamin]] |author2=[[Kendrick Frazier|Frazier, Kendrick]] |title=The Edge of Reason: A Rational Skeptic in an Irrational World |journal=Skeptical Inquirer |date=January 2017 |volume=41 |issue=1 |page=60}}</ref>

=== Cognitive and behavioral sciences ===
[[Cognitive science|Cognitive]] and [[behavioral sciences]] try to describe, explain, and predict how people think and act. Their models are often based on the assumption that people are rational. For example, [[classical economics]] is based on the assumption that people are rational agents that maximize expected utility. However, people often depart from the ideal standards of rationality in various ways. For example, they may only look for confirming [[evidence]] and ignore disconfirming evidence. Another factor studied in this regard are the limitations of human intellectual capacities. Many discrepancies from rationality are caused by limited time, memory, or attention. Often [[heuristics]] and rules of thumb are used to mitigate these limitations, but they may lead to new forms of irrationality.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Bendor2009"/>

===Logic===
{{main|Logic and rationality}}
Theoretical rationality is closely related to [[logic]], but not identical to it.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/> Logic is often defined as the study of correct [[argument]]s. This concerns the relation between the [[proposition]]s used in the argument: whether its [[premise]]s offer support to its conclusion. Theoretical rationality, on the other hand, is about what to believe or how to change one's beliefs. The laws of logic are relevant to rationality since the agent should change their beliefs if they violate these laws. But logic is not directly about what to believe. Additionally, there are also other factors and norms besides logic that determine whether it is rational to hold or change a belief.<ref name="Harman2013"/> The study of rationality in logic is more concerned with epistemic rationality, that is, attaining beliefs in a rational manner, than instrumental rationality.

=== Decision theory ===
An influential account of practical rationality is given by [[decision theory]].<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Knauff2021a"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/> Decisions are situations where a number of possible courses of action are available to the agent, who has to choose one of them. Decision theory investigates the rules governing which action should be chosen. It assumes that each action may lead to a variety of outcomes. Each outcome is associated with a [[conditional probability]] and a [[utility]]. The ''expected gain'' of an outcome can be calculated by multiplying its conditional probability with its utility. the ''[[Subjective expected utility|expected utility]]'' of an act is equivalent to the sum of all expected gains of the outcomes associated with it. From these basic ingredients, it is possible to define the rationality of decisions: a decision is rational if it selects the act with the highest expected utility.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/> While decision theory gives a very precise formal treatment of this issue, it leaves open the empirical problem of how to assign utilities and probabilities. So decision theory can still lead to bad empirical decisions if it is based on poor assignments.<ref name="Harman2013"/>

According to decision theorists, rationality is primarily a matter of internal consistency. This means that a person's [[mental state]]s like beliefs and preferences are consistent with each other or do not go against each other. One consequence of this position is that people with obviously false beliefs or perverse preferences may still count as rational if these mental states are consistent with their other mental states.<ref name="Mele2004a"/> Utility is often understood in terms of [[self-interest]] or personal [[preference]]s. However, this is not a necessary aspect of decisions theory and it can also be interpreted in terms of goodness or [[Value (ethics)|value in general]].<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Dreier2004"/>

=== Game theory ===
[[Game theory]] is closely related to decision theory and the problem of rational choice.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Knauff2021a"/> Rational choice is based on the idea that rational agents perform a [[cost-benefit analysis]] of all available options and choose the option that is most beneficial from their point of view. In the case of game theory, several agents are involved. This further complicates the situation since whether a given option is the best choice for one agent may depend on choices made by other agents. Game theory can be used to analyze various situations, like playing chess, firms competing for business, or animals fighting over prey. Rationality is a core assumption of game theory: it is assumed that each player chooses rationally based on what is most beneficial from their point of view. This way, the agent may be able to anticipate how others choose and what their best choice is relative to the behavior of the others.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Bicchieri2004"/><ref name="Ross2021"/><ref>{{cite web |title=game theory |url=https://www.britannica.com/science/game-theory |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=28 July 2022 |language=en |archive-date=26 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220726124646/https://www.britannica.com/science/game-theory |url-status=live }}</ref> This often results in a [[Nash equilibrium]], which constitutes a set of strategies, one for each player, where no player can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Bicchieri2004"/><ref name="Ross2021"/>

=== Bayesianism ===
A popular contemporary approach to rationality is based on [[Bayesian epistemology]].<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Joyce2004"/> Bayesian epistemology sees belief as a continuous phenomenon that comes in degrees. For example, Daniel is relatively sure that the [[Boston Celtics]] will win their next match and absolutely certain that two plus two equals four. In this case, the degree of the first belief is weaker than the degree of the second belief. These degrees are usually referred to as ''credences'' and represented by numbers between 0 and 1. 0 corresponds to full disbelief, 1 corresponds to full belief and 0.5 corresponds to suspension of belief. Bayesians understand this in terms of [[probability]]: the higher the credence, the higher the [[subjective probability]] that the believed [[proposition]] is true. As probabilities, they are subject to the laws of [[probability theory]]. These laws act as norms of rationality: beliefs are rational if they comply with them and irrational if they violate them.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hájek |first1=Alan |title=Interpretations of Probability: 3.3 The Subjective Interpretation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#SubPro |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=6 March 2021 |date=2019 |archive-date=17 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217013520/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#SubPro |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Olsson |first1=Erik J. |title=Introduction to Formal Philosophy |date=2018 |publisher=Springer |pages=431–442 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/OLSBE |chapter=Bayesian Epistemology |access-date=2022-08-19 |archive-date=2021-05-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516095057/https://philpapers.org/rec/OLSBE |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Hartmann |first1=Stephan |last2=Sprenger |first2=Jan |title=The Routledge Companion to Epistemology |date=2010 |publisher=London: Routledge |pages=609–620 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BOVSIO |chapter=Bayesian Epistemology |access-date=2022-08-19 |archive-date=2021-05-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516095047/https://philpapers.org/rec/BOVSIO |url-status=live }}</ref> For example, it would be irrational to have a credence of 0.9 that it will rain tomorrow together with another credence of 0.9 that it will not rain tomorrow. This account of rationality can also be extended to the practical domain by requiring that agents maximize their subjective expected utility. This way, Bayesianism can provide a unified account of both theoretical and practical rationality.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Joyce2004"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

===Economics===
Rationality plays a key role in economics and there are several strands to this.<ref>{{cite book|title=Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk|publisher=Oxford University Press|author=Paul Anand|year=1993|isbn=0198233035}}{{page needed|date=July 2019}}</ref> Firstly, there is the concept of instrumentality—basically the idea that people and organisations are instrumentally rational—that is, adopt the best actions to achieve their goals. Secondly, there is an axiomatic concept that rationality is a matter of being logically consistent within your preferences and beliefs. Thirdly, people have focused on the accuracy of beliefs and full use of information—in this view, a person who is not rational has beliefs that do not fully use the information they have.

Debates within economic sociology also arise as to whether or not people or organizations are "really" rational, as well as whether it makes sense to model them as such in formal models. Some have argued that a kind of [[bounded rationality]] makes more sense for such models.

Others think that any kind of rationality along the lines of [[rational choice theory]] is a useless concept for understanding human behavior; the term ''[[homo economicus]]'' (economic man: the imaginary man being assumed in economic models who is [[logically consistent]] but amoral) was coined largely in honor of this view. [[Behavioral economics]] aims to account for economic actors as they actually are, allowing for psychological biases, rather than assuming idealized instrumental rationality.

===Artificial intelligence===
The field of [[artificial intelligence]] is concerned, among other things, with how problems of rationality can be implemented and solved by computers.<ref name="Knauff2021a"/> Within [[artificial intelligence]], a ''[[intelligent agent|rational agent]]'' is typically one that maximizes its expected utility, given its current knowledge. [[Utility]] is the usefulness of the consequences of its actions. The utility function is arbitrarily defined by the designer, but should be a function of "performance", which is the directly measurable consequences, such as winning or losing money. In order to make a safe agent that plays defensively, a nonlinear function of performance is often desired, so that the reward for winning is lower than the punishment for losing. An agent might be rational within its own problem area, but finding the rational decision for arbitrarily complex problems is not practically possible. The rationality of human thought is a key problem in the [[psychology of reasoning]].<ref>Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). ''Deduction''. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.</ref>

===International relations===
There is an ongoing debate over the merits of using "rationality" in the study of [[international relations]] (IR). Some scholars hold it indispensable.<ref>Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce (2010) Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models. In The International Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Allen Denemark. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.{{page needed|date=July 2019}}</ref> Others are more critical.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Walt |first1=Stephen M. |title=Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies |journal=International Security |date=April 1999 |volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=5–48 |doi=10.1162/isec.23.4.5 |s2cid=53513711 }}</ref> Still, the pervasive and persistent usage of "rationality" in political science and IR is beyond dispute. "Rationality" remains ubiquitous in this field. Abulof finds that Some 40% of all scholarly references to "foreign policy" allude to "rationality"—and this ratio goes up to more than half of pertinent academic publications in the 2000s. He further argues that when it comes to concrete security and foreign policies, IR employment of rationality borders on "malpractice": rationality-based descriptions are largely either false or unfalsifiable; many observers fail to explicate the meaning of "rationality" they employ; and the concept is frequently used politically to distinguish between "us and them."<ref name="Abulof">{{cite journal |last1=Abulof |first1=Uriel |title=The malpractice of 'rationality' in international relations |journal=Rationality and Society |date=16 July 2015 |volume=27 |issue=3 |pages=358–384 |doi=10.1177/1043463115593144 |s2cid=147058088 }}</ref>

==Criticism==
The concept of rationality has been subject to criticism by various philosophers who question its [[Universality (philosophy)|universality]] and capacity to provide a comprehensive understanding of reality and [[human existence]].

[[Friedrich Nietzsche]], in his work "[[Beyond Good and Evil]]" (1886), criticized the overemphasis on rationality and argued that it neglects the irrational and instinctual aspects of human nature. Nietzsche advocated for a [[Transvaluation of values|reevaluation of values]] based on individual perspectives and the [[will to power]], stating, "There are no facts, only interpretations."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Nietzsche |first1=Friedrich |title=Jenseits von Gut und Böse |date=1886 |publisher=C. G. Naumann |location=Leipzig}}</ref>

[[Martin Heidegger]], in "[[Being and Time]]" (1927), offered a critique of the instrumental and calculative view of [[reason]], emphasizing the primacy of our everyday practical engagement with the world. Heidegger challenged the notion that rationality alone is the sole arbiter of truth and understanding.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Heidegger |first1=Martin |title=Sein und Zeit |date=1927 |publisher=Max Niemeyer Verlag |location=Tübingen}}</ref>

[[Max Horkheimer]] and [[Theodor W. Adorno|Theodor Adorno]], in their seminal work "[[Dialectic of Enlightenment]]"<ref>{{cite book |author1=Max Horkheimer |author2=Theodor Adorno |title=Dialectic of Enlightment |date=1947 |publisher=Querido Verlag |location=Amsterdam}}</ref> (1947), questioned the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]]'s rationality. They argued that the dominance of instrumental reason in modern society leads to the domination of nature and the dehumanization of individuals. Horkheimer and Adorno highlighted how rationality narrows the scope of human experience and hinders critical thinking.

[[Michel Foucault]], in "[[Discipline and Punish]]"<ref>{{cite book |last1=Foucault |first1=Michel |title=Surveiller et punir : Naissance de la prison |date=1975 |publisher=Gallimard |location=Paris |isbn=9782070291793}}</ref> (1975) and "[[The Birth of Biopolitics]]"<ref>{{cite book |last1=Foucault |first1=Michel |title=The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 |date=1979 |publisher=Galimard |location=Seuil |isbn=978-2020324014}}</ref> (1978), critiqued the notion of rationality as a neutral and objective force. Foucault emphasized the intertwining of rationality with power structures and its role in social control. He famously stated, "Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Foucault |first1=Michel |title=Dits et écrits, 1954-1988 |date=1977 |publisher=Gallimard |location=Paris |isbn=2020324016}}</ref>

These philosophers' critiques of rationality shed light on its limitations, assumptions, and potential dangers. Their ideas challenge the universal application of rationality as the sole framework for understanding the complexities of human existence and the world.


==See also==
{{Portal|Philosophy|Psychology}}
{{div col|colwidth=22em}}
* [[Bayesian epistemology]]
* [[Cognitive bias]]
* [[Coherence (linguistics)]]
* [[Counterintuitive]]
* [[Dysrationalia]]
* [[Flipism]]
* [[Homo economicus]]
* {{section link|Humeanism#Practical reason}}
* [[Imputation (game theory)]] (individual rationality)
* [[Instinct]]
* [[Intelligence]]
* [[Irrationality]]
* [[Law of thought]]
* [[LessWrong]]
* [[List of cognitive biases]]
* [[Principle of rationality]]
* [[Rational emotive behavior therapy]]
* [[Rationalism]]
* [[Rationalization (making excuses)]]
* [[Satisficing]]
* [[Superrationality]]
* [[Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem]]
{{div col end}}

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==Further reading==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20151031091523/http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ArchiveFolder/Research%20Group/Publications/Reason/ReasonRationality.htm Reason and Rationality], by Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich, Luc Faucher on the broad field of reason and rationality from descriptive, normative, and evaluative points of view
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-historicist/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Historicist Theories of Rationality]
* [http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/leglreas.htm Legal Reasoning After Post-Modern Critiques of Reason] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121221145826/http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/leglreas.htm |date=2012-12-21 }}, by Peter Suber
*{{cite journal |last1=Spohn |first1=Wolfgang |title=The Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality |journal=Croatian Journal of Philosophy |date=2002 |volume=II |issue=6 |pages=249–264 |citeseerx=10.1.1.1019.3269 }}
* [[Lucy Suchman]] (2007). Human-machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Action. Cambridge University Press.
* [[Cristina Bicchieri]] (1993). Rationality and Coordination, New York: Cambridge University Press
* [[Cristina Bicchieri]] (2007). "Rationality and Indeterminacy", in D. Ross and H. Kinkaid (eds.) The Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, The Oxford Reference Library of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, vol. 6, n.2.
* Anand, P (1993). ''Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk'', Oxford, Oxford University Press.
* Habermas, J. (1984) ''The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1; Reason and the Rationalization of Society'', Cambridge: Polity Press.
* Mosterín, Jesús (2008). ''Lo mejor posible: Racionalidad y acción humana''. Madrid: [[Alianza Editorial]]. 318 pp.&nbsp;{{ISBN|978-84-206-8206-8}}.
* Nozick, Robert (1993). ''[[The Nature of Rationality]].'' Princeton: Princeton University Press.
* Sciortino, Luca (2023). ''History of Rationalities: Ways of Thinking from Vico to Hacking and Beyond.'' New York: Springer- Palgrave McMillan. {{isbn|978-3031240034}}.
* Eagleton, M. (ed) (2003) ''A Concise Companion to Feminist Theory'', Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
* Simons, H. and Hawkins, D. (1949), "Some Conditions in Macro-Economic Stability", Econometrica, 1949.
* Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). Deduction. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.

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