Paper 2013/733
A Key Compromise Impersonation attack against Wang's Provably Secure Identity-based Key Agreement Protocol
Maurizio Adriano Strangio
Abstract
In a 2005 IACR report, Wang published an efficient identity-based key agreement protocol (IDAK) suitable for resource constraint devices. The author shows that the IDAK key agreement protocol is secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model with random oracles and also provides an ad-hoc security proof claiming that the IDAK protocol is not vulnerable to Key Compromise Impersonation attacks. In this report, we claim that the IDAK protocol is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation attacks. Indeed, Wang's results are valid only for a passive adversary that can corrupt parties or reveal certain session-specific data but is not allowed to manipulate protocol transcripts; a model considering this type of adversary is unable to afford KCI resilience.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- -- withdrawn --
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Contact author(s)
- strangio @ mat uniroma3 it
- History
- 2013-11-15: withdrawn
- 2013-11-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/733
- License
-
CC BY