

Public Key Encryption Which is Simultaneously a Locally-Decodable Error-Correcting Code

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Abstract

In this paper, we introduce the notion of a Public-Key Encryption Scheme that is also a Locally-Decodable Error-Correcting Code (PKLDC). In essence, this is a protocol that is semantically-secure in the standard sense, but possesses the additional property that it is a binary error-correcting locally-decodable code against any polynomial-time Adversary. That is, we allow a polynomial-time Adversary to read the entire ciphertext, perform any polynomial-time computation and change an arbitrary (i.e. adversarially chosen) constant fraction of *all* bits of the ciphertext. The goal of the Adversary is to cause error in decoding any bit of the plaintext. Nevertheless, the decoding algorithm can decode **all** bits of the plaintext (given the corrupted ciphertext) while making a mistake on *any* bit of the plaintext with only a negligible in k error probability. In addition, the decoding algorithm has a **Local Decodability** property. That is, given a corrupted ciphertext of $E(x)$ the decoding algorithm, for any $1 \leq i \leq n$, can recover the i 'th bit of the plaintext x with overwhelming probability reading a sublinear (in $|x|$) number of bits of the corrupted ciphertext and performing computation polynomial in the security parameter k .

We present a general reduction from any semantically-secure encryption protocol and any computational Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol to a PKLDC. In particular, since it was shown that homomorphic encryption implies PIR, we give a general reduction from any semantically-secure homomorphic encryption protocol to a PKLDC. Applying our construction to the best known PIR protocol (that of Gentry and Ramzan), we obtain a PKLDC, which for messages of size n and security parameter k achieves ciphertexts of size $\mathcal{O}(n)$, public key of size $\mathcal{O}(n + k)$, and locality of size $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$. This means that for messages of length $n = \omega(k^{2+\epsilon})$, we can decode bit of the plaintext from a corrupted ciphertext while doing computation sublinear in n . We emphasize that this protocol achieves codewords that are only a *constant* times larger than the underlying plaintext, while the best known locally-decodable codes (due to Yekhanin) have codewords that are only slightly subexponential in the length of the plaintext. In addition, we believe that the tools and techniques developed in this paper will be of independent interest in other settings as well.

Keywords: Public Key Cryptography, Locally Decodable Codes, Error Correcting Codes, Bounded Channel Model, Chinese Remainder Theorem, Private Information Retrieval.

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1 Introduction

Error correction has been an important field of research since Shannon laid the groundwork for a mathematical theory of communication in the nineteen forties. An error correcting code is a pair of algorithms C and D such that given a message x , $C(x)$ is a codeword such that, given a string y , if the Hamming Distance between $d(C(x), y)$ is “small”, then $D(C(x)) = x$. When speaking of an error correcting code, two of its most important characteristics are the *information rate*, which is the ratio of the message size to the codeword size $\frac{|x|}{|C(x)|}$, and the *error rate* which is the smallest ϵ such that if $d(C(x), y) > \epsilon|C(x)|$ then $D(C(x))$ fails to recover x uniquely. Since the field’s inception, many codes have been found that exhibit both constant information rate, and constant error rate, which, in a sense, is optimal. These codes all share the property that to recover even a small portion of the message x from the codeword y , the receiver must decrypt the entire codeword. In [21], Katz and Trevisan posed the question: can codes be found in which a single bit of the message can be recovered by decoding only a small number of bits from the codeword? Codes of this type are called *locally-decodable*, and would be immensely useful in encoding large amounts of data which only needs to be recovered in small portions, for example any kind of database or archive. Currently the best known locally-decodable codes are due to Yekhanin [35], they can tolerate a constant error rate, but achieve only slightly better than exponentially small information rates¹.

It was shown by Katz and Trevisan [21], that any information-theoretic Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme can be transformed into a locally-decodable code. While this provides a new approach to the problem of constructing efficient locally-decodable codes, so far it has not lead to any codes with significantly sub-exponential size codewords, as we are still unable to construct efficient information-theoretic Private Information Retrieval schemes.

In 1994, Lipton examined the notion of error-correction in the computationally bounded channel model [24]. In this model, errors are not introduced in codewords at random, but in a worst case fashion *by a computationally bounded adversary*. This realistic restriction on the power of the channel allowed for the introduction of cryptographic tools into the problem of error correction. In [24] and [14] it was shown how, assuming a shared private key, one can use hidden permutations to achieve improved error correcting codes in the private key setting. Recently, Micali, Peikert, Sudan and Wilson used the computationally bounded channel model to show how existing error correcting codes could be significantly improved in the public-key setting [28]. After seeing the dramatic improvement of error-correcting codes in this model, a natural question then becomes whether locally-decodable codes can also be improved in the computationally bounded channel model.

The first real progress in this setting was by Ostrovsky, Pandey and Sahai [31], where they construct a constant information-rate, constant error-rate locally-decodable code in the case where the sender and receiver share a private key. This left open the question whether the same can be accomplished in the Public-Key setting, which does not follow from their results. Indeed, a naïve proposal (that does not work) would be to encrypt the key needed by [31] separately and then switch to the private-key model already solved by [31]. This however leaves unresolved the following question: how do you encrypt the private key from [31] in a locally-decodable fashion? Clearly, if we allow the adversary to corrupt a constant fraction of all the bits (including encryption of the key and the message), and we encrypt the key separately, then the encryption of the key must consume a constant fraction of the message, otherwise it can be totally corrupted by an Adversary. But if this is the case all hope for local decodability is lost. Another suggestion is to somehow hide the encryption of the key inside the encryption of the actual message, but it is not clear how this can be done.

A more sophisticated, but also flawed, idea is to use Lipton’s code-scrambling approach [24]. In his paper, Lipton uses a private shared permutation to “scramble” the code and essentially reduce worst-case error to random error. A first observation is that we can use PIR to implement a random permutation in the public-key setting. We proceed as follows: the receiver will generate a random permutation $\sigma \in S_r$, and the receiver’s public key would be a set of PIR queries Q_1, \dots, Q_r , where Q_i is a PIR query for the $\sigma(i)$ th block of an r block database, using some known PIR protocol. The sender would then break their message x into blocks, x_1, \dots, x_r , apply standard error correction to each block, calculate the Q_1, \dots, Q_r on their message, apply standard error correction to each PIR response $R_i = Q_i(\text{ECC}(x))$, and send the message $\text{ECC}(R_1), \dots, \text{ECC}(R_r)$. If ECC and PIR have constant expansion rates, as is the case with many ECCs and the Gentry-Ramzan PIR [11], the resulting code has only constant expansion rate. But

¹Yekhanin achieves codewords of size $2^{n^{1/\log \log n}}$ for messages of length n , assuming there exist infinitely many Mersenne primes.

an adversary can still destroy a single block, by focusing damage on a single PIR response. If we add redundancy by copying the message c times, and publishing cr PIR queries, the adversary can still destroy a block with non-negligible probability by destroying constant number of blocks at random, and with non-negligible probability the adversary will destroy all c responses corresponding to the same block, and the information in that block will be lost. Recall that we demand that no bit of information should be destroyed except with negligible probability. Hence this method does not work either. Of course, this can be fixed by increasing the redundancy beyond a constant amount, but then the codeword expansion becomes more than constant as does the public key size. Thus, this solution does not work either, and new ideas are needed. Indeed, in this paper, we use PIR to implement a hidden permutation, but we achieve a PKLDC which can recover from constant error-rate with only *constant* ciphertext expansion.

1.1 Previous Work

The first work on error correction in the computationally bounded channel model was done by Lipton in [24]. In [24] and [14] it was shown how to use hidden permutations to achieve improved error correcting codes in the private key setting. The computationally bounded channel model was first considered in the public key setting only recently. In [28], Micali et al used a generic public key signature scheme combined with list-decoding to demonstrate a class of binary error correcting codes with positive information rate, that can uniquely decode from $\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$ error rate, under the assumption that one-way functions exist. These codes decode from an error rate *above* the proven upper bound of $\frac{1}{4} - \epsilon$ in the (unbounded) adversarial channel model. Here, again, we emphasize the reasonableness of the computationally bounded channel model, since under the assumption that one-way functions exist, Micali et al show that *all* channels (that don't hold the messages for an exponential amount of time) must be computationally bounded, or they could be used as inverters of the one-way function. The first application of the computationally bounded channel to Locally Decodable Codes was in [31], although their work was in the private-key setting.

In addition to extending the work in the computationally bounded channel model, our work draws heavily from the field of Computational Private Information Retrieval (PIR). The first computational PIR protocol was [22], and since then there has been much progress, see for example [4], [5], [20], [23], [11]. For a survey of work relating to computational PIR see [30].

1.2 Our Results

In this paper, we present a general reduction from semantically-secure encryption and a PIR protocol to a Public Key Encryption system with local decodability (PKLDC). We also present a general reduction from any homomorphic encryption to a PKLDC. In §7 we present the first Locally Decodable Code with constant information-rate which does not require the sender and receiver to share a secret key. To achieve this, we work in the Computationally Bounded Channel Model, which allows us to use cryptographic tools that are not available in the Adversarial Channel Model. Our system presents a significant improvement in communication costs over the best codes in the information-theoretic setting. Yekhanin's Codes, described in [35], which are currently the shortest known locally decodable codes in the information-theoretic setting, still have codewords which are almost exponential in the message size, while our codewords are only a constant times larger than the message.

Informally, our results can be summarized as follows,

Main Theorem (informal). Given a computational PIR protocol with query size $|Q|$, and response size $|R|$ which retrieves dk bits per query, and a semantically-secure encryption protocol, there exists a Public Key Locally Decodable Code which can recover from a constant error-rate in the bits of the message, which has public key size $\mathcal{O}(n|Q|/(dk^2) + k)$ and ciphertexts of size $\mathcal{O}(n|R|/(dk^2))$, where n is the size of the plaintext and k is the security parameter. The resulting code has locality $\mathcal{O}(|R|k/d)$, i.e. to recover a single bit from the message we must read $\mathcal{O}(|R|k/d)$ bits of the codeword.

Combining the main theorem with the general reduction from homomorphic encryption to PIR, we obtain

Corollary 1. Under any homomorphic encryption protocol which takes plaintexts of length m to ciphertexts of length αm , there is a Public-Key Locally Decodable Code which can recover from a constant error-rate in the bits of the message, with public key size $\mathcal{O}(nk\beta \sqrt[\beta]{n})$ and ciphertexts of size $\mathcal{O}(n\alpha^{\beta-1}k)$, for any $\beta \in \mathbb{N}$, where n is the size of the plaintext and k is the security parameter. The resulting code has locality $\mathcal{O}(\alpha^{\beta-1}k^2)$, i.e. to recover a single bit from the message we must read $\mathcal{O}(\alpha^{\beta-1}k^2)$ bits of the codeword.

We can further improve efficiency if we have a Length-Flexible Additively Homomorphic Encryption like D amgaard-Jurik [8], using this cryptosystem we obtain

Corollary 2. Under the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption [32] there is a Public-Key Locally Decodable Code which can recover from a constant error-rate in the bits of the message, with public key size $\mathcal{O}(n \log^2(n) + k)$ and ciphertexts of size $\mathcal{O}(n \log(n))$, where n is the size of the plaintext and k is the security parameter. The resulting code has locality $\mathcal{O}(k^2 \log(n))$, i.e. to recover a single bit from the message we must read $\mathcal{O}(k^2 \log(n))$ bits of the codeword.

We also give a specific construction of a system based on the Φ -hiding assumption (see §7), in this situation we obtain

Corollary 3. Under the Small Primes Φ -Hiding Assumption (Assumption 1) there is a Public-Key Locally Decodable Code which can recover from a constant error-rate in the bits of the message, with public key size $\mathcal{O}(n)$ and ciphertexts of size $\mathcal{O}(n)$, where n is the size of the plaintext and k is the security parameter. The resulting code has locality $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$, i.e. to recover a single bit from the message we must read $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$ bits of the codeword.

Note that in full generality, our main result requires two assumptions, the existence of a PIR protocol and a semantically-secure encryption protocol. In practice, however, two separate assumptions are usually not needed, and all the corollaries apply under a single hardness assumption.

Our construction does have a few disadvantages over the information-theoretic codes. First, our channel is computationally limited. This assumption is fairly reasonable, but it is also necessary one for any type of public key encryption. In [28], Micali et al. show that if a true adversarial channel exists, which can always introduce errors in a worst-case fashion, then one-way functions cannot exist. Second, our code has a larger ‘‘locality’’ than most information-theoretic codes. For example, in Yekhanin’s Codes, the receiver is only required to read three letters of the codeword to recover one letter of the message. In our code in §7 the receiver must read $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$ bits to recover 1 bit of the plaintext, where k is the security-parameter. It should be noted, however, that to maintain the semantic security of the cryptosystem, the receiver must read $\omega(\log k)$ bits to recover any single bit of the message. It is an interesting question whether the locality of our code can be reduced from $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$ to $\mathcal{O}(k)$. For long messages (i.e. $n = \omega(k^{2+\epsilon})$) our code still presents a very significant improvement in locality over standard error correcting codes.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

In this paper, we adopt the following naming conventions.

- x or X will denote a plaintext message, which will usually be n bits in length.
- k will denote our security parameter.
- $\nu(k)$ will denote a function which is negligible in k .

We will use the notation \in_R , to denote an element drawn uniformly at random from a set.

3 Computationally Locally Decodable Codes

3.1 Modelling Noisy Channels

When discussing error correcting, or locally-decodable codes, it is important to consider how the errors are introduced by the channel. While it may be natural to assume the errors are introduced ‘‘at random’’, small changes in the exact nature of these errors can result in substantial changes in the bounds on the best possible codes.

The first definition of a noisy channel is due to Claude Shannon [34]. Shannon defined the *symmetric channel* where each message symbol is independently changed to a random different symbol with some fixed probability, called the error rate. An alternative definition of a noisy channel is Hamming’s *adversarial channel*, where one imagines an adversary corrupting bits of the message in a worst-case fashion,

subject only to the total number of bits that can be corrupted per block. Most error correcting and locally-decodable codes were designed for Hamming’s model.

In 1994, Lipton [24] observed that the adversarial channel model assumes that the adversarial channel itself is computationally unbounded. In that paper, Lipton proposed a new model of *computationally bounded noise*, which is similar to Hamming’s adversarial channel, except the adversary is restricted to computation which is polynomial in the block length of the code. This restriction on the channel’s ability to introduce error is a natural one, and it is implied by the existence of any one-way function [28]. Throughout this paper, we use Lipton’s model.

3.2 Definitions

We use the standard definition of computational indistinguishability for public key encryption, where we also view the size of the plaintext as a function of the security parameter. That is, we set the plaintext x to be of length k^α , where k is the security parameter and $\alpha > 1$.

The primary difference between our definition and the standard definition of semantic security is the local decodability property of the cryptosystem. Roughly, this says that given an encryption c of a message x , and a corrupted encryption c' such that the hamming distance of c and c' is less than $\delta|c|$, the time it takes the decoder to decode any bit x_i of the plaintext x from c' is much shorter than the length of the message, and does not increase as the message length increases.

Definition 1. We call *Public Key Cryptosystem semantically-secure (in the sense of indistinguishability) and δ -computationally locally-decodable* if there is a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (G, E, D) , such that for all k and for all α sufficiently large

- $(PK, SK) \leftarrow G(1^k, \alpha)$,
- $c \leftarrow E(PK, x, r)$ (where $|x| = k^\alpha$ is a plaintext message of length polynomial in k , and r is the randomness of the encryption algorithm);
- $b' \leftarrow D(SK, c', i)$

so that for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, A' :

$$\Pr[(PK, SK) \leftarrow G(1^k, \alpha); \{x^0, x^1, \gamma\} \leftarrow A(PK); A'(E(PK, x^b, r), \gamma) = b] < \frac{1}{2} + \nu(k),$$

where x^0 and x^1 must both be of length k^α , and the probability is taken over the key generation algorithm’s randomness, b , randomness r used in the encryption algorithm E and the internal randomness of A and A' .² Furthermore, it is computationally, locally-decodable. That is, for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A'' and A''' ,

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr[(PK, SK) \leftarrow G(1^k, \alpha); \\ &\quad (x, \gamma) \leftarrow A''(PK); \\ &\quad c \leftarrow E(PK, x, r); \\ &\quad \{c', i\} \leftarrow A'''(c, \gamma) : \\ &\quad D(SK, c', i) = x_i] > 1 - \nu(k), \end{aligned}$$

where x_i denotes the i th bit of x , x must be of the length k^α , c' and c must be of the same length and the hamming distance between c' and c is at most $\delta|c|$, and where the probability is taken over the key generation algorithm’s randomness, the randomness r used in the encryption algorithm E and the internal randomness of both A'' and A''' . The information-rate is $\frac{|m|}{|c|}$ and we call the decryption algorithm *locally-decodable* if its running time is $o(k^\alpha)$, and the *efficiency* of the local decodability is measured as a function of k and α .

²As is standard practice, to allow the adversary A to pass state information γ , which could include information about the plaintexts x^0, x^1 , which might be of use in determining which plaintext is encrypted by $E(PK, x^b, r)$.

4 Building Blocks

Our construction relies on a number of standard cryptographic tools and for completeness we briefly review them here

4.1 Private Information Retrieval

A computational Private Information Retrieval protocol (PIR) is a protocol in which a user or client to query a position from a database, while keeping the position queried hidden from the server who controls the database. In particular the user generates a decryption key D_{PIR} , picks a position j and generates a query Q_j . Then, given Q_j , the server who has database (or message) x , can execute query Q_j on x and obtain a response R_j . The privacy requirement is that server cannot guess the position j with probability noticeably greater than random. The correctness requirement is that given D_{PIR} , and R_j the user can correctly recover the j th position of the message x . The efficiency of a PIR protocol is measured in the communication complexity, i.e. the sizes of Q and R . Currently, the most efficient PIR protocol is that of Gentry and Ramzan [11], which has $|Q| = |R| = \mathcal{O}(k)$ where k is a security parameter, and each query successfully retrieves approximately $k/4$ bits of the message x .

Formal definitions and concrete constructions of computational Private Information Retrieval protocols can be found in [22], [19], [4], [5] or [11].

4.2 Semantically-Secure Public Key Encryption

Our construction requires a semantically-secure encryption protocol, SSE. The only requirement we make on the protocol SSE, is that for a message x , $|\text{SSE}(x)| = \mathcal{O}(|x|)$. For concreteness, we assume $|\text{SSE}(x)| = c_1|x|$ for some constant c_1 . This is achieved by many cryptosystems for example [32], [8], [29], [10], or the Φ -hiding based scheme in described §7.2.

To avoid making additional intractability assumptions, it is natural to choose hardness assumption that yields both a semantically-secure encryption protocol as well as a PIR protocol. In practice this is almost always the case, for example Paillier's Cryptosystem [32] and Chang's PIR [5], or Gentry-Ramzan [11] (or Cachin-Micali-Stadler PIR [4]) and the encryption protocol outlined in Section 7.2. It is also worth noting that since [19] shows that any homomorphic encryption protocol immediately yields a PIR protocol, if we have a homomorphic encryption, we need not make an additional assumption to obtain a PIR protocol.

4.3 Reed-Solomon Codes

Our construction uses a standard error-correcting code as building block. In this paper we use the Reed-Solomon code for three reasons. First, it is very simple algebraically; second it is almost universally known and understood; and third, when recovering from a constant error rate it has only a constant expansion factor. It should be clear, however, that these codes can be replaced by any efficient error-correcting code.

The Reed-Solomon Error Correcting Code (RS-ECC) works as follows: first we fix a prime p of length k , and all computations are done in the field $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$. Then, given a plaintext x of length n , we represent x as a polynomial f_x of degree $n/k - 1$ over $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$. This can be done in many ways, perhaps the simplest is to break x into blocks of size k and view these as the coefficients of f_x . Then, the encoding of x is simply the evaluation of f_x at a number of points in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$. We need at least n/k evaluations uniquely determine a polynomial of degree $n/k - 1$, the RSECC adds redundancy by evaluating f_x at more points, $\text{RSECC}(x) = (f_x(1), \dots, f_x(\rho n/k))$ for some $\rho > 1$. For distinct plaintexts x, y , we have $f_x - f_y \neq 0$, and since a nonzero polynomial of degree $n/k - 1$ has at most $n/k - 1$ zeros, $\text{RSECC}(x)$ and $\text{RSECC}(y)$ must have hamming distance at least $(\rho - 1)n/k + 1$, thus this code can recover from $(\rho - 1)n/(2k)$ errors in the evaluation points, i.e. it can recover from an error rate of $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}$ in the digits of the code.

From now on we will view $\text{RSECC}(x)$ as a $\rho n/k$ -tuple which can be successfully decoded from an error rate of $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}$ in its digits.

4.4 Binary Error Correction

A desirable property of any error-correcting code is the ability to recover from a constant fraction of errors among the *bits* of the codeword. A drawback of many error-correcting codes, and locally-decodable codes,

is that they are defined over large alphabets, and can only recover from a constant fraction of errors in the alphabet of the code. The natural alphabet of the RSECC described above is the field $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$. In practice, all these codes are implemented on computers, where the natural alphabet is $\{0, 1\}$. Thus when we say that a code like Reed-Solomon code can tolerate a constant fraction of errors, we mean a constant fraction of errors in their natural alphabet. In the Reed Solomon code, if one bit of each evaluation point is corrupted, there are no guarantees that the message will not be corrupted. Binary error correcting codes do exist, but they are generally not as efficient as codes over larger alphabets.

To allow our code to tolerate a constant fraction of errors in the *bits* of the ciphertext, we will make use of a binary error correcting code ECC, with two properties

- $|\text{ECC}(x)| = c_2|x|$ for some constant c_2 ,
- ECC can recover from an error-rate of $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$ in the *bits* of $\text{ECC}(x)$.

Such codes exist, for $\delta > \frac{1}{4}$ in the unbounded adversarial channel model, and $\delta > 0$ in the computationally bounded channel model. See Appendix B for a more in-depth discussion.

5 Construction

5.1 High Level Outline of Our Construction

A public key will be a list of t PIR queries Q_1, \dots, Q_t , along with the public key to the semantically-secure encryption SSE. The private key will be the private key for the semantically-secure encryption, the private key for the PIR protocol and a permutation $\sigma \in S_t$ such that Q_j is a query for the $\sigma(j)$ th position of the message. To encrypt an n -bit message X , we first divide X into r blocks X_1, \dots, X_r , then we encrypt each block using our semantically-secure encryption (this can be done by further subdividing the block if necessary). Then we encode each block using the Reed-Solomon code, thus obtaining a list of evaluation points that constitute the Reed-Solomon encoding of this block. Next, we concatenate the evaluation points for all the blocks, and, treating this list as a single database, we evaluate all t PIR queries on it. Finally, we encode each PIR response with a standard binary error correcting code ECC.

In more detail, we assume that when we evaluate a PIR query Q on a message X , the PIR response R encodes dk bits of X where k is our security parameter and d depends on the specific PIR protocol used. For example the Gentry-Ramzan protocol has $d \approx \frac{1}{4}$, while a PIR protocol like [4] which only retrieves a single bit at a time has $d = 1/k$. Next, we fix a prime p of length k which will determine the base-field of the RSECC. Then, we set $r = n/(\ell k)$, thus each block X_i has $|X_i| = \ell k$, where ℓ is the parameter that will determine the “spread” of our code. Next we encrypt each block X_i using SSE, obtaining $\text{SSE}(X_1), \dots, \text{SSE}(X_r)$ where $|\text{SSE}(X_i)| = c_1 \ell k$. Then we encode each encrypted block as $c_1 \rho \ell$ field elements in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ using RSECC. Thus we can recover any block X_i as long as no more than $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}$ of the field elements that encode it are corrupted. Finally, we concatenate all $c_1 r \rho \ell$ field elements, thus at this point our “database” is $c_1 r \rho \ell k = c_1 n \rho$ bits. Next we evaluate all t queries Q_1, \dots, Q_t on this database. Since we wish to retrieve *all* the information in X , we need $t = c_1 n \rho / (dk)$. Thus we obtain t PIR responses R_1, \dots, R_t . Finally, we send the t -tuple $(\text{ECC}(R_1), \dots, \text{ECC}(R_t))$.

Thus our final encryption is of size $c_1 c_2 n \rho |R_j| / (dk)$. If $|R_j| \approx k$ as is case in [4], [5], [11], then our encryption will be of length $c_1 c_2 \rho n / d$. If we use the PIR protocol in [11] then, d will be constant, thus our code will have constant information rate. Notice that the spread parameter ℓ has no effect on the length of the encryption. This encryption is error correcting because as long as no more than $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}$ of the responses that encode a given block are corrupted, the block can be recovered correctly by first decoding each point using ECC, and then reconstructing the block using the RSECC. This cryptosystem is also locally-decodable since to decrypt a given block, it suffices to read the $\frac{c_1 \rho \ell}{dk}$ PIR responses that encode it.

5.2 Error Correcting Public Key Encryption

We now define a triple of algorithms G, E, D for our encryption scheme.

Key Generation: $G(1^k, \alpha)$.

- Fix a prime p of length k .

- Generate public-key private-key pair for SSE, PK_E, SK_E .
- Generate a PIR decryption key D_{PIR} .
- Generate a random permutation $\sigma \in S_t$.
- Generate t PIR queries Q_1, \dots, Q_t , where Q_j queries the block of dk bits at position $(\sigma(j) - 1)c_1dk + 1$ of a $c_1n\rho$ bit database.

The public key will then be

$$PK = (PK_E, Q_1, \dots, Q_t)$$

and the secret key will be

$$SK = (\sigma, SK_E, D_{PIR})$$

Thus the public key will be of length $t|Q| + |SK_E| = c_1n\rho|Q|/(dk)$. If we use [11], then $|Q| = k$ and d is constant, so assuming $|SK_E| = \mathcal{O}(k)$, we obtain $|PK| = \mathcal{O}(n + k)$.

Encryption: given an n -bit message X ,

- Break X into $r = \frac{n}{\ell k}$ blocks X_i of size ℓk .
- Encrypt each block using SSE. If SSE can only encrypt strings of length k , we simply divide X_i into shorter strings, encrypt the shorter strings and then concatenate the encryptions.
- For each encrypted block, $SSE(X_i)$ we encode it as a list of $c_1\rho\ell$ field elements $Z_{i,1}, \dots, Z_{i,c_1\rho\ell}$ in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ using the RSECC.
- Concatenate all the evaluations, creating $\tilde{X} = Z_{1,1}, \dots, Z_{1,c_1\rho\ell}, \dots, Z_{r,1}, \dots, Z_{r,c_1\rho\ell}$. Thus $|\tilde{X}| = rc_1\rho\ell k = c_1n\rho$ bits, and we run each PIR query $\{Q_1, \dots, Q_t\}$ on \tilde{X} receiving responses R_1, \dots, R_t . Since each PIR query recovers dk bits, we will need c_1/d queries to recover each field element Z .
- Encode each R_j individually using the binary error correcting code ECC.
- The encryption is then the t -tuple $(ECC(R_1), \dots, ECC(R_t))$.

Decryption: to recover the i th block, of a message X from the t -tuple $(ECC(R_1), \dots, ECC(R_t))$

- We wish to retrieve the encoding $Z_{i,1}, \dots, Z_{i,c_1\rho\ell}$, which are the bits of \tilde{X} in positions $(i-1)c_1\rho\ell/d + 1, \dots, ic_1\rho\ell/d$. Thus we select the $c_1\rho\ell/d$ responses that encode X_i , $\{ECC(R_{\sigma^{-1}((i-1)c_1\rho\ell/d+1)}), \dots, ECC(R_{\sigma^{-1}(ic_1\rho\ell/d)})\}$.
- Decode each $ECC(R_j)$ to obtain $\{R_{\sigma^{-1}((i-1)c_1\rho\ell/d+1)}, \dots, R_{\sigma^{-1}(ic_1\rho\ell/d)}\}$.
- Decode each of the $c_1\rho\ell/d$ PIR responses R_j to obtain $Z_{i,1}, \dots, Z_{i,c_1\rho\ell}$.
- Using the RSECC reconstruct $SSE(X_i)$ from $Z_{i,1}, \dots, Z_{i,c_1\rho\ell}$.
- Decrypt $SSE(X_i)$.

Notice that to recover block X_i we only need to read $c_1c_2|R|\rho\ell/d$ bits of the encryption. In the Gentry-Ramzan PIR $|R| = k$ and $d = 1/4$, so we are reading only $\mathcal{O}(\ell k)$ bits of the message. For correctness we will choose $\ell = k$, thus in this case our scheme will achieve locality $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$.

5.3 Local-Decodability

One of the most interesting features of our construction is the local-decodability. To recover a small portion of the message X , only a small portion of the ciphertext ($\text{ECC}(R_1), \dots, \text{ECC}(R_t)$) needs to be decoded. During encryption the message X is broken into blocks of length ℓk bits, and this is the smallest number of bits that can be recovered at a time. To recover a single bit of X , or equivalently the entire block X_i that contains it, we must read $c_1 \rho \ell / d$ blocks of the ciphertext $\{\text{ECC}(R_{\sigma^{-1}((i-1)c_1\rho\ell/d+1)}), \dots, \text{ECC}(R_{\sigma^{-1}(ic_1\rho\ell/d)})\}$. Since $|\text{ECC}(R_j)| = c_2 |R_j|$, we must read a total of $c_1 c_2 |R| \rho \ell / d$ bits. Since the probability of error will be negligible in ℓ , we will set $\ell = k$. Here c_2 and ρ are parameters that determine the error-rate of our code.

Using the Gentry-Ramzan PIR, we have $|R| = k$ and $d = 1/4$, so the locality is $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$. Using the Chang’s PIR [5] based on Paillier’s cryptosystem [32] we have $|R| = 2k$ and $d = 1/2$ so we achieve the same encryption size and locality, although in this situation the public key size is $\mathcal{O}(n^{3/2})$ instead of $\mathcal{O}(n)$ in the Gentry-Ramzan case.

5.4 Extensions

For convenience, in our proof of correctness (§6.2) we set the parameter ρ equal to $1/2$. It should be clear that this value is somewhat arbitrary and that by increasing ρ we increase the error tolerance of the code along with the ciphertext expansion. Similarly, in our proof we set the parameter ℓ to be the security parameter k . We can change ℓ , and an increase in ℓ corresponds to a decrease in the probability that the channel succeeds in introducing an error, and a decrease in the locality of the code. In particular our code fails with probability that is negligible in ℓ , and the smallest number of bits that can be recovered from the message is $\mathcal{O}(\ell k)$.

Our protocol also benefits nicely from the idea of Batch Codes [20]. Since our protocol requires making multiple PIR queries to the same message, this is an ideal application of Batch Codes, which can be used to amortize the cost of making multiple PIR queries to a fixed database. By first “batching” the message \tilde{X} in §5.2, we can significantly decrease server computation by slightly increasing ciphertext expansion, or we can decrease ciphertext expansion by paying a slight increase in server computation. It should be noted that batch codes are perfect, in the sense that batching the message in this way does not change the probability of correctness.

We can also increase the efficiency of our construction by further taking advantage of the bounded channel model. If in addition to the sender knowing the receiver’s public key, we assume that the receiver knows the verification key to the sender’s signature algorithm (a reasonable assumption since anyone receiving messages from the sender should be able to verify them), our scheme benefits nicely from the sign and list-decode methods described in [28]. As in §5.2, we break our message X into ℓk -bit blocks X_1, \dots, X_t . Then, before applying the RSECC to each block, we sign each block using any Public Key Signature Scheme which is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack. The existence of such a scheme is implied by the existence of a one-way function [33]. We can also improve the efficiency of the digital signature by using the standard trick of first hashing the message, then signing the hash. Since every PIR protocol is a collision-resistant hash function [19], we can first “hash” each block X_i then sign the hash of each block. Now, we proceed as before, encoding each signed block using the RSECC, and finally each of these blocks is further encoded by a binary ECC. As mentioned above (in §4.4), the rate of the binary ECC can also be improved via this method. Again, we note that this construction requires the receiver to know the public key for the sender’s signature scheme, in addition to the sender knowing the public key to the receiver’s encryption scheme.

To decode in this situation, we first decode the binary ECC, then we *list-decode* the RSECC. Then, with all but negligible probability, only one of the possible decodings will be a valid *signed* block. This has the effect of improving the information rate of the RSECC. It should be noted that our scheme has constant codeword expansion, and can recover from constant error-rate even without these improvements. The use of digital signatures before applying the RSECC or the binary ECC has the effect of increasing the maximum tolerable error-rate, and decreasing the codeword expansion. Unlike the application of Batch Codes above, this sign and list-decode technique will slightly increase the probability that a message fails to decrypt, although it still remains negligible.

5.5 Constructions Based on Homomorphic Encryption

It was shown in [19] that any homomorphic encryption protocol yields a PIR protocol, thus our construction can be achieved based on any homomorphic encryption protocol. In this situation, it is unnecessary

to first encrypt each block X_i before applying the RSECC since the PIR protocol described in [19] is already semantically-secure. Thus the idea of coupling encryption and error-correction is even more natural in this situation. Using the construction in [30] to construct a PIR protocol from a homomorphic encryption protocol and then applying our construction yields

Corollary 1. Under any homomorphic encryption protocol which takes plaintexts of length m to ciphertexts of length αm , there is a Public-Key Locally Decodable Code which can recover from a constant error-rate in the bits of the message, with public key size $\mathcal{O}(nk\beta \sqrt[\beta]{n})$ and ciphertexts of size $\mathcal{O}(n\alpha^{\beta-1}k)$, for any $\beta \in \mathbb{N}$, where n is the size of the plaintext and k is the security parameter. The resulting code has locality $\mathcal{O}(\alpha^{\beta-1}k^2)$, i.e. to recover a single bit from the message we must read $\mathcal{O}(\alpha^{\beta-1}k^2)$ bits of the codeword.

Using a Length-Flexible Additively Homomorphic Encryption protocol such as the one described in [8] yields an even more efficient PIR protocol. Using the methods outlined in [30] and applying our construction we arrive at the following result

Corollary 2. Under the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption [32] there is a Public-Key Locally Decodable Code which can recover from a constant error-rate in the bits of the message, with public key size $\mathcal{O}(n \log^2(n) + k)$ and ciphertexts of size $\mathcal{O}(n \log(n))$, where n is the size of the plaintext and k is the security parameter. The resulting code has locality $\mathcal{O}(k^2 \log(n))$, i.e. to recover a single bit from the message we must read $\mathcal{O}(k^2 \log(n))$ bits of the codeword.

6 Proof of Security

6.1 Overview

The semantic security of our scheme follows immediately from the semantic security of the underlying encryption SSE. The full proof of the correctness (i.e. local decodability) of our scheme requires some care. Here, we outline only the high-level ideas of the proof. The structure of the proof is as follows. Given an encryption $(\text{ECC}(R_1), \dots, \text{ECC}(R_t))$. The outer ECC forces an adversary to concentrate their errors among only a few R_j . Thus, we may assume that the adversary is only allowed to introduce errors into a constant fraction of the R_j . Then, we note that any polynomial-time adversary cannot tell which remainders R_j encode which block X_i by the privacy of the PIR protocol. Thus any errors introduced in the R_j will be essentially uniform among the Z 's that make up the Reed-Solomon encryptions. Next, we note show that our code has sufficient ‘‘spread’’ so that errors introduced uniformly among the R_j will cluster on the R_j encoding a given block X_i with only negligible probability. Finally, if the errors are not clustered among the R_j that encode a given block, we show that the RSECC will correctly recover that block.

Thus we arrive at the following result

Main Theorem. Given a computational PIR protocol with query size $|Q|$, and response size $|R|$ which retrieves dk bits per query, and a semantically-secure encryption protocol SSE, there exists a Public Key Locally Decodable Code which can recover from a constant error-rate in the bits of the message, which has public key size $\mathcal{O}(n|Q|/(dk^2) + k)$ and ciphertexts of size $\mathcal{O}(n|R|/(dk^2))$, where n is the size of the plaintext and k is the security parameter. The resulting code has locality $\mathcal{O}(|R|k/d)$, i.e. to recover a single bit from the message we must read $\mathcal{O}(|R|k/d)$ bits of the codeword.

6.2 Proof of Local-Decodability

Here, we show correctness, i.e. that our system is computationally locally-decodable up to a constant fraction of errors. By an encryption of a message X , we mean a t -tuple $(\text{ECC}(R_1), \dots, \text{ECC}(R_t))$ where $t = \frac{\rho n}{dk}$, and each R_j is a PIR response to query Q_j . For concreteness, we set $\rho = 2$, and we show that our decoding algorithm decodes correctly with all but negligible probability, at most a $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ fraction of the bits of the encryption have been corrupted by a polynomial-time adversary A . Notice that our algorithm will decode a block X_i correctly whenever no more than $\frac{1}{4} \frac{2\ell}{d}$ of the R_j that encode it are corrupted. Thus we will show that any polynomial-time adversary that corrupts a $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ fraction of the bits, only corrupts more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of the R_j that encode a given block of the message with negligible probability. We prove this through a series of lemmas.

We begin by noticing that any adversary A that corrupts at most $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ fraction of the *bits* of the message, can only corrupt at most a $\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2$ fraction of the R_j .

Lemma 1. Given $(\text{ECC}(R_1), \dots, \text{ECC}(R_t))$, where ECC recovers from a binary error-rate of $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$, any adversary A that corrupts at most $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ bits of the entire codeword, can corrupt no more than $\frac{1}{2} - \delta + \delta^2$ of the R_j

Proof. This is simply counting. A can corrupt a total of $(\frac{1}{4} - \delta)ct|R_j|$ bits, and to corrupt one R_j A needs to spend $(\frac{1}{2} - \delta)c|R_j|$, thus A can corrupt at most $(\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2)t$ of the R_j since

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{(\frac{1}{4} - \delta) ct|R_j|}{(\frac{1}{2} - \delta) c|R_j|} &\leq \frac{\frac{1}{4} - \frac{\delta}{2} - \frac{\delta}{2} + \delta^2 - \frac{\delta^2}{2} + \delta^3}{\frac{1}{2} - \delta} t \\ &= \frac{(\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2) (\frac{1}{2} - \delta)}{\frac{1}{2} - \delta} t \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2\right) t. \end{aligned}$$

■

For the rest of the proof of correctness, we assume that A is restricted to corrupting a $\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2$ fraction of the R_j , rather than $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ bits of the message.

Now, we show that any such corrupting adversary cannot detect whether inputs are “well-formed”, i.e. A behaves in an indistinguishable manner whether the t -tuple (R_1, \dots, R_t) is a valid encryption or not.

Lemma 2. For all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A , such that A introduces errors in t -tuples (R_1, \dots, R_t) , where each R_j is a response to query Q_j and each Q_j queries distinct position in the database, then A will also introduce errors in t -tuples (R_1, \dots, R_t) where each Q_j queries the *same* position of the database.

Proof. Instead of running A on a t -tuple where each query Q_j queries a distinct position in the database, we provide A with t -tuple in which each PIR query Q_j queries the *the same* position in the database. Assume A fails to introduce errors on this malformed input with non-negligible probability ϵ . Now we proceed via hybrid argument. Since the probability the A fails on t queries querying the same position is ϵ greater than when each Q_j queries a different position, then the triangle inequality tells us that there must be some $t^* < t$ such that,

$$|\Pr[A \text{ fails when } t^* Q_j \text{ query the same position}] - \Pr[A \text{ fails when } t^* + 1 Q_j \text{ query the same position}]| > \frac{\epsilon}{t}.$$

We can now use A to break the privacy of the PIR protocol. Given a query Q^* such that Q^* queries position i^* where i^* equals i_0 or i_1 , we construct t^* queries Q_1, \dots, Q_{t^*} that query position i_0 , and $t - t^* - 1$ queries $Q_{t^*+1}, \dots, Q_{t-1}$ that query positions other than i_0, i_1 . We then run A , on the t -tuple $(R_1, \dots, R_{t-1}, R^*)$ where R_j is a response to Q_j for $1 \leq i < t$, and R^* is a response to Q^* . If A fails to introduce errors on this t -tuple, we say that Q^* queries position i_0 . This algorithm correctly distinguishes whether Q^* queries position i_0 or i_1 with probability at least $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2t}$. Although, we do not know the exact value of t^* , we can guess it with probability $\frac{1}{t}$, to obtain an algorithm which decides whether Q^* queries position i_0 with advantage $\frac{\epsilon}{2t^2}$ which is a violation of the privacy of the PIR protocol. ■

If each Q_j queries the same position i , then A must distribute errors randomly among the blocks, since the notion of blocks in this case is completely arbitrary. Since A must behave identically when each Q_j queries the same position as when they all query different positions, we notice that an adversary cannot focus the errors on the remainders encoding a specific block. To make this formal, recall that the message X was divided into blocks $r = \frac{n}{\ell k}$ blocks X_i , and for each block RSECC(SSE(X_i)) was encoded by $2c_1\ell/d$ PIR responses, and t was the total number of responses $t = \frac{2c_1n}{dk}$. If we define $S_i \subset \{R_1, \dots, R_t\}$ to be the set of remainders encoding block X_i , $S_i = h_{\sigma^{-1}(2(i-1)c_1\ell/d+1)}, \dots, h_{\sigma^{-1}(2c_1\ell/d)}$, then $|S_i| = 2\ell/d$, and we obtain the following lemma.

Lemma 3. If A is a probabilistic polynomial-time machine which introduces errors in $\{R_1, \dots, R_t\}$, the distribution of the errors in the set $\{S_1, \dots, S_r\}$ is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform random distribution on $\{S_1, \dots, S_r\}$.

Proof. Suppose there exists a distinguisher D that can distinguish the corruptions A introduces among the S_i from uniform random with advantage ϵ . Then we run D on A 's output when A is given queries that query between one and t distinct positions. When we run A on a t -tuple (R_1, \dots, R_t) where each Q_j queries the same position, in this situation A must distribute errors uniformly, since A has *no* information about the underlying subsets S_i . Thus in this situation, D cannot distinguish A 's corruptions from random with probability greater than $\frac{1}{2}$, since in this case A 's corruptions *are* random. Now we proceed via a hybrid argument. When A is run on queries that query t distinct positions, then D can distinguish A 's corruptions from random with advantage ϵ , thus by the triangle inequality, there exists a $t^* < t$ such that D can distinguish A 's output when A is run on queries, t^* of which are then same, from A 's output when A is run on queries, $t^* + 1$ of which are the same, with advantage $\frac{\epsilon}{t}$. This allows us to break the privacy of the PIR in exactly the manner described before. Given a query Q^* that queries either i_0 or i_1 , we construct t^* queries Q_1, \dots, Q_{t^*} which all query position i_0 , and $t - t^* - 1$ queries $Q_{t^*+1}, \dots, Q_{t-1}$ which all query different positions. Then we run D on A 's output, when A is given $(R_1, \dots, R_{t-1}, R^*)$. By the definition of t^* D succeeds in distinguishing whether Q^* queries position i_0 with advantage $\frac{\epsilon}{2t}$. Thus by guessing a random value in $\{1, \dots, t - 1\}$ for t^* , we break the privacy of the PIR protocol with advantage $\frac{\epsilon}{2t^2}$, a contradiction. ■

Lemma 4. If A distributes $(\frac{1}{4} - \delta)t$ errors uniformly among the t responses, the probability that A destroys any given block X_i is negligible in ℓ .

Proof. If A distributes errors at random, then we can view A as selecting field elements $Z_{i,\ell}$ to corrupt uniformly at random. The adversary A destroys a block X_i exactly when A corrupts more than $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$ of the points $Z_{i,\ell}$ that encode that block, the probability that A destroys a block is exactly the probability that more than $(\frac{1}{2} - \delta)\frac{2c_1\ell}{d}$ points that encode X_i are corrupted. This distribution is then the Hypergeometric Distribution, where $\frac{2c_1\ell}{d}$ items are selected and $(\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2)t$ of which are corrupted. In [18], Hush and Scovel give the bound

$$\Pr \left[\# \text{ of errors in encoding of block } X_i > \left(\frac{1}{2} - \delta \right) \frac{2c_1\ell}{d} \right] < e^{-2\left(\frac{d}{2c_1\ell+d}\right)\left(\frac{4\delta^4 c_1^2 \ell^2}{d^2} - 1\right)},$$

where the probability is taken over the uniform distribution on the t remainders, and this probability is clearly negligible in ℓ . ■

Lemma 5. If at most $(\frac{1}{4} - \delta)t$ of the t encryptions are corrupted by a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A , then the probability that any bit of the message fails to decode properly is negligible in k .

Proof. For a given block X_i the probability that that block is damaged under the corruptions created by A is negligibly different in k than if A produced the corruptions at random, which itself would damage X_i with only negligible probability in ℓ . Taking $\ell \approx k$, we have that the block X_i is damaged with at most negligible probability in k . The union bound then gives that the probability that *any* block X_i is damaged is at most t times the probability that a specific block is damaged, which remains negligible in k . ■

7 A Concrete Protocol Based on Φ -Hiding

We now present a concrete example of our reduction based on the Gentry-Ramzan [11] PIR protocol. A straightforward application of our main construction in §5.2 already yields a PKLDC with public key size $\mathcal{O}(n)$ and constant ciphertext expansion, but the Gentry-Ramzan PIR protocol has many nice properties which can be exploited to simplify the construction and further increase the efficiency of the protocol. The construction we present here differs from the straightforward application of our general reduction to the Gentry-Ramzan protocol in two ways. First, we are able to integrate the basic semantically-secure encryption protocol into our construction, thus reducing the ciphertext expansion by a constant factor, and eliminating the need for another hardness assumption. Second, we use the Chinese Remainder Theorem Error Correcting Code (CRT-ECC) instead of the Reed-Solomon code used in the general

construction. This is because the Φ -hiding assumption allows us to do hidden chinese-remaindering, and so it is a more natural code to use in this context. This does not change the arguments in any substantial way, since from the ring-theoretic perspective, the CRT-ECC and the Reed-Solomon ECC are exactly the same (see Appendix E).

7.1 The Small Primes Φ -Hiding Assumption

The Φ -Hiding Assumption is a relatively new computational hardness assumption, which relates to the difficulty of finding small prime factors of $\varphi(m)$, where φ is the Euler Totient Function. If a prime p divides $\varphi(m)$, we say that m Φ -hides p . The Φ -Hiding assumption was first proposed by Cachin, Micali and Stadler in [4], and a variant was proposed by Gentry and Ramzan in [11]. Our constructions require only the security of the Gentry-Ramzan PIR scheme, and so we make the following variant of the Φ -Hiding Assumption

Let \mathcal{P}_k denote the set of primes of bit-length $\frac{k}{2}$, \mathcal{H}_k be the set of products of two primes in \mathcal{P}_k with $\gcd(p-1, q-1) = 2$, and let $\mathcal{H}_k^\pi \subset \mathcal{H}_k$ denote the set of composite moduli that Φ -hide π , i.e.

$$\mathcal{H}_k^\pi = \{m : m = pq, \{p, q\} \subset \mathcal{P}_k, \gcd(p-1, q-1) = 2, p \equiv 1 \pmod{\pi}\}.$$

Assumption 1. The *Small Primes Φ -Hiding Assumption*

For all small prime powers, π_0, π_1 such that $3 < \pi_0 < \pi_1 < 2^{\frac{k}{4}-1}$, given $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ and $m \in_R \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_b}$, for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A , we have

$$\Pr[A(\pi_0, \pi_1, m) = b] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \nu(k),$$

for some negligible function $\nu(k)$, where the probability is taken over all $m \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_b}$, $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and the internal randomness of A .

Thus we are asserting that no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can determine which prime power a given modulus Φ -hides. We will sometimes find it convenient to use a slightly different form. Specifically, we assert that given two moduli m_0, m_1 which Φ -hide two prime powers π_0, π_1 , no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can tell whether $\pi_0 = \pi_1$ with probability better than one half.

Lemma 6. Under the Small Primes Φ -Hiding Assumption, if $\pi_0 \in_R \{5, \dots, \lfloor 2^{\frac{k}{4}-1} \rfloor\}$, $S_0 = \{\pi_0\}$, $S_1 = \{5, \dots, \lfloor 2^{\frac{k}{4}-1} \rfloor\} \setminus \{\pi_0\}$, $b^* \in_R \{0, 1\}$, $\pi_1 \in_R S_{b^*}$, $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ and $m_0 \in_R \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_b}$ and $m_1 \in_R \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_{1-b}}$. Then for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A ,

$$\Pr[A(m_0, m_1) = 0 \text{ and } \pi_0 = \pi_1] + \Pr[A(m_0, m_1) = 1 \text{ and } \pi_0 \neq \pi_1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \nu(k),$$

for some negligible function $\nu(k)$, where the probability is taken over the internal randomness of A , the choice of π_0, π_1, m_0, m_1 , and the choice of b^* and b .

Proof. Assume there exists a polynomial-time adversary A which can correctly determine whether $\pi_0 = \pi_1$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(k)$ for some non-negligible function $\epsilon(k)$. Given π_0, π_1 and m such that $\pi_b \mid \varphi(m)$, we wish to construct an algorithm A' that guesses b , as follows: Pick a random $b' \in \{0, 1\}$, and generate $m' \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_{b'}}$. Then run A on (m, m') . If A returns 0 then A' returns b' , otherwise A' returns $1 - b'$. Since A succeeds with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(k)$, A' succeeds with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(k)$ which is still non-negligible in k , and thus a violation of the Φ -Hiding assumption \blacksquare

In particular, we are asserting that there is no efficient algorithm which can match the π_i to the moduli m_i significantly better than by guessing randomly. Notice that in the small primes Φ -hiding assumption we have excluded $\pi = 2$ or 3 , this is because every odd number Φ -hides 2 , and $m \equiv 2 \pmod{3}$, only if m Φ -hides 3 . Notice also that we restrict the π_i to be smaller than $\sqrt[4]{m_i}$, this is to prevent the lattice based attack described in [7], [6]. When the p_i 's and the π_i 's are chosen subject to these restrictions, there are no efficient algorithms known for breaking the Φ -Hiding assumption.

7.2 A Φ -hiding based Semantically-Secure Encryption Protocol

Here, we describe a simple semantically-secure public key encryption scheme, **BasicEncrypt** that will be an essential building block of our construction. The encryption protocol consists of three algorithms, G, E, D described below.

To generate the keys, $G(1^k)$ first selects a small prime-power π , then generates $m \in \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$, i.e. $m = pq$, where $p, q \in_R \mathcal{P}_k$, subject to $\pi \mid p - 1$. The public key will be $PK = (g, m, \pi)$ where g is a generator for the cyclic group G_m , and $SK = \frac{\varphi(m)}{\pi}$.

To encrypt a message $x \in \mathbb{Z}/\pi\mathbb{Z}$, we have

$$E(x) = g^{x+\pi r} \pmod{m},$$

for a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$. To decrypt, we do

$$D(y) = y^{\varphi(m)/\pi} = g^{x\varphi(m)/\pi \pmod{\varphi(m)}} \pmod{m} = \left(g^{\varphi(m)/\pi}\right)^x \pmod{m},$$

then, using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm to compute the discrete logarithm in the group $\langle g^{\varphi(m)/\pi} \rangle$, we can recover $x \pmod{\pi} = x$. If a is a small prime, and $\pi = a^c$, the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm runs in time $c\sqrt{a}$. Thus the decryption requires $\mathcal{O}(\log(m/\pi) + c\sqrt{a})$ group operations in G_m which is acceptable for small primes a . In our locally decodable code, we will require multiple different prime powers π_1, \dots, π_t , and we will choose the small primes a , as the first primes, i.e. $\pi_1 = 5^{e_1}, \pi_2 = 7^{e_2}, \pi_3 = 11^{e_3}$. If we require t prime powers π_i , the Prime Number Theorem, implies that the largest a , will be approximately $t \log t$. Since t will be less than the message length, n , \sqrt{a} will be polynomial in the message length, and hence polynomial in the security parameter k .

It is worth noticing that this scheme is additively homomorphic over the group $\mathbb{Z}/\pi\mathbb{Z}$, although we do not have an explicit use for this property. When $\pi = 2$, this is just Goldwasser-Micali Encryption [13], for larger π it was described in [3] and [2]. An extension of this scheme is described in [29].

While this protocol is not new, none of the previous descriptions of this protocol make use of the Φ -hiding assumption, and instead their security is based on some form of composite residuosity assumption, i.e. it is impossible to tell whether a random group element h belongs to the subgroup of order π in G_m . We are able to prove security under the Φ -hiding assumption because the Φ -hiding assumption is strictly stronger than these other assumptions. The reduction is simple, for suppose there exists an adversary A which can determine whether a group element $h \in G_m$ is a π th power. Noticing that if $\pi \mid \varphi(m)$ exactly 1 in π elements will be π th powers, while if $\gcd(\pi, \varphi(m)) = 1$, then *every* element is a π th power, by simply sending random group elements h_i to A , and measuring the probability which A says that h_i is a π th power, we can distinguish whether $\pi \mid \varphi(m)$.

7.3 The Semantic-Security of BasicEncrypt

We now prove the semantic security of the simple encryption protocol given in §7.2 under the Φ -hiding assumption, we prove this as a sequence of lemmas, lemma 7 through lemma 9.

Lemma 7. Under the Small Primes Φ -Hiding Assumption, if we define

$$H_0 = \{g \in G_m : \langle g \rangle = G_m, \text{ i.e. } g \text{ generates } G_m \},$$

and $H_1 = G_m \setminus H_0$, then, if $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$, given $m \in_R \mathcal{H}_k$, $g \in_R H_b$, no probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher D can correctly distinguish whether $g \in H_0$ with probability noticeably greater than $\frac{1}{2}$.

Proof. Suppose D correctly guesses whether g generates G_m with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ for some noticeable function ϵ . We will use D to break the Φ -hiding assumption. Our adversary A is given m, π according to the distributions given in Assumption 1, and will use D as a subroutine to determine whether $m \in \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$.

First notice that G_m is a cyclic group, so $|H_0| = \varphi(|G_m|) = \varphi(\varphi(m)/2)$. A well-known consequence of the Prime Number Theorem is the lower bound

$$\varphi(n) > \frac{cn}{\log \log(e^2 n)},$$

for some constant c and all n (see for example [1]). Thus

$$\begin{aligned} |H_0| &= \varphi(|G_m|) \\ &> \frac{c|G_m|}{\log \log(e^2|G_m|)} \\ &> \frac{c|G_m|}{\log \log(e^2m)}. \end{aligned}$$

In particular $\frac{|H_0|}{|G_m|} > \frac{c}{\log \log(e^2m)}$ which is noticeable in k , since $k \approx \log m$. Thus an element drawn uniformly at random from G_m will be a generator with noticeable probability, we call this probability ι . Then to determine if $m \in \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$, we generate a random $g \in G_m$, and send g^π and m to D . If D says $g \in H_0$, A replies that $m \notin \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$, i.e. m does not Φ -hide π .

To show that we succeed with noticeable probability, we note that if $m \notin \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$, then $g^\pi \in H_0$ iff $g \in H_0$, so $g^\pi \in H_0$ with probability ι . If $m \in \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$, then g^π cannot generate G_m , so $g^\pi \notin H_0$.

Thus

	$\pi \varphi(m)$	$\pi \nmid \varphi(m)$
A says $g^\pi \in H_0$	$\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$	$\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon + 2\iota\epsilon$
A says $g^\pi \notin H_0$	$\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$	$\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon - 2\iota\epsilon$

so A is correct with probability

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon + 2\iota\epsilon}{(\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon) + (1 - \epsilon + 2\iota\epsilon)} + \frac{\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon}{(\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon) + (\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon - 2\iota\epsilon)} \right) &= \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon + 2\iota\epsilon}{1 - 2\epsilon + 2\iota\epsilon} + \frac{\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon}{1 + 2\epsilon - 2\iota\epsilon} \right) \\ &> \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\iota\epsilon}{1 - 2\epsilon + 2\iota\epsilon} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\iota\epsilon}{1 + 2\epsilon - 2\iota\epsilon} \right) \\ &> \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \iota\epsilon + \frac{1}{2} \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\iota\epsilon}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

Which is non-negligible since both ι and ϵ are non-negligible. ■

Next, we prove a straightforward fact about the distribution $r \bmod \varphi(m)$, where $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$.

Lemma 8. If r is selected uniformly at random in $\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$, and r' is selected uniformly at random in $\mathbb{Z}/|G_m|\mathbb{Z}$, then the distributions of $r \bmod |G_m|$ and r' are statistically close, i.e.

$$\frac{1}{2} \sum_{x \in \mathbb{Z}/|G_m|\mathbb{Z}} |\Pr[r = x] - \Pr[r' = x]|$$

is negligible in k .

Proof. Since $|G_m| = \frac{\varphi(m)}{2} = \frac{pq-p-q+1}{2}$, the distribution for $r \bmod |G_m|$ becomes

$$P(r = x) = \begin{cases} \frac{2}{m} & \text{for } |G_m| - p - q + 1 \text{ elements} \\ \frac{3}{m} & \text{for } p + q - 1 \text{ elements} \end{cases}$$

Thus

$$\frac{1}{2} \sum_{x \in \mathbb{Z}/|G_m|\mathbb{Z}} |\Pr[r = x] - \Pr[r' = x]| = \frac{1}{2} (|G_m| - p - q + 1) \left(\frac{1}{|G_m|} - \frac{2}{m} \right) + \frac{1}{2} (p + q - 1) \left(\frac{3}{m} - \frac{1}{|G_m|} \right).$$

Now,

$$\frac{1}{|G_m|} - \frac{2}{m} = 2 \left(\frac{1}{pq - p - q + 1} - \frac{1}{pq} \right) = \frac{p + q - 1}{m|G_m|},$$

so

$$\frac{1}{2}(|G_m| - p - q + 1) \left(\frac{1}{|G_m|} - \frac{2}{m} \right) \leq \frac{p+q}{2m}.$$

Similarly, we have

$$\frac{3}{m} - \frac{1}{|G_m|} = \frac{3(pq - p - q + 1) - 2pq}{m(pq - p - q + 1)} = \frac{pq - 3(p+q-1)}{2m|G_m|} < \frac{pq - p - q + 1}{2m|G_m|} = \frac{1}{m}.$$

so

$$\frac{1}{2}(p+q-1) \left(\frac{3}{m} - \frac{1}{|G_m|} \right) \leq \frac{p+q}{2m}.$$

Thus the statistical distance is less than

$$\frac{(p+q)}{m}$$

which is negligible in k since $\log m \approx k$, and $\log p \approx \log q \approx \frac{k}{2}$. \blacksquare

Now we are ready to prove the semantic security of our cryptosystem.

Lemma 9. The encryption in §7.2 is semantically-secure under the small primes Φ -hiding assumption.

Proof. Given any distinguisher D for the encryption protocol that succeeds with non-negligible probability, we construct an adversary A which violates the Φ -hiding assumption with non-negligible probability. Given m and π where $m \in_R \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$ with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ and $m \in_R \mathcal{H}_k \setminus \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$ with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, the adversary A picks a $g \in G_m$ and sends g, m to the distinguisher D , and D responds with two messages x^0, x^1 . Then A chooses $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$, and $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$ and computes

$$c = g^{x^b + \pi r} \pmod{m}$$

and sends c to the distinguisher D . D responds with a bit b^* . If $b^* = b$ the adversary responds that m Φ -hides π , otherwise the adversary responds m does not Φ -hide π .

Now we must show that this adversary breaks the Φ -hiding assumption with non-negligible probability.

First, assume g generates G_m . If m Φ -hides π , then c is a valid encryption of x^b , and so by the definition of D , we must have that $b^* = b$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ for some non-negligible function ϵ .

On the other hand, if m does not Φ -hide π , then $\pi \in (\mathbb{Z}/|G_m|\mathbb{Z})^*$. Now, notice that if r' were chosen uniformly in $\mathbb{Z}/|G_m|\mathbb{Z}$ instead of $\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$, we would have $x^b + \pi r' \pmod{|G_m|}$ is also uniformly distributed in $\mathbb{Z}/|G_m|\mathbb{Z}$. Thus $g^{x^b + \pi r'}$ would be uniformly distributed in G_m , and hence any distinguisher D could guess b from $g^{x^b + \pi r'}$ with probability at most one half. By lemma 8, the statistical distance between $g^{x^b + \pi r}$ and $g^{x^b + \pi r'}$ is negligible, thus any distinguisher D succeeds in guessing b with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \nu$ for some negligible function ν .

Then, following this scheme, if g generates G_m with probability a , our algorithm succeeds in breaking the Φ -hiding assumption with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon - \nu}{2}$ which is a non-negligible since ϵ is non-negligible and ν is negligible.

If, instead, g does not generate G_m , then by lemma 7, D 's output distribution must be negligibly different from when g generates G_m . Thus in this case as well, A correctly guesses whether $\pi | \varphi(m)$ with probability noticeably greater than $\frac{1}{2}$. \blacksquare

7.4 Outline of Our Φ -hiding based Construction

We begin by fixing a list of t prime powers $\{\pi_1, \dots, \pi_t\}$ as part of the public parameters. For concreteness we choose $\pi_1 = 5^{e_1}$, $\pi_2 = 7^{e_2}$, \dots as in §7.2. A public key will be a list of t RSA moduli $\{m_1, \dots, m_t\}$, such that each m_j Φ -hides some prime power $\pi_{j'}$. The Private key will be the factorizations of the m_j , more specifically $\varphi(m_1), \dots, \varphi(m_t)$, along with a random permutation $\sigma \in S_t$ such that m_j Φ -hides $\pi_{\sigma(j)}$. To encrypt a message $X \in \{0, 1\}^n$, we first divide X into blocks X_i of size ℓk . Where k is the security parameter, and ℓ is a parameter determining the ‘‘spread’’ of the code. As in the Gentry-Ramzan PIR scheme, we view each block as a number in the range $\{0 \dots 2^{\ell k}\}$. Our public key will be $t = \frac{pn}{dk}$ RSA moduli $\{m_1, \dots, m_{\frac{pn}{dk}}\}$ such that each modulus Φ -hides a prime power π_j . We will use $s = \lceil \rho \ell / d \rceil$ of the π_j to encode each block X_i . Since there are $\lceil n / \ell k \rceil$, and for each block we use $\lceil \rho \ell / d \rceil$ prime powers, we use

a total of $\frac{n}{\ell k} \cdot \frac{\rho^\ell}{d} = \frac{\rho n}{dk} = t$ prime powers. The parameter ρ determines the redundancy of the CRT-ECC, hence increasing ρ increases the error tolerance and also the ciphertext expansion. Recall that d is the information rate of the Gentry-Ramzan PIR, so d is some fixed constant less than $1/4$, for concreteness you can assume $d = 1/5$. Exactly which prime is hidden by which modulus will be chosen at random at the time of key generation, and is part of the receiver's secret key. For each block X_i , the sender encrypts X_i modulo the s prime powers $\{\pi_{(i-1)s+1}, \dots, \pi_{is}\}$, where each π_j is roughly of size dk . Notice here that we have used ρ times as many moduli π_j as necessary to encode each block, thus for each block X_i we have effectively calculated an encoding of X_i under the CRT-ECC which can tolerate $\left(\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}\right) \frac{\ell}{d}$ corrupted moduli (see Appendix C). We do this for each block, and thus the resulting encryption is $\frac{\rho^\ell}{d} \cdot \frac{n}{\ell k}$ residues. Since each residue is of size k , the the encryption of the whole message is now of $\frac{n}{\ell k} \frac{\rho^\ell}{d} = \frac{\rho n}{dk}$ encryptions of size k . Finally, we encode each of the $\rho n/(kd)$ encryptions independently using the error correcting code in §4.4. So our final encryption is of size $\rho c_2 n/d$ bits, which is a constant multiple of n . This encryption is error correcting because as long as no more than $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}$ of the residues that encode a given block are corrupted, the block can be recovered correctly by first decrypting each residue, and then reconstructing the CRT-ECC. This cryptosystem is also locally-decodable since to decrypt a given block, it suffices to decrypt the $\frac{\rho^\ell}{d}$ encryptions that encode it.

7.5 Error Correcting Public Key Encryption Based on Φ -hiding

We now define a triple of algorithms G, E, D for our encryption scheme.

Key Generation: $G(1^k, \alpha)$.

- Let p_1, \dots, p_t be primes with $5 \leq p_1 < p_2 < \dots < p_t$, and choose $e_j = \left\lfloor \frac{k}{4 \log p_j} \right\rfloor$, thus e_j is the largest integer such that $\log(p_j^{e_j}) < dk$, for some $d < \frac{1}{4}$. Set $\pi_j = p_j^{e_j}$. To encrypt n -bit messages, we will need to choose $t = \frac{\rho n}{dk}$. Since we assume $n = k^\alpha$, this becomes $t = \frac{\rho k^{\alpha-1}}{d}$.
- Generate a random permutation $\sigma \in_R S_t$, the symmetric group on t elements.
- Generate moduli m_1, \dots, m_t such that $m_j \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_{\sigma(j)}}$, i.e. m_j Φ -hides $\pi_{\sigma(j)}$.
- Find generators $\{g_j\}$ of the cyclic groups $\{G_{m_j}\}$.

The public key will then be

$$PK = ((g_1, m_1, \pi_1), \dots, (g_t, m_t, \pi_t)),$$

and the secret key will be

$$SK = \left(\sigma, \frac{\varphi(m_1)}{\pi_{\sigma(1)}}, \dots, \frac{\varphi(m_t)}{\pi_{\sigma(t)}} \right).$$

Encryption: given an n -bit message X ,

- Break X into $\frac{n}{\ell k}$ blocks X_i of size ℓk , and treat each X_i as an integer in the range $\{0 \dots 2^{\ell k}\}$.
- For block X_i , we will use the s prime powers $\pi_{(i-1)s+1}, \dots, \pi_{is}$ to encode X_i . Since the moduli $m_{\sigma^{-1}((i-1)s+1)}, \dots, m_{\sigma^{-1}(is)}$ that correspond to these π 's is unknown to the sender, he must apply the Chinese Remainder Theorem using all the π_j 's. Thus for each block X_i , using the CRT, the sender generates $\tilde{X}_i \in [1, \dots, (\pi_1 \cdots \pi_t)]$, such that

$$\tilde{X}_i = \begin{cases} X_i \pmod{\pi_j} & \text{for } j \in [(i-1)s+1, \dots, is], \\ 0 \pmod{\pi_j} & \text{for } j \in [1, \dots, (i-1)s] \cup [is+1, \dots, t]. \end{cases}$$

To recover from error-rate $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}$, we set $s = \frac{\rho^\ell}{d}$.

- The sender then sets $\tilde{X} = \sum_{i=1}^{\frac{n}{\ell k}} \tilde{X}_i$. Thus for each j , $\tilde{X} = X_i \pmod{\pi_{\sigma(j)}}$ for the unique i such that $(i-1)s+1 \leq \sigma(j) \leq is$.

- For $j \in [1, \dots, t]$, generate a random $r_j \in \{0, \dots, \pi_1 \cdots \pi_t\}$.
- Then calculate $h_j = g_j^{\tilde{X} + r_j \pi_1 \cdots \pi_t} \bmod m_j$ for each $j \in \{1, \dots, t\}$. Thus

$$h_j = E\left(\tilde{X} \bmod \pi_{\sigma(j)}\right) = E(X_i \bmod \pi_{\sigma(j)}),$$

where $(i-1)s+1 \leq \sigma(j) \leq is$, and E is the encryption protocol described in §7.2. At this point, partial information about the block X_i is spread over s of the h_j 's.

- Apply the binary Error Correcting Code ECC to each h_j individually.
- The encryption is then the t -tuple $(\text{ECC}(h_1), \text{ECC}(h_2), \dots, \text{ECC}(h_t))$.

Decryption: to recover the i th block, of a message X from the t -tuple (h_1, \dots, h_t)

- Select the s encryptions that encode X_i , $\{\text{ECC}(h_{\sigma^{-1}((i-1)s+1)}), \dots, \text{ECC}(h_{\sigma^{-1}(is)})\}$.
- Decode each $\text{ECC}(h_j)$ to find obtain $\{h_{\sigma^{-1}((i-1)s+1)}, \dots, h_{\sigma^{-1}(is)}\}$.
- Decrypt each of the s encryptions using the decryption algorithm from §7.2. This gives a_1, \dots, a_s where $a_j = X_i \bmod (\pi_{(i-1)s+j})$.
- Using the Chinese Remainder Code Decoding Algorithm, reconstruct X_i from the s remainders a_1, \dots, a_s . Note that if there are no errors introduced, this step can be replaced by simple Chinese Remaindering.

8 Analysis

The proof of local-decodability remains essentially the same as in the general setting (see §6.2).

For the locality, we note that to recover a single bit of X , or equivalently the entire block X_i that contains it, we must read s blocks of the ciphertext $\{\text{ECC}(h_{\sigma^{-1}((i-1)s+1)}), \dots, \text{ECC}(h_{\sigma^{-1}(is)})\}$. Since $|h_j| = k$ and $|\text{ECC}(h_j)| = c_2 k$, we must read a total of $sc_2 k = \frac{\rho c_2 \ell k}{d}$ bits. Since the probability of error will be negligible in ℓ , we set $\ell \approx k$, and since $d < \frac{1}{4}$, we find that we need to read $5c_2 \rho k^2$ bits of the ciphertext to recover one bit of the plaintext, where c and ρ are parameters that determine the error-rate of our code. Thus our system only achieves local-decodability for $n = \mathcal{O}(k^{2+\epsilon})$. For $n \approx k^3$, our system already offers a significant improvement over standard error-correcting codes. It should also be noted, that for any semantically-secure cryptosystem, to recover one bit of the plaintext, you must read at least $\omega(\log k)$ bits of the ciphertext. It is an interesting question whether the locality of such a scheme can be improved from $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$ to $\mathcal{O}(k)$.

Thus we arrive at the following result

Corollary 3. Under the Small Primes Φ -Hiding Assumption (Assumption 1) there is a Public-Key Locally Decodable Code which can recover from a constant error-rate in the bits of the message, with public key size $\mathcal{O}(n)$ and ciphertexts of size $\mathcal{O}(n)$, where n is the size of the plaintext and k is the security parameter. The resulting code has locality $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$, i.e. to recover a single bit from the message we must read $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$ bits of the codeword.

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Appendix

A Semantic Security

By a *Public Key Cryptosystem*, we mean a triple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms G, E, D , such that $(PK, SK) \leftarrow G(1^k)$, $c \leftarrow E(PK, x, r)$ $x' \leftarrow D(SK, c)$ Where PK, SK denote the public and secret keys and $x' = x$ w.h.p for the same message. A public key encryption system is semantically-secure if, given two messages x^0 and x^1 , $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$, and an encryption of one of the messages, $E(PK, x^b, r)$, no polynomial time adversary can determine b with probability significantly greater than one half. That is:

Definition 2. A Public Key Cryptosystem, G, E, D , with security parameter k is called *semantically-secure* (in the sense of indistinguishability) if for all message pairs $\{x^0, x^1\}$ and for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A , and for all $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$,

$$\Pr[(PK, SK) \leftarrow G(1^k); \{x^0, x^1\} \leftarrow A(PK); A(E(PK, x^b, r)) = b] < \frac{1}{2} + \nu(k)$$

Where x^0 and x^1 must be of equal length, and the probability is taken over the key generation algorithm's randomness, choice of b , randomness r used in the encryption algorithm E and the internal randomness of A .

B Constant Rate Binary Error Correcting Codes

For our scheme to have constant information rate, we need to find a *binary* error-correcting code which can tolerate an error-rate of $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$.

One method for creating such a code, uses the notion of Concatenated Codes, originally described by Forney in [9]. By combining a Reed-Solomon Code and a Random Linear Code as described in [16], it is possible to obtain a binary error correcting code which recovers from $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ error-rate, but the information-rate of the resulting code is very low, about 10^{-4} for their construction.

Since we are working in the computationally bounded channel model, we can take advantage of the constructions described in [28], to create a binary code with error-rate $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$, and significantly better information rates than in the unbounded channel model. Applying Micali et al's construction to the binary codes with list-decoding rate $\frac{1}{2}$ and information rate δ^4 described in [15], we obtain a code which uniquely decodes from error-rate $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$, and has information rate about $\frac{1}{\delta^4}$.

C CRT-Based Error Correction

It was observed in the 1970s [25], [26], [27], that the Chinese Remainder Theorem could be used to make efficient Error Correcting Codes. If $\pi_1, \dots, \pi_n, \pi_{n+1}, \dots, \pi_{n+t}$ an increasing sequence of pairwise coprime integers, i.e. $\pi_1 < \pi_2 < \dots < \pi_{n+t}$, and $\gcd(\pi_i, \pi_j) = 1$ whenever $i \neq j$. Then for any integer x with $x < \prod_{i=1}^n \pi_i$, we encode x as the $(n+t)$ -tuple $\{x \bmod p_1, \dots, x \bmod p_{n+t}\}$. If x and x' are distinct integers less than $\prod_{i=1}^n \pi_i$, then the two vectors $E(x) = \{x \bmod \pi_1, \dots, x \bmod \pi_{n+t}\}$ and $E(x') = \{x' \bmod \pi_1, \dots, x' \bmod \pi_{n+t}\}$ must differ in at least $t+1$ coordinates since the residue of x modulo *any* n of the moduli π_i uniquely determines x . Thus the minimum distance in this code is t , and so it can correct $\lfloor \frac{t}{2} \rfloor$ errors. Thus if we take $n+t = \rho n$, this code can recover from error-rate $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}$, in the digits of the code.

This code differs significantly from most other error correcting codes in that each "digit", i.e. each remainder, of the codeword carries a different amount of information. Thus the Hamming distance between two codewords, measured as the number of remainders in which they differ is not the natural distance to consider for this code. This fact made finding an efficient decoding algorithm a nontrivial task. In his original paper in 1972, Mandelbaum proposed an algorithm that ran in expected polynomial-time. Since then, many variants of that algorithm have appeared, but it was not until 2001 [17] that the first polynomial-time decoding algorithm was found. Since the Chinese Remainder Codes are efficiently list decodable [12], [17], we can apply the technique in [28] of combining list-decoding with digital signatures to our protocol to further improve the information-rate.

D Gentry-Ramzan PIR

While our scheme does not explicitly rely on the Gentry-Ramzan PIR scheme, our protocol was inspired by their use of the Φ -hiding assumption to do “hidden” Chinese Remaindering. In the interest both of giving some context for our scheme, and of showing what else can be achieved by hidden Chinese Remaindering, we briefly sketch the Gentry-Ramzan Private Information Retrieval scheme [11]. This scheme allows computationally private single database PIR with constant communication rate under the Φ -hiding assumption. Here “constant” means proportional to the security parameter. The scheme allows retrieval of entire blocks at once, and the scheme we describe will retrieve an ℓ -bit block from an n -bit database.

The scheme assumes some initial set-up. First, sequence of small primes p_1, \dots, p_t are fixed in advance. Then we set $\ell = \lceil n/t \rceil$, and $c_i = \lceil \log_{p_i} \ell \rceil$. Setting $\pi_i = p_i^{c_i}$, we have that $\pi_i > 2^\ell$ for all i , and the integers π_1, \dots, π_t are pairwise relatively prime. This initial set-up is assumed to be known to both the user and the database, and is not included in the communication complexity of the scheme.

To begin the scheme, the database must do some pre-processing. Instead of viewing the database as a single n -bit string, we instead view it as a concatenation of t ℓ -bit integers a_1, \dots, a_t . Recall that we have chosen our π_i such that $a_i < \pi_i$ for each i . Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the database can find an integer $e < \prod_{i=1}^t \pi_i$, such that $e \bmod \pi_i = a_i$.

To retrieve the j th block of the database, a_j , the user then chooses an RSA modulus $m = pq$ that Φ -hides π_j , and a g for cyclic the group G_m , i.e. g has order $\frac{\varphi(m)}{2}$ in $(\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^*$. Since $\pi_j | \varphi(m)$, we have that G_m has a subgroup of order π_j . Letting $q = \frac{\varphi(m)}{2\pi_j}$, this subgroup is generated by g^q . The user then sends both m , and g to the database. The database calculates $g^e \bmod m$ and returns the result.

Given $g^e \bmod m$, the user then calculates $(g^e)^q = (g^q)^e = g^{e \bmod \pi_j} \bmod m$ since g^q has order π_j in G_m . Then by performing (a tractable) discrete-log computation in the subgroup of order π_j generated by g^q the user recovers $e \bmod \pi_j = a_j$. Using Pohlig-Hellman algorithm this discrete-log computation can be calculated in $\mathcal{O}(c_j \sqrt{p_j})$ time.

If $\log_2(m) = k$, then the user sends $2k$ bits to the database, and the database replies with k bits, so the total communication complexity is $3k$ bits. To avoid the lattice-based attacks described in [7] and [6], we must choose m such that $\pi_i < m^{\frac{1}{4}}$ for all i , i.e. $\ell < 4k$.

E Why the CRT-ECC and the Reed-Solomon Code Are The Same

The general form of the Chinese Remainder Theorem states that if R is a commutative ring and I_1, \dots, I_t are pairwise coprime ideals (i.e. $I_i + I_j = R$ for all $i \neq j$) then

$$R/(I_1 I_2 \cdots I_t) \simeq R/I_1 \times R/I_2 \times \cdots \times R/I_t.$$

Taking $R = \mathbb{Z}$ and $I_j = m_j \mathbb{Z}$ for pairwise coprime integers m_j we arrive at the classical form of the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Now, noting that

$$\begin{aligned} \psi : \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x-a) &\rightarrow \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \\ f(x) &\rightarrow f(a) \end{aligned}$$

is a ring isomorphism, we can view evaluating $f \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ at a point a as quotienting out by the ideal $(x-a)$. Applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem to $R = \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}[x]$ and $I_j = (x-a)$, we obtain exactly the setting of the Reed-Solomon code. In both situations, the minimal distance for the code remains exactly the same since an element in $R/(I_1 \cdots I_t)$ is uniquely determined by its t images in the quotient rings R/I_j .