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Abortion debate

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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by RoyBoy (talk | contribs) at 16:31, 20 October 2007 (→Privacy: shorten caption, for quote below). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

The abortion debate refers to discussion and controversy surrounding the moral and legal status of abortion. The two main groups involved in the abortion debate are the pro-choice movement, which generally supports access to abortion and regards it as morally permissible, and the pro-life movement, which generally opposes access to abortion and regards it as morally wrong. Each movement has, with varying results, sought to influence public opinion and to attain legal support for its position. In Canada, for example, abortion is available on demand,[1] while in Nicaragua abortions are always illegal. In the USA, abortion is generally legal but subject to restrictions in some jurisdictions and circumstances. In some cases, the abortion debate has led to the use of violence.

Terminology

Many of the terms used in the debate are seen as political framing: terms used to validate one's own stance while invalidating the opposition's. For example, the labels "pro-choice" and "pro-life" imply endorsement of widely held values such as liberty and freedom, while suggesting that the opposition must be "anti-choice" or "anti-life" (alternatively "pro-coercion" or "pro-death"). Such terms gloss over the underlying issue of which choice or life is being considered and whose choice or what kind of life is deemed most important.

Appeals are often made in the abortion debate to the alleged "rights" of the fetus, pregnant woman or other parties. Such appeals can generate confusion if the type of rights is not specified (whether civil, natural, or otherwise), or if it is simply assumed that the right appealed to takes precedence over all other competing rights (an example of begging the question).

The appropriate terms with which to designate the human organism prior to birth are also debated. The terms "embryo" and "fetus" are seen by pro-life advocates as dehumanizing; the terms "baby" and "unborn child" are seen by pro-choice advocates as emotionalized. Likewise, there is debate between use of the terms "woman" and "mother".

Political debate

Politics refers to the processes, defined and limited through legal documents, by which decisions (laws) are made in governments. In politics, rights are the protections and privileges legally granted to citizens by the government. Regarding abortion law, the political debate usually surrounds a right to privacy, and when or how a government may regulate abortion. For example, there is abundant debate regarding the extent of abortion regulation. Some argue that it is illegal for governments to regulate abortion any more than other medical practices.[2] Some argue that governments may regulate abortions after the 20th week,[3] viability,[4] or the second trimester.[5] Some want to regulate all abortions, starting from conception.[6]

Privacy

Time has stated that the issue of bodily privacy is "the core" of the abortion debate.[7] In political terms, privacy can be understood as a condition in which one is not observed or disturbed by government.[8] Privacy, in relation to abortion, is defined as the ability of a woman to "decide what happens to her own body".[7]

While governments are allowed to invade the privacy of their citizens in some cases, they are expected to protect privacy in all cases lacking a compelling state interest. Abortions are recognized as being private, but are criticized for producing the negative effect of the death a biological human. Critics argue that abortion regulation is valid because the state interest in protecting prenatal life is compelling. Defenders argue either that there is no state interest in regulating abortion, or that the woman's privacy is a more compelling interest.

Albert Wynn and Gloria Feldt at the U.S. Supreme Court to rally in support of Roe v. Wade.

U.S. judicial involvement

Roe v. Wade, which struck down state laws banning abortion in 1973, was the first of many cases that have defined abortion law in the United States. Since Roe, abortion has been legal throughout the country, but states have placed varying regulations on it, from requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion to restricting late-term abortions.

Critics of the Roe decision argue that it is an example of judicial activism and that it should be overturned so that abortion law can be decided by legislatures.[9] Justice Potter Stewart, who joined with the majority, viewed the Roe opinion as "legislative" and asked that more consideration be paid to state legislatures.[10] In response to an argument that the judiciary can "call the contending sides of national controversy to end their national division", Justice Antonin Scalia wrote:

Quite to the contrary, by foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue arouses, by banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish [over abortion].[11]

Some also cite Gonzales v. Carhart as judicial activism.[12] In upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, Carhart is the first judicial opinion upholding a legal barrier to a specific abortion procedure.

"No to abortion" at a 2007 meeting with Pope Benedict XVI in São Paulo, Brazil. The crowd have both arms raised in a prayer gesture.

Church and state

The separation of church and state is an oft-debated topic in connection with abortion. Many churches have official positions on abortion, and there is a correlation between these official positions and the personal positions of adherents. Some argue that efforts to codify official church positions are an illegal breach of separation. Some argue that churches are an important source of information, resources, and incentives to engage in the political process.[13] Religious influences are closely tied to ethical opposition of abortion,[14] and ethical opposition often impels people toward political opposition. Some argue that separation of church and state should include separation of religion from politics.[15] Arguments regarding church intrusion are defended by referencing the similar ethical arguments against abortion that are made by atheists.[16]

Ethical debate

Main articles: Ethical aspects of abortion and Philosophical aspects of the abortion debate

Ethics refers to "moral philosophy," or the study of values and the analysis of right and wrong. In contrast with politics, ethics goes beyond what is or can be legal to what should be legal. In ethics, rights have no connection with legal documents, like a constitution, but are presented as inherent. Regarding abortion, the ethics debate usually surrounds whether an embryo has rights, and whether those rights should take precedence over a woman's. For many, there is a strong correlation between religion and abortion ethics.

Personhood

Some argue that abortion is wrong based on a belief that an embryo is an innocent person with a right to live.[17] Others argue that the designation of an embryo as a person is incorrect. If it is accepted that an embryo is innocent and biologically human, it may be debated whether an embryo should be referred to as a person with any rights.[18] Some define personhood through a set of criteria. A being need not exhibit every criterion to qualify as a person, but failure to exhibit most is proposed as disqualification. One list includes consciousness (at least the capacity to feel pain), reasoning, self motivation, the ability to communicate on many possible topics, and self-awareness.[19]

Lists like this are intended to help someone be able to objectively distinguish between a biological human and a person. According to the author of this list, an embryo is not a person because it satisfies only one criterion, namely consciousness (and this only after it becomes susceptible to pain).[20] Other lists apply similar criteria, concluding that an embryo lacks personhood (and a right to life) because it lacks self-consciousness,[21] rationality,[22] and autonomy.[23] These lists diverge over precisely which features confer a right to life,[24] but tend to propose that they are developed psychological features not found in embryos.

Criticism of this line of reasoning begins with two classes of persons (after birth) in which these criteria do not confer personhood: those who are comatose, and infants. Just like embryos, comatose patients (even when the coma is reversible) do not satisfy the criteria—they are not conscious, do not communicate, and so on. Therefore, based on the criteria, these are not "persons" and lack a right to life.[25] Likewise, infants do not begin to exhibit additional criteria—beyond embryos— until around one year old. Mary Ann Warren concedes that infants are not "persons" by these criteria,[26] and others state that infanticide could be morally acceptable under some circumstances (i.e. if the infant is severely disabled[27] or in order to save the lives of other infants[28]). Critics of this formulation argue that these allowances are a major failure of defining personhood by observed characteristics.

An alternate definition of personhood relies on a being's natural capacity instead of its current observable capacity. It is argued that being the kind of being that can develop itself to the point of exhibiting the criteria is what is crucial. Biological humans have this natural capacity—and have it essentially. By this view, personhood begins at conception[29] and it is not possible for an embryo to fail to have a right to life.[30] It is argued that both definitions rely on arbitrary distinctions.[31][32]

Pro-life demonstrators in Washington, D.C. symbolically cover their mouths with red tape.

Deprivation

Some argue that abortion is wrong because it deprives the embryo of a valuable future.[33] By this argument, killing any human being is wrong because it deprives the victim of a valuable future: any experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would have been enjoyed.[34] Thus, if a being has a valuable future ahead of it—a "future like ours"—then killing that being would be seriously wrong.[35] As an embryo has a valuable future, the "overwhelming majority" of deliberate abortions are placed in the "same moral category" as killing an innocent adult human being.[36] Not all abortions are deemed to be seriously wrong. According to this formulation, abortion may be justified if the same justification can be applied to killing a postnatal human.

Criticism of this line of reasoning follows several threads. Some argue that the personal identity of the embryo is questionable, arguing that humans are not biological organisms, but rather embodied minds that come into existence when the brain gives rise to certain developed psychological capacities.[37] By this criticism, the embryo would not itself have a future of value, but would merely have the potential to give rise to a different entity that would have a future of value. Some argue that deprivation of a valuable future is not possible if there are no psychological connections (i.e. memory, belief, desire, etc.) between the being as it is at death and the being as it would have become.[38] Some criticize this argument due to the inequalities it creates.[39] As some futures appear to contain much more value than others—a middle class person’s future has much less gratuitous pain and suffering than someone in extreme poverty—some killings would turn out to be much less wrong than others. Some argue that killing is not wrong because of future value but because of the interest one has in its future. They argue that an embryo's lack of conscious interest in its future dismisses this formulation. Some argue that gametes have equal potential as a zygote, arguing that this reasoning deems contraception to be wrong.

File:March.jpg
The 2004 March for Women's Lives near the Washington Monument.

Bodily rights

Main article: A Defense of Abortion

Some argue that abortion is right (or permissible) because it allows a woman her right to control her body. This formulation is irrespective of the rights ascribed to embryos. The argument holds that the decision to carry an embryo to term falls within the prerogative of each woman. Forcing a woman to continue an unwanted pregnancy is made analogous to forcing one person's body to be used as a dialysis machine for another person suffering from kidney failure.

Criticism of this line of reasoning argues that the given analogy is poor. It is argued that the analogy (with a person suffering from kidney failure) overlooks tacit consent[40] and subsequent responsibility[41] for having participated in intercourse; the embryo is the woman's child as opposed to a stranger[42]; and that abortion kills the embryo and does not merely let it die.[43][44] Some defend this formulation, dismissing these objections as morally irrelevant or inapplicable.[45]

Another argument in favor of abortion is the questionable quality of life for unwanted children when a woman is forced to carry a pregnancy to term. This is particularly relevant in the case of rape victims, as well as women who, due to youth or disability, are incapable of caring for a child, or sometimes even fully understanding the situation.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ "abortion on demand". Dictionary.com. Retrieved 2007-05-01. (1) the right of a woman to have an abortion during the first six months of a pregnancy; (2) an abortion performed on a woman solely at her own request
  2. ^ "Abortion". Positions. British Columbia Civil Liberties Association. Retrieved 2007-05-24. …rights call for complete legal freedom to secure an abortion, in the sense that the legal status of abortion should be the same as that of other medical services that a doctor provides to a patient
  3. ^ "Abortion". Where We Stand—CMA Position Papers. California Medical Association. 1973. p. 43. Retrieved 2007-05-24. Good medical practice indicates that abortion should not be performed after the 20th week of pregnancy {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  4. ^ Lee, Ellie (2002). "Abortion issues today - a position paper" (PDF). Legal Issues for Pro-Choice Opinion - Abortion Law in Practice. University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NY, UK. p. 2. Retrieved 2007-05-24. While most people have no difficulty accepting the legality of abortion at early stages of pregnancy, fewer are so sure about their position as pregnancy progresses – especially when the fetus is perceived to be 'viable' {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  5. ^ "Abortion". Positions. American Medical Women's Association. 2000. Retrieved 2007-05-24. The 1973 Supreme court decision Roe v. Wade struck a fair balance between the responsibility of the state to protect a woman's right to make personal medical decisions and the responsibility of the state to protect the potentially viable third trimester fetus
  6. ^ Johnston, Wm. Robert (24 December 2002). "Evaluation of the BGCT Christian Life Commission's "Abortion and the Christian Life"". Committee Report. First Baptist Church, Brownsville, Texas. …the unique value that human life has, as a gift from God, regardless of stage of development or physical health, from the point of conception to the point of physical death {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  7. ^ a b "Abortion and Privacy". TIME. 1972-03-13. Retrieved 2007-05-25.
  8. ^ "Privacy". Compact Oxford English Dictionary. AskOxford.com. Retrieved 2007-05-24.
  9. ^ Romney, Mitt (2005-07-26). "Why I Vetoed Contraception Bill". The Boston Globe. Retrieved 2007-05-24. …avoiding the bitter battles engendered by 'one size fits all' judicial pronouncements. A federalist approach would allow such disputes to be settled by the citizens and elected representatives of each state, and appropriately defer to democratic governance
  10. ^ Kmiec, Douglas W. (1996-04-22). "Testimony of Douglas W. Kmiec". Judiciary Committee, U.S. House of Representatives. Retrieved 2007-05-24.
  11. ^ Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
  12. ^ Hossain, Farhana (2007). "The Presidential Candidates on Abortion". New York Times. Retrieved 2007-05-23. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  13. ^ Greenberg, Anna (Fall 2000). "The Church and the Revitalization of Politics and Community". Political Science Quarterly. 115 (3): 377-394(18). {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  14. ^ Kelley, Jonathan (1993). "Moral Reasoning and Political Conflict: The Abortion Controversy". The British Journal of Sociology. 44 (4): 589–612. doi:10.2307/591412. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  15. ^ Weithman, Paul J. (Winter 1991). "The Separation of Church and State: Some Questions for Professor Audi". Philosophy and Public Affairs. 20 (1): 52–65. Audi sees the separation doctrine so understood as but one part of a larger issue: the separation of religion from politics {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  16. ^ Roth, Jen (2000-08-20). "A Secular Case Against Abortion". Secularist v. Secularist: Abortion. Infidels.org. Retrieved 2007-05-23.
  17. ^ Warren, 1973
  18. ^ Warren 1973: 457. See also Tooley 1972: 40-43; Singer 2000: 126-28 and 155-156; and John Locke. Person is used as a psychological property, a moral property, or both.
  19. ^ Warren 1973: 458.
  20. ^ Warren 1973: 458-459
  21. ^ Tooley 1972: 44.
  22. ^ Singer 2000: 128 and 156-157.
  23. ^ McMahan 2002: 260
  24. ^ It is similarly unclear which features one must have a natural capacity for, in order to have a right to life (cf Schwarz 1990: 105-109), or which features constitute a "future like ours."
  25. ^ Marquis 1989: 197; Schwarz 1990: 89. One response is that the reversibly comatose "retain all their unconscious mental states," from Stretton 2004: 267, original emphasis; Singer 2000: 137; Boonin 2003: 64-70
  26. ^ Warren 1982
  27. ^ Singer 2000: 186-193
  28. ^ McMahan 2002: 359-360
  29. ^ Conception is the point at which the organism becomes biologically human.
  30. ^ Lee 1996 and 2004: Schwarz 1990: 91-93.
  31. ^ McMahan 2002: 261-265 argues that current capacity definition is arbitrary.
  32. ^ Stretton 2004: 270-274; McMahan 2002: 217 argue that natural capacity definition is arbitrary.
  33. ^ Marquis 1989. See also Stone 1987.
  34. ^ Marquis 1989: 189-190
  35. ^ Marquis 1989: 190. The type of wrongness appealed to here is presumptive or prima facie wrongness: it may be overridden in exceptional circumstances.
  36. ^ Marquis 1989: 183.
  37. ^ McMahan 2002: ch 1.
  38. ^ McMahan 2002: 271; Stretton 2004: 171-179
  39. ^ Stretton 2004: 250-260; see also McMahan 2002: 234-235 and 271
  40. ^ Warren 1973
  41. ^ McMahan 2002
  42. ^ Schwarz 1990; McMahan 2002
  43. ^ Schwarz 1990; McMahan 2002
  44. ^ Schwarz 1990; Lee 1996
  45. ^ Boonin 2003: ch 4

References

  • Boonin, David (2003). A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Public Policy. Boulder: University of Colorado. ISBN 0521520355.
  • Lee, Patrick (1996). Abortion and Unborn Human Life. Catholic University of America Press. ISBN 0813208467.
  • Lee, Patrick (2004). "The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defense". Bioethics. 18 (3): 249. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00393.x. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  • Mappes, Thomas A. (2001). Biomedical Ethics. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0072303654. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Marquis, Don (1989). "Why Abortion is Immoral". The Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  • McMahan, Jeff (2002). The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford Ethics Series. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195169824.
  • Warren, Mary Ann (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". In Thomas A. Mappes (ed.). Biomedical Ethics. David DeGrazia. McGraw-Hill. pp. 456–461. {{cite conference}}: Unknown parameter |booktitle= ignored (|book-title= suggested) (help)
  • Warren, Mary Ann (1982). "Postscript on Infanticide". In Thomas A. Mappes (ed.). Biomedical Ethics. David DeGrazia. McGraw-Hill. pp. 461–463. {{cite conference}}: Unknown parameter |booktitle= ignored (|book-title= suggested) (help)
  • Schwarz, Stephen D. (1990). The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press. ISBN 0829406239.
  • Singer, Peter (2000). Writings on an Ethical Life. Ecco (HarperCollins). ISBN 0060198389.
  • Stone, Jim (1987). "Why Potentiality Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17 (4): 815–830. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  • Stretton, Dean (2004). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  • Tooley, Michael (1972). "Abortion and Infanticide". Philosophy and Public Affairs. 2 (1): 37–65. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help)

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