Hwasong-11A
| Hwasong-11A | |
|---|---|
| Type | Short-range ballistic missile |
| Place of origin | North Korea |
| Service history | |
| Used by | North Korea Russia |
| Wars | Russian invasion of Ukraine |
| Production history | |
| Designed | 2018 |
| Manufacturer | February 11 Plant |
| Specifications | |
| Mass | 3,415 kg (7,529 lb) |
| Length | 8.7 m (29 ft) |
| Diameter | 1.1 m (3 ft 7 in)[1] |
| Warhead | 500 kg (1,100 lb), nuclear and conventional[2] |
| Engine | Solid composite propellant |
Operational range | 900 km (560 mi)[3] |
Guidance system | Inertial navigation system (INS), possible satellite navigation |
| Accuracy | 35 m[4] |
Launch platform | 8×8 wheeled TEL 10×10 wheeled TEL Tracked launcher Railway car |
The Hwasong-11A[a] (Korean: 《화성-11가》형; lit. Mars Type 11A;[b] KN-23 under United States’s naming convention)[7] is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled short-range ballistic missile.
The official name of this missile (Hwasong-11A), which was previously known by the United States’s designation (KN-23), was revealed by North Korea during the “Weaponry Exhibition-2023” military exhibition.[8]
Design
[edit]The Hwasong-11A bears an external resemblance to the Russian Iskander-M and South Korean Hyunmoo-2B short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), being distinguished by its elongated cable raceway, different jet vane actuators and smooth base. Like the Iskander-M, it flies in a quasi-ballistic trajectory, flattening out below an altitude of about 50 km (160,000 ft) where the atmosphere is dense enough so the missile's fins can change course along its flight path.[7][9][10]
It is believed to have a range of some 450 km with a 500 kg warhead, putting all of South Korea within range. It is possible to extend the range out to 690 km with a reduced payload. The warhead can be conventional, likely unitary or submunition, or nuclear. Its active steering capability could make it accurate to within 100 meters CEP with satellite guidance, or within 200 meters using INS alone. It is launched from a wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).[7][9][10]
It is significantly larger than the Iskander, with it using likely the same 1.1 meter diameter motor as the Pukguksong-1. The motor is somewhat lengthened, having only one stage, compared to the Pukkuksong-1. The motor has a very different structure, compared to the Iskander. Its TEL has more space for the missile, as it lacks the structure immediately after the cab.[11]
The missile is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs, like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6. Being road-mobile and solid-fueled, it can be moved and fired more rapidly, making it more difficult for an opposing force to locate and target before firing. Once launched, the missile's low apogee, short overall flight time, and ability to conduct a terminal "pull-up" maneuver makes it harder to detect and be intercepted by traditional missile defense systems. Its increased accuracy also reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target.[7][9][10]
The Hwasong-11A is likely to feature some form of foreign involvement such as parts, as when compared to the later developed Hwasong-11B (KN-24), the Korean Central News Agency focuses mainly on the deployment of the missile, with little coverage on its research. While the Hwasong-11B are called 'Juche projectiles', it is never mentioned for the KN-23. The focus on the combat-readiness of the system suggests that it had been deployed for a while but not tested, like the Hwasong-10.[12] The KN-23 still bears significant differences from the 9K720 Iskander.[13]
Its warhead section has enough space for up to 1500 kilograms of high explosives compared to 700 kilograms for SCUD-B (Hwasong-5) and 800 kilograms of 9K720 Iskander.[4]
History
[edit]North Korea first displayed the Hwasong-11A publicly in a military parade on 8 February 2018. The first flight test was on 4 May 2019 near Wonsan, reaching an apogee of 60 km and a range of 240 km (150 mi). The footage was apparently manipulated, and the missiles were probably fired from two different vehicles.[11] Five days later, two more missiles were fired from Kusong. One had a range of 420 km (260 mi) and the other had 270 km (170 mi), both with a 50 km apogee.[7][9]
On 17 May 2019, the missile was designated by the United States Forces Korea as KN-23. North Korea test-fired another two missiles on 25 July 2019, both missiles again reaching 50 km in altitude, but demonstrating greater ranges of 430 km (270 mi) and 690 km, before landing in the Sea of Japan. A fourth flight test on 6 August 2019 launched two missiles from North Korea's west coast, overflying the North Korean capital region at an apogee of 37 km out to 450 km.[7][9]
North Korea stated the test of two road-mobile Hwasong-11A missiles on 27 January 2022 was to confirm the power of an air burst conventional warhead. The launch was on a depressed trajectory of 20 km apogee, previously 37-60 km, while traveling 190 km (120 mi), showing that the missile can fly at a lower altitude over short ranges, which would reduce reaction time for missile defenses. Taken together, this suggests that the KN-23 is operational.[14]
Rail launched missile
[edit]On 15 September 2021, two missiles were fired from Yangdok that traveled 800 km (500 mi), to a maximum altitude of 60 km. They appeared to be baseline KN-23 versions. They flew much further than any previous flight of the weapon, and went an even greater distance than the larger variant tested earlier in 2021. Such excess range could indicate it hadn't previously been tested out to its maximum range, or that the design underwent modifications such as a reduced payload or flight profile improvements. The launches were made from a modified railway car rather than the typical road-mobile launcher. The launch railcar used two side-by-side erector/launcher mechanisms like the side-by-side arrangement used in the TEL.[15][16]
The use of a rail-mobile system is unusual for an SRBM, as road-mobile launchers are easier for deploying and hiding relatively small missiles, while railway missiles are restricted to the rail network. Adding railway launchers may be an effort to further increase and diversify the country's SRBM missile force, since modifying existing railcars to fire missiles could be a way to supplement a limited number of launch trucks, or possibly to test the concept before applying it to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A rail-borne ICBM would have advantages over one carried by a wheeled TEL, as such large liquid-fueled missiles carried in railway cars would be able to move more places and be kept in a higher readiness state.[17][18]
On 14 January 2022, North Korea again tested railway launched Hwasong-11A. Two missiles fired from Uiju and traveled 430 km (270 mi). On 15 January, KCNA released photos of the missile launching test.[19]
Combat use
[edit]The missile was highly likely first used in combat during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. An unknown number of North Korean ballistic missiles were transferred to Russia in October 2023, according to declassified US intelligence. Based on debris left by Russian attacks on Ukrainian targets on 30 December 2023, the ring housing the control vanes have been identified as being characteristic to the KN-23 and KN-24 missiles.[20][21] The barometer on the missile was found to have a Hangul character, and various parts of the missile were stamped with the possible factory name.[1]
According to the Conflict Armament Research, 75% of components in the guidance control system for the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) fired at Kharkiv are based on American parts.[22] They also indicated that some of the missiles were newly produced.[23]
During the Kharkiv strikes of 2 January 2024, Ukrainian authorities noted that the missiles used were of North Korean origin, noting that the shape and design were different than that of Iskander missiles. On 29 April 2024, the UNSC confirmed that the munitions used during the strike were that of Hwasong-11A (KN-23)s.[24][25]
On 7 May 2024, Ukrainian sources reported that the missiles have a high failure rate. According to these officials, half of the North Korean missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air.[26]
Variants
[edit]Along with the base version, Hwasong-11A has some variants:[5]
Larger variant
[edit]Hwasong-11C is the larger version of Hwasong-11A, claimed to have a 2.5 tons warhead.[5]
A variant with 4.5 tons warhead, called Hwasong-11C-4.5, was tested on 1 July 2024 and 18 September 2024.[27][28]
SLBM variant
[edit]Hwasong-11S is the underwater-launched version of Hwasong-11A.[5]
It was tested two times, on 19 October 2021 and 25 September 2022.[29]
Smaller variant
[edit]Hwasong-11D is the smaller variant of Hwasong-11A, with reduced range.[5]
It was tested on 16 April 2022, 3 November 2022, 9 March 2023 and 17 May 2024.[29]
See also
[edit]- Hwasong-11B (KN-24)
- Hwasong-11C
- Hwasong-11D
- Hwasong-11S
Notes
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ a b "Documenting a North Korean missile in Ukraine". ArcGIS StoryMaps. Conflict Armament Research. 2024-01-19. Retrieved 2024-01-21.
- ^ "Report to Congress on North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs". USNI News. U.S. Naval Institute. 26 January 2023.
- ^ "【お知らせ：北朝鮮のミサイル等関連情報】".
- ^ a b Delory, Stéphane; Bondaz, Antoine; Maire, Christian (2023). "North Korean Short Range Systems: Military consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25" (PDF). Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. Archived (PDF) from the original on 16 January 2023. Retrieved 27 December 2024.
- ^ a b c d e "Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK". Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 2025-01-04.
- ^ Lewis, Jeffery. "Jeffery Lewis's post on X (formerly Twitter)". Twitter. Retrieved 2023-04-09.
- ^ a b c d e f KN-23. Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- ^ "KN-23（イスカンデル擬き）は火星11Aである" [KN-23 (Iskander imitator) is Hwasong-11A]. Yahoo News Japan (in Japanese). Retrieved 2024-12-29.
- ^ a b c d e KN-23. Missile Defense Advocacy.
- ^ a b c North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation. 38 North. 9 October 2019.
- ^ a b "Pukguksong GLBM-2 and GLBM-3". www.b14643.eu. Retrieved 2021-10-25.
- ^ "A Tale of Two Missiles: Analysis of KCNA Reports on North Korea's KN-23 and KN-24 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles". datayo.org. Archived from the original on 2021-01-15. Retrieved 2021-10-13.
- ^ "Preliminary Analysis: KN-23 SRBM". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 2019-06-05. Retrieved 2021-10-13.
- ^ Vann H. Van Diepen (31 January 2022). "North Korea's Fifth and Sixth Rounds of January Missile Launches". 38 North. The Henry L. Stimson Center. Retrieved 31 January 2022.
- ^ It’s the Launcher, Not the Missile: Initial Evaluation of North Korea’s Rail-Mobile Missile Launches. 38 North. 17 September 2021.
- ^ The First DPRK Missile Launch from a Rail-Mobile Launcher Archived 2022-01-30 at the Wayback Machine. One Earth Future. 17 September 2021.
- ^ It’s the Launcher, Not the Missile: Initial Evaluation of North Korea’s Rail-Mobile Missile Launches. 38 North. 17 September 2021.
- ^ The First DPRK Missile Launch from a Rail-Mobile Launcher Archived 2022-01-30 at the Wayback Machine. One Earth Future. 17 September 2021.
- ^ Shin, Hyonhee. "North Korea tests railway-borne missile in latest launch amid rising tension with U.S." Reuters.
- ^ "White House says Russia used missiles from North Korea to strike Ukraine". Retrieved 5 January 2024.
- ^ US DoD accuses Russia firing North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles against Ukraine. Army Recognition. 5 January 2024.
- ^ "North Korea used US parts in ballistic missile Russia fired at Ukraine: Report". NK News. 21 February 2024. Archived from the original on 2024-02-22.
- ^ "Newly made North Korean missile used in Russian strike on Ukraine: Re…".
- ^ "Ukraine shows evidence Russia fired North Korea missile at Kharkiv". Reuters. 6 January 2024. Retrieved 1 May 2024.
- ^ Nichols, Michelle (29 April 2024). "Exclusive: UN experts say North Korea missile landed in Ukraine's Kharkiv". Reuters. Retrieved 1 May 2024.
- ^ "Exclusive: Ukraine examines N.Korean missile debris amid fears of Moscow-Pyongyang axis". Reuters. 7 May 2024. Retrieved 7 May 2024.
- ^ "DPRK Missile Administration Conducts Test-fire of New-type Tactical Ballistic Missile". Korean Central News Agency. 2 July 2024. Retrieved 2025-01-04.
- ^ "North Korea tests 'explosive power' of new ballistic missile". NK News. 19 September 2024. Retrieved 2025-01-04.
- ^ a b "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved 2025-01-03.