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Syrian–Turkish normalization

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Syrian–Turkish normalization
DateDecember 2022 – ongoing
LocationRussia, Syria, Turkey
Also known asNormalizing relations between Syria and Turkey
CauseRefugee crisis,[1] separatism, economic crisis
PatronsPM Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani[2]
FM Sergei Lavrov
Alexander Lavrentiev
Participants Iraq
 Russia
 Syria
 Turkey

The Syrian–Turkish normalization refers to attempts to restore Syria–Turkey relations that were damaged in the wake of the Syrian crisis. Turkey was considered a strong ally of Syria prior to the year 2011. Diplomatic ties between the two nations have been severed as of 26 March 2012.

The initial explicit endeavor can be traced back to August 2022, when Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu articulated the potential for restoring Turkish-Syrian ties to their former state. This was contingent upon the Syrian government offering assurances of positive neighborly interactions, including measures to safeguard borders and combat terrorism and separatist activities.

The Syrian government's position is that there will be no progress in the negotiations unless Ankara withdraws its forces from Syrian territory.[3] The parties sponsoring the Turkish-Syrian reconciliation are seeking to convene a summit between the two nations leaders. The opposition Syrian National Coalition neither supports nor opposes the initiative. In December 2022, a trilateral summit was held in Moscow between the defense ministers of Syria, Turkey, and Russia.[4] On 7 July 2024, Turkish President Erdoğan stated that he could invite Assad to a meeting in Turkey at any time.[5]

Analysts have indicated that the main obstacle to the completion of the Turkish-Syrian reconciliation process are Iran and ongoing Turkish occupation of the Syrian territory.[6][7]

Background

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The relationship between Syria and Turkey deteriorated significantly in the early 2010s, particularly after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Initially, Turkey had cultivated close ties with Syria under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Bashar al-Assad, emphasizing economic cooperation and diplomatic engagement. However, Turkey's support for the Syrian opposition and its demand for Assad's resignation in response to the Syrian government's violent crackdown on protests led to a severe rift between the two countries. This was evident in the Ankara's declaration of 26 March 2012 to shut down its embassy in Damascus to show disapproval of Assad.[8] However, the consulate in Aleppo remained open.[9] In June 2012, the Syrian Armed Forces shot down a Turkish fighter plane over Syrian territorial waters.[10] Turkey became a key player in supporting anti-Assad factions, hosting millions of Syrian refugees, and allowing its territory to be used by rebel groups, further deepening tensions. The conflict escalated as Turkey became increasingly involved in military operations in northern Syria, aimed at both countering Kurdish groups it considers terrorist organizations and mitigating the influx of refugees. The involvement of Russia and Iran on the side of the Syrian government also complicated Turkey’s position, contributing to the strain in Syrian-Turkish relations.

However, by the early 2020s, regional dynamics began shifting. Turkey, facing economic challenges and a complex geopolitical landscape, signaled a willingness to normalize relations with neighboring countries, including Syria. The rebuilding of ties was driven by pragmatic considerations, such as addressing security concerns along the border, managing refugee flows, and economic pressures. Talks brokered by Russia and other regional actors, as well as a broader trend of rapprochement in the Middle East, led to incremental steps toward improving relations. By 2022, while full normalization had not yet been achieved, there were noticeable efforts to reduce hostilities and open channels of communication between Ankara and Damascus.

Issues

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Refugees

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A major catalyst for Turkey's rapprochement with Bashar al-Assad's government is the refugee crisis that has been ongoing for 13 years. Recently, Turkish political parties and forces expressed their desire to return Syrian refugees.[11] Clashes and acts of violence between Turkish citizens and Syrian residents in Turkey have led to tension between the Syrian opposition and the Turkish authorities. The presence of millions of refugees also creates burdens on the Turkish economy, which is facing difficulties. The safe return of refugees to major cities is one of Türkiye's conditions for resuming relations.[citation needed]

Separatism

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It is acknowledged that both parties are concerned about the separatist aspirations demonstrated by the autonomous administration in northeastern Syria, which was established in 2016.[12] The SDF aims to organize elections in this area, a proposal vehemently opposed by Ankara.[13]

Terrorism

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Syrian reconciliation

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Turkey calls for a solution to the Syrian conflict based on negotiations between the official opposition and the government in Damascus that lead to a comprehensive national unity government.

Timeline

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  • 11 August 2022 – The Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced that he had a short conversation with his Syrian counterpart, Faisal Mekdad, on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in October 2021. Protests occur in Syrian opposition areas.[14]
  • 23 August 2022 – the Turkish Foreign Minister announces that his country has no preconditions for dialogue with Syria.[15]
  • September 2022, Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan was reported to have visited Damascus[16]
  • 16 September 2022Hurriyet newspaper reports that Erdoğan wanted to meet Assad at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Uzbekistan.[17]
  • 3 April 2023 – A meeting in Moscow for the three countries at the level of deputy foreign ministers, in addition to Iran, which was included
  • 25 April 2023 – The defense ministers of the four countries met in Moscow to discuss strengthening security in Syria and normalization between Ankara and Damascus
  • 7 May 2023 – The suspension of Syria's membership in the Arab League is lifted.[18]
  • 28 May 2023 – President Erdoğan wins a new five-year term. There are doubts about the possibility of continuing the normalization path.
  • 17 July 2023 – President Erdoğan says that he is ready to meet with President Assad, but setting withdrawal as a condition for dialogue is "unacceptable."[19] He added that the issue is their approach towards us. They want Turkey to leave northern Syria. This cannot happen, because we are fighting terrorism.
  • 19 July 2023SDF leaders warn against normalization.[20]
  • 9 August 2023 – In an interview, Assad said: Our goal is Turkey's withdrawal from Syrian territory, but Erdoğan wants to legitimize Turkey's presence. Therefore, a meeting cannot take place on Erdoğan's terms.[21]
  • 5 September 2023 – Erdoğan criticizes Syria, saying that it is not taking positive steps towards normalization
  • 28 May 2024 – Erdoğan's ally Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, called for military cooperation with the Syrian government.[22]
  • 17 June 2024Aydınlık newspaper reports that a meeting was held between a military delegation from the Turkish Armed Forces and a Syrian military delegation at the Hmeimim base, Latakia, in a resumption of negotiations that have been suspended for a while. It was also reported that the next meeting will be held in Baghdad, Iraq.[23]
  • 26 June 2024 – Al-Assad stated during his meeting with the Russian envoy Lavrentiev that his country is open to all initiatives related to relations with Turkey.
  • In early September 2024, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Turkey was ready to withdraw its forces from Syria.
  • 10 September 2024 – During an Arab League meeting in Cairo, Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad and his accompanying delegation walked out when invited Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan delivered his speech. [24] This was attributed to Damascus' refusal to Ankara's attendance.[25]
  • 3 November 2024 – Foreign Minister Fidan revealed that Bashar al-Assad's government was not prepared to normalize relations with Turkey or reach an agreement with the opposition to end the conflict.[26]

Reactions

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  •  Iran: On 13 January 2023, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian welcomed the improving relations between Syria and Turkey.[27]
  •  Iraq: Iraq has participated in the mediation of rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus to a large extent since April 2024.

See also

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References

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  1. ^ "Turkey Hosts Syria Opposition After Outreach to Assad". Voice of America. 3 January 2023. Archived from the original on 18 June 2024. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  2. ^ "Iraqi PM says Baghdad works on Syria-Turkey reconciliation". 1 June 2024. Archived from the original on 14 August 2024. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  3. ^ "Syria says no dialogue with Turkey before Ankara announces plans to withdraw its troops". AP News. 4 June 2024. Archived from the original on 18 June 2024. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  4. ^ "Russian, Syrian, Turkish defence ministers meet in Moscow for first talks since 2011". France 24. 28 December 2022. Archived from the original on 20 March 2023. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  5. ^ "Erdogan to invite Assad for talks to restore Turkey-Syria ties". Reuters. 7 July 2024. Retrieved 3 August 2024.
  6. ^ Analysis: Iran obstructs normalization between Turkey and Syria
  7. ^ "Syria: Abuses, Impunity in Turkish-Occupied Territories". Human Rights Watch. 29 February 2024. Retrieved 10 October 2024.
  8. ^ "Turkey shuts embassy in Syria to isolate Assad | Reuters".
  9. ^ "Turkey temporarily closes its embassy in Damascus". The Times of Israel. 26 March 2012.
  10. ^ "Syrian military says it downed Turkish fighter jet". 22 June 2012. Archived from the original on 5 March 2023. Retrieved 18 June 2024 – via www.bbc.com.
  11. ^ "Turkey's main opposition leader hopes to meet with Assad to discuss refugee problem". Turkish Minute. 5 July 2024. Archived from the original on 14 August 2024. Retrieved 3 August 2024.
  12. ^ "Kurds fear 'everything will change' if Syria, Turkey reconcile | Reuters". Archived from the original on 3 December 2022. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  13. ^ "Turkey signals a new military intervention in Syria if Kurdish groups hold local elections". AP News. 30 May 2024. Archived from the original on 18 June 2024. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  14. ^ "Assad opponents in Syria protest Turkish 'reconciliation' call | Reuters".
  15. ^ "Turkey has no preconditions for dialogue with Syria - foreign minister | Reuters".
  16. ^ "Turkish, Syrian intelligence chiefs meet: reports". Archived from the original on 14 August 2024. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  17. ^ "Erdogan wanted to meet Syria's Assad - Turkish media | Reuters". Archived from the original on 8 June 2023. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  18. ^ "Arab League votes to re-admit Syria, after 11 years of suspension". 7 May 2023. Archived from the original on 14 August 2024. Retrieved 18 June 2024 – via Le Monde.
  19. ^ "Turkey's Erdoğan says he is open to meeting with Syria's Assad".
  20. ^ "Damascus-Ankara normalisation would deepen Syrian crisis, warns Kurdish-led SDF". 19 July 2023. Archived from the original on 14 August 2024. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  21. ^ "Syria's Assad tamps down expectations of closer ties with Turkey, Arab world | Reuters". Archived from the original on 11 August 2023. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  22. ^ "BAHÇELİ, ESAD'LA İŞBİRLİĞİ ÇAĞRISI YAPTI". Adımlar Dergisi. 28 May 2024. Archived from the original on 14 August 2024. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  23. ^ "Syrian, Turkish officials to meet in Baghdad soon". 6 June 2024.
  24. ^ [1]
  25. ^ هل يرسل انسحاب المقداد أثناء كلمة نظيره التركي «رسائل متناقضة»؟
  26. ^ Syria's Assad not ready for normalization with Türkiye: FM
  27. ^ "Iran praises possible rapprochement between Syria and Turkey". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 14 August 2024. Retrieved 18 June 2024.