Paper 2008/516
Distinguishing and Forgery Attacks on Alred and Its AES-based Instance Alpha-MAC
Zheng Yuan, Keting Jia, Wei Wang, and Xiaoyun Wang
Abstract
In this paper, we present new distinguishers of the MAC construction \textsc{Alred} and its specific instance \textsc{Alpha}-MAC based on AES, which is proposed by Daemen and Rijmen in 2005. For the \textsc{Alred} construction, we describe a general distinguishing attack which leads to a forgery attack directly. The complexity is $2^{64.5}$ chosen messages and $2^{64.5}$ queries with success probability 0.63. We also use a two-round collision differential path for \textsc{Alpha}-MAC, to construct a new distinguisher with about $2^{65.5}$ queries. The most important is that the new distinguisher can be used to recover the internal state, which is an equivalent secret subkey, and leads to a second preimage attack. Moreover, the distinguisher on \textsc{Alred} construction is also applicable to the MACs based on CBC and CFB encryption mode.
Note: Recovery of the internal state is presented.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Distinguishing attackForgery attack\textsc{Alred} construction\textsc{Alpha}-MACAES
- Contact author(s)
- xiaoyunwang @ mail tsinghua edu cn
- History
- 2008-12-12: revised
- 2008-12-09: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/516
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/516, author = {Zheng Yuan and Keting Jia and Wei Wang and Xiaoyun Wang}, title = {Distinguishing and Forgery Attacks on Alred and Its {AES}-based Instance Alpha-{MAC}}, howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/516}, year = {2008}, note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/516}}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/516} }