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Line 1: {{Short description\|Quality of being agreeable to reason}} {{redirect\|Rational\|the mathematical property of some numbers\|Rational number\|other uses\|text=Not to be confused with [[Rationale (disambiguation)\|Rationale]]}}{{For\|the use and formalization of rationality in [[economics]] and [[mathematics]]\|decision theory}}{{Distinguish\|Rationalism}} ~~{{Distinguish\|rationalism}}~~ {{use dmy dates\|date=May 2024}} ~~{{redirect\|Rational\|the mathematical property of some numbers\|Rational number\|other uses}}~~ {{Epistemology sidebar}} '''Rationality''' is the [[Quality (philosophy)\|quality]] of being guided by or based on ~~donuts~~[[reason]]. In this regard, a person [[Action (philosophy)\|acts]] rationally if they have a good reason for what they do, or a [[belief]] is rational if it is based on strong [[evidence]]. This quality can apply to an ability, as in ~~the~~a ~~ability~~[[rational ~~to eat donuts~~animal]], to a psychological [[process]], like [[Logical reasoning\|reasoning]], to [[mental state]]s, such as ~~[[belief]]s~~beliefs and [[intention]]s, or to [[person]]s who possess these other forms of rationality. A thing that lacks rationality is either ~~not a donut~~''arational'', if it is outside the domain of rational evaluation, or ~~a donut~~''[[irrational]]'', if it belongs to this domain but does not fulfill its standards. There are many discussions about the [[Essence\|essential features]] shared by all forms of rationality. According to reason-responsiveness accounts, to be rational is to be responsive to reasons. For example, dark clouds are a reason for taking an [[umbrella]], which is why it is rational for an agent to do so in response. An important rival to this approach are coherence-based accounts, which define rationality as internal coherence among the agent's mental states. Many rules of coherence have been suggested in this regard, for example, that one should not hold [[contradictory]] beliefs or that one should intend to do something if one believes that one should do it. Goal-based accounts characterize rationality in relation to goals, such as acquiring [[truth]] in the case of theoretical rationality. [[Internalism and externalism\|Internalists]] believe that rationality depends only on the person's [[mind]]. Externalists contend that external factors may also be relevant. Debates about the [[normativity]] of rationality concern the question of whether one should always be rational. A further discussion is whether rationality requires that all beliefs be reviewed from scratch rather than trusting pre-existing beliefs. Line 13: == Definition and semantic field == In its most common sense, rationality is the quality of being guided by reasons or being reasonable.<ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Broome2021"/><ref>{{cite web \|title=Rationality \|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rationality \|website=www.merriam-webster.com \|access-date=10 August 2022 \|language=en \|archive-date=8 August 2022 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220808012930/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rationality \|url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web\|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rational\|title=Definition of ~~RATIONAL~~rational \|website=~~www.merriam~~Merriam-~~webster.com\|date=15~~Webster ~~July~~ ~~2023~~\|access-date=24 September 2017\|archive-date=17 August 2017\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170817055716/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rational\|url-status=live}}</ref> For example, a person who acts rationally has good reasons for what they do. This usually implies that they reflected on the possible consequences of their action and the goal it is supposed to realize. In the case of [[belief]]s, it is rational to believe something if the agent has good [[evidence]] for it and it is coherent with the agent's other beliefs.<ref name="Audi2004"/><ref name="Lord2018-1"/> While [[Action (philosophy)\|actions]] and beliefs are the most paradigmatic forms of rationality, the term is used both in ordinary language and in many academic disciplines to describe a wide variety of things, such as [[person]]s, [[desire]]s, [[intention]]s, [[Choice\|decisions]], policies, and institutions.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Mele2004a"/> Because of this variety in different contexts, it has proven difficult to give a unified definition covering all these fields and usages. In this regard, different fields often focus their investigation on one specific conception, type, or aspect of rationality without trying to cover it in its most general sense.<ref name="Rysiew2012"/> These different forms of rationality are sometimes divided into [[abilities]], [[process]]es, [[mental state]]s, and persons.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Rysiew2012"/><ref name="Mittelstraß2005"/> For example, when it is claimed that humans are [[rational animal]]s, this usually refers to the ability to [[think]] and act in reasonable ways. It does not imply that all humans are rational all the time: this ability is exercised in some cases but not in others.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Rysiew2012"/><ref name="Mittelstraß2005"/> On the other hand, the term can also refer to the process of reasoning that results from exercising this ability. Often many additional activities of the higher cognitive faculties are included as well, such as acquiring concepts, [[judging]], [[Deliberation\|deliberating]], planning, and deciding as well as the formation of desires and intentions. These processes usually affect some kind of change in the thinker's mental states. In this regard, one can also talk of the rationality of mental states, like beliefs and intentions.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/> A person who possesses these forms of rationality to a sufficiently high degree may themselves be called ''rational''.<ref name="Moser2006"/> In some cases, also non-mental results of rational processes may qualify as rational. For example, the arrangement of products in a supermarket can be rational if it is based on a rational plan.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Broome2021"/> Line 19: The term "rational" has two opposites: ''[[irrational]]'' and ''arational''. Arational things are outside the domain of rational evaluation, like digestive processes or the weather. Things within the domain of rationality are either rational or irrational depending on whether they fulfill the standards of rationality.<ref>{{cite journal \|last1=Nolfi \|first1=Kate \|title=Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why? \|journal=Philosophical Issues \|date=2015 \|volume=25 \|issue=1 \|pages=41–63 \|doi=10.1111/phis.12051 \|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/NOLWMS \|access-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-date=2021-06-05 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210605114441/https://philpapers.org/rec/NOLWMS \|url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Mele2004a"/> For example, beliefs, actions, or general policies are rational if there is a good reason for them and irrational otherwise. It is not clear in all cases what belongs to the domain of rational assessment. For example, there are disagreements about whether desires and [[emotion]]s can be evaluated as rational and irrational rather than arational.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/> The term "irrational" is sometimes used in a wide sense to include cases of arationality.<ref>{{cite web \|title=The American Heritage Dictionary entry: irrational \|url=https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=irrational&submit.x=58&submit.y=14 \|website=www.ahdictionary.com \|access-date=10 August 2022 \|archive-date=12 August 2023 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230812182349/https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=irrational&submit.x=58&submit.y=14 \|url-status=live }}</ref> The meaning of the terms "rational" and "irrational" in academic discourse often differs from how they are used in everyday language. Examples of behaviors considered irrational in ordinary discourse are giving into [[temptation]]s, going out late even though one has to get up early in the morning, smoking despite being aware of the health risks, or believing in [[astrology]].<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref>{{cite book \|last1=Grim \|first1=Patrick \|title=Philosophy of Science and the Occult: Second Edition \|date=17 July 1990 \|publisher=SUNY Press \|isbn=978-1-4384-0498-1 \|page=28 \|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5VewAkDw8h0C&pg=PA28 \|language=en \|chapter=On Dismissing Astrology and Other Irrationalities \|access-date=3 September 2022 \|archive-date=30 December 2023 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142143/https://books.google.com/books?id=5VewAkDw8h0C&pg=PA28#v=onepage&q&f=false \|url-status=live }}</ref> In the academic discourse, on the other hand, rationality is usually identified with being guided by reasons or following norms of internal coherence. Some of the earlier examples may qualify as rational in the academic sense depending on the circumstances. Examples of irrationality in this sense include [[cognitive bias]]es~~, making [[arithmetic]] mistakes,~~ and violating the laws of [[probability theory]] when assessing the likelihood of future events.<ref name="Harman2013"/> This article focuses mainly on irrationality in the academic sense. The terms "rationality", "[[reason]]", and "reasoning" are frequently used as synonyms. But in technical contexts, their meanings are often distinguished.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Moser2006"/> Reason is usually understood as the faculty responsible for the process of reasoning.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref>Mosterín, Jesús (2008). ''Lo mejor posible: Racionalidad y acción humana''. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2008. 318 pp. {{ISBN\|978-84-206-8206-8}}.</ref> This process aims at improving mental states. Reasoning tries to ensure that the norms of rationality obtain. It differs from rationality nonetheless since other psychological processes besides reasoning may have the same effect.<ref name="Mele2004a"/> Rationality derives etymologically from the Latin term ''{{lang\|la\|rationalitas}}''.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/> Line 31: A common idea of many theories of rationality is that it can be defined in terms of reasons. On this view, to be rational means to respond correctly to reasons.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/> For example, the fact that a food is healthy is a reason to eat it. So this reason makes it rational for the agent to eat the food.<ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/> An important aspect of this interpretation is that it is not sufficient to merely act accidentally in accordance with reasons. Instead, ''responding'' to reasons implies that one acts [[Intention\|intentionally]] because of these reasons.<ref name="Broome2021"/> Some theorists understand reasons as external facts. This view has been criticized based on the claim that, in order to respond to reasons, people have to be aware of them, i.e. ifthey have some form of epistemic access.<ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Lord2018-1"/> But lacking this access is not automatically irrational. In one example by [[John Broome (philosopher)\|John Broome]], the agent eats a fish contaminated with [[salmonella]], which is a strong reason against eating the fish. But since the agent could not have known this fact, eating the fish is rational for them.<ref name="Broome2007"/><ref name="Kiesewetter2017"/> Because of such problems, many theorists have opted for an internalist version of this account. This means that the agent does not need to respond to reasons in general, but only to reasons they have or possess.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Lord2018-1"/><ref name="Lord2018-3"/> The success of such approaches depends a lot on what it means to have a reason and there are various disagreements on this issue.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/> A common approach is to hold that this access is given through the possession of [[evidence]] in the form of cognitive [[mental state]]s, like [[perception]]s and [[knowledge]]. A similar version states that "rationality consists in responding correctly to beliefs about reasons". So it is rational to bring an umbrella if the agent has strong evidence that it is going to rain. But without this evidence, it would be rational to leave the umbrella at home, even if, unbeknownst to the agent, it is going to rain.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Lord2018-3"/> These versions avoid the previous objection since rationality no longer requires the agent to respond to external factors of which they could not have been aware.<ref name="Broome2021"/> A problem faced by all forms of reason-responsiveness theories is that there are usually many reasons relevant and some of them may conflict with each other. So while salmonella contamination is a reason against eating the fish, its good taste and the desire not to offend the host are reasons in favor of eating it. This problem is usually approached by weighing all the different reasons. This way, one does not respond directly to each reason individually but instead to their [[weighted sum]]. Cases of conflict are thus solved since one side usually outweighs the other. So despite the reasons cited in favor of eating the fish, the balance of reasons stands against it, since avoiding a salmonella infection is a much weightier reason than the other reasons cited.<ref name="Broome2007"/><ref name="Kiesewetter2017"/> This can be expressed by stating that rational agents pick the option favored by the balance of reasons.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="McClennen2004"/> Line 193: ===Economics=== Rationality plays a key role in economics and there are several strands to this.<ref>{{cite book\|title=Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk\|publisher=Oxford University Press\|author=Paul Anand\|year=1993\|isbn=0198233035}}{{page needed\|date=July 2019}}</ref> Firstly, there is the concept of instrumentality—basically the idea that people and organisations are instrumentally rational—that is, adopt the best actions to achieve their goals. Secondly, there is an axiomatic concept that rationality is a matter of being logically consistent within your preferences and beliefs. Thirdly, people have focused on the accuracy of beliefs and full use of information—in this view, a person who is not rational has beliefs that do not fully use the information they have. Debates within economic sociology also arise as to whether or not people or organizations are "really" rational, as well as whether it makes sense to model them as such in formal models. Some have argued that a kind of [[bounded rationality]] makes more sense for such models. Line 258: <ref name="Mintoff1997">{{cite journal \|last1=Mintoff \|first1=Joe \|title=Slote on Rational Dilemmas and Rational Supererogation \|journal=Erkenntnis \|date=1997 \|volume=46 \|issue=1 \|pages=111–126 \|doi=10.1023/A:1005337707418 \|s2cid=117173349 \|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MINSOR \|access-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-date=2023-08-12 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230812182353/https://philpapers.org/rec/MINSOR \|url-status=live }}</ref> <ref name="Priest2002">{{cite journal \|last1=Priest \|first1=G. \|title=Rational Dilemmas \|journal=Analysis \|date=2002 \|volume=62 \|issue=1 \|pages=11–16 \|doi=10.1093/analys/62.1.11 \|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PRIRD-2 \|access-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814153740/https://philpapers.org/rec/PRIRD-2 \|url-status=live }}</ref> <ref name="Heinzelmann2022">{{cite journal \|last1=Heinzelmann \|first1=Nora \|title=Rationality is Not Coherence \|journal=Philosophical Quarterly \|date=2022 \|volume=999 \|pages=312–332 \|doi=10.1093/pq/pqac083 \|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HEIRIN \|access-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814153745/https://philpapers.org/rec/HEIRIN \|url-status=live }}</ref> <ref name="Pinker2022">{{cite web \|last1=Pinker \|first1=Steven \|title=rationality \|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/rationality \|website=www.britannica.com \|access-date=6 August 2022 \|language=en \|archive-date=14 August 2022 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814153740/https://www.britannica.com/topic/rationality \|url-status=live }}</ref> <ref name="Frankena1983">{{cite journal \|last1=Frankena \|first1=William K. \|title=Concepts of Rational Action in the History of Ethics \|journal=Social Theory and Practice \|date=1983 \|volume=9 \|issue=2/3 \|pages=165–197 \|doi=10.5840/soctheorpract198392/37 \|jstor=23558957 \|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23558957 \|issn=0037-802X \|access-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814153740/https://www.jstor.org/stable/23558957 \|url-status=live }}</ref> Line 274: <ref name="Mele2004a">{{cite book \|last1=Mele \|first1=Alfred R. \|last2=Rawling \|first2=Piers. \|title=The Oxford Handbook of Rationality \|date=2004 \|publisher=Oxford University Press \|isbn=978-0-19-514539-7 \|url=https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195145399.001.0001/acprof-9780195145397-chapter-1 \|chapter=INTRODUCTION: Aspects of Rationality \|doi=10.1093/0195145399.001.0001 \|access-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-date=2022-01-22 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220122151733/https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195145399.001.0001/acprof-9780195145397-chapter-1 \|url-status=live }}</ref> <ref name="Kolb2008">{{cite book \|last1=Kolb \|first1=Robert W. \|title=Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society \|date=2008 \|publisher=SAGE \|isbn=978-1-4129-1652-3 \|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5m9yq0Eu-vsC \|language=en \|chapter=Rationality \|access-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-date=2023-12-30 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142648/https://books.google.com/books?id=5m9yq0Eu-vsC \|url-status=live }}</ref> <ref name="Audi2004">{{cite book \|last1=Audi \|first1=Robert \|editor-first1=Alfred R \|editor-first2=Piers \|editor-last1=Mele \|editor-last2=Rawling \|title=The Oxford Handbook of Rationality \|date=2004 \|publisher=Oxford University Press \|isbn=978-0-19-514539-7 \|url=https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195145399.001.0001/acprof-9780195145397-chapter-2 \|chapter=~~THEORETICAL~~Theoretical ~~RATIONALITY~~Rationality: Its Sources, Structure, and Scope \|doi=10.1093/0195145399.001.0001 \|access-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-date=2023-12-30 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142659/https://academic.oup.com/oxford-scholarship-online \|url-status=live }}{{dead link\|date=February 2024}}</ref> <ref name="Hintikka2006">{{cite book \|last1=Jaakko \|first1=Hintikka \|last2=Sandu \|first2=Gabriel \|title=Philosophy of Logic \|date=2006 \|publisher=North Holland \|pages=13–39 \|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/JAAWIL \|chapter=What is Logic? \|access-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-date=2021-12-07 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211207235525/https://philpapers.org/rec/JAAWIL \|url-status=live }}</ref> <ref name="Hampton1996">{{cite book \|last1=Hampton \|first1=Jean \|title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy \|url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/rationality-practical/v-1 \|date=1996 \|publisher=Routledge \|language=en \|chapter=Rationality, practical \|access-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-date=2022-08-14 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814154359/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/rationality-practical/v-1 \|url-status=live }}</ref> Line 298: * [https://web.archive.org/web/20151031091523/http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ArchiveFolder/Research%20Group/Publications/Reason/ReasonRationality.htm Reason and Rationality], by Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich, Luc Faucher on the broad field of reason and rationality from descriptive, normative, and evaluative points of view * [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-historicist/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Historicist Theories of Rationality] * [http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/leglreas.htm Legal Reasoning After Post-Modern Critiques of Reason] {{Webarchive\|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121221145826/http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/leglreas.htm \|date=2012-12-21 }}, by Peter Suber {{cite journal \|last1=Spohn \|first1=Wolfgang \|title=The Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality \|journal=Croatian Journal of Philosophy \|date=2002 \|volume=II \|issue=6 \|pages=249–264 \|citeseerx=10.1.1.1019.3269 }} [[Lucy Suchman]] (2007). Human-machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Action. Cambridge University Press.