Dual System Encryption Framework in Prime-Order Groups

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Abstract

We propose a new generic framework for achieving fully secure attribute based encryption (ABE) in *prime-order* bilinear groups. It is generic in the sense that it can be applied to ABE for *arbitrary* predicate. All previously available frameworks that are generic in this sense are given only in *composite-order* bilinear groups, of which operations are known to be much less efficient than in prime-order ones for the same security level. These consist of the frameworks by Wee (TCC'14) and Attrapadung (Eurocrypt'14). Both provide abstractions of dual-system encryption techniques introduced by Waters (Crypto'09). Our framework can be considered as a prime-order version of Attrapadung's framework and works in a similar manner: it relies on a main component called *pair encodings*, and it generically compiles any secure pair encoding scheme for a predicate in consideration to a fully secure ABE scheme for that predicate. One feature of our new compiler is that although the resulting ABE schemes will be newly defined in prime-order groups, we require essentially the same security notions of pair encodings as before. Beside the security of pair encodings, our framework assumes only the Matrix Diffie-Hellman assumption (Escala *et al.*, Crypto'13), which is a weak assumption that includes the Decisional Linear assumption as a special case.

As for its applications, we can plug in available pair encoding schemes and automatically obtain the first fully secure ABE realizations in prime-order groups for predicates of which only fully secure schemes in composite-order groups were known. These include ABE for regular languages, ABE for monotone span programs (and hence Boolean formulae) with short ciphertexts or keys, and completely unbounded ABE for monotone span programs.

As a side result, we establish the first generic implication from ABE for monotone span programs to ABE for branching programs. This implies fully-secure ABE for branching programs in some new variants, namely, unbounded, short-ciphertext, and short-key. Previous schemes are bounded and require linear-size ciphertexts and keys.

Keywords. attribute-based encryption, full security, generic framework, dual-system, prime-order, unbounded, constant-size, monotone span programs, regular languages, branching program.

1 Introduction

Attribute based encryption (ABE), initiated by Sahai and Waters [52], is an emerging paradigm that extends beyond normal public-key encryption. In an ABE scheme for predicate $R : \mathbb{X} \times \mathbb{Y} \to \{0, 1\}$, a ciphertext is associated with a ciphertext attribute, say, $Y \in \mathbb{Y}$, while a key is associated with a key attribute, say, $X \in \mathbb{X}$, and the decryption is possible if and only if $R(X, Y) = 1$.[1] In Key-Policy (KP) type, $\mathbb{X}$ is a set of Boolean functions (often called *policies*), while $\mathbb{Y}$ is a set of inputs to functions, and we define $R(f, x) = f(x)$. Ciphertext-Policy (CP) type is the dual of KP where the roles of $\mathbb{X}$ and $\mathbb{Y}$ are swapped (that is, policies are associated to ciphertexts). Besides a direct application of fine-grained access control over encrypted data [30], ABE has many applications including verifiable computation outsourcing [50].

The standard security requirement for ABE is *full security*, where an adversary is allowed to adaptively query keys for any attribute X as long as $R(X, Y) = 0$, where Y is an adversarially chosen attribute for a challenge ciphertext. *Dual system encryption techniques* introduced by Waters [56] have been successful approaches for constructing fully secure ABE systems that are based on bilinear groups. Despite being versatile as they can be applied to ABE systems for many predicates, until only recently, however, there were no known generic frameworks that can use the techniques in a black-box and modular manner. Wee [58] and Attrapadung [1] recently proposed such generic frameworks that abstract the dual system techniques by decoupling what seem to be essential underlying primitives and characterizing their sufficient conditions so as to obtain fully-secure ABE automatically via generic constructions. However, their frameworks are inherently constructed over bilinear groups of *composite-order*. Although composite-order bilinear groups are more intuitive to work with, especially in the case of dual system techniques, *prime-order* bilinear groups are more preferable as they provide more efficient and compact instantiations. This has been motivated already in a line of research [20, 46, 44, 53, 37, 31, 38]. More concretely, group elements in composite-order groups are more than 12 times larger than those in prime-order groups for the same security level (3072 bits or 3248 bits for composite-order vs 256 bits for prime-order in case of 128-bit security, according to NIST or ECRYPT II recommendations [31]). Regarding time performances, Guillevic [31] reported that bilinear pairings are 254 times slower in composite-order than in prime-order groups for the same 128-bit security. Moreover, exponentiations are also about 300 to 1000 times slower [31, table 6]. In this work, our goal is to propose a generic framework for dual-system encryption in prime-order groups.

The generic frameworks of [58] and [1] work similarly but with the difference that the latter [1] captures also dual system techniques with *computational approaches*, which are generalized from techniques implicitly used in the ABE of Lewko and Waters [42]. (The former [58] only captures the traditional dual systems, which implicitly use information-theoretic approaches). Using computational approaches, the framework of [1] is able to obtain the first fully secure schemes for many ABE primitives for which only selectively secure constructions were known before, including KP-ABE for regular languages [57], KP-ABE for Boolean formulae[2] with constant-size ciphertexts [5], and (completely) unbounded KP-ABE for Boolean formulae [41, 51]. Moreover, Attrapadung and Yamada [6] recently show that, within the framework of [1], we can generically

[1] Traditionally, ABE usually refers to only ABE for *Boolean formulae* predicate [30]. In this paper, however, we use the term ABE for arbitrary predicate R. More precisely, it corresponds to the "public-index predicate encryption" class of functional encryption as categorized in [13].

[2] Or more precisely, ABE for monotone span programs, which implies ABE for Boolean formulae [30]. We will use both terms interchangeably.

convert ABE to its *dual* scheme; that is, key-policy type to ciphertext-policy type, and vice versa. They also show a conversion to its *dual-policy* [3] type, which is the conjunctive of both KP and CP. Many instantiations were then achieved in [6], including the first CP-ABE for Boolean formulae with constant-size keys. Due to its generality, we choose to build upon [1].

1.1 Our Contributions

New Framework. We present a new generic framework for achieving fully secure ABE in *prime-order groups*. It is generic in the sense that it can be applied to ABE for *arbitrary* predicate. Our framework extends the framework of [1], which was constructed in composite-order groups, and works in a similar manner as follows. First, the main component is a primitive called *pair encoding* scheme defined for a predicate. Second, we provide a generic construction that compiles any secure pair encoding scheme for a predicate R to a fully secure ABE scheme for the same predicate R. The *security* requirement for the underlying encoding scheme is exactly the same as that in the framework of [1]. On the other hand, we restrict the *syntax* of encodings into a class we call *regular encodings*, via some simple requirements. This confinement, however, seems natural and does not affect any concrete pair encoding schemes proposed so far [58, 1, 6]. Beside the security of pair encodings, our framework assumes only the Matrix Diffie-Hellman assumption, given by Escala *et al.* [19]. This assumption can be considered as a framework of assumptions, and our scheme can rely on any instance of them, including the most standard one, namely, the Decisional Linear assumption.

New Instantiations. By using exactly the same encoding instantiations in [1, 6], we thus automatically obtain fully secure ABE schemes, *for the first time in prime-order groups*, for various predicates. These include the first fully-secure schemes for

- KP-ABE and CP-ABE for regular languages,
- KP-ABE for monotone span programs with constant-size ciphertexts,
- CP-ABE for monotone span programs with constant-size keys,
- Completely unbounded KP-ABE and CP-ABE for monotone span programs,

all in prime-order groups, which should admit better efficiency and compactness. The assumptions for respective encodings are the same as those in [1] (albeit with a minor syntactic change to prime-order groups). Moreover, via the dual-policy conversion of [6], we also obtain their respective dual-policy variants.

We position our instantiations in Table 2, which show prime-order schemes by their properties. In Table 2, our instantiations that are the first such schemes for given predicates and properties are specified by **New**. Our new instantiations that are not the first of a kind are specified by **New′**. Table 1 provides composite-order schemes for comparison.

New Predicates: Unbounded ABE for Branching Programs, and More. Besides the above new instantiations for existing predicates, we also consider new predicates. More precisely, we propose some new variants of ABE for Branching Program (ABE-BP), namely, *unbounded*, *short-ciphertext*, and *short-key* variants. Unbounded ABE-BP refers to a system that allows an encryptor to associate a ciphertext with an input string of any length (in the case of key-policy). We obtain the first (fully-secure, prime-order) schemes for

- Unbounded KP-ABE and CP-ABE for branching programs,
- KP-ABE for branching programs with constant-size ciphertexts,
- CP-ABE for branching programs with constant-size keys.

Table 1: Composite-order ABE schemes, positioned by properties (for comparing to Table 2)

Predicate	Properties		Unbounded		KP	CP	DP
	Security	Universe	Input	Multi-use			
ABE-PDS	full	-	-	-	A14 [1]	AY15 [6]	AY15 [6]
Unbounded ABE-MSP	selective	large	yes	yes	LW11 [41],	sub	sub
	full	small	yes	yes	sub	LW12 [42]	sub
	full	large	yes	no	sub	sub	sub
	full	large	yes	yes	A14 [1]	AY15 [6]	AY15 [6]
Short-Cipher ABE-MSP	selective	large	no	yes	sub	open	open
	full	large	no	yes	A14 [1]	open	open
Short-Key ABE-MSP	selective	large	no	yes	sub	sub	open
	full	large	no	yes	open	AY15 [6]	open
(Bounded) ABE-MSP	selective	large	no	yes	sub	sub	sub
	full	small	no	no	LOS+10 [43], A14 [1], W14 [58]	LOS+10 [43], A14 [1], W14 [58]	AY15 [6]
	full	large	no	no	A14 [1],	A14 [1]	AY15 [6]
ABE-RL	selective	small	-	-	sub	sub	sub
	full	large	-	-	A14 [1]	A14 [1]	AY15 [6]

Acronym: "ABE-PDS" = *ABE for policy over doubly-spatial relations*, "ABE-MSP" = *ABE for monotone span programs*, "ABE-RL" = *ABE for regular languages*, "ABE-BP" = *ABE for branching programs*. "KP" means *key-policy*. "CP" means *ciphertext-policy*. "DP" means *dual-policy*. "sub" means *subsumed* (no previous work but is subsumed by another system with stronger properties such as full security or prime-order). "open" means *open problem*. "-" means *not defined*. "Unbounded input" refers to unbounded size of attribute set size per ciphertext in KP-ABE-MSP, attribute set size per key in CP-ABE-MSP, and input string in ABE-BP. "Unbounded Multi-use" refers to unbounded multi-use of attributes in one policy in ABE-MSP, and in one branching program in ABE-BP.

We note that these ABE-BP schemes are the first such schemes for respective variants even among composite-order or selectively secure schemes. In particular, the only previous schemes, KP-ABE-BP of [29, 34], are of bounded type and require linear-size ciphertexts and keys.[3]

New Implication. We obtain the above new ABE-BP variants by establishing the first implication from ABE for monotone span programs to ABE-BP. This implication is generic as it is not confined in the encoding framework, and hence can be of an independent interest.

1.2 Difficulties and Our Approaches

Background on the Framework of [1]. In the framework of [1], a ciphertext CT encrypting M, and a key SK take the forms of

$$\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{C}, C_0) = (g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{h})}, Me(g_1,g_2)^{\alpha s_0}), \qquad \mathsf{SK} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})}$$

[3]Note that we consider only *Boolean* branching programs here as in [29], in contrast with [34], where *arithmetic* branching programs are also considered.

Table 2: Prime-order ABE schemes, positioned by properties

Predicate	Properties		Unbounded		KP	CP	DP
	Security	Universe	Input	Multi-use			
ABE-PDS	full	-	-	-	**New**$_1$	**New**$_2$	**New**$_3$
Unbounded ABE-MSP	selective	large	yes	yes	RW13 [51]	RW13 [51]	sub
	full	small	yes	yes	sub	LW12 [42]	sub
	full	large	yes	no	OT12 [48]	OT12 [48]	sub
	full	large	yes	yes	**New**$_4$	**New**$_5$	**New**$_6$
Short-Cipher ABE-MSP	selective	large	no	yes	ALP11 [5]	open	open
	full	large	no	yes	**New**$_7$	open	open
Short-Key ABE-MSP	selective	large	no	yes	remark	sub	open
	full	large	no	yes	open	**New**$_8$	open
(Bounded) ABE-MSP	selective	large	no	yes	GPSW06 [30]	W11 [55]	AI09 [3]
	full	small	no	no	CGW15 [14], **New**$'_9$	CGW15 [14], **New**$'_{10}$	**New**$_{11}$
	full	large	no	no	OT10 [46], **New**$'_{12}$	OT10 [46], **New**$'_{13}$	**New**$_{14}$
ABE-RL	selective	small	-	-	W12 [57]	sub	sub
	full	large	-	-	**New**$_{15}$	**New**$_{16}$	**New**$_{17}$
Unbounded ABE-BP	full	-	yes	yes	**New**$_{18}$	**New**$_{19}$	**New**$_{20}$
Short-Cipher ABE-BP	full	-	no	yes	**New**$_{21}$	open	open
Short-Key ABE-BP	full	-	no	yes	open	**New**$_{22}$	open
(Bounded) ABE-BP	selective	-	no	yes	GVW13 [29]	sub	sub
	full	-	no	no	CGW15 [14], **New**$'_{23}$	CGW15 [14], **New**$'_{24}$	**New**$_{25}$

Acronym: "**New**$_i$" = new instantiations from our framework that are the first such schemes for given predicates and properties. The subscript i is the scheme numbering. "**New**$'_i$" = new instantiations but not the first of a kind. "remark" refers to a solution based on lattices (namely, [10]). Also refer to the acronym of Table 1.

where $\boldsymbol{c}$ and $\boldsymbol{k}$ are *encodings* of attributes Y and X associated to a ciphertext and a key, respectively. Here, g_1, g_2 are generators of subgroups of order p_1 of $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$, which are asymmetric bilinear groups of composite order $N = p_1p_2p_3$ with bilinear map $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_T$.[4] The bold fonts denote vectors. Intuitively, α plays the role of a master key, $\boldsymbol{h}$ represents common variables (or called parameters). These define a public key $\mathsf{PK} = (g_1^{\boldsymbol{h}}, e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha})$. $\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{r}$ represents randomness in the ciphertext and the key, respectively, with s_0 being the first element in $\boldsymbol{s}$. The pair $(\boldsymbol{c}, \boldsymbol{k})$ form a *pair encoding* scheme for predicate R. It is exactly this primitive on which the framework of [1] studies and give sufficient conditions so that, roughly speaking, the ABE scheme defined with CT, SK as above would be fully secure (see the full description in §C). The framework defines *semi-functional* ciphertexts and keys (of type 1,2,3) directly from the encoding

[4] Although the framework of [1] was originally formalized using symmetric groups, generalizing to asymmetric groups is straightforward. For self-containment, we describe the scheme of [1] in asymmetric groups in §C.

albeit over another subgroup (of order p_2), as follows. (Here we also write the normal elements as type 0.)

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} \boldsymbol{C}_{\mathsf{type0}} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{h})} \\ \boldsymbol{C}_{\mathsf{type1}} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{h})} \hat{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} \end{array}\right\} \text{Subgroup Decision} \qquad \left.\begin{array}{l} \mathsf{SK}_{\mathsf{type0}} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \\ \mathsf{SK}_{\mathsf{type1}} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \hat{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(0,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} \\ \mathsf{SK}_{\mathsf{type2}} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \hat{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\hat{\alpha},\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} \\ \mathsf{SK}_{\mathsf{type3}} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \hat{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\hat{\alpha},\boldsymbol{0},\boldsymbol{0})} \end{array}\right. \begin{array}{l} \text{Subgroup Decision} \\ \text{Security of Encoding} \\ \text{Subgroup Decision} \end{array}$$

where $\hat{g}_1, \hat{g}_2$ are generators of subgroup of order p_2 of $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$, respectively. A security proof in the dual system approaches is structured by using a sequence of hybrid games where each game switches normal to semi-functional elements, so that in the final game, all the elements will be semi-functional and the security can be proved trivially. The framework of [1] makes it clear which game transitions would use which underlying assumptions: we write them along with the definition above. More importantly, it decouples the dual system techniques in such a way that the security of encoding will be used in exactly one type of transition (type 1 to 2 as shown in the diagram), while other transitions will be generically based on subgroup decision assumptions provided by the composite-order bilinear groups. Indeed, the security of encoding is defined to be just what we need for that transition. That is, the security of encoding states that given $\hat{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ and $\hat{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\hat{\alpha},\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ where $\boldsymbol{c}, \boldsymbol{k}$ encodes (adversarially chosen) Y, X such that $R(X, Y) = 0$, together with generators of every subgroup, the adversary cannot guess if $\hat{\alpha} = 0$ or $\hat{\alpha}$ is random.

Our Goal. Towards translating to a new prime-order based framework, we would like to use the definition and the security of encoding "as is", since this will allow us to instantly instantiate the encoding schemes already proposed and proved security in [1]. If we can leave encoding "as is", we will only have to replace subgroup decision assumptions provided by composite-order groups with some mechanisms from prime-order groups that mimic them.

A First Attempt: Dual-Pairing Vector Space Approaches. One candidate approach for mimicking subgroup decision assumptions in prime-order groups is to use *dual-pairing vector space* techniques initiated by Okamoto and Takashima [45, 46] and extended by Lewko [37]. However, we expect that this would force us to work with one of the encoding (in the pair encoding) in an "orthogonal form" in order to enable inner-product spaces, which seems to be essential in this approach. This is best described by using an example. Consider a pair encoding scheme that underlies IBE of Boneh and Boyen [8], and Lewko and Waters [39] (and hence for the equality predicate). Their encoding is defined as: $\boldsymbol{c}(s, \boldsymbol{h}) = (s, s(h_1 + h_2 Y))$ and $\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha, r, \boldsymbol{h}) = (\alpha + r(h_1 + h_2 X), r)$, where $\boldsymbol{h} = (h_1, h_2)$. From what we understood, essentially, Lewko [37] converts the IBE scheme to the prime-order setting by (implicitly) considering a vector $\boldsymbol{c}' = (s, sY, -s)$ for $\boldsymbol{c}$ and $\boldsymbol{k}' = (\alpha, r, rX)$ for $\boldsymbol{k}$ and using the fact that the inner product of both vectors becomes αs if $X = Y$ to implement the scheme. In essence, while $\boldsymbol{k}'$ is directly picked from the coefficients in $\boldsymbol{k}$; contrastingly, $\boldsymbol{c}'$ is defined by $(Y, -1)$, which is exactly an orthogonal vector of $(1, Y)$. Orthogonal transformation is certainly doable for simple predicates and encodings, but it could be paramount for enormous encoding schemes (such as in [57, 1]). More importantly, the transformation would change the form of encoding, and we could not use the definition and security of encoding "as is".

Next Attempt: Dual-system Groups. Due to the above difficulty, we then turn to use a variant of the dual-pairing vector space approach recently devised by Chen and Wee [15], called

dual-system groups. Their notion is generic in a complementary way to the frameworks of [58, 1] in the sense that it *unifies composite-order and prime-order* bilinear group properties for dual system encryption techniques but are applied to only ABE with *specific predicates*, namely, HIBE and spatial encryption, while the frameworks of [58, 1] unify dual system encryption techniques for *any predicate* but *only over composite-order* groups.

We briefly describe the basic idea of *Prime-order Dual System Groups* (PDSG) in our notation as follows. Subgroup decision assumptions in composite-order groups will be emulated using the d-Decisional Linear assumption (d-DLIN) in prime-order groups, for any $d \geq 2$. The group $\mathbb{G}_1$ will be emulated by the full *column space* of a random invertible matrix $\boldsymbol{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$ (in the exponent). The subgroup of order p_1 and p_2 of $\mathbb{G}_1$ will then be emulated by using the column spaces of d *leftmost columns* of $\boldsymbol{B}$ and of the one *rightmost column* of $\boldsymbol{B}$, respectively. The group $\mathbb{G}_2$ will be emulated similarly but by the matrix $\boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}$. More concretely, we consider bilinear groups $(\bar{\mathbb{G}}_1, \bar{\mathbb{G}}_2, \bar{\mathbb{G}}_T)$ of prime order p with generator $\bar{g}_1, \bar{g}_2$. The roles of generators $g_1, \hat{g}_1, g_2, \hat{g}_2$ (of subgroups of order p_1, p_2 in $\mathbb{G}_1$ and p_1, p_2 in $\mathbb{G}_2$, resp.) in composite-order groups will be played by the following elements in prime-order groups:

$$g_1 \mapsto \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \qquad \hat{g}_1 \mapsto \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \qquad g_2 \mapsto \bar{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \qquad \hat{g}_2 \mapsto \bar{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)}.$$

We note that $\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)$ denotes the $(d+1)\times d$ matrix where the first d rows comprise the identity matrix while the last row is zero. It functions as a left-projection map.[5] Similarly, $\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)$ is the $(d+1)\times 1$ matrix where the last row is 1; it functions as a right-projection map.

Why the Prime-order Dual-system Groups are Suitable. Although the dual system groups were proposed for applying to HIBE in mind, their idea can be generalized to work with elements in the pair encoding notion as follows. The role of parameter $h \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ in composite-order setting will then be played by a *matrix* $\boldsymbol{H} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$, while the role of randomness s, r (in the normal components) in a ciphertext and a key will be played by *vectors*, say $\boldsymbol{v}_s, \boldsymbol{v}_r \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$, respectively. It is this nature of translating element in a precise way that allows us to work with encoding "as is" by just substituting variables with the translated ones, *e.g.,* our ciphertext encoding function $\boldsymbol{c}((s_0, \ldots, s_\ell), (h_1, \ldots, h_n))$ will become $\boldsymbol{c}((\boldsymbol{v}_{s_0}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_{s_\ell}), (\boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n))$.

In order to be fully compatible with the framework of [1], however, the prime-order dual system groups should not only translate the elements but also fully mimic composite-order groups in both aspects of *properties* and *procedures* that are required by both dual system techniques in general and the framework of [1] in particular. As an example of mimicking *properties*, we have orthogonality between generators from different subspaces, mimicking $e(g_1, \hat{g}_2) = 1$:

$$e(\bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \bar{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)}) = e(\bar{g}_1, \bar{g}_2)^{(\boldsymbol{0}\ 1)\boldsymbol{B}^{-1}\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} = 1,$$

where for matrices $\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{Y}$ with an equal number of rows, we define $e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{X}}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{Y}}) = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{Y}^\top \boldsymbol{X}}$.

As an example of mimicking *procedures*, the "exponentiation" can be done as follows:

$$g_1^s \mapsto \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{v}_s} = \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{v}_s\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \qquad g_2^r \mapsto \bar{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{v}_r} = \bar{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{v}_r\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}.$$

In particular, one of the most important properties that the prime-order dual system groups mimic from composite-order groups are *parameter-hiding* and *associativity*. We elaborate the

[5] That is, $X\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times d}$ is the matrix consisting of all left d columns of X for any $X \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$.

translation of these properties to the prime-order groups in §4.1. *It turns out that, however, the "out-of-the-box" prime-order dual-system groups are still not sufficient for applying to the framework of [1].* We elaborate them as follows.

Dealing with Exponentiation Procedure. We describe an issue on *procedures* first. In the framework of [1], the encoding $\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h})$ is defined to be an ordered set of polynomials, each of which contains only monomials of the form $s_j, h_k s_j$, where we write $\boldsymbol{h} = (h_1, \ldots, h_n)$, $\boldsymbol{s} = (s_0, \ldots, s_\ell)$. Moreover, in the resulting ABE, we define public key to contain $g_1^{\boldsymbol{h}}$ and ciphertext to contain $g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{h})}$; therefore, we would require exponentiations in the translated prime-order groups that mimic $g_1^{h_k}, g_1^{s_j}, (g_1^{h_k})^{s_j}$. We have already seen the case of $g_1^{s_j}$ above. However, it turns out that the procedure to do exponentiation as $(g_1, h_k) \mapsto g_1^{h_k}$ is not implied by the out-of-the-box formulation of PDSG. This corresponds to the fact that we cannot directly compute (written in our notation):

$$(\bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{pmatrix}}, \boldsymbol{H}_k) \not\mapsto \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{H}_k\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{pmatrix}},$$

since matrix multiplication is not commutative and hence we cannot insert a matrix in the middle of a multiplicative term. Here, the three terms implicitly mimic the roles of $g_1, h_k, g_1^{h_k}$, respectively, in PDSG. We resolve this issue by newly defining exponentiation as

$$(\bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{pmatrix}}, \boldsymbol{H}_k) \mapsto \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_k\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{pmatrix}}, \tag{1}$$

where we can now compute by the *left multiplication* in the exponent. It turns out that this not only resolves the issue of mimicking the exponentiation procedure, but also helps resolving a perhaps more important issue of mimicking subgroup decisions assumptions, as we elaborate next.

Dealing with Subgroup Decision Assumptions. The next issue regarding *properties* is more important. It turns out that the subgroup decision assumptions-like properties as provided by PDSG [15] are not sufficient for translating the framework of [1] to prime-order settings. This is since, to the best of our knowledge, such properties in [15] would guarantee indistinguishability for elements that have *only one element of randomness* in the encoding. More precisely, the out-of-the-box formalization in [15] only guarantees the indistinguishability:

$$\left\{\bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{v}s\\0\end{pmatrix}}, \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{H}_1\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{v}s\\0\end{pmatrix}}, \ldots, \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{H}_n\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{v}s\\0\end{pmatrix}}\right\} \quad \text{and} \quad \left\{\bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{v}s\\\hat{s}\end{pmatrix}}, \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{H}_1\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{v}s\\\hat{s}\end{pmatrix}}, \ldots, \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{H}_n\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{v}s\\\hat{s}\end{pmatrix}}\right\} \tag{2}$$

where $\hat{s} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. This is called *left-subgroup indistinguishability* in [15]. We note that s reflects the *one randomness element* in the encoding of $\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h})$. In other words, we can use this out-of-the-box property from [15] to deal only with encoding $\boldsymbol{c}$ that has a vector $\boldsymbol{s}$ having only one variable s. In order to deal with $\boldsymbol{s}$ that contains *any number of elements*, as required for general pair encodings defined by [1], we introduce a new technique that uses *random self-reducibility* of the underlying assumption.[6] More precisely, we use the *Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption* [19]. We informally recap it as follows. It is defined by a distribution $\mathcal{D}_d$ that outputs matrices of certain forms in $\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$. The assumption states that the adversary cannot distinguish

$$\left\{\bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{T}}, \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{y}\\0\end{pmatrix}}\right\} \quad \text{and} \quad \left\{\bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{T}}, \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{y}\\\hat{y}\end{pmatrix}}\right\}$$

[6] Random self-reducibility was already used in [1] but for different reasons and schemes, it was for their (almost) tightly secure IBE scheme in the same paper.

where $\boldsymbol{T} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_d, \boldsymbol{y} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}, \hat{y} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. A useful property of this assumption is that it has random self-reducibility: we can extend the column of $\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{y} \\ \hat{y} \end{pmatrix}$ from the original one column to any number of columns, with *tight reduction*. That is, in the extended problem, it becomes to distinguish

$$\left\{\bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{T}}, \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{y}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{y}_\ell \\ 0, \ldots, 0 \end{pmatrix}}\right\} \quad \text{and} \quad \left\{\bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{T}}, \bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{y}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{y}_\ell \\ \hat{y}_1, \ldots, \hat{y}_\ell \end{pmatrix}}\right\} \tag{3}$$

for any ℓ of polynomial size. Hence, we can use the j-th column for simulating the j-th randomness, *i.e.*, $\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{y}_j \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$ or $\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{y}_j \\ \hat{y}_j \end{pmatrix}$ for $\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{v}_{s_j} \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$ or $\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{v}_{s_j} \\ \hat{s}_j \end{pmatrix}$, and hence obtain the following indistinguishability:

$$\left\{\bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_k\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{v}_{s_j} \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}}\right\}_{k,j} \quad \text{and} \quad \left\{\bar{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_k\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{v}_{s_j} \\ \hat{s}_j \end{pmatrix}}\right\}_{k,j}$$

which is analogously to (2) as above, but now we can deal with *as many randomness variables as appear in* $\boldsymbol{s} = (s_0, \ldots, s_\ell)$, as required.[7]

We also note a crucial fact that our solution of using this random self-reducibility becomes possible only due to our newly defined exponentiation procedure (1) above. Intuitively, this is since if we were to use the out-of-the-box PDSG, it is not clear how to reduce the (many-randomness-variable version of) indistinguishability in (2) to the expanded problem in (3), since we cannot directly exponentiate with $\boldsymbol{H}_k$ (and hence cannot lift (3) to (2)).

Now that we modify and extend dual system groups to be compatible with the framework of [1], some issues still remain in such a way that dual system groups formalization inherently cannot avoid so. To this end, we also restrict the *syntax* definition of pair encoding so as to resolve them. This will be done in a minimal manner that all the encoding schemes proposed so far [58, 1, 6] satisfy the additional restrictions. We thus call it *regular* encoding.

Restricting the Syntax Definition of Encodings. The encoding definition allows the multiplication of monomials $h_k s_j$ from a ciphertext encoding with $h_{k'} r_{j'}$ from a key encoding (when pairing). Since we translate the parameters $h_k, h_{k'}$ to matrices $\boldsymbol{H}_k, \boldsymbol{H}_{k'}$ and the matrix multiplication does not commute, such a multiplication procedure from composite-order settings would not be mimicked correctly (see Eq.(8)). To this end, we restrict the encoding scheme so that there will be no multiplication in the above manner. We additionally need three simple requirements which will be used in the security proof of the framework. We describe the intuition for them in §3.1.

1.3 Concurrent and Independent Work

Concurrently and independently, Chen, Gay, and Wee [14] recently propose a generic framework that abstracts dual system ABE for arbitrary predicates in prime-order bilinear groups. The main difference between their framework and ours is that ours can deal with *computationally secure encodings*, while their framework can deal only with information-theoretic ones. As motivated in [1], computational approaches have an advantage in that they are applicable to ABE for predicates where information-theoretic theoretic argument seems insufficient. These include ABE with some *unbounded* properties, or *constant-size* ciphertexts (or keys). We compare some instantiations of [14] (available in their full version) that are relevant to ours in Table 2.

[7] Note that here we implicitly set $\boldsymbol{B} = \boldsymbol{T}$, and in the proof, $\boldsymbol{H}_k$ will be known values to the reduction algorithm. We only give a very informal argument here just to grasp the intuition. The details are in, *e.g.*, Lemma 4.

Another difference is that the syntax of encoding in [14] seems more restricted in the sense that it can deal with only one element of randomness, while our syntax can deal with arbitrary many elements. On one hand, one unit of randomness is shown to suffice for all known information-theoretic encodings in [14]. On the other hand, multi-unit randomness seems essential in more esoteric predicates such as ABE for regular languages (of which information-theoretic encodings are not known).

In the conceptual view, their framework unifies both composite-order and prime-order groups into one generic construction via the dual system group syntax. Contrastingly, we focus only on the prime-order generic construction. Nevertheless, since we use the same notion of pair encoding as in the composite-order framework of [1], it can be said that our framework together with [1] provide a unified framework albeit with two generic constructions.

It is also worth noting that [14] extends their ABE framework to achieve weakly attribute-hiding predicate encryption.[8]

1.4 Related Work

Researches on ABE and its generalization, functional encryption (FE), stem from a large number of works [52, 30, 7, 49, 12, 55, 56, 3, 4, 39, 43, 46, 5, 40, 41, 13, 47, 48, 51], and many more, that progressively strengthen ABE in many aspects such as allowable predicate classes, security, underlying assumptions, added functionalities, efficiency, and so on.

Composite-to-Prime Translations. Composite-order bilinear groups were first suggested by [11]. Freeman [20] identified two useful features of composite-order groups, namely *projecting* and *canceling* pairing, and proposed guidelines for translating schemes in composite-order groups to prime-order ones while preserving either feature. Subsequent works [44, 53, 33, 38] further studied translations that preserve both features simultaneously. In [37], Lewko points out why the features identified by Freeman might not be sufficient for enabling dual-system proof approaches. In particular, an implicit but important feature for dual system proofs, namely *parameter-hiding*, was not captured by Freeman's framework. Based on dual-pairing vector spaces [46], Lewko [37] then proposed techniques that can be seen as guidelines for simulating some parameter-hiding feature, which are then applied to the IBE of [39] and the HIBE of [41]. While the guideline of [37] is versatile, it is not generic: a scheme designer must still design a scheme and prove the security anew each time. On the other hand, our framework is generic: it provides a unified generic construction and a unified security proof, and can be applied to ABE for arbitrary predicates (for which secure pair encoding exists).

ABE for More General Predicates. In this work, we allow only efficient tools, namely, bilinear groups. When basing on bilinear groups, the largest allowable predicate classes for ABE turn out to be Boolean formulae [30, 43] and deterministic finite Automata [57, 1], which are subclasses of log-depth circuits (NC1, or log-space computations). When basing on some seemingly stronger (and hence less efficient) tools, such as lattice-based cryptography and the LWE assumption, multi-linear maps [21, 17, 18], or cryptographic obfuscations [23], we can obtain ABE and FE for much larger classes such as poly-size circuits [22, 29, 25, 10], or Turing machines [27, 28]. We remark that, until recently, all known ABE systems for these general classes are only selectively secure (or fully secure but with exponential reductions). Fully secure ABE systems for circuits are recently proposed in [24, 2] using composite-order multi-linear

[8] Note that, however, only (H)IBE and zero inner-product are currently the only predicates applicable in this extended framework [14].

maps [18] via dual system techniques. Constructing such ABEs in prime-order settings is still an interesting open problem. Our framework might be a suitable starting point for solving it.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Definitions of Attribute Based Encryption

Predicate Family. We consider a predicate family $R = \{R_\kappa\}_{\kappa \in \mathbb{N}^c}$, for some constant $c \in \mathbb{N}$, where a relation $R_\kappa : \mathbb{X}_\kappa \times \mathbb{Y}_\kappa \to \{0,1\}$ is a predicate function that maps a pair of key attribute in a space $\mathbb{X}_\kappa$ and ciphertext attribute in a space $\mathbb{Y}_\kappa$ to $\{0,1\}$. The family index $\kappa = (n_1, n_2, \ldots)$ specifies the description of a predicate from the family. We will often neglect κ for simplicity of exposition.

Attribute Based Encryption Syntax. An attribute based encryption (ABE) scheme for predicate family R consists of the following algorithms.

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \kappa) \to (\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{MSK})$: takes as input a security parameter 1^λ and a family index κ of predicate family R, and outputs a master public key PK and a master secret key MSK.
- $\mathsf{Encrypt}(Y, M, \mathsf{PK}) \to \mathsf{CT}$: takes as input a ciphertext attribute $Y \in \mathbb{Y}_\kappa$, a message $M \in \mathcal{M}$, and public key PK. It outputs a ciphertext CT.
- $\mathsf{KeyGen}(X, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{PK}) \to \mathsf{SK}$: takes as input a key attribute $X \in \mathbb{X}_\kappa$ and the master key MSK. It outputs a secret key SK.
- $\mathsf{Decrypt}(\mathsf{CT}, \mathsf{SK}) \to M$: given a ciphertext CT with its attribute Y and the decryption key SK with its attribute X, it outputs a message M or $\perp$.

Correctness. Consider all indexes κ, all $M \in \mathcal{M}$, $X \in \mathbb{X}_\kappa$, $Y \in \mathbb{Y}_\kappa$ such that $R_\kappa(X, Y) = 1$. If $\mathsf{Encrypt}(Y, M, \mathsf{PK}) \to \mathsf{CT}$ and $\mathsf{KeyGen}(X, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{PK}) \to \mathsf{SK}$ where $(\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{MSK})$ is generated from $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \kappa)$, then $\mathsf{Decrypt}(\mathsf{CT}, \mathsf{SK}) \to M$.

We defer the security definition for ABE to §A.

2.2 Bilinear Groups and Assumptions

In our framework, for maximum generality and clarity, we consider asymmetric bilinear groups $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T)$ of prime order p, with an efficiently computable bilinear map $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_T$. The symmetric version of our framework can be obtained by just setting $\mathbb{G}_1 = \mathbb{G}_2$.[9] We define a bilinear group generator $\mathcal{G}(\lambda)$ that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e, p)$. We recall that e has the bilinear property: $e(g_1^a, g_2^b) = e(g_1, g_2)^{ab}$ for any $g_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2$, $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ and the non-degeneration property: $e(g_1, g_2) \neq 1 \in \mathbb{G}_T$ whenever $g_1 \neq 1 \in \mathbb{G}_1, g_2 \neq 1 \in \mathbb{G}_2$.

Notation for Matrix in the Exponents. Vectors will be treated as either row or column matrices. When unspecified, we shall let it be a row vector. Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a group. Let $\boldsymbol{a} = (a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ and $\boldsymbol{b} = (b_1, \ldots, b_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$. We denote $\boldsymbol{a} \cdot \boldsymbol{b} = (a_1 \cdot b_1, \ldots, a_n \cdot b_n)$, where '$\cdot$' is the group operation of $\mathbb{G}$. For $g \in \mathbb{G}$ and $\boldsymbol{c} = (c_1, \ldots, c_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$, we denote $g^{\boldsymbol{c}} = (g^{c_1}, \ldots, g^{c_n})$. We denote by $\mathbb{GL}_{p,n}$ the group of invertible matrices (the general linear group) in $\mathbb{Z}_p^{n \times n}$. Consider $\boldsymbol{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times n}$ (the set of all $d \times n$ matrices in $\mathbb{Z}_p$). We denote the transpose of $\boldsymbol{M}$ as $\boldsymbol{M}^\top$. We denote by $g^{\boldsymbol{M}}$

[9] This can be done since we will *not* assume, *e.g.,* the External DH assumption [9].

the matrix in $\mathbb{G}^{d\times n}$ of which its (i,j) entry is $g^{\boldsymbol{M}_{i,j}}$, where $\boldsymbol{M}_{i,j}$ is the (i,j) entry of $\boldsymbol{M}$. For $\boldsymbol{Q}\in\mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell\times d}$, we denote $(g^{\boldsymbol{Q}})^{\boldsymbol{M}}=g^{\boldsymbol{QM}}$. Note that from $\boldsymbol{M}$ and $g^{\boldsymbol{Q}}\in\mathbb{G}^{\ell\times d}$, we can compute $g^{\boldsymbol{QM}}$ without knowing $\boldsymbol{Q}$, since its (i,j) entry is $\prod_{k=1}^{d}(g^{\boldsymbol{Q}_{i,k}})^{\boldsymbol{M}_{k,j}}$. The same can be said about $g^{\boldsymbol{M}}$ and $\boldsymbol{Q}$. For $\boldsymbol{X}\in\mathbb{Z}_p^{r\times c_1}$ and $\boldsymbol{Y}\in\mathbb{Z}_p^{r\times c_2}$, we denote its pairing as:

$$e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{X}},g_2^{\boldsymbol{Y}})=e(g_1,g_2)^{\boldsymbol{Y}^\top\boldsymbol{X}}\in\mathbb{G}_T^{c_2\times c_1}.$$

Matrix-DH Assumptions [19]**.** We call $\mathcal{D}_d$ a matrix distribution if it outputs (in poly time, with overwhelming probability) matrices in $\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$ of the form:

$$\boldsymbol{T}=\begin{array}{c}\\ d\\ 1\end{array}\begin{array}{c}\begin{array}{cc}d & 1\end{array}\\ \begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{M} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{c} & 1\end{pmatrix}\end{array}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathcal{D}_d. \tag{4}$$

such that $\boldsymbol{M}$ is an invertible matrix in $\mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times d}$ (*i.e.,* $\boldsymbol{M}\in\mathbb{GL}_{p,d}$). We say that the $\mathcal{D}_d$-*Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption* holds relative to $\mathcal{G}$ if for all ppt adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, the advantage

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}(\lambda):=\left|\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}(\mathbb{G},g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}},g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{y}}{0}})=1\right]-\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}(\mathbb{G},g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}},g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{y}}{\hat{y}}})=1\right]\right|$$

is negligible in λ, where the probability is taken over $(\mathbb{G}_1,\mathbb{G}_2,\mathbb{G}_T,e,p)\xleftarrow{\$}\mathcal{G}(\lambda)$, $g_1\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{G}_1$, $g_2\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{G}_2$, $\boldsymbol{T}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathcal{D}_d$, $\boldsymbol{y}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$, $y\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p$, and the randomness of $\mathcal{A}$. Denote $\mathbb{G}=(\mathbb{G}_1,\mathbb{G}_2,\mathbb{G}_T,e,p,g_1,g_2)$.

Remark 1. We remark that the assumption is progressively weaker as d increases. In particular, in any k-multi-linear groups, the $\mathcal{D}_d$-Matrix DH Assumption is false if $d<k$ ([19]). Hence, we can use the assumption with $d\geq 2$, since we work on bilinear groups. The most well-known special case of the $\mathcal{D}_d$-Matrix-DH Assumption is the Decision d-Linear Assumption, for which $\boldsymbol{M}$ are restricted to random diagonal matrices and $\boldsymbol{c}$ is fixed as the vector with all 1's.

Our scheme will use arbitrary $\mathcal{D}_d$ for maximal generality. One can directly tradeoff the weakness of assumption and the sizes of ciphertexts and keys by d.

Random Self Reducibility of Matrix-DH Assumptions. The $\mathcal{D}_d$-Matrix-DH Assumption is random self reducible, as shown in [19]: the problem instance defined by $(\boldsymbol{T},\binom{\boldsymbol{y}}{\hat{y}})$ can be randomized to another instance defined by $(\boldsymbol{T},\binom{\boldsymbol{y'}}{\hat{y'}})$. This is done by choosing $\boldsymbol{\delta}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1},\hat{\delta}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p$ and setting

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{y'}}{\hat{y'}}}=g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{y}}{\hat{y}}\hat{\delta}}g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{\delta}}{0}},$$

and observe that $y=0$ iff $y'=0$. We can gather each new instance $\binom{\boldsymbol{y'}}{\hat{y'}}$ into columns of a matrix and consider the *m-fold* $\mathcal{D}_d$-Matrix-DH Assumption for which the advantage is defined as

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{m,\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}(\lambda):=\left|\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}(\mathbb{G},g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}},g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{Y}}{\boldsymbol{0}}})=1\right]-\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}(\mathbb{G},g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}},g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{Y}}{\hat{\boldsymbol{y}}}})=1\right]\right|,$$

where the probability is taken over $(\mathbb{G}_1,\mathbb{G}_2,\mathbb{G}_T,e,p)\xleftarrow{\$}\mathcal{G}(\lambda)$, $g_1\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{G}_1$, $g_2\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{G}_2$, $\boldsymbol{T}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathcal{D}_d$, $\boldsymbol{Y}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times m}$, $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p^{1\times m}$, and the randomness of $\mathcal{A}$. Again, we denote $\mathbb{G}=(\mathbb{G}_1,\mathbb{G}_2,\mathbb{G}_T,e,p,g_1,g_2)$. Due to the random self-reducibility, the reduction to the m-fold variant is tight.

Proposition 1. ([19]) *For any integer m, for all ppt adversary $\mathcal{A}$, there exists a ppt algorithm $\mathcal{A}'$ such that* $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}'}^{m,\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}(\lambda)=\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}(\lambda)$.

3 Definition of Pair Encoding

We recall the definition of pair encoding schemes as given in [1]. A pair encoding scheme for predicate family R consists of four deterministic algorithms given by $\mathsf{P} = (\mathsf{Param}, \mathsf{Enc1}, \mathsf{Enc2}, \mathsf{Pair})$ as follows:

- $\mathsf{Param}(\kappa) \to n$. It takes as input an index κ and outputs an integer n, which specifies the number of *common variables* in $\mathsf{Enc1}$, $\mathsf{Enc2}$. For the default notation, let $\boldsymbol{h} = (h_1, \ldots, h_n)$ denote the the list of common variables.

- $\mathsf{Enc1}(X) \to (\boldsymbol{k} = (k_1, \ldots, k_{m_1}); m_2)$. It takes as inputs $X \in \mathbb{X}_\kappa$, and outputs a sequence of polynomials $\{k_i\}_{i\in[1,m_1]}$ with coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}_p$, and $m_2 \in \mathbb{N}$. We require that each polynomial k_i is a *linear combination of monomials* $\alpha, r_j, h_k r_j$, where $\alpha, r_1, \ldots, r_{m_2}, h_1, \ldots, h_n$ are variables. More precisely, it outputs a set of coefficients $\{b_i\}_{i\in[1,m_1]}, \{b_{i,j}\}_{i\in[1,m_1],j\in[1,m_2]}$, $\{b_{i,j,k}\}_{i\in[1,m_1],j\in[1,m_2],k\in[1,n]}$ that defines the sequence of polynomials:

$$\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha, (r_1, \ldots, r_{m_2}), (h_1, \ldots, h_n)) = \left\{ b_i\alpha + \left(\sum_{j\in[1,m_2]} b_{i,j} r_j\right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j\in[1,m_2]\\k\in[1,n]}} b_{i,j,k} h_k r_j\right)\right\}_{i\in[1,m_1]} \tag{5}$$

- $\mathsf{Enc2}(Y) \to (\boldsymbol{c} = (c_1, \ldots, c_{w_1}); w_2)$. It takes as inputs $Y \in \mathbb{Y}_\kappa$, and outputs a sequence of polynomials $\{c_i\}_{i\in[1,w_1]}$ with coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}_p$, and $w_2 \in \mathbb{N}$. We require that each polynomial c_i is a *linear combination of monomials* $s_j, h_k s_j$, where $s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_{w_2}, h_1, \ldots, h_n$ are variables. More precisely, it outputs $\{a_{i,j}\}_{i\in[1,w_1],j\in[0,w_2]}, \{a_{i,j,k}\}_{i\in[1,w_1],j\in[0,w_2],k\in[1,n]}$ which is a set of coefficients that defines the sequence of polynomials:

$$\boldsymbol{c}((s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_{w_2}), (h_1, \ldots, h_n)) \quad = \quad \left\{ \left(\sum_{j\in[0,w_2]} a_{i,j} s_j\right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j\in[0,w_2]\\k\in[1,n]}} a_{i,j,k} h_k s_j\right)\right\}_{i\in[1,w_1]} \tag{6}$$

- $\mathsf{Pair}(X, Y) \to \boldsymbol{E}$. It takes as inputs X, Y, and output $\boldsymbol{E} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{m_1\times w_1}$.

Correctness. The correctness requirement is defined as follows. Let $(\boldsymbol{k}; m_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc1}(X)$, $(\boldsymbol{c}; w_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc2}(Y)$, and $\boldsymbol{E} \leftarrow \mathsf{Pair}(X, Y)$. We have that if $R(X, Y) = 1$, then $\boldsymbol{k}\boldsymbol{E}\boldsymbol{c}^\top = \alpha s_0$, where the equality holds symbolically.

Note that since $\boldsymbol{k}\boldsymbol{E}\boldsymbol{c}^\top = \sum_{i\in[1,m_1],j\in[1,w_1]} E_{i,j} k_i c_j$, the correctness amounts to check if there is a linear combination of $k_i c_j$ terms summed up to αs_0. In what follows, we denote $\boldsymbol{h} = (h_1, \ldots, h_n), \boldsymbol{r} = (r_1, \ldots, r_{m_2}), \boldsymbol{s} = (s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_{w_2})$.

3.1 Regular Pair Encoding

Towards proving the security of our framework in prime-order groups, we require new properties for pair encoding. We formalize them as *regularity*. This would generally confine the class of encoding schemes that the new framework can deal with from the previous framework by [1]. Nonetheless, the confinement seems natural since all the pair encoding schemes proposed so

far [1, 58, 6] turn out to be regular, and hence are not affected. The definition can be best described by using an example, we will thus illustrate an the regularity of an existing encoding from [1] in §F.

Definition 1 (Regular Pair Encoding)**.** We call a pair encoding *regular* if the following hold:

1. For $i \in [1, m_1], i' \in [1, w_1]$ such that there is $j \in [1, m_2], k \in [1, n], j' \in [1, w_2], k' \in [1, n]$ where $b_{i,j,k} \neq 0$ and $a_{i',j',k'} \neq 0$, we require that $E_{i,i'} = 0$.

2. For $j \in [1, m_2]$ such that there is no $i' \in [1, m_1]$ where $k_{i'} = r_j$, we require that for any $i \in [1, m_1], k \in [1, n]$, we have $b_{i,j,k} = 0$.

3. For $j \in [0, w_2]$ such that there is no $i' \in [1, w_1]$ where $c_{i'} = s_j$, we require that for any $i \in [1, m_1], k \in [1, n]$, we have $a_{i,j,k} = 0$.

4. There is $i' \in [1, w_1]$ where $c_{i'} = s_0$. Wlog, we always let such i' be 1, *i.e.,* the first polynomial in $\boldsymbol{c}$ is $c_1 = s_0$.

Explaining the Definition. The first restriction basically states that the multiplication of $(h_k r_j)$ and $(h_{k'} s_{j'})$ will not be allowed when pairing. The reason to do so is that the parameter $h_k, h_{k'}$ will be translated to matrices, and the matrix multiplication does not commute; hence, the multiplication procedure would not be mimicked correctly (from the composite-order setting) if it were to be allowed (see Eq. (8)). This restriction is quite natural since the product $r_j h_k, h_{k'} s_{j'}$ can be implemented by grouping $h_{k''} = h_k h_{k'}$, and just using associativity $(r_j h_{k''}) s_{j'} = r_j (h_{k''} s_{j'})$ instead; therefore, the multiplication of $(h_k r_j)$ and $(h_{k'} s_{j'})$ will not be needed in the first place.

The second restriction basically states that a term $h_k r_j$ is allowed in the key encoding only if r_j is given out explicitly in the key encoding. The third is similar but for the ciphertext encoding. These restrictions are also natural since intuitively to cancel out $h_k r_j$ (so that the bilinear combination would give only the term αs_0 and no others), one would need r_j to multiply with, say $h_k s_{j'}$ (since we cannot do the multiplication concerning two parameters, as depicted above). The meaning of the fourth is clear: s_0 must be given out in the encoding. These latter three restrictions will be used for the security proofs of game transitions that are based on the security of encodings (Lemma 7,10).

3.2 Security Definitions for Pair Encodings

We will use (almost) the same definitions for security notions of pair encoding schemes as given in [1], with a refinement regarding the number of queries in [6]. We therefore defer it to §B. The definitions comprise an information-theoretic flavor called *perfectly master-key hiding* (PMH) and a computational flavor called *doubly selectively master-key hiding*, which consists of two sub-notions called *selectively master-key hiding* (SMH) and *co-selectively master-key hiding* (CMH). We use a new refinement proposed in [6] that parameterizes the notions with the number of queries for ciphertext and key. The notions in [1] can then be rephrased as $(1, \mathsf{poly})$-SMH and $(1, 1)$-CMH. An advantage of this refinement is that we can have a "dual" conversion that converts between $(1, 1)$-CMH and $(1, 1)$-SMH for dual predicate [6]. We remark a slight difference from those in [1, 6]: here we define it in *asymmetric* and *prime-order* groups, while it was defined in *symmetric* and *prime-order subgroup of composite-order* groups in [1, 6]. We argue that these are merely syntactical and the security of all concrete pair encoding schemes proposed in [1, 6] will preserve. We refer to §B.

4 Our Framework in Prime-Order Groups

4.1 Intuition for Translation to Prime-Order Groups

Before describing our prime-order framework, we describe how we translate elements, procedures, and properties from the composite-order group setting to the prime-order group setting. For self-containment, we also describe the composite-order framework of [1] in §C.

- **Generators.** In composite-order groups $(\mathbb{C}_1, \mathbb{C}_2, \mathbb{C}_T)$ of order $N = p_1p_2p_3$, we consider generators $c_1 \in \mathbb{C}_{1,p_1}$, $\hat{c}_1 \in \mathbb{C}_{1,p_2}$, $c_2 \in \mathbb{C}_{2,p_1}$, $\hat{c}_2 \in \mathbb{C}_{2,p_2}$, where $\mathbb{C}_{i,p_j}$ is the subgroup of $\mathbb{C}_i$ of order p_j. In prime-order groups $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T)$ with generators $g_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2$, we use the following elements to mimic generators $c_1, \hat{c}_1, c_2, \hat{c}_2$, respectively:

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times d}, \qquad g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1},$$
$$g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times d}, \qquad g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1}.$$

  where $\boldsymbol{B} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$, $\boldsymbol{Z} := \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{D}$ where $\boldsymbol{D} := \left(\begin{smallmatrix}\tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) \in \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$ with $\tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d}$.

- **Variables.** The role of parameter h_k (in $\boldsymbol{h}$) in the composite-order setting will be played by a matrix $\boldsymbol{H}_k \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$. The role of randomness s_j, r_j (in $\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{r}$) to be exponentiated over c_1, c_2 in the composite-order setting for a ciphertext and a key will be played by vectors $\boldsymbol{s}_j, \boldsymbol{r}_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$, respectively, in the prime-order setting. The role of randomness $\hat{s}_j, \hat{r}_j$ (in $\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}$) to be exponentiated over $\hat{c}_1, \hat{c}_2$ will be used as it is (a scalar in $\mathbb{Z}_p$) in the prime-order setting.

- **Exponentiation by parameter.** To mimic exponentiation $c_1^{h_k}$, $\hat{c}_1^{\hat{h}_k}$, $c_2^{h_k}$, $\hat{c}_2^{\hat{h}_k}$ in the composite-order setting, we do the following in the prime-order setting:

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_k\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times d}, \qquad g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\hat{h}_k} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1},$$
$$g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_k^\top\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times d}, \qquad g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\hat{h}_k} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1}.$$

- **Exponentiation by randomness.** To mimic exponentiation $c_1^{s_j}$, $\hat{c}_1^{\hat{s}_j}$, $c_2^{r_j}$, $\hat{c}_2^{\hat{r}_j}$, in the composite-order setting, we do the following in the prime-order setting:

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{s}_j} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1}, \qquad g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\hat{s}_j} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\\hat{s}_j\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1},$$
$$g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{r}_j} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_j\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1}, \qquad g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\hat{r}_j} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\\hat{r}_j\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1}.$$

- **Exponentiation by randomness over parameter.** To mimic $(c_1^{h_k})^{s_j}$, $(\hat{c}_1^{\hat{h}_k})^{\hat{s}_j}$, $(c_2^{h_k})^{r_j}$, $(\hat{c}_2^{\hat{h}_k})^{\hat{r}_j}$, in the composite-order setting, we do the following in the prime-order setting:

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_k\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{s}_j} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_k\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1}, \qquad g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\hat{h}_k\hat{s}_j} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\\hat{h}_k\hat{s}_j\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1},$$
$$g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_k^\top\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{r}_j} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_k^\top\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_j\\0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1}, \qquad g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\hat{h}_k\hat{r}_j} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\\hat{h}_k\hat{r}_j\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1}.$$

- **Pair Encoding.** From the ciphertext attribute encoding $\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h})$ defined in Eq.(6), we define an augmented encoding with variables $\boldsymbol{x}_j$ replacing s_j, $\boldsymbol{H}_k$ replacing h_k as

$$\boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}((\boldsymbol{x}_0, \boldsymbol{x}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}_{w_2}), (\boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n)) := \left\{ \left(\sum_{j \in [0, w_2]} a_{i,j} \boldsymbol{B} \boldsymbol{x}_j \right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j \in [0, w_2] \\ k \in [1, n]}} a_{i,j,k} \boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B} \boldsymbol{x}_j \right) \right\}_{i \in [1, w_1]}.$$

  Similarly, from the key attribute encoding $\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha, \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h})$ defined in Eq.(5), we define an augmented encoding with variables $\boldsymbol{y}_j$ replacing s_j, $\boldsymbol{H}_k$ replacing h_k, and $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1}$ replacing α as

$$\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, (\boldsymbol{y}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{y}_{m_2}), (\boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n)) := \left\{ b_i \boldsymbol{\alpha} + \left(\sum_{j \in [1, m_2]} b_{i,j} \boldsymbol{Z} \boldsymbol{y}_j \right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j \in [1, m_2] \\ k \in [1, n]}} b_{i,j,k} \boldsymbol{H}_k^\top \boldsymbol{Z} \boldsymbol{y}_j \right) \right\}_{i \in [1, m_1]}.$$

  Note that we will use $\boldsymbol{x}_j$ as either $\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_j \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right)$ or $\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_j \\ \hat{s}_j \end{smallmatrix}\right)$ and $\boldsymbol{y}_j$ as either $\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{r}_j \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right)$ or $\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{r}_j \\ \hat{r}_j \end{smallmatrix}\right)$.

- **Associativity.** In the composite-order setting, we have $e(t_1^{h_k s_j}, t_2^{r_i}) = e(t_1^{s_j}, t_2^{h_k r_i})$, for any $t_1 \in \mathbb{C}_1, t_2 \in \mathbb{C}_2$. In the prime-order setting, we have

$$e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_j \\ \hat{s}_j \end{smallmatrix}\right)}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{r}_i \\ \hat{r}_i \end{smallmatrix}\right)}) = e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{B} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_j \\ \hat{s}_j \end{smallmatrix}\right)}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_k^\top \boldsymbol{Z} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{r}_i \\ \hat{r}_i \end{smallmatrix}\right)}). \tag{7}$$

  as $\left(\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{r}_i^\top & \hat{r}_i \end{smallmatrix}\right) \boldsymbol{Z}^\top \right) \left(\boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_j \\ \hat{s}_j \end{smallmatrix}\right) \right) = \left(\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{r}_i^\top & \hat{r}_i \end{smallmatrix}\right) \boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_k \right) \left(\boldsymbol{B} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_j \\ \hat{s}_j \end{smallmatrix}\right) \right)$.

- **Parameter-Hiding.** In composite-order groups, we have that: given $c_1^{h_k}, c_2^{h_k}, c_1, \hat{c}_1, c_2, \hat{c}_2, p_1, p_2$; $h_k \bmod p_2$ is infor-mation-theoretically hidden (due to the Chinese Remainder Theorem). In prime-order settings, we have Lemma 2.

Lemma 2. *Given* $g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times d}$ *and* $g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_k^\top \boldsymbol{Z} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right)} \in \mathbb{G}_2^{(d+1)\times d}$*, along with* $g_1, g_2, \boldsymbol{B}, \boldsymbol{Z}$*, the quantity of the entry at* $(d+1, d+1)$ *of the matrix* $\boldsymbol{B}^{-1} \boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B}$ *is information-theoretically hidden.*

Proof. Write $\boldsymbol{B}^{-1} \boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B} = \left(\begin{smallmatrix} M_1 & M_2 \\ M_3 & \delta \end{smallmatrix}\right)$, where $M_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times d}$, $M_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}, M_3 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{1\times d}, \delta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} \boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right) &= \boldsymbol{B} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} M_1 & M_2 \\ M_3 & \delta \end{smallmatrix}\right) \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right) = \boldsymbol{B} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} M_1 \\ M_3 \end{smallmatrix}\right), \\ \boldsymbol{H}_k^\top \boldsymbol{Z} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right) &= \boldsymbol{H}_k^\top \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\right) \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right) = \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} M_1^\top & M_3^\top \\ M_2^\top & \delta \end{smallmatrix}\right) \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{smallmatrix}\right) \\ &= \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} M_1^\top \tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} \\ M_2^\top \tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} \end{smallmatrix}\right), \end{aligned}$$

where in the second line, we use the fact that $\boldsymbol{B}^\top \boldsymbol{H}^\top \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top} = \left(\begin{smallmatrix} M_1^\top & M_3^\top \\ M_2^\top & \delta \end{smallmatrix}\right)$. We can see that both $\boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right), \boldsymbol{H}_k^\top \boldsymbol{Z} \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right)$ do not contain information on δ. □

We also give an intuition why commutativity does not preserve to prime-order settings as follows.

- **Unavailable Commutativity.** In the composite-order setting, we allow for any $t_1 \in \mathbb{C}_1, t_2 \in \mathbb{C}_2$, $e(t_1^{h_k s_j}, t_2^{h_{k'} r_i}) = e(t_1^{h_{k'} s_j}, t_2^{h_k r_i})$. However, when translating to our prime-order setting using our rules so far, an analogous mechanism would not hold as we can see that:

$$e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{s}}_j\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_{k'}^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_i\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)}) \neq e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_{k'} \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{s}}_j\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_k^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_i\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)}), \tag{8}$$

as $\left((\boldsymbol{r}_i^\top \ \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}_i)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_{k'}\right)\left(\boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{s}}_j\end{smallmatrix}\right)\right) \neq \left((\boldsymbol{r}_i^\top \ \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}_i)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_k\right)\left(\boldsymbol{H}_{k'} \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{s}}_j\end{smallmatrix}\right)\right)$, due to the fact that the matrix multiplication is not commutative. This is exactly why we will *not* use this commu-tativity-based computation in our prime-order framework by disallowing exactly this kind of multiplication to occur. We enable this with the first rule of *regular encoding*, which exactly prevents multiplying $h_k s_j$ with $h_{k'} r_{j'}$.

4.2 Our Generic Construction for Fully Secure ABE

We are now ready to describe our generic construction in prime-order groups. It is obtained by translating the composite-order scheme of [1], recapped in §C, to the prime-order setting using the above rules. As a caveat, we actually use a variant of [1], see Remark 2. From a pair encoding scheme P for a predicate R, we construct an ABE scheme for the predicate R, denoted $\mathsf{ABE}(\mathsf{P})$, as follows.

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \kappa)$: Run $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e, p) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$. Pick generators $g_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_1$ and $g_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_2$. Run $n \leftarrow \mathsf{Param}(\kappa)$. Pick $\boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$ and $\boldsymbol{B} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1} \subset \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$. Choose $\tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d}$, define $\boldsymbol{D} := \left(\begin{smallmatrix}\tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) \in \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$ and $\boldsymbol{Z} := \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{D}$. Choose $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1}$. Output

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathsf{PK} &= \left(e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_1 \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \ldots, g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_n \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}\right),\\
\mathsf{MSK} &= \left(g_2^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_1^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \ldots, g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_n^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}\right).
\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

- $\mathsf{Encrypt}(Y, M, \mathsf{PK})$: Upon input $Y \in \mathbb{Y}$, run $(\boldsymbol{c}; w_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc2}(Y)$. Pick $\boldsymbol{s}_0, \boldsymbol{s}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{s}_{w_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$. Let $\boldsymbol{S} := (\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right), \left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_1\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right), \ldots, \left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_{w_2}\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{w_2+1}$. Denote $\mathbb{H} := (\boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n)$. Output the ciphertext as $\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{C}, C_0)$:

$$\boldsymbol{C} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H})} \in (\mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1})^{w_1}, \qquad C_0 = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \cdot M \in \mathbb{G}_T. \tag{10}$$

Note that $\boldsymbol{C}$ can be computed from PK since

$$\boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H}) = \left\{\left(\sum_{j\in[0,w_2]} a_{i,j} \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j\in[0,w_2]\\ k\in[1,n]}} a_{i,j,k} \boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\right)\right\}_{i\in[1,w_1]} \tag{11}$$

and thanks to the identity relation $\left(\boldsymbol{X}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\right)\boldsymbol{y} = \boldsymbol{X}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{y}\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)$ for any $\boldsymbol{X} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$, $\boldsymbol{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$.

- $\mathsf{KeyGen}(X, \mathsf{MSK})$: Upon input $X \in \mathbb{X}$, run $(\boldsymbol{k}; m_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc1}(X)$. Randomly pick $\boldsymbol{r}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{m_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$. Let $\boldsymbol{R} := ((\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_1\\0\end{smallmatrix}), \ldots, (\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_{m_2}\\0\end{smallmatrix})) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{m_2}$. Recall the notation $\mathbb{H} = (\boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n)$. Output

$$\mathsf{SK} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{R}, \mathbb{H})} \in (\mathbb{G}_2^{(d+1)\times 1})^{m_1}. \tag{12}$$

  Note that SK can be computed from MSK since

$$\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{R}, \mathbb{H}) \quad = \quad \left\{ b_i \boldsymbol{\alpha} + \left(\sum_{j\in[1,m_2]} b_{i,j} \boldsymbol{Z} (\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_j\\0\end{smallmatrix}) \right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j\in[1,m_2]\\k\in[1,n]}} b_{i,j,k} \boldsymbol{H}_k^\top \boldsymbol{Z} (\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_j\\0\end{smallmatrix}) \right) \right\}_{i\in[1,m_1]} \tag{13}$$

  and thanks again to the identity relation above.

- $\mathsf{Decrypt}(\mathsf{CT}, \mathsf{SK})$: Obtain Y, X from CT, SK. Suppose $R(X, Y) = 1$. Run $\boldsymbol{E} \leftarrow \mathsf{Pair}(X, Y)$. Denote by $\boldsymbol{C}[i']$ the i'-th element in $\boldsymbol{C}$, and $\mathsf{SK}[i]$ the i-th element in SK. Compute

$$e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B} (\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0\\0\end{smallmatrix})} \in \mathbb{G}_T \leftarrow \prod_{i\in[1,m_1], i'\in[1,w_1]} e(\boldsymbol{C}[i'], \mathsf{SK}[i])^{E_{i,i'}},$$

  and obtain $M \leftarrow C_0 / e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B} (\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0\\0\end{smallmatrix})}$.

Correctness. We would like to prove that if $R(X, Y) = 1$ then

$$\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B} (\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0\\0\end{smallmatrix}) = \sum_{i\in[1,m_1], i'\in[1,w_1]} E_{i,i'} \cdot (\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{R}, \mathbb{H})[i])^\top \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H})[i'].$$

This is implied from the correctness of the pair encoding which states that: if $R(X, Y) = 1$, then $\alpha s_0 = \sum_{i\in[1,m_1], i'\in[1,w_1]} E_{i,i'} \cdot \boldsymbol{k}(\alpha, \boldsymbol{r}, \boldsymbol{h})[i] \cdot \boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h})[i']$. Intuitively, since we translate to the prime-order setting by substituting variables and procedures while preserving their properties as in §4.1, this relation should also translate to the above equation. In particular, we use associativity but not use commutativity, as clarified in §4.1. We verify the correctness more formally in §D.

5 Security Theorems and Proofs

We obtain three security theorems for the generic construction. The first one is the main theorem and is for the case when the pair encoding is $(1, \mathsf{poly})$-SMH and $(1,1)$-CMH, where we achieve tighter reduction cost, $O(q_1)$. The other two are for the case of PMH and the pair of $(1,1)$-SMH, $(1,1)$-CMH, where we obtain normal reduction cost, $O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$. We postpone the latter two to §E.

Theorem 3. *Suppose that a pair encoding scheme* P *for predicate* R *is* $(1, \mathsf{poly})$*-selectively and* $(1,1)$*-co-selectively master-key hiding in* $\mathcal{G}$*, and the Matrix-DH Assumption holds in* $\mathcal{G}$*. Then the construction* $\mathsf{ABE}(\mathsf{P})$ *in* $\mathcal{G}$ *is fully secure. More precisely, for any PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, let* q_1 *denote the number of queries in phase 1, there exist PPT algorithms* $\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2, \mathcal{B}_3$*, whose running times are the same as* $\mathcal{A}$ *plus some polynomial times, such that for any* λ*,*

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{ABE}}(\lambda) \le (2q_1 + 3)\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_1}^{\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}(\lambda) + q_1 \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_2}^{(1,1)\text{-}\mathsf{CMH}}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_3}^{(1,\mathsf{poly})\text{-}\mathsf{SMH}}(\lambda).$$

Semi-functional Algorithms. We define semi-functional algorithms which will be used in the security proof. These are also translated from semi-functional algorithms from the framework of [1], recapped in §C.

- $\mathsf{SFSetup}(1^\lambda, \kappa) \to (\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{PK}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}})$: This is exactly the same as the Setup algorithm albeit it additionally outputs also $\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}$, $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}$, $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}}$ defined as

$$\widehat{\mathsf{PK}} = \left(e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B} \binom{\mathbf{0}}{1}}, g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1}}, g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_1 \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1}}, \ldots, g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_n \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1}} \right), \tag{14}$$

$$\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1}}, \qquad \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}} = \left(g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_1^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1}}, \ldots, g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_n^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1}} \right). \tag{15}$$

- $\mathsf{SFEncrypt}(Y, M, \mathsf{PK}, \widehat{\mathsf{PK}}) \to \mathsf{CT}$: Upon inputs Y, M, PK and $\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}$, first run $(\boldsymbol{c}; w_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc2}(Y)$. Pick $\boldsymbol{s}_0, \boldsymbol{s}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{s}_{w_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$, $\hat{s}_0, \hat{s}_1, \ldots, \hat{s}_{w_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. Let

$$\boldsymbol{S} := \left(\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{0}, \binom{\boldsymbol{s}_1}{0}, \ldots, \binom{\boldsymbol{s}_{w_2}}{0} \right), \hat{\boldsymbol{S}} := \left(\binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{s}_0}, \binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{s}_1}, \ldots, \binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{s}_{w_2}} \right) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{w_2+1}$$

Output the ciphertext as $\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{C}, C_0)$:

$$\boldsymbol{C} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H}) + \boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\hat{\boldsymbol{S}}, \mathbb{H})} \in (\mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1})^{w_1}, \qquad C_0 = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{\hat{s}_0}} \cdot M \in \mathbb{G}_T. \tag{16}$$

Note that $\boldsymbol{C}$ can be computed from PK and $\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}$ since

$$\boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H}) \ + \ \boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\hat{\boldsymbol{S}}, \mathbb{H}) \quad = \quad \left\{ \left(\sum_{j \in [0, w_2]} a_{i,j} \boldsymbol{B} \binom{\boldsymbol{s}_j}{\hat{s}_j} \right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j \in [0, w_2] \\ k \in [1, n]}} a_{i,j,k} \boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B} \binom{\boldsymbol{s}_j}{\hat{s}_j} \right) \right\}_{i \in [1, w_1]}$$

and thanks to the identity relation $\left(\boldsymbol{X} \binom{\boldsymbol{I}_d}{0} \right) \boldsymbol{y} + (\boldsymbol{X} \binom{\mathbf{0}}{1}) \hat{y} = \boldsymbol{X} \binom{\boldsymbol{y}}{\hat{y}}$.

- $\mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}}, \mathsf{type} \in \{0,1,2,3\}, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_p) \to \mathsf{SK}$: Upon inputs X, MSK, $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}}, \mathsf{type} \in \{0,1,2,3\}, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, first run $(\boldsymbol{k}; m_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc1}(X)$. Pick $\boldsymbol{r}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{m_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$ and $\hat{r}_1, \ldots, \hat{r}_{m_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. Let

$$\boldsymbol{R} := \left(\binom{\boldsymbol{r}_1}{0}, \ldots, \binom{\boldsymbol{r}_{m_2}}{0} \right), \hat{\boldsymbol{R}} := \left(\binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{r}_1}, \ldots, \binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{r}_{m_2}} \right) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{m_2}$$

Output the secret key SK:

$$\mathsf{SK} = \begin{cases} g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{R}, \mathbb{H})} & \text{if } \mathsf{type} = 0 \quad (17) \\ g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{R}, \mathbb{H}) + \boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\ \mathbf{0}\ , \hat{\boldsymbol{R}}, \mathbb{H})} & \text{if } \mathsf{type} = 1 \quad (18) \\ g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{R}, \mathbb{H}) + \boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{\beta}, \hat{\boldsymbol{R}}, \mathbb{H})} & \text{if } \mathsf{type} = 2 \quad (19) \\ g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{R}, \mathbb{H}) + \boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{\beta}, \mathbf{0}, \mathbb{H})} & \text{if } \mathsf{type} = 3 \quad (20) \end{cases}$$

Note that SK of each type can be computed from $\mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}}$ since $\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{R}, \mathbb{H}) + \boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\mathbf{0}\\ \beta\end{pmatrix}, \hat{\boldsymbol{R}}, \mathbb{H}) =$

$$\left\{ b_i\boldsymbol{\alpha} + b_i\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\mathbf{0}\\ \beta\end{pmatrix} + \left(\sum_{j\in[1,m_2]} b_{i,j}\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_j\\ \hat{r}_j\end{pmatrix}\right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j\in[1,m_2]\\ k\in[1,n]}} b_{i,j,k}\boldsymbol{H}_k^\top\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_j\\ \hat{r}_j\end{pmatrix}\right)\right\}_{i\in[1,m_1]}$$

and thanks again to the identity relation above. Furthermore, we note that:

- In computing type $0, 3$, $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}}$ is not required as input (and no $\hat{\boldsymbol{R}}$ needed).
- In computing type $0, 1$, β is not required as input.

Proof of Theorem 3. We use a sequence of games in the following order:



where each game is defined as follows. $\mathsf{G}_{\mathrm{real}}$ is the actual security game, as defined in §A. Each of the following game is defined exactly as *its previous game* in the sequence except the specified modification as follows. For notational purpose, let $\mathsf{G}_{0,3} := \mathsf{G}_0$.

- G_0: We modify the challenge ciphertext to be semi-functional type.
- $\mathsf{G}_{i,t}$ where $i \in [1, q_1]$, $t \in \{1, 2, 3\}$: We modify the i-th queried key to be semi-functional of type-t. We use fresh β for each key (for type $t = 2, 3$).
- G_{q_1+t} where $t \in \{1, 2, 3\}$: We modify all keys in phase 2 to be semi-functional of type-t at once. We use the same β for all these keys (for type $t = 2, 3$).
- $\mathsf{G}_{\mathrm{final}}$: We modify the challenge to encrypt a random message.

More formal definitions of games are depicted in Fig. 1, where each box shows each game modification and the box number shows the place of modification in the security game in §A.

In the final game, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ is trivially 0. We prove the indistinguishability between all these adjacent games (under the underlying assumptions as written in the diagram). These comprise Lemma 4,5,7,8,9,10,11,12 (also depicted in the diagram). The proofs of these are shown below. From these, we obtain Theorem 3. □

The following remark describes how our framework deviates from the framework of [1].

Remark 2. In translating to the prime-order setting, we actually start from a *variant* of [1], where we also incorporate a technique from [58] related to the information-theoretic argument for the final transition. This has an advantage over [1] in that we can eliminate a computational assumption for this transition. To enable this, we have used $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1}$, instead of an element from the left subspace, say $\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{\alpha}'\\ 0\end{pmatrix}$, for some $\boldsymbol{\alpha}' \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$ (as would be used if [1] were used), to define $\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{R}, \mathbb{H})$ in keys as in Eq. (13) and C_0 in ciphertexts as in Eq. (10), (16). Also, we have defined the message mask element of semi-functional ciphertext in Eq. (16) to contain $\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0\\ \hat{s}_0\end{pmatrix}$, instead of $\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0\\ 0\end{pmatrix}$.

Figure 1: The sequence of games in the security proof.

G_0	:Modify $^{(0)}$	$\boxed{\mathsf{SFsetup}(1^\lambda,\kappa)\to(\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{MSK},\widehat{\mathsf{PK}},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}})}$.
	Modify $^{(2)}$	$\boxed{\boldsymbol{C}^\star\leftarrow\mathsf{SFEncrypt}(Y^\star,M_b,\mathsf{PK},\widehat{\mathsf{PK}})}$.
$\mathsf{G}_{i,1}$	:Modify $^{(1)}$	$\boxed{\beta_j\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p,\ \mathsf{SK}_j\leftarrow\begin{cases}\mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X_j,\mathsf{MSK},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}},-,3,\beta_j) & \text{if } j<i\\ \mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X_j,\mathsf{MSK},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}},1,-) & \text{if } j=i\\ \mathsf{KeyGen}(X_j,\mathsf{MSK}) & \text{if } j>i\end{cases}}$
$\mathsf{G}_{i,2}$	:Modify $^{(1)}$	$\boxed{\beta_j\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p,\ \mathsf{SK}_j\leftarrow\begin{cases}\mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X_j,\mathsf{MSK},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}},-,3,\beta_j) & \text{if } j<i\\ \mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X_j,\mathsf{MSK},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}},2,\beta_j) & \text{if } j=i\\ \mathsf{KeyGen}(X_j,\mathsf{MSK}) & \text{if } j>i\end{cases}}$
$\mathsf{G}_{i,3}$	:Modify $^{(1)}$	$\boxed{\beta_j\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p,\ \mathsf{SK}_j\leftarrow\begin{cases}\mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X_j,\mathsf{MSK},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}},-,3,\beta_j) & \text{if } j\le i\\ \mathsf{KeyGen}(X_j,\mathsf{MSK}) & \text{if } j>i\end{cases}}$
G_{q_1+1}	:Modify $^{(3)}$	$\boxed{\mathsf{SK}_j\leftarrow\mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X_j,\mathsf{MSK},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}},1,-)}$
G_{q_1+2}	:Insert	$\boxed{\beta\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p}$ at the begin of Phase 2.
	Modify $^{(3)}$	$\boxed{\mathsf{SK}_j\leftarrow\mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X_j,\mathsf{MSK},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}},2,\beta)}$
G_{q_1+3}	:Modify $^{(3)}$	$\boxed{\mathsf{SK}_j\leftarrow\mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X_j,\mathsf{MSK},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}},-,3,\beta)}$
$\mathsf{G}_{\mathrm{final}}$	:Modify $^{(2)}$	$\boxed{M\xleftarrow{\$}\mathcal{M},\ \boldsymbol{C}^\star\leftarrow\mathsf{SFEncrypt}(Y^\star,M,\mathsf{PK},\widehat{\mathsf{PK}})}$.

In the following subsections, we prove the distinguishability between the consecutive games. We define $\mathsf{G}_j\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ to be the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in the game G_j.

5.1 Normal to Semi-functional Ciphertext

Lemma 4 ($\mathsf{G}_{\mathrm{real}}$ to G_0)**.** *For any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against* ABE*, there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the $\mathcal{D}_d$-Matrix-DH Assumption with* $|\mathsf{G}_{\mathrm{real}}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)-\mathsf{G}_0\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)|\le\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}_{\mathcal{B}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ obtains an input $(\mathbb{G},g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}},g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{y}\\ \hat{y}\end{pmatrix}})$ from the $\mathcal{D}_d$-Matrix DH Assumption where either $\hat{y}=0$ or $\hat{y}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p$, and $\boldsymbol{T}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathcal{D}_d$, $\boldsymbol{y}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$.

Setup. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ does exactly the same as $\mathsf{SFSetup}(1^\lambda,\kappa)$ except that it uses $\mathbb{G}$ from its input, and that it will set $\boldsymbol{B}$ and $\boldsymbol{D}$ in an implicit way. $\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{MSK},\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}$ will be determined from this implicit programming. Note that $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}},\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}}$ are also determined from this but not computable; nevertheless, they are not used in $\mathsf{G}_{\mathrm{real}}$ or G_0. $\mathcal{B}$ begins by choosing $\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$, $\boldsymbol{J}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{GL}_{p,d}$ and *implicitly* setting [10]

$$\boldsymbol{B}=\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}\boldsymbol{T},\qquad\qquad \boldsymbol{Z}=\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-\top}\tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}}:=(\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-\top})\begin{matrix}\\ d\\ 1\end{matrix}\overset{\begin{matrix}d & 1\end{matrix}}{\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{J} & -\boldsymbol{M}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{c}^\top\\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1\end{pmatrix}},$$

[10] Here, we write dimensions of sub-matrices for ease of viewing.

where we recall that $\boldsymbol{T} = \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{M} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{c} & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\right)$ from Eq.(4). From this, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\boldsymbol{D} = \boldsymbol{B}^\top \boldsymbol{Z} &= (\boldsymbol{T}^\top \tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^\top)(\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-\top} \tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}}) = \boldsymbol{T}^\top \tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}} \\ &= \begin{smallmatrix} & d & 1 \\ d & \end{smallmatrix}\!\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{M}^\top & \boldsymbol{c}^\top \\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{smallmatrix} & d & 1 \\ d & \end{smallmatrix}\!\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{J} & -\boldsymbol{M}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{c}^\top \\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{smallmatrix} & d & 1 \\ d & \end{smallmatrix}\!\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{M}^\top \boldsymbol{J} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1 \end{pmatrix},\end{aligned}$$

where we can verify that the upper right block is $\boldsymbol{0}$ by seeing that $(\boldsymbol{M}^\top)(-\boldsymbol{M}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{c}^\top)+(\boldsymbol{c}^\top)(1) = \boldsymbol{0}$. $\boldsymbol{B}$ is properly distributed due to the randomness of $\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}$ and that $\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}, \boldsymbol{T} \in \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$. $\boldsymbol{D}$ is properly distributed due to the randomness of $\boldsymbol{J}$ and that $\boldsymbol{M}^\top, \boldsymbol{J} \in \mathbb{GL}_{p,d}$. $\mathcal{B}$ can then compute

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}} = g_1^{\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}\boldsymbol{T}}, \qquad\qquad g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\boldsymbol{I}_d}{0}} = g_2^{\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-\top}\binom{\boldsymbol{J}}{\boldsymbol{0}}},$$

where the first term is computable from $g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}}$, while in the second term, the unknown last column of $\boldsymbol{Z}$ vanishes through the left projection map, $\binom{\boldsymbol{I}_d}{0}$. From these two terms, $\mathcal{B}$ can compute $\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{PK}}$; in particular, $\mathcal{B}$ chooses $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1}$, $\boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$, and computes Eq.(9),(14). (We note that $\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}$ is not used in the simulation though).

Phase 1. When $\mathcal{A}$ makes the j-th key query for X_j , $\mathcal{B}$ generates a key $\mathsf{SK} \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(X_j, \mathsf{MSK})$.

Challenge. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs messages $M_0, M_1 \in \mathbb{G}_T$ along with a target $Y^\star$. $\mathcal{B}$ chooses $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}$. $\mathcal{B}$ extends the Matrix-DH Assumption to (w_2+1)-fold by random self reducibility and obtains $(g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}}, g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{Y}}{\hat{\boldsymbol{y}}}})$ where either $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \boldsymbol{0}$ or $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{1\times(w_2+1)}$ with $\boldsymbol{T} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_d$, $\boldsymbol{Y} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times(w_2+1)}$. $\mathcal{B}$ implicitly sets $\boldsymbol{S} + \hat{\boldsymbol{S}} = \binom{\boldsymbol{Y}}{\hat{\boldsymbol{y}}}$; that is,

$$\boldsymbol{S} + \hat{\boldsymbol{S}} = \begin{smallmatrix} & 1 & 1 & & 1 \\ d & & & & \end{smallmatrix}\!\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_0 & \boldsymbol{s}_1 & \cdots & \boldsymbol{s}_{w_2} \\ \hat{s}_0 & \hat{s}_1 & \cdots & \hat{s}_{w_2} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{Y} \\ \hat{\boldsymbol{y}} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{smallmatrix} & 1 & 1 & & 1 \\ d & & & & \end{smallmatrix}\!\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{y}_0 & \boldsymbol{y}_1 & \cdots & \boldsymbol{y}_{w_2} \\ \hat{y}_0 & \hat{y}_1 & \cdots & \hat{y}_{w_2} \end{pmatrix},$$

where we denote $\binom{\boldsymbol{y}_j}{\hat{y}_j}$ as the j-th column of $\binom{\boldsymbol{Y}}{\hat{\boldsymbol{y}}}$. Thus, $\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_j}{\hat{s}_j} = \binom{\boldsymbol{y}_j}{\hat{y}_j}$. $\mathcal{B}$ then can compute for each $j \in [0, w_2]$,

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_j}{\hat{s}_j}} = g_1^{\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_j}{\hat{s}_j}} = g_1^{\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{y}_j}{\hat{y}_j}}.$$

since $\mathcal{B}$ possesses $g_1^{\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{Y}}{\hat{\boldsymbol{y}}}}$. From these terms, $\mathcal{B}$ can compute the ciphertext in Eq.(16) since $\mathcal{B}$ possesses $\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n$. In particular, for C_0, $\mathcal{B}$ computes $C_0 = e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{\hat{s}_0}}, g_2) \cdot M_b$.

Phase 2. $\mathcal{B}$ does the same as in Phase 1.

Guess. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ has properly simulated $\mathsf{G}_{\mathrm{real}}$ if $\hat{y} = 0$ and G_0 if $\hat{y} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. Hence, $\mathcal{B}$ can use the output of $\mathcal{A}$ to break the Matrix DH Assumption. □

5.2 Normal to Type-1 Semi-functional Key in Phase 1

Lemma 5 ($\mathsf{G}_{i-1,3}$ to $\mathsf{G}_{i,1}$)**.** *For any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against* ABE*, there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the $\mathcal{D}_d$-Matrix-DH Assumption with* $|\mathsf{G}_{i-1,3}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) - \mathsf{G}_{i,1}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)| \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}_{\mathcal{B}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ obtains an input $(\mathbb{G}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{T}}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{T}\binom{\boldsymbol{y}}{\hat{y}}})$ from the $\mathcal{D}_d$-Matrix DH Assumption where either $\hat{y} = 0$ or $\hat{y} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, and $\boldsymbol{T} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_d$, $\boldsymbol{y} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$. Note that it is wlog that we let the problem instance term be defined over g_2 (instead of g_1).

Setup. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ does exactly the same as $\mathsf{SFSetup}(1^\lambda, \kappa)$ except that it uses $\mathbb{G}$ from its input, and that it will set $\boldsymbol{B}$ and $\boldsymbol{D}$ in an implicit way. $\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{PK}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}}$ will be determined from this implicit programming, but only $\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}$ will not be computable. $\mathcal{B}$ begins by choosing $\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$, $\boldsymbol{J} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d}$ and implicitly setting

$$\boldsymbol{B} = \tilde{\boldsymbol{B}} \begin{matrix} d \\ 1 \end{matrix}\!\!\begin{pmatrix} \overset{d}{\boldsymbol{I}} & \overset{1}{\boldsymbol{M}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{c}^\top} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & -1 \end{pmatrix}, \qquad \boldsymbol{D} = \begin{matrix} d \\ 1 \end{matrix}\!\!\begin{pmatrix} \overset{d}{\boldsymbol{M}\boldsymbol{J}} & \overset{1}{\boldsymbol{0}} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1 \end{pmatrix},$$

where we recall that $\boldsymbol{T} = \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{M} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{c} & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\right)$ from Eq.(4). $\boldsymbol{B}$ is properly distributed due to the uniform randomness of $\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}$ in $\mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$. $\boldsymbol{D}$ is properly distributed due to the randomness of $\boldsymbol{J}$ and that $\boldsymbol{M}, \boldsymbol{J} \in \mathbb{GL}_{p,d}$. From this we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\boldsymbol{B}^{-1} &= \begin{matrix} d \\ 1 \end{matrix}\!\!\begin{pmatrix} \overset{d}{\boldsymbol{I}} & \overset{1}{\boldsymbol{M}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{c}^\top} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & -1 \end{pmatrix}\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-1}, \\
\boldsymbol{Z} = \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{D} &= \tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-\top} \begin{matrix} d \\ 1 \end{matrix}\!\!\begin{pmatrix} \overset{d}{\boldsymbol{I}} & \overset{1}{\boldsymbol{0}} \\ \boldsymbol{c}\boldsymbol{M}^{-1} & -1 \end{pmatrix}\begin{pmatrix} \overset{d}{\boldsymbol{M}\boldsymbol{J}} & \overset{1}{\boldsymbol{0}} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1 \end{pmatrix} \\
&= \tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-\top} \begin{matrix} d \\ 1 \end{matrix}\!\!\begin{pmatrix} \overset{d}{\boldsymbol{M}\boldsymbol{J}} & \overset{1}{\boldsymbol{0}} \\ \boldsymbol{c}\boldsymbol{J} & -1 \end{pmatrix} = \tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{T} \begin{matrix} d \\ 1 \end{matrix}\!\!\begin{pmatrix} \overset{d}{\boldsymbol{J}} & \overset{1}{\boldsymbol{0}} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & -1 \end{pmatrix}.
\end{aligned}$$

We denote $\tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}} := \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{J} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & -1 \end{smallmatrix}\right)$, hence $\boldsymbol{Z} = \tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{T}\tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}}$. We also have $\tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}}^{-1} = \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{J}^{-1} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & -1 \end{smallmatrix}\right)$. $\mathcal{B}$ then can compute

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{I}_d}{0}} = g_1^{\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}\binom{\boldsymbol{I}_d}{0}}, \qquad g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}} = g_2^{\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{T}\tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}}},$$

where in the first term, the unknown last column of $\boldsymbol{B}$ vanishes through the left projection map $\binom{\boldsymbol{I}_d}{0}$, while the second term is computable from $g_2^{\boldsymbol{T}}$. From these two terms, $\mathcal{B}$ can compute $\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}}$; in particular, $\mathcal{B}$ chooses $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1}$, $\boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$ and computes Eq.(9),(15).

Phase 1. When $\mathcal{A}$ makes the j-th key query for X_j, $\mathcal{B}$ generates a key as follows

- **Case $j > i$.** $\mathcal{B}$ generates a normal key $\mathsf{SK} \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(X_j, \mathsf{MSK})$.
- **Case $j < i$.** $\mathcal{B}$ chooses $\beta_j \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and generates a type-3 semi-functional key as $\mathsf{SK} \leftarrow \mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X_j, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, -, 3, \beta_j)$.

– **Case $j = i$.** Let $(\boldsymbol{k}; m_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc1}(X_j)$. $\mathcal{B}$ extends the Matrix-DH Assumption to m_2-fold by random self reducibility and obtains $(g_2^{\boldsymbol{T}}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{T}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{Y}\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{y}}\end{pmatrix}})$ where either $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \boldsymbol{0}$ or $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{1\times m_2}$ with $\boldsymbol{T} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_d$, $\boldsymbol{Y} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times m_2}$. $\mathcal{B}$ implicitly sets $\boldsymbol{R} + \hat{\boldsymbol{R}} = \tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}}^{-1}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{Y}\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{y}}\end{pmatrix}$; that is,

$$\boldsymbol{R} + \hat{\boldsymbol{R}} = \begin{matrix}d\\1\end{matrix}\overbrace{\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_1 & \cdots & \boldsymbol{r}_{m_2}\\ \hat{r}_1 & \cdots & \hat{r}_{m_2}\end{pmatrix}}^{1} = \tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}}^{-1}\begin{matrix}d\\1\end{matrix}\overbrace{\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{Y}\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{y}}\end{pmatrix}}^{m_2} = \tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}}^{-1}\begin{matrix}d\\1\end{matrix}\overbrace{\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{y}_1 & \cdots & \boldsymbol{y}_{m_2}\\ \hat{y}_1 & \cdots & \hat{y}_{m_2}\end{pmatrix}}^{1},$$

where we denote $\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{y}_j\\ \hat{y}_j\end{pmatrix}$ as the j-th column of $\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{Y}\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{y}}\end{pmatrix}$. Thus, $\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_j\\ \hat{r}_j\end{pmatrix} = \tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}}^{-1}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{y}_j\\ \hat{y}_j\end{pmatrix}$. $\mathcal{B}$ then can compute for each $j \in [1, m_2]$,

$$g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_j\\ \hat{r}_j\end{pmatrix}} = g_2^{\left(\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{T}\tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}}\right)\left(\tilde{\boldsymbol{Z}}^{-1}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{y}_j\\ \hat{y}_j\end{pmatrix}\right)} = g_2^{\tilde{\boldsymbol{B}}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{T}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{y}_j\\ \hat{y}_j\end{pmatrix}},$$

since $\mathcal{B}$ possesses $g_2^{\boldsymbol{T}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{Y}\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{y}}\end{pmatrix}}$. From these terms, $\mathcal{B}$ can compute all the elements of the key since $\mathcal{B}$ possesses $\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n$. We can see that if $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \boldsymbol{0}$ then the key is a normal key, and if $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{1\times m_2}$ then the key is type-1 semi-functional.

Challenge. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs messages $M_0, M_1 \in \mathbb{G}_T$ along with a target $Y^\star$. $\mathcal{B}$ chooses $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}$. Let $(\boldsymbol{c}; w_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc2}(Y)$. For $j \in [0, w_2]$, $\mathcal{B}$ chooses $\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}'_j\\ \hat{s}'_j\end{pmatrix} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1}$ and implicitly sets

$$\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j\\ \hat{s}_j\end{pmatrix} = \boldsymbol{B}^{-1}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}'_j\\ \hat{s}'_j\end{pmatrix}.$$

$\mathcal{B}$ then can compute

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j\\ \hat{s}_j\end{pmatrix}} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\boldsymbol{B}^{-1}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}'_j\\ \hat{s}'_j\end{pmatrix}\right)} = g_1^{\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}'_j\\ \hat{s}'_j\end{pmatrix}}.$$

From these terms, $\mathcal{B}$ can compute all the elements of the semi-functional ciphertext for M_b (since, again, $\mathcal{B}$ possesses $\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n$). In particular, for C_0, $\mathcal{B}$ computes

$$C_0 = e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0\\ \hat{s}_0\end{pmatrix}}, g_2) \cdot M_b = e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}'_j\\ \hat{s}'_j\end{pmatrix}}, g_2) \cdot M_b.$$

Phase 2. When $\mathcal{A}$ makes the j-th key query for X_j, since $j > i$ in this phase, $\mathcal{B}$ generates a normal key $\mathsf{SK} \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(X_j, \mathsf{MSK})$.

Guess. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ has properly simulated $\mathsf{G}_{i-1,3}$ if $\hat{y} = 0$ and $\mathsf{G}_{i,1}$ if $\hat{y} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. Hence, $\mathcal{B}$ can use the output of $\mathcal{A}$ to break the Matrix DH Assumption. □

5.3 Applying the Parameter-Hiding Lemma

Equivalent Semi-Functional Algorithms. Before describing the proof for the next transition (switching type-1 to type-2 semi-functional keys), we prepare another setup algorithm, $\mathsf{SFSetup}'$, and its consequences to the other algorithms. The difference from $\mathsf{SFSetup}$ is shown in red color. We will then prove that $\mathsf{SFSetup}'$ is indeed equivalent to $\mathsf{SFSetup}$.

- $\mathsf{SFSetup}'(1^\lambda, \kappa) \to (\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{PK}}', \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}'_{\mathsf{aux}})$: This is modifed from $\mathsf{SFSetup}$, where it outputs $\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}$ in exactly the same way. It additionally chooses $\hat{h}_1, \ldots, \hat{h}_n \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and outputs $\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}'$, $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}'_{\mathsf{aux}}$ defined as

$$\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}' = \left(e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1}}, g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1}}, g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_1 \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1} + \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{h}_1}}, \ldots, g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_n \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1} + \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{h}_n}} \right), \tag{21}$$

$$\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}'_{\mathsf{aux}} = \left(g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_1^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1} + \boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{h}_1}}, \ldots, g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_n^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1} + \boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{h}_n}} \right). \tag{22}$$

- $\mathsf{SFEncrypt}(Y, M, \mathsf{PK}, \widehat{\mathsf{PK}}') \to \mathsf{CT}'$: We write the output from the already defined $\mathsf{SFEncrypt}$ algorithm, but now with the input $\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}'$ instead of $\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}$. Concretely, it picks $\boldsymbol{s}_0, \boldsymbol{s}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{s}_{w_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$ and $\hat{s}_0, \hat{s}_1, \ldots, \hat{s}_{w_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. Let

$$\boldsymbol{S} := \left(\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{0}, \binom{\boldsymbol{s}_1}{0}, \ldots, \binom{\boldsymbol{s}_{w_2}}{0}\right) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{w_2+1},$$
$$\hat{\boldsymbol{S}} := \left(\binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{s}_0}, \binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{s}_1}, \ldots, \binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{s}_{w_2}}\right) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{w_2+1}$$

  Denote $\hat{\boldsymbol{h}} = (\hat{h}_1, \ldots, \hat{h}_n)$. We claim that the outputted ciphertext is $\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{C}, C_0)$ where

$$\boldsymbol{C} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H}) + \boldsymbol{c}'_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\hat{\boldsymbol{S}}, \mathbb{H}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} \in (\mathbb{G}_1^{(d+1)\times 1})^{w_1}, \qquad C_0 = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{\hat{s}_0}} \cdot M \in \mathbb{G}_T. \tag{23}$$

  where $\boldsymbol{c}'_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\hat{\boldsymbol{S}}, \mathbb{H}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})$ is newly defined via

$$\boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H}) + \boldsymbol{c}'_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\hat{\boldsymbol{S}}, \mathbb{H}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}}) = \left\{ \left(\sum_{j\in[0,w_2]} a_{i,j} \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_j}{\hat{s}_j} \right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j\in[0,w_2]\\ k\in[1,n]}} a_{i,j,k} \left(\boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_j}{\hat{s}_j} + \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{h}_k \hat{s}_j} \right) \right) \right\}_{i\in[1,w_1]}. \tag{24}$$

  The claim can be verified thanks to the relation $\left(\boldsymbol{X}\binom{\boldsymbol{I}_d}{0}\right)\boldsymbol{y} + \left(\boldsymbol{X}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{1} + \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{h}\right)\hat{y} = \boldsymbol{X}\binom{\boldsymbol{y}}{\hat{y}} + \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\mathbf{0}}{h\hat{y}}$ for any $\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$, $\boldsymbol{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$, and $h, \hat{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$.

- $\mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}'_{\mathsf{aux}}, \mathsf{type} \in \{1, 2\}, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_p) \to \mathsf{SK}$: We write the output from the already defined $\mathsf{SFKeyGen}$ algorithm, but now with the input $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}'_{\mathsf{aux}}$ instead of $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}}$ and we consider only $\mathsf{type} = 1, 2$. Concretely, it picks $\boldsymbol{r}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{m_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$ and $\hat{r}_1, \ldots, \hat{r}_{m_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. Let

$$\boldsymbol{R} := \left(\binom{\boldsymbol{r}_1}{0}, \ldots, \binom{\boldsymbol{r}_{m_2}}{0}\right) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{m_2},$$
$$\hat{\boldsymbol{R}} := \left(\binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{r}_1}, \ldots, \binom{\mathbf{0}}{\hat{r}_{m_2}}\right) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{m_2}$$

We claim that the outputted secret key SK is

$$\mathsf{SK} = \begin{cases} g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha},\boldsymbol{R},\mathbb{H})+\boldsymbol{k}'_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(0,\hat{\boldsymbol{R}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} & \text{if } \mathsf{type}=1 \quad (25) \\ g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha},\boldsymbol{R},\mathbb{H})+\boldsymbol{k}'_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{R}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} & \text{if } \mathsf{type}=2 \quad (26) \end{cases}$$

where $\boldsymbol{k}'_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{R}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})$ is newly defined via

$$\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha},\boldsymbol{R},\mathbb{H})+\boldsymbol{k}'_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{R}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}}) = \left\{ b_i\boldsymbol{\alpha} + b_i\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ \beta\end{pmatrix} + \left(\sum_{j\in[1,m_2]} b_{i,j}\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_j\\ \hat{r}_j\end{pmatrix}\right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j\in[1,m_2]\\ k\in[1,n]}} b_{i,j,k}\left(\boldsymbol{H}_k^\top\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_j\\ \hat{r}_j\end{pmatrix} + \boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ \hat{h}_k\hat{r}_j\end{pmatrix}\right)\right)\right\}_{i\in[1,m_1]} \quad (27)$$

The claim can be verified thanks to the relation $\left(\boldsymbol{X}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{pmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{y} + \left(\boldsymbol{X}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{pmatrix} + \boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ h\end{pmatrix}\right)\hat{y} = \boldsymbol{X}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{y}\\ \hat{y}\end{pmatrix} + \boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ h\hat{y}\end{pmatrix}$ for any $\boldsymbol{X},\boldsymbol{Z}\in\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$, $\boldsymbol{y}\in\mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$, and $h,\hat{y}\in\mathbb{Z}_p$.

For further use, we write explicit forms of $\boldsymbol{c}'_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\hat{\boldsymbol{S}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})$ and $\boldsymbol{k}'_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{R}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})$ as follows:

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}'_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\hat{\boldsymbol{S}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} = \left\{ g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ c_\iota(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \prod_{\substack{j\in[0,w_2]\\ k\in[1,n]}} g_1^{a_{\iota,j,k}\boldsymbol{H}_k\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ \hat{s}_j\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \right\}_{\iota\in[1,w_1]}.$$

$$g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}'_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{R}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} = \left\{ g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ k_\iota(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \prod_{\substack{j\in[1,m_2]\\ k\in[1,n]}} g_2^{b_{\iota,j,k}\boldsymbol{H}_k^\top\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ \hat{r}_j\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \right\}_{\iota\in[1,m_1]}.$$

The first equation holds from (24) by eliminating (11) and using the definition of $\boldsymbol{c}$ in (6) to inspect. The second equation can be done similarly.

Lemma 6. *The outputs from* $\mathsf{SFSetup}'$ *and* $\mathsf{SFSetup}$ *are identically distributed.*

Proof. From the parameter-hiding lemma (Lemma 2), we have that for $\boldsymbol{H}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$, $\boldsymbol{B}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$, and $\hat{h}_i\xleftarrow{\$}\mathbb{Z}_p$, the distribution of

$$F_{\boldsymbol{H}_i,\hat{h}_i} := \boldsymbol{H}_i + \boldsymbol{B}\begin{array}{c} \\ d \\ 1\end{array}\begin{array}{c}\begin{array}{cc} d & 1\end{array}\\ \begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & \hat{h}_i\end{pmatrix}\end{array}\boldsymbol{B}^{-1} \quad (28)$$

is exactly the same as $\boldsymbol{H}_i$. Therefore, replacing $\boldsymbol{H}_i$ with $F_{\boldsymbol{H}_i,\hat{h}_i}$ for every $i\in[1,n]$, does not affect the output distribution of $\mathsf{SFKeyGen}$. We claim that this modification results in the unmodified

elements $\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}$ as shown in Eq. (9), Eq. (15), and the modified elements $\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}', \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}'_{\mathsf{aux}}$ as shown in Eq. (21), Eq. (22). To prove the claim, it is sufficient to prove that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
F_{\boldsymbol{H}_i,\hat{h}_i}\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ \boldsymbol{0}\end{pmatrix} &= \boldsymbol{H}_i\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ \boldsymbol{0}\end{pmatrix},\\
F^{\top}_{\boldsymbol{H}_i,\hat{h}_i}\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ \boldsymbol{0}\end{pmatrix} &= \boldsymbol{H}_i^{\top}\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ \boldsymbol{0}\end{pmatrix},\\
F_{\boldsymbol{H}_i,\hat{h}_i}\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{pmatrix} &= \boldsymbol{H}_i\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{pmatrix} + \boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ \hat{h}_i\end{pmatrix},\\
F^{\top}_{\boldsymbol{H}_i,\hat{h}_i}\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{pmatrix} &= \boldsymbol{H}_i^{\top}\boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{pmatrix} + \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ \hat{h}_i\end{pmatrix}.
\end{aligned}
$$

This can be verified as follows, where we recall $\boldsymbol{D} = \left(\begin{smallmatrix}\tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1\end{smallmatrix}\right)$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
F_{\boldsymbol{H}_i,\hat{h}_i}\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right) &= \left(\boldsymbol{H}_i + \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{B}^{-1}\right)\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right) = \boldsymbol{H}_i\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right) + \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\\
&= \boldsymbol{H}_i\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\\
F^{\top}_{\boldsymbol{H}_i,\hat{h}_i}\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right) &= \left(\boldsymbol{H}_i^{\top} + \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{B}^{\top}\right)(\boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{D})\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\\
&= \boldsymbol{H}_i^{\top}\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right) + \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{D}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)\\
&= \boldsymbol{H}_i^{\top}\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right) + \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right) = \boldsymbol{H}_i^{\top}\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d\\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right),\\
F_{\boldsymbol{H}_i,\hat{h}_i}\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) &= \left(\boldsymbol{H}_i + \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{B}^{-1}\right)\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) = \boldsymbol{H}_i\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) + \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\\
&= \boldsymbol{H}_i\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) + \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right),\\
F^{\top}_{\boldsymbol{H}_i,\hat{h}_i}\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) &= \left(\boldsymbol{H}_i^{\top} + \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{B}^{\top}\right)(\boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{D})\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\\
&= \boldsymbol{H}_i^{\top}\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) + \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)\boldsymbol{D}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\\
&= \boldsymbol{H}_i^{\top}\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) + \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) = \boldsymbol{H}_i^{\top}\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) + \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ \hat{h}_i\end{smallmatrix}\right).
\end{aligned}
$$

This concludes the proof. □

5.4 Type-1 to Type-2 Semi-functional Key in Phase 1

Lemma 7 ($\mathsf{G}_{i,1}$ to $\mathsf{G}_{i,2}$)**.** *For any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against ABE, there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the co-selective master-key hiding security of encoding with $|\mathsf{G}_{i,1}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) - \mathsf{G}_{i,2}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)| \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{CMH}}_{\mathcal{B}}(\lambda)$.*

Proof. Suppose we have an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that can distinguish between $\mathsf{G}_{i,1}$ and $\mathsf{G}_{i,2}$ with non-negligible probability. We construct a simulator $\mathcal{B}$ that would win the co-selective game for master-key hiding for P by simulating $\mathsf{G}_{i,1}$ or $\mathsf{G}_{i,2}$ for $\mathcal{A}$. In the co-selective game for $\mathcal{B}$, $\mathcal{B}$ is given the group description $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, g_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2$ from its challenger.

Setup. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ generates PK as in the real construction but using the given g_1, g_2. More precisely, $\mathcal{B}$ picks $\boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$, $\boldsymbol{B} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1} \subset \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$. It chooses

$\tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d}$ and defines $\boldsymbol{D} := \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\right) \in \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$ and $\boldsymbol{Z} := \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{D}$. It chooses $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1}$. It computes PK, MSK as in Eq.(9) and $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}$ as in Eq.(15). It sends PK to the adversary $\mathcal{A}$. We note that these elements distributed as if they are from $\mathsf{SFSetup}'$.

Phase 1. When $\mathcal{A}$ makes the j-th private key query for $X_{\mathsf{j}} \in \mathbb{X}$, $\mathcal{B}$ does as follows.

[**Case** $\mathsf{j} < i$] In this case, the algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ picks $\beta_{\mathsf{j}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and creates a type-3 semi-functional key by computing $\mathsf{SK} \leftarrow \mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, -, 3, \beta_{\mathsf{j}})$.

[**Case** $\mathsf{j} = i$] The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ makes a key query X_i to its challenger and receives $\boldsymbol{V} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ where $(\boldsymbol{k}; m_2) = \mathsf{Enc1}(X_i)$. This is the challenge for $\mathcal{B}$ to guess if $\beta = 0$ or β is randomly chosen in $\mathbb{Z}_p$. The crucial point here is that up to this point the semi-functional parameter $\hat{\boldsymbol{h}} = (\hat{h}_1, \ldots, \hat{h}_n)$, which will be used to define $\widehat{\mathsf{PK}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}}$ for $\mathsf{SFSetup}'$, has not been defined since it is not required for all the previous keys. (This feature is known as *delayed parameter*). $\mathcal{B}$ will thus implicitly define the semi-functional parameter to $\hat{\boldsymbol{h}}$ that is defined in $\boldsymbol{V}$. (Note that $\hat{\boldsymbol{h}}$ is unknown to $\mathcal{B}$). This is done by answering back to $\mathcal{A}$ the key for X_i by using $\boldsymbol{V}$. More precisely, $\mathcal{B}$ does as follows.

1. $\mathcal{B}$ computes the normal part of the key as usual. More precisely, this is done by picking $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1}$, $\boldsymbol{r}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{m_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$ and setting $\boldsymbol{R} := (\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{r}_1 \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right), \ldots, \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{r}_{m_2} \\ 0 \end{smallmatrix}\right)) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{m_2}$, and obtaining $g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha},\boldsymbol{R},\mathbb{H})}$ by Eq.(13).

2. $\mathcal{B}$ computes the semi-functional part of the key by using $\boldsymbol{V}$ as follows. $\mathcal{B}$ implicitly sets $\hat{\boldsymbol{R}} = \left(\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \hat{r}_1 \end{smallmatrix}\right), \ldots, \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \hat{r}_{m_2} \end{smallmatrix}\right)\right) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{m_2}$ by using $\hat{\boldsymbol{r}} = (\hat{r}_1, \ldots, \hat{r}_{m_2})$ that is defined in $\boldsymbol{V}$. It also implicitly sets β_i as β that is defined in $\boldsymbol{V}$. These are done by computing

$$g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}'_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\beta_i,\hat{\boldsymbol{R}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} = \left\{ g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ k_\iota(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}}) \end{smallmatrix}\right)} \prod_{\substack{j\in[1,m_2] \\ k\in[1,n]}} g_2^{b_{\iota,j,k}\boldsymbol{H}_k^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \hat{r}_j \end{smallmatrix}\right)} \right\}_{\iota\in[1,m_1]}.$$

   We argue that this is computable as follows. The first term $g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ k_\iota(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}}) \end{smallmatrix}\right)}$ can be computed from $V_\iota = g_2^{k_\iota(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ and the known $\boldsymbol{Z}$, where we write $\boldsymbol{V} = (V_1, \ldots, V_{m_1})$. The second term (the product term) can be computed since for each $j \in [1, m_2]$ we either have the following.

   - For j such that there is ι' where $k_{\iota'}(\beta, \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}}) = \hat{r}_j$, we have $g_2^{\hat{r}_j}$ available as $V_{\iota'} = g_2^{k_{\iota'}(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} = g_2^{\hat{r}_j}$ in $\boldsymbol{V}$.
   - For j such that there is no ι' as above, we have that by *regularity* of encoding (the second rule, in Definition 1), $b_{\iota'',j,k} = 0$ for all ι'', k.

   From these two facts and the known $\boldsymbol{Z}$ and $\boldsymbol{H}_k$, we can compute the product term.

3. $\mathcal{B}$ outputs $\mathsf{SK} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha},\boldsymbol{R},\mathbb{H})} g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}'_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\beta_i,\hat{\boldsymbol{R}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$.

This is a properly distributed semi-functional key of type-1 if $\beta = 0$ or type-2 if β is random.

[**Case** $\mathsf{j} > i$] The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ generates a normal key as in the construction by computing $\mathsf{SK} \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(X_{\mathsf{j}}, \mathsf{MSK})$.

Challenge. In the challenge phase, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs messages $M_0, M_1 \in \mathbb{G}_T$ along with her target $Y^\star$ such that $R(X_j, Y^\star) = 0$ for all $j \in [1, q_1]$. $\mathcal{B}$ then makes a ciphertext query for $Y^\star$ to its challenger and receives back $\boldsymbol{U} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ where $(\boldsymbol{c}; w_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc2}(Y^\star)$. This query can be made since $R(X_i, Y^\star) = 0$. Then, $\mathcal{B}$ flips a coin $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}$, and does as follows.

1. $\mathcal{B}$ computes the normal part of the ciphertext as usual. More precisely, we pick $\boldsymbol{s}_0, \boldsymbol{s}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{s}_{w_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$ and let $\boldsymbol{S} := (\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{0}, \binom{\boldsymbol{s}_1}{0}, \ldots, \binom{\boldsymbol{s}_{w_2}}{0}) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{w_2+1}$, and obtaining $\bar{C}_0 = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B} \binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{0}}$. M_b and $g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H})}$ by Eq.(11).

2. $\mathcal{B}$ computes the semi-functional part of the ciphertext by using $\boldsymbol{U}$ as follows. $\mathcal{B}$ implicitly sets $\hat{\boldsymbol{S}} = \left(\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{\hat{s}_0}, \binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{\hat{s}_1}, \ldots, \binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{\hat{s}_{w_2}}\right) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{w_2+1}$ by using $\hat{\boldsymbol{s}} = (\hat{s}_1, \ldots, \hat{s}_{w_2})$ that is defined in $\boldsymbol{U}$. This is done by computing

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}'_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\hat{\boldsymbol{S}}, \mathbb{H}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} = \left\{ g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{c_\iota(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}} \prod_{\substack{j\in[0,w_2]\\ k\in[1,n]}} g_1^{a_{\iota,j,k}\boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{\hat{s}_j}} \right\}_{\iota\in[1,w_1]}.$$

   We argue that this is computable as follows. The first term $g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{c_\iota(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}}$ can be computed from $D_i = g_1^{c_\iota(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ and the known $\boldsymbol{B}$, where we write $\boldsymbol{U} = (U_1, \ldots, U_{w_1})$. The second term (the product term) can be computed since for each $j \in [1, w_2]$ we either have the following.

   - For j such that there is ι' where $c_{\iota'}(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}}) = \hat{s}_j$, we have $g_1^{\hat{s}_j}$ available as $U_{\iota'} = g_1^{c_{\iota'}(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} = g_1^{\hat{s}_j}$ in $\boldsymbol{U}$.
   - For j such that there is no ι' as above, we have that by *regularity* of encoding (the third rule, in Definition 1), $a_{\iota'',j,k} = 0$ for all ι'', k.

   From these two facts and the known $\boldsymbol{B}$ and $\boldsymbol{H}_k$, we can compute the product term.

3. $\mathcal{B}$ also computes $\hat{C}_0 = e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{\hat{s}_0}}, g_2)$. This can be done since $c_1 = g_1^{\hat{s}_0}$ is available in $\boldsymbol{U}$, also due to the *regularity* of encoding (the fourth rule, in Definition 1).

4. $\mathcal{B}$ computes $\boldsymbol{C} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H})} g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}'_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\hat{\boldsymbol{S}}, \mathbb{H}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ and $C_0 = \bar{C}_0 \hat{C}_0$, and returns $\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{C}, C_0)$.

This is a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext of Equation (16).

Phase 2. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ generates a normal key as in the construction by computing $\mathsf{SK} \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(X_j, \mathsf{MSK})$.

Guess. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ has properly simulated $\mathsf{G}_{i,1}$ if $\beta = 0$, and $\mathsf{G}_{i,2}$ if β is random. Hence, $\mathcal{B}$ can use the output of $\mathcal{A}$ to guess β. □

5.5 Type-2 to Type-3 Semi-functional Key in Phase 1

Lemma 8 ($\mathsf{G}_{i,2}$ to $\mathsf{G}_{i,3}$)**.** *For any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against* ABE*, there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the $\mathcal{D}_d$-Matrix-DH Assumption with* $|\mathsf{G}_{i,2}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) - \mathsf{G}_{i,3}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)| \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}_{\mathcal{B}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. The proof is exactly the same as that of Lemma 5, where we moved from normal to type-1 semi-functional key, except that the i-th key has an additional vector $g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ \beta_i\end{smallmatrix}\right),\boldsymbol{0},\mathbb{H})} = \{g_2^{b_\iota \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ \beta_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)}\}_{\iota\in[1,m_1]}$ multiplied with it (see Eq.(19),(20)). To compute this, $\mathcal{B}$ samples $\beta_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and computes $g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ \beta_i\end{smallmatrix}\right)} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right)\beta_i}$. We recall that $\mathcal{B}$ possesses $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{0}\\ 1\end{smallmatrix}\right)}$. Following the proof of Lemma 5, we can see that if $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \boldsymbol{0}$ then the key is a type-3 semi-functional, and if $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{1\times m_2}$ then the key is type-2 semi-functional. The rest of the proof follows exactly the same as that of Lemma 5. □

5.6 Normal to Type-1 Semi-functional Keys in Phase 2

Lemma 9 ($\mathsf{G}_{q_1,3}$ to G_{q_1+1})**.** *For any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against* ABE*, there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the $\mathcal{D}_d$-Matrix-DH Assumption with* $|\mathsf{G}_{q_1,3}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) - \mathsf{G}_{q_1+1}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)| \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}_{\mathcal{B}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. The proof is exactly the same as when we modify normal to type-1 semi-functional key in phase 1 (the proof of Lemma 5), except that this time we modify the post-challenge keys *all at once*, instead of one key at a time. In particular, the simulation of $\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{aux}}$ and the challenge ciphertext is exactly the same. The simulation for type-3 semi-functional key queries in phase 1 is done using $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}$. The simulation of every key in phase 2 can be done by extending the Matrix-DH Assumption to q_2m_2-fold by random self reducibility (instead of only m_2 as in the proof of Lemma 5). It obtains $(g_2^{\boldsymbol{T}}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{T}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{Y}\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{y}}\end{smallmatrix}\right)})$ where either $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \boldsymbol{0}$ or $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{1\times(q_2m_2)}$ with $\boldsymbol{T} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_d$, $\boldsymbol{Y} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times(q_2m_2)}$. Each key will use m_2 columns of randomness in $\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{Y}\\ \hat{\boldsymbol{y}}\end{smallmatrix}\right)$, in an analogous way to the i-th key in the proof of Lemma 5. For example, the first key query in phase 2 will use the randomness in column 1 to m_2, the second key query in phase 2 will then use the randomness in column m_2+1 to $2m_2$, and so on. Following the proof of Lemma 5, we can see that if $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \boldsymbol{0}$ then every key in phase 2 will be a normal key, and if $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{1\times(q_2m_2)}$ then it is type-1 semi-functional. □

5.7 Type-1 to Type-2 Semi-functional Key in Phase 2

Lemma 10 (G_{q_1+1} to G_{q_1+2})**.** *For any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against* ABE*, there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the selective master-key hiding security of encoding with* $|\mathsf{G}_{q_1+1}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) - \mathsf{G}_{q_1+2}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)| \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SMH}}_{\mathcal{B}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. Suppose we have an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that can distinguish between G_{q_1+1} and G_{q_1+2} with non-negligible probability. We construct a simulator $\mathcal{B}$ that would win the selective game for master-key hiding for P by simulating G_{q_1+1} or G_{q_1+2} for $\mathcal{A}$. In the selective game for $\mathcal{B}$, $\mathcal{B}$ is given the group description $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, g_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2$ from its challenger.

Setup. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ generates PK as in the real construction but using the given g_1, g_2. More precisely, $\mathcal{B}$ picks $\boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_n \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$, $\boldsymbol{B} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1} \subset \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$. It chooses $\tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d}$ and defines $\boldsymbol{D} := \left(\begin{smallmatrix}\tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} & \boldsymbol{0}\\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1\end{smallmatrix}\right) \in \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$ and $\boldsymbol{Z} := \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{D}$. It chooses $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1}$. It computes PK, MSK as in Eq.(9) and $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}$ as in Eq.(15). It sends PK to the adversary $\mathcal{A}$. We note that these elements distributed as if they are from $\mathsf{SFSetup}'$.

Phase 1. When $\mathcal{A}$ makes the j-th private key query for $X_j \in \mathbb{X}$, $\mathcal{B}$ picks $\beta_j \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and runs $\mathsf{SK} \leftarrow \mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X, \mathsf{MSK}, \widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}}, -, 3, \beta_j)$ for a type-3 semi-functional key.

Challenge. In the challenge phase, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs messages $M_0, M_1 \in \mathbb{G}_T$ along with her target $Y^\star$ such that $R(X_j, Y^\star) = 0$ for all $j \in [1, q_1]$. $\mathcal{B}$ then makes a ciphertext query for $Y^\star$ to its challenger and receives back $\boldsymbol{U} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ where $(\boldsymbol{c}; w_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc2}(Y^\star)$. The crucial point here is that up to this point the semi-functional parameter have not been defined since it is not necessary for all the previous keys. $\mathcal{B}$ will thus implicitly define the semi-functional parameter to $\hat{\boldsymbol{h}}$ that is defined in $\boldsymbol{U}$. (Note that $\hat{\boldsymbol{h}}$ is unknown to $\mathcal{B}$). This is done by answering back to $\mathcal{A}$ the ciphertext for $Y^\star$ by using $\boldsymbol{U}$. More precisely, $\mathcal{B}$ first flips a coin $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$, and does as follows.

1. $\mathcal{B}$ computes the normal part of the ciphertext as usual. More precisely, we randomly pick $\boldsymbol{s}_0, \boldsymbol{s}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{s}_{w_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times 1}$, let $\boldsymbol{S} := \left(\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \ldots, \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_{w_2} \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \right) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1) \times 1})^{w_2+1}$, and obtain $\bar{C}_0 = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B} \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}} \cdot M_b$ and $g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H})}$ by Eq.(11).

2. $\mathcal{B}$ computes the semi-functional part of the ciphertext by using $\boldsymbol{U}$ as follows. $\mathcal{B}$ implicitly sets $\hat{\boldsymbol{S}} = \left(\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \hat{s}_0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \hat{s}_1 \end{pmatrix}, \ldots, \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \hat{s}_{w_2} \end{pmatrix} \right) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1) \times 1})^{w_2+1}$ by using $\hat{\boldsymbol{s}} = (\hat{s}_1, \ldots, \hat{s}_{w_2})$ that is defined in $\boldsymbol{U}$. This is done by computing

$$g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}'_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\hat{\boldsymbol{S}}, \mathbb{H}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} = \left\{ g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ c_\iota(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}}) \end{pmatrix}} \prod_{\substack{j \in [0, w_2] \\ k \in [1, n]}} g_1^{a_{\iota,j,k} \boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B} \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \hat{s}_j \end{pmatrix}} \right\}_{\iota \in [1, w_1]}.$$

   We argue that this is computable as follows. The first term $g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ c_\iota(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}}) \end{pmatrix}}$ can be computed from $D_i = g_1^{c_\iota(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ and the known $\boldsymbol{B}$, where we write $\boldsymbol{U} = (U_1, \ldots, U_{w_1})$. The second term (the product term) can be computed since for each $j \in [1, w_2]$ we either have the following.

   - For j such that there is ι' where $c_{\iota'}(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}}) = \hat{s}_j$, we have $g_1^{\hat{s}_j}$ available as $U_{\iota'} = g_1^{c_{\iota'}(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} = g_1^{\hat{s}_j}$ in $\boldsymbol{U}$.
   - For j such that there is no ι' as above, we have that by *regularity* of encoding (the third rule, in Definition 1), $a_{\iota'', j, k} = 0$ for all ι'', k.

   From these two facts and the known $\boldsymbol{B}$ and $\boldsymbol{H}_k$, we can compute the product term.

3. $\mathcal{B}$ also computes $\hat{C}_0 = e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \hat{s}_0 \end{pmatrix}}, g_2)$. This can be done since $c_1 = g_1^{\hat{s}_0}$ is available in $\boldsymbol{U}$, also due to the *regularity* of encoding (the fourth rule, in Definition 1).

4. $\mathcal{B}$ computes $\boldsymbol{C} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H})} g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}'_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\hat{\boldsymbol{S}}, \mathbb{H}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ and $C_0 = \bar{C}_0 \hat{C}_0$, and returns $\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{C}, C_0)$.

This is a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext of Equation (16).

Phase 2. When $\mathcal{A}$ makes the j-th private key query for $X_{\mathrm{j}} \in \mathbb{X}$, $\mathcal{B}$ does as follows. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ makes a key query X_{j} to its challenger and receives $\boldsymbol{V} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\beta, \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ where $(\boldsymbol{k}; m_2) = \mathsf{Enc1}(X_{\mathrm{j}})$. This query can be made since $R(X_{\mathrm{j}}, Y^\star) = 0$. These are the challenges for $\mathcal{B}$ to guess if $\beta = 0$ or β is randomly chosen in $\mathbb{Z}_p$, where we note that β is the same for all queries. This matches our definition of all the post-challenge keys, which use the same β, as defined in Figure 1.

1. $\mathcal{B}$ computes the normal part of the key as usual. More precisely, this is done by picking $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1}$, $\boldsymbol{r}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_{m_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$ and setting $\boldsymbol{R} := (\binom{\boldsymbol{r}_1}{0}, \ldots, \binom{\boldsymbol{r}_{m_2}}{0}) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{m_2}$, and obtaining $g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha},\boldsymbol{R},\mathbb{H})}$ by Eq.(13).

2. $\mathcal{B}$ computes the semi-functional part of the key by using $\boldsymbol{V}$ as follows. $\mathcal{B}$ implicitly sets $\hat{\boldsymbol{R}} = \left(\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{\hat{r}_1}, \ldots, \binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{\hat{r}_{m_2}}\right) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1})^{m_2}$ by using $\hat{\boldsymbol{r}} = (\hat{r}_1, \ldots, \hat{r}_{m_2})$ that is defined in $\boldsymbol{V}$. It also implicitly sets β as β that is defined in $\boldsymbol{V}$. These are done by computing

$$g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}'_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{R}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} = \left\{ g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{k_\iota(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}} \prod_{\substack{j\in[1,m_2]\\ k\in[1,n]}} g_2^{b_{\iota,j,k}\boldsymbol{H}_k^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{\hat{r}_j}} \right\}_{\iota\in[1,m_1]}.$$

   We argue that this is computable as follows. The first term $g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{k_\iota(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}}$ can be computed from $V_\iota = g_2^{k_\iota(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$ and the known $\boldsymbol{Z}$, where we write $\boldsymbol{V} = (V_1, \ldots, V_{m_1})$. The second term (the product term) can be computed since for each $j \in [1, m_2]$ we either have the following.

   - For j such that there is ι' where $k_{\iota'}(\beta, \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}}) = \hat{r}_j$, we have $g_2^{\hat{r}_j}$ available as $V_{\iota'} = g_2^{k_{\iota'}(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} = g_2^{\hat{r}_j}$ in $\boldsymbol{V}$.
   - For j such that there is no ι' as above, we have that by *regularity* of encoding (the second rule, in Definition 1), $b_{\iota'',j,k} = 0$ for all ι'', k.

   From these two facts and the known $\boldsymbol{Z}$ and $\boldsymbol{H}_k$, we can compute the product term.

3. $\mathcal{B}$ outputs $\mathsf{SK} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha},\boldsymbol{R},\mathbb{H})} g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}'_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\beta,\hat{\boldsymbol{R}},\mathbb{H},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})}$.

This is a properly distributed semi-functional key of type-1 if $\beta = 0$ or type-2 if β is random.

Guess. The algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ has properly simulated G_{q_1+1} if $\beta = 0$, and G_{q_1+2} if β is random. Hence, $\mathcal{B}$ can use the output of $\mathcal{A}$ to guess β. □

5.8 Type-2 to Type-3 Semi-functional Key in Phase 2

Lemma 11 (G_{q_1+2} to G_{q_1+3})**.** *For any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against* ABE*, there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the $\mathcal{D}_d$-Matrix-DH Assumption with* $|\mathsf{G}_{q_1+2}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) - \mathsf{G}_{q_1+3}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)| \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}_{\mathcal{B}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. The proof is exactly the same as that of Lemma 9, where we switched every key in phase 2 from normal to type-1 semi-functional all at once, except that every key has an additional vector $g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{\beta},\boldsymbol{0},\mathbb{H})} = \{g_2^{b_\iota \boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{\beta}}\}_{\iota\in[1,m_1]}$ multiplied with it, where we note that β is the same across all the keys in phase 2 (as defined in Figure 1). To compute this, $\mathcal{B}$ samples $\beta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ *at the beginning of phase 2*, and computes $= g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{\beta}} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{1}\beta}$. We recall that $\mathcal{B}$ possesses $\widehat{\mathsf{MSK}}_{\mathsf{base}} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\binom{\boldsymbol{0}}{1}}$. Following the proof of Lemma 9, we can see that if $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \boldsymbol{0}$ then the key is a type-3 semi-functional, and if $\hat{\boldsymbol{y}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{1\times(q_2 m_2)}$ then the key is type-2 semi-functional. The rest of the proof follows exactly the same as that of Lemma 9. □

5.9 Final Game

Lemma 12 (G_{q_1+3} to $\mathsf{G}_{\mathrm{final}}$). *We have* $\mathsf{G}_{q_1+3}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \mathsf{G}_{\mathrm{final}}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. Since $\boldsymbol{Z} \in \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$, we can define $\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{\delta} \\ \hat{\delta} \end{pmatrix} = \boldsymbol{Z}^{-1}\boldsymbol{\alpha}$, where $\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}, \hat{\delta} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. That is, $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = \boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{\delta} \\ \hat{\delta} \end{pmatrix}$. We first claim that in G_{q_1+3}, $\hat{\delta}$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_p$ to the adversary $\mathcal{A}$'view. The claim holds since every appearance of $\hat{\delta}$ in all the semi-functional keys (of type-3) is added by a uniformly random value: β_j for each pre-challenge j-th key and β for all the post-challenge keys (as defined in Eq.(20) and Figure 1). Hence, $\hat{\delta}$ in C_0 in the challenge ciphertext is uniformly random to $\mathcal{A}$. Therefore, we can modify $\hat{\delta}$ to $\hat{\delta} + u$ for uniformly random $u \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. This results in changing $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ to $\boldsymbol{\alpha} + \boldsymbol{Z}\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ u \end{pmatrix}$ and hence modifying $C_0 = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ \hat{s}_0 \end{pmatrix}} \cdot M$ to C_0' where

$$C_0' = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ \hat{s}_0 \end{pmatrix} + (\mathbf{0}\ u)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ \hat{s}_0 \end{pmatrix}} \cdot M = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ \hat{s}_0 \end{pmatrix}} e(g_1, g_2)^{u\hat{s}_0} \cdot M$$

where we can verify that $(\mathbf{0}\ u)\,\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ \hat{s}_0 \end{pmatrix} = (\mathbf{0}\ u)\begin{pmatrix} \tilde{D}^\top & \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{0} & 1 \end{pmatrix}\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ \hat{s}_0 \end{pmatrix} = (\mathbf{0}\ u)\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ \hat{s}_0 \end{pmatrix} = u\hat{s}_0$, where we recall that $\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{B} = \begin{pmatrix} \tilde{D}^\top & \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{0} & 1 \end{pmatrix}$ by definition. Finally, we observe that C_0' encrypts $e(g_1, g_2)^{u\hat{s}_0} \cdot M$, which is uniformly random in $\mathbb{G}_T$ since $u \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. This is exactly the description of the final game, and hence concludes the proof. □

6 New Instantiations

In this section, we describe new instantiations from our framework. We consider Key-Policy (KP), Ciphertext-Policy (CP), and Dual-Policy (DP) types. In KP type, a key is associated with a policy, a ciphertext is associated with an input (to policy). In CP type, the roles of policy and input are exchanged. DP type [3] is the conjunctive of both types.

These instantiations are positioned in Table 2 Below, the numbering i of each scheme corresponds to the numbering of $\mathbf{New}_i$ in Table 2.

ABE for Policy over Doubly-Spatial Relation (ABE-PDS). This predicate was defined in [1] as a generalization that captures doubly-spatial encryption [32] and ABE for monotone span programs (and hence Boolean formulae) into one primitive. We refer the definition to [1]. By using exactly the same encodings in [1, 6], we automatically obtain the first fully-secure prime-order schemes for the following primitives.

- ($\mathbf{New}_1$). KP-ABE-PDS (from the encoding of [1, Scheme 6]).
- ($\mathbf{New}_2$). CP-ABE-PDS (from the encoding of [6, Scheme 2]).
  - A simpler alternative (but with a looser reduction) can also be obtained from the encoding of [1, Scheme 6] + the dual conversion of [6, §4].
- ($\mathbf{New}_3$). DP-ABE-PDS (from the encoding of [1, Scheme 6] + the conjunctive conversion of [6, §6]).

ABE for Monotone Span Programs (ABE-MSP). Let $\mathcal{U}$ be the universe of attributes. If $|\mathcal{U}|$ is of super-polynomial size, it is called large universe [30, 51], otherwise, it is small universe. In ABE-MSP [30], a policy is specified by a monotone span program (A, ρ) where A is an integer

matrix of dimension $m \times k$ for some m, k, and ρ is a map $\rho : [1, m] \to \mathcal{U}$. For a set of attributes $S \subseteq \mathcal{U}$, let $A|_S$ be the sub-matrix of A that takes all the rows j such that $\rho(j) \in S$. We say that (A, ρ) accepts S if $(1, 0, \ldots, 0) \in \mathrm{rowspan}(A|_S)$. ABE-MSP is the most popular predicate studied in the literature since it is known to imply ABE for Boolean formulae [30].

Let $t := |S|$. Some schemes specifies bounds on maximum allowed sizes of t, m, k (we denote these bounds as T, M, K). Some may restrict the maximum number, denoted by R, of attribute multi-use in one policy (that is, the number of distinct i for the same $\rho(i)$). We call a large-universe scheme without any bounds a *completely unbounded* ABE scheme.

By using encodings in [1, 6], we obtain the first fully-secure prime-order schemes for the following primitives.

- ($\mathbf{New}_4$). Completely unbounded KP-ABE-MSP (from the encoding of [1, Scheme 4]).
- ($\mathbf{New}_5$). Completely unbounded CP-ABE-MSP (from the encoding of [6, Scheme 3]).
  - A simpler alternative (but with a looser reduction) can also be obtained from the encoding of [1, Scheme 4] + the dual conversion of [6, §4].
- ($\mathbf{New}_6$). Completely unbounded DP-ABE-MSP (from the encoding of [6, Scheme 4]).
- ($\mathbf{New}_7$). KP-ABE-MSP with constant-size ciphertexts (from the encoding in [1, Scheme 5]).
- ($\mathbf{New}_8$). CP-ABE-MSP with constant-size keys (from the encoding of [6, Scheme 5]).
  - A simpler alternative (but with a looser reduction) can also be obtained from the encoding of [1, Scheme 5] + the dual conversion of [6, §4].

For concreteness, we explicitly give the description for one of our instantiations, $\mathbf{New}_4$, in §G.

By using encodings in [1] for bounded schemes, we also obtain some bounded schemes as follows. The underlying encodings of these schemes are perfectly master-key hiding, hence the resulting schemes rely solely on the Matrix-DH assumption.

- ($\mathbf{New}'_9$). KP-ABE-MSP with small universe (from the encoding in [1, Scheme 9]).
- ($\mathbf{New}'_{10}$). CP-ABE-MSP with small universe (from the encoding in [1, Scheme 11]).
- ($\mathbf{New}_{11}$). DP-ABE-MSP with small universe (from the encoding in [1, Scheme 9] + the conjunctive conversion of [6, §6]).
- ($\mathbf{New}'_{12}$). KP-ABE-MSP with large universe (from the encoding in [1, Scheme 12]).
- ($\mathbf{New}'_{13}$). CP-ABE-MSP with large universe (from the encoding in [1, Scheme 13]).
- ($\mathbf{New}_{14}$). DP-ABE-MSP with large universe (from the encoding in [1, Scheme 12] + the conjunctive conversion of [6, §6]).

Performances of Our ABE-MSP Schemes. We compare performances of our KP-ABE-MSP, CP-ABE-MSP to others in the literature in Table 3 and 4, respectively. We use the most efficient instantiation, namely, $d = 2$. In such a case, schemes can rely on the Decision 2-Linear assumption (DLIN). For clarity of comparison, we augment schemes in the literature which were proposed for one-use, to multi-use (with bound R) by using the transformation in [43].

Table 3: Performance by each KP-ABE for monotone span programs

	Scheme	|PK|	|SK|	|CT|	Decryption complexity			Sec.	Assumptions	Reduction
					Pairing	Exp$\mathbb{G}$	Exp$\mathbb{G}_T$			cost
Composite-order schemes	LW11 [41]	5	$4m$	$3t+1$	$4m$	0	m	sel.	SD	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	A14 [1, Scheme 4]	8	$3m+3$	$2t+4$	$3m+3$	0	m	full	SD,	$O(q_1)$
									$(1,t)$-EDHE3,	1
									$(1,m,k)$-EDHE4	$O(q_1)$
	A14 [1, Scheme 5]	$T+8$	$Tm+3m$ +3	6	6	$Tm+3m$	0	full	SD,	$O(q_1)$
									$(T+1,1)$-EDHE3,	1
									$(T+1,m,k)$-EDHE4	$O(q_1)$
	CW14 [16]	$U+1$	$Um+m$	2	$2m$	U	m	semi	3DHsub	$O(U)$
									SD	$O(1)$
	L+10 [43]	$UR+1$	$2m$	$tR+1$	$2m$	0	m	full	SD	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	A14 [1, Scheme 9]	$UR+1$	$m+1$	$tR+1$	2	$2m$	0	full	SD	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	W14 [58]	$UR+1$	$m+1$	$tR+1$	2	$2m$	0	full	SD	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	A14 [1, Scheme 12]	$16(M+TR)^2$ $\times\log(UR)$	$m+1$	$tR+1$	2	$2m$	0	full	SD	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	KL15 [36]	$2\log(UR)+1$	$3m$	$3tR$	$3m$	0	m	full	DLIN,	$O(URq_{\mathrm{all}})$
									SD	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
Prime-order schemes	RW13 [51]	4	$3m$	$2t+1$	$3m$	0	m	sel.	t-RW2	1
	OT12 [48]	99	$14m+5$	$14tR+5$	$14m+5$	0	m	full	DLIN	$O(t^2q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	New$_4$	42	$9m+9$	$6t+12$	$9m+9$	0	m	full	DLIN,	$O(q_1)$
									$(1,t)$-EDHE3p,	1
									$(1,m,k)$-EDHE4p	$O(q_1)$
	ALP11 [5]	$T+1$	$Tm+m$	3	3	$Tm+m$	0	sel.	T-DBDHE	1
	T14 [54]	$12T^2+15$	$6Tm+6T$	17	17	$6Tm+6T$	0	semi	DLIN	$O(T)$
	New$_7$	$6T+42$	$3Tm+9m$ +9	18	18	$3Tm+9m$	0	full	DLIN,	$O(q_1)$
									$(T+1,1)$-EDHE3p,	1
									$(T+1,m,k)$-EDHE4p	$O(q_1)$
	GPSW06 [30]	$T+3$	$2m$	$t+1$	$2m$	0	m	sel.	DBDH	1
	CGW15 [14]	$6UR+2$	$3m+3$	$3tR+3$	6	$6m$	0	full	DLIN	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	New$'_9$	$6UR+6$	$3m+3$	$3tR+3$	6	$6m$	0	full	DLIN	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	OT10 [46]	$21TR+15$	$7m+5$	$7tR+5$	$7m+5$	0	m	full	DLIN	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	New$'_{12}$	$96(M+TR)^2$ $\times\log(UR)$	$3m+3$	$3tR+3$	6	$6m$	0	full	DLIN	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	KL15 [36]	$24\log^2(UR)$ $+48\log(UR)$	$3m\log UR$ $+6m$	$3tR\log UR$ $+6tR$	$3m\log UR$ $+6m$	0	m	full	DLIN	$O(URq_{\mathrm{all}})$

[1] Variables:
- t is the attribute set size; T is the maximum size for t (if bounded).
- $m \times k$ is the dimension of the matrix for the span program (the policy); M, K are the maximum sizes for m, k (if bounded).
- U is the size of the attribute universe (if bounded small-universe).
- R is the maximum number of attribute multi-use in one policy (if bounded).
- q_1 is the number of key queries in phase 1 (before the challenge). q_{all} is the number of all key queries.

[2] |PK|, |SK|, |CT| depict the number of source group elements ($\mathbb{G}_1$ or $\mathbb{G}_2$) in public key, secrete key, and ciphertext, respectively. Composite-order group elements are about 12 times larger than prime-order group elements [31]. We omit target group elements ($\mathbb{G}_T$): in PK, all the schemes above have at most 3 elements; in CT, all schemes contain 1 element.

[3] In Decryption complexity, 'Pairing' = the number of pairings, 'Exp$\mathbb{G}$' = the number of exponentiations in source groups ($\mathbb{G}_1$ or $\mathbb{G}_2$), 'Exp$\mathbb{G}_T$' = the number of exponentiations in the target group ($\mathbb{G}_T$).

[4] Sec. is for security. 'sel.'= selective; 'full'= full security. 'semi'= semi-adaptive security [16, 54] (an intermediate of selective/full).

[5] We refer assumptions to corresponding papers. Particularly, SD refers to some subgroup decision assumptions in composite-order groups [39, 43].

[6] The reduction cost refers to the security factor loss to the corresponding assumption in the same line in the table. The security of each scheme relies on all assumptions for it combined.

Table 4: Performance by each CP-ABE for monotone span programs

	Scheme	|PK|	|SK|	|CT|	Decryption complexity			Sec.	Assumptions	Reduction cost
					Pairing	Exp$\mathbb{G}$	Exp$\mathbb{G}_T$			
Composite-order schemes	LW12 [42]	$U+3$	$t+3$	$2m+2$	$2m+2$	0	m	full	SD, 3DHsub, $\max\{m,k\}$-SPBDHE	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$ $O(q_1)$ $O(q_2)$
	AY15 [6, Scheme 3]	10	$2t+6$	$3m+5$	$3m+5$	0	m	full	SD, $(1,t)$-EDHE3, $(1,m,k)$-EDHE4dual	$O(q_1)$ $O(q_1)$ 1
	AY15 [6, Scheme 5]	$T+10$	8	$Tm+3m$ $+5$	8	$Tm+3m$	0	full	SD, $(T+1,1)$-EDHE3, $(T+1,m,k)$-EDHE4dual	$O(q_1)$ $O(q_1)$ 1
	L+10 [43]	$UR+2$	$tR+2$	$2m+1$	$2m+1$	0	m	full	SD	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	A14 [1, Scheme 11]	$UR+2$	$tR+2$	$m+2$	3	$2m$	0	full	SD	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	W14 [58]	$UR+2$	$tR+2$	$m+2$	3	$2m$	0	full	SD	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	A14 [1, Scheme 13]	$16(M+TR)^2$ $\times\log(UR)$	$tR+2$	$m+2$	3	$2m$	0	full	SD	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
Prime-order schemes	RW13 [51]	5	$2t+2$	$3m+1$	$3m+1$	0	m	sel.	$\max\{m,k\}$-RW1	1
	LW12 [42]	$24U+12$	$6t+6$	$6m+6$	$6m+9$	0	m	full	DLIN, 3DH, $\max\{m,k\}$-SPBDHEp	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$ $O(q_1)$ $O(q_2)$
	OT12 [48]	99	$14tR+5$	$14m+5$	$14m+5$	0	m	full	DLIN	$O(t^2 q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	New$_5$	54	$6t+18$	$9m+15$	$9m+15$	0	m	full	DLIN, $(1,t)$-EDHE3p, $(1,m,k)$-EDHE4dualp	$O(q_1)$ $O(q_1)$ 1
	New$_8$	$6T+54$	24	$3Tm+9m$ $+15$	24	$3Tm+9m$	0	full	DLIN, $(T+1,1)$-EDHE3p, $(T+1,m,k)$-EDHE4dualp	$O(q_1)$ $O(q_1)$ 1
	W11 [55]	$U+2$	$t+2$	$2m+1$	$2m+1$	0	m	sel.	$\max\{m,k\}$-PDBDH	1
	CGW15 [14]	$6UR+8$	$3tR+6$	$3m+3$	6	$6m$	0	full	DLIN	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	New$'_{10}$	$6UR+12$	$3tR+6$	$3m+6$	9	$6m$	0	full	DLIN	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	OT10 [46]	$21TR+15$	$7tR+5$	$7m+5$	$7m+5$	0	m	full	DLIN	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$
	New$'_{13}$	$96(M+TR)^2$ $\times\log(UR)$	$3tR+6$	$3m+6$	9	$6m$	0	full	DLIN	$O(q_{\mathrm{all}})$

[1] q_2 is the number of queries in phase 2 (after the challenge).
[2] We refer for the remaining parameters to the note under Table 3.

The numbers of group elements in our schemes for SK, CT are 3 times as large as their composite-order counterparts in $\mathsf{A14}$, $\mathsf{A15}$ [1, 6]. But since composite-order elements are 12 times larger than prime-order ones [31], we achieve improvements of 25% size reduction. More importantly, time performance is significantly improved. We recall that pairing is 250 times slower in composite-order groups than in prime-order ones [31]. In unbounded ABE ($\mathbf{New}_4$, $\mathbf{New}_5$), the dominant operation is pairing, and the numbers of pairings in decryption are 3 times as large as their composite-order counterparts in [1, 6]. As a result, our decryption is about 80 times faster. In constant-size ABE ($\mathbf{New}_7$, $\mathbf{New}_8$), the numbers of pairing are constant, and exponentiation may dominate (depending on m, T), but the improvement is similar, since exponentiation (in $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$) is about 300 to 1000 times faster in prime-order groups [31, table 6].

Remark 3. The underlying pair encodings of our schemes $\mathbf{New}_4, \mathbf{New}_7$ are those proposed in [1, §7.1-7.2], of which security rely on parameterized assumptions, namely, EDHE3, EDHE4, also given in [1]. We indeed use *prime-order group* versions, hence denoted as EDHE3p, EDHE4p, instead of *prime-order subgroup in composite-order group* as defined in [1]. These are defined exactly the same as the original except only that the group generator $\mathbb{G}$ outputs a prime-order group instead of a composite-order group (see [1, Def.6-7]). For self-containment, we recapture them in §H. This modification is merely syntactic, see Remark 5.

ABE for Regular Languages (ABE-RL). In ABE-RL [57], a policy is a deterministic finite automata (DFA) M, and an input to policy is a string w, and $R(M, w) = 1$ if the automata M accepts the string w. We defer the detailed definition to §F. We obtain the first fully-secure prime-order for

- ($\mathbf{New}_{15}$). KP-ABE-RL (from the encoding in [1, Scheme 3]).
- ($\mathbf{New}_{16}$). CP-ABE-RL (from the encoding in [1, Scheme 7]).
- ($\mathbf{New}_{17}$). DP-ABE-RL (from the encoding in [1, Scheme 3] + the conjunctive conversion of [6, §6]).

For concreteness, the pair encoding for KP-ABE-RL of [1, Scheme 3] is recapped in §F, where we also examine its regularity.

ABE for Branching Programs (ABE-BP). In ABE-BP [29], a policy is associated to a branching program Γ, which is a directed acyclic graph in which every non-terminal node has exactly two outgoing edges labeled $(i, 0)$ and $(i, 1)$ for some $i \in \mathbb{N}$. For an edge j, denote its label as ℓ_j. Moreover, there is a distinguished terminal node called accept node. We can also assume wlog that there is exactly one start node. We can assume wlog that there is at most only one edge connecting any two nodes in Γ (See [29]).

An input to policy is a binary string w. Every input binary string w induces a subgraph Γ_w that contains exactly all the edges labeled (i, w_i) for $i \in [1, |w|]$, where we write $w = (w_1, \ldots, w_{|w|})$ as the binary representation of w. We say that Γ accepts w if there is a path from the start node to the accept node in Γ_w. If the allow length of w is bounded, we say that it is a *bounded* ABE-BP, otherwise, it is an *unbounded* scheme. In the latter, a label (i, b) has no bound on i. As a side result in this paper, We obtain the following:

Theorem 13. *Large-universe ABE-MSP implies ABE-BP.*

We dedicate the proof to the next section (§7). The proof is constructive and the conversion preserves efficiency and the unbounded property (if satisfied) of the original ABE-MSP. Therefore, by using our instantiated ABE-MSP, we obtain the first schemes for the following variants of ABE-BP:

- ($\mathbf{New}_{18}$). Unbounded KP-ABE-BP (from our unbounded KP-ABE-MSP $\mathbf{New}_4$).
- ($\mathbf{New}_{19}$). Unbounded CP-ABE-BP (from our unbounded CP-ABE-MSP $\mathbf{New}_5$).
- ($\mathbf{New}_{20}$). Unbounded DP-ABE-BP (from our unbounded DP-ABE-MSP $\mathbf{New}_6$).
- ($\mathbf{New}_{21}$). KP-ABE-BP with constant-size ciphertexts (from our KP-ABE-MSP with constant-size ciphertexts $\mathbf{New}_7$).
- ($\mathbf{New}_{22}$). CP-ABE-BP with constant-size keys (from our CP-ABE-MSP with constant-size keys $\mathbf{New}_8$).

These are the first such schemes for given properties, not to mention that they are fully-secure and prime-order schemes.

We also obtain bounded ABE-BP from bounded ABE-MSP as follows.

- ($\mathbf{New}'_{23}$). Bounded KP-ABE-BP (from our KP-ABE-MSP with small universe $\mathbf{New}'_9$).
- ($\mathbf{New}'_{24}$). Bounded CP-ABE-BP (from our CP-ABE-MSP with small universe $\mathbf{New}'_{10}$).
- ($\mathbf{New}_{25}$). Bounded DP-ABE-BP (from our DP-ABE-MSP with small universe $\mathbf{New}_{11}$).

Besides the bounded input length, these bounded schemes also require *bounded multi-use* in one branching program, The bound of multi-use refers to the maximum number of allowed repetition of the same label assigned to different edges in a branching program. More precisely, it is defined as $\max_{i \in E_\Gamma} |\{ j \in E_\Gamma \mid \ell_j = \ell_i \}|$, where E_Γ is the set of all edges in Γ. This multi-use bound reflects from the multi-use bound of ABE-MSP. We note that independently, Chen *et al.* [14] also obtains bounded ABE for branching programs (as a special case of their schemes for arithmetic branching programs).

7 New Implication: ABE-MSP Implies ABE-BP

In this section, we prove the implication of ABE-MSP for large universes to ABE-BP (Theorem 13).

Proof. To show the implication, we will define two maps: π_1 maps a branching program to a monotone span program, and π_2 maps a string to a set of attributes, as follows. First, let E_Γ, V_Γ be the sets of edges and nodes of Γ, respectively. We can assume wlog that $E_\Gamma = [1, |E_\Gamma|]$, $V_\Gamma = [1, |V_\Gamma|]$, and the terminal accept node is denoted by the number 1, while the start node is denoted by $|V_\Gamma|$. An edge j is directed from its tail node, denoted t_j, to its head, denoted h_j.

We define $\pi_1 : \Gamma \mapsto (M, \rho)$ for which an access matrix M of dimension $|E_\Gamma| \times (|V_\Gamma| - 1)$ and a row label function $\rho : E_\Gamma \to \mathbb{N} \times \{0, 1\}$ are set as follows. We define the entry (j, k) of M as follows:

$$M_{j,k} := \begin{cases} -1 & \text{if } k \text{ is the tail node of edge } j, \\ 1 & \text{if } k \text{ is the head node of edge } j, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We define ρ to map the row number $j \in [1, |E_\Gamma|]$ to the label ℓ_j of the edge j in Γ. We define $\pi_2 : \{0,1\}^* \to 2^{\mathbb{N}\times\{0,1\}}$ by mapping $\pi_2 : w \mapsto \{ (i, w_i) \mid i \in [1, |w|] \}$. We claim the following lemma.

Lemma 14. *The branching program Γ accepts the string w if and only if the monotone span program $\pi_1(\Gamma)$ accepts the attribute set $\pi_2(w)$.*

We can naturally use the maps π_1 and π_2 to construct an (unbounded) ABE-BP scheme from an (unbounded) ABE for monotone span programs (ABE-MSP): a ciphertext for w in ABE-BP is constructed by encrypting $\pi_2(w)$ in ABE-MSP, while a key for Γ in ABE-BP is obtained as a key for $\pi_1(\Gamma)$ in ABE-MSP. The *if* and the *only-if* part of the lemma will guarantee that the *security* and the *correctness* are preserved, respectively.[11] This concludes the proof of the theorem. □

It remains to prove the above lemma. Let $(M, \rho) = \pi_1(\Gamma)$, $S = \pi_2(w)$.

Proof of Lemma 14. We first proof for ($\Rightarrow$). Assume that Γ accepts w. Hence, there exists a path from the start node (node $|V_\Gamma|$) to the accept node (node 1) in Γ_w. Let $(|V_\Gamma|, v_1, \ldots, v_t, 1)$ be the nodes on the path. Also let $(j_1, \ldots, j_{t+1})$ be the edges on this path. Hence, by definition, $M|_S$ is the matrix that exactly takes the row $j_1, \ldots, j_{t+1}$ from M. Now, consider the sum of all row vectors in $M|_S$. We have:

- The row j_{t+1} contributes 1 at column 1, and -1 at column v_t.
- For i from t down to 2, the row j_i contributes 1 at column v_i, and -1 at column v_{i-1}.
- The row j_1 contributes 1 at column v_1.

Therefore, all the values at column $v_1, \ldots, v_t$ are canceled out to 0. Hence, the sum is exactly $(1, 0, \ldots, 0)$. Therefore, $(1, 0, \ldots, 0) \in \text{rowspan}(M|_S)$ which means that (M, ρ) accepts S.

We now prove for ($\Leftarrow$). Assume that Γ does not accept w. Let Γ'_w be the *undirected* graph obtained from Γ_w by treating every edge as an undirected edge. We have the following properties:[12]

1. Since Γ does not accept w, we have that the start node and the accept node lie in different connected components of Γ'_w.
2. Γ'_w contains no cycle. This is since Γ_w is acyclic and every non-terminal node has exactly one outgoing edge.

Assume for contradiction that $(1, 0, \ldots, 0) \in \text{rowspan}(M|_S)$. Let $J = \{ j \mid \rho(j) \in S \}$. (Hence, J is the set of edges of Γ_w). We write this linear combination as $(1, 0, \ldots, 0) = \sum_{j\in J} c_j M_j$, where M_j is the row j of M and c_j is some coefficient. For each node $k \in [1, |V_\Gamma|]$, let J_k be the set of edges j in J that are adjacent to k and that $c_j \neq 0$. From the linear combination, we must have that:

$$\sum_{j\in J_k} c_j M_{j,k} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } k = 1, \\ 0 & \text{if } k \in [2, |V_\Gamma| - 1]. \end{cases} \tag{29}$$

[11] This was formalized and called the embedding lemma in [12].
[12] These properties were also used, albeit differently, for proving selective security for the ABE-BP of [29].

Let Γ''_w be the subgraph of Γ'_w that takes all edges $j \in J$ such that $c_j \neq 0$ (while treating as undirected edges). We observe that for every node $k \in [2, |V_\Gamma| - 1]$ (*i.e.,* not the accept nor the start node), there are *at least two edges adjacent to it in* Γ''_w. This is since otherwise the sum $\sum_{j \in J_k} c_j M_{j,k}$ would not be canceled out to 0, where we observe that for $j \in J_k$ we have $M_{j,k} \neq 0$. We claim that Γ''_w will always contain a cycle. Hence, this will contradict the property 2, and the proof will be concluded. It now remains to prove the claim. We consider an arbitrary node $k \in [2, |V_\Gamma| - 1]$. We have three cases:

- If k is not connected to neither the accept nor the start node in Γ''_w, then the largest connected subgraph of Γ''_w that contains k has all nodes with at least two adjacent edges.
- If k is connected to the accept node, then it is not connected to the start node by the property 1. Hence, the largest connected subgraph of Γ''_w that contains k has at most one node (the accept node) that may have one adjacent edge.
- If k is connected to the start node, then it is not connected to the accept node by the property 1. Hence, the largest connected subgraph of Γ''_w that contains k has at most one node (the start node) that may have one adjacent edge.

In all cases, the considering connected subgraph has at most one node that may have one adjacent edge. Hence, it always contain a cycle. This concludes the proof of the claim, and hence the lemma. □

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A Security Definition for ABE

Security Notion. An attribute-based encryption scheme for predicate family R is fully secure if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has non-negligible advantage in the following game between $\mathcal{A}$ and the challenger $\mathcal{C}$. For our purpose of modifying games in the proof, we write some in the boxes. Let q_1, q_2 be the numbers of queries in Phase 1,2, respectively.

1. **Setup**: $\mathcal{C}$ runs $^{(1)}\boxed{\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \kappa) \to (\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{MSK})}$ and hands PK to $\mathcal{A}$.

2. **Phase 1**: $\mathcal{A}$ makes a j-th private key query for $X_j \in \mathbb{X}_\kappa$. $\mathcal{C}$ returns SK_j by computing $^{(2)}\boxed{\mathsf{SK}_j \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(X_j, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{PK})}$.

3. **Challenge**: $\mathcal{A}$ submits equal-length messages M_0, M_1 and a target ciphertext attribute $Y^\star \in \mathbb{Y}_\kappa$ with the restriction that $R_\kappa(X_j, Y^\star) = 0$ for all $j \in [1, q_1]$. $\mathcal{C}$ flips a bit $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}$ and returns the challenge ciphertext $^{(3)}\boxed{\mathsf{CT}^\star \leftarrow \mathsf{Encrypt}(Y^\star, M_b, \mathsf{PK})}$.

4. **Phase 2**: $\mathcal{A}$ continues to make a j-th private key query for $X_j \in \mathbb{X}_\kappa$ under the restriction $R_\kappa(X_j, Y^\star) = 0$. $\mathcal{C}$ returns $^{(4)}\boxed{\mathsf{SK}_j \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(X_j, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{PK})}$.

5. **Guess**: The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a guess $b' \in \{0,1\}$ and wins if $b' = b$. The advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ against ABE is defined as $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[b = b'] - \frac{1}{2}|$.

B Recap the Security Definitions for Pair Encodings

The security notions of pair encoding schemes are given in [1], with a refinement regarding the number of queries in [6]. We describe almost the same definitions here and remark slight differences from [1, 6] below.

(Perfect Security). The pair encoding scheme P is *perfectly master-key hiding* (PMH) if the following holds. Suppose $R(X, Y) = 0$. Let $n \leftarrow \mathsf{Param}(\kappa)$, $(\boldsymbol{k}; m_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc1}(X)$, $(\boldsymbol{c}; w_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc2}(Y)$, then the following two distributions are identical:

$$\{\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h}),\ \boldsymbol{k}(0, \boldsymbol{r}, \boldsymbol{h})\} \qquad \text{and} \qquad \{\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h}),\ \boldsymbol{k}(\alpha, \boldsymbol{r}, \boldsymbol{h})\},$$

where the probability is taken over $\boldsymbol{h} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^n, \alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p, \boldsymbol{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{m_2}, \boldsymbol{s} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(w_2+1)}$.

(Computational Security). We define two flavors for computational security notions: *selectively* and *co-selectively secure master-key hiding* $(\mathsf{SMH}, \mathsf{CMH})$ in a bilinear group generator $\mathcal{G}$. We first define the following game template, denoted as $\mathsf{Exp}_{\mathcal{G},\mathsf{P},\mathsf{G},b,\mathcal{A},t_1,t_2}(\lambda)$, for pair encoding P, a flavor $\mathsf{G} \in \{\mathsf{CMH}, \mathsf{SMH}\}$, $b \in \{0,1\}$, and $t_1, t_2 \in \mathbb{N}$. It takes as input the security parameter λ and does the experiment with the adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$, and outputs b'. Denote by st a state information by $\mathcal{A}$. The game is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathsf{Exp}_{\mathcal{G},\mathsf{G},b,\mathcal{A},t_1,t_2}(\lambda) : (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e, p) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(\lambda);\ g_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_1, g_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_2,\\ \alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p, n \leftarrow \mathsf{Param}(\kappa), \boldsymbol{h} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^n;\\ \mathsf{st} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}^1_{\mathsf{G},b,\alpha,\boldsymbol{h}}(\cdot)}(g_1, g_2);\ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}^2_{\mathsf{G},b,\alpha,\boldsymbol{h}}(\cdot)}(\mathsf{st}),\end{aligned}$$

where each oracle $\mathcal{O}^1, \mathcal{O}^2$ *can be queried at most* t_1, t_2 *times respectively*, and is defined as follows.

- **Selective Security.**
  - $\mathcal{O}^1_{\mathsf{SMH},b,\alpha,\boldsymbol{h}}(Y^\star)$: Run $(\boldsymbol{c}; w_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc2}(Y^\star); \boldsymbol{s} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(w_2+1)}$; return $\boldsymbol{U} \leftarrow g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{h})}$.
  - $\mathcal{O}^2_{\mathsf{SMH},b,\alpha,\boldsymbol{h}}(X)$: If $R(X, Y^\star) = 1$, then return $\perp$.
    Else, run $(\boldsymbol{k}; m_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc1}(X); \boldsymbol{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{m_2}$; return

$$\boldsymbol{V} \leftarrow \begin{cases} g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(0,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \text{ if } b = 0 \\ g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \text{ if } b = 1 \end{cases}.$$

- **Co-selective Security.**
  - $\mathcal{O}^1_{\mathsf{CMH},b,\alpha,\boldsymbol{h}}(X^\star)$: Run $(\boldsymbol{k}; m_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc1}(X^\star); \boldsymbol{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{m_2}$; return

$$\boldsymbol{V} \leftarrow \begin{cases} g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(0,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \text{ if } b = 0 \\ g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \text{ if } b = 1 \end{cases}.$$

  - $\mathcal{O}^2_{\mathsf{CMH},b,\alpha,\boldsymbol{h}}(Y)$: If $R(X^\star, Y) = 1$, then return $\perp$.
    Else, run $(\boldsymbol{c}; w_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc2}(Y); \boldsymbol{s} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(w_2+1)}$; return $\boldsymbol{U} \leftarrow g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{h})}$.

We define the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ against the pair encoding scheme P in the security game $\mathsf{G} \in \{\mathsf{SMH}, \mathsf{CMH}\}$ for bilinear group generator $\mathcal{G}$ with the bounded number of queries (t_1, t_2) as

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{(t_1,t_2)\text{-}\mathsf{G}(\mathsf{P})}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\mathsf{Exp}_{\mathcal{G},\mathsf{P},\mathsf{G},0,\mathcal{A},t_1,t_2}(\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\mathsf{Exp}_{\mathcal{G},\mathsf{P},\mathsf{G},1,\mathcal{A},t_1,t_2}(\lambda) = 1]|$$

We say that P is (t_1, t_2)-*selectively master-key hiding* in $\mathcal{G}$ if $\mathsf{Adv}^{(t_1,t_2)\text{-}\mathsf{SMH}(\mathsf{P})}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ is negligible for all polynomial time attackers $\mathcal{A}$. Analogously, P is (t_1, t_2)-*co-selectively master-key hiding* in $\mathcal{G}$ if $\mathsf{Adv}^{(t_1,t_2)\text{-}\mathsf{CMH}(\mathsf{P})}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ is negligible for all polynomial time attackers $\mathcal{A}$.

Poly-many Queries. We also consider the case where t_i is *not a-priori bounded* and hence the corresponding oracle can be queried polynomially many times. In such a case, we denote t_i as poly.

Remark 4. The original notions considered in [1] are $(1, \mathsf{poly})$-SMH, $(1,1)$-CMH for selective and co-selective master-key hiding security, respectively. The refinement with (t_1, t_2) is done recently in [6]. The purpose of refinement is that there exists a generic conversion that converts a $(1,1)$-SMH-secure pair encoding scheme for a predicate into another scheme for its *dual predicate* which is $(1,1)$-CMH-secure, and vice-versa [6]. We note that $(1, \mathsf{poly})$-SMH trivially implies $(1,1)$-SMH.

Remark 5. The definition of computational security for encoding here is slightly different from that in [1, 6] in that here we define it in *asymmetric* and *prime-order* groups, while it was defined in *symmetric* and *prime-order subgroup of composite-order* groups in [1, 6]. We use asymmetric groups for the purpose of generality, one can obtain schemes in symmetric groups by just setting $\mathbb{G}_1 = \mathbb{G}_2$. Hence, we can use all the proposed encodings in [1, 6] by working on the symmetric group version of our framework. For the latter issue, the difference of definitions between prime-order groups and prime-order subgroups are merely *syntactic*. This is since although the original definition was defined in prime-order subgroups, the hardness of factorization was not assumed (*i.e.,* generators of each subgroup or even factors of composites N can be given out to the adversary). Hence, the encoding schemes in [1, 6] are secure in our definition under the security proofs in their present forms.

C Recap the Composite-order Construction of [1]

For self-containment, we recap the ABE construction in composite-order groups, albeit using asymmetric groups (the original scheme was defined in symmetric groups). It will use a composite-order asymmetric bilinear group generator $\mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{composite}}$ which outputs $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e, N, p_1, p_2, p_3) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{composite}}(\lambda)$, where $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$ are of order $N = p_1 p_2 p_3$. The bilinear map takes the form $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_T$. Let $\mathbb{G}_{1,p_i}, \mathbb{G}_{2,p_i}$ be the subgroup of order p_i of $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ respectively. Let $g_1 \in \mathbb{G}_{1,p_1}$, $\hat{g}_1 \in \mathbb{G}_{1,p_2}$, $g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_{2,p_1}$, $\hat{g}_2 \in \mathbb{G}_{2,p_2}$ be a generator in each subgroup. The scheme is as follows.

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \kappa)$: Run $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e, N, p_1, p_2, p_3) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{composite}}(\lambda)$. Pick generators $g_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_{1,p_1}$, $g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_{2,p_1}$, $Z_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_{2,p_3}$. Obtain $n \leftarrow \mathsf{Param}(\kappa)$. Pick $\boldsymbol{h} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N^n$ and $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N$. The public key is $\mathsf{PK} = (g_1, g_2, e(g_1, g_2)^\alpha, g_1^{\boldsymbol{h}}, Z_3)$. The master secret key is $\mathsf{MSK} = \alpha$.

- $\mathsf{Encrypt}(Y, M, \mathsf{PK})$: Upon input $Y \in \mathbb{Y}_N$, run $(\boldsymbol{c}; w_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc2}(Y)$. Pick $\boldsymbol{s} = (s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_{w_2}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N^{w_2+1}$. Output the ciphertext as $\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{C}, C_0)$:

$$\boldsymbol{C} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{h})} \in \mathbb{G}^{w_1}, \qquad C_0 = (e(g_1, g_2)^\alpha)^{s_0} M \in \mathbb{G}_T.$$

  Note that $\boldsymbol{C}$ can be computed from $g_1^{\boldsymbol{h}}$ and $\boldsymbol{s}$ since $\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h})$ contains only linear combinations of monomials $s, s_i, sh_j, s_i h_j$.

- $\mathsf{KeyGen}(X, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{PK})$: Upon input $X \in \mathbb{X}_N$, run $(\boldsymbol{k}; m_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc1}(X)$. Parse $\mathsf{MSK} = \alpha$. Recall that $m_1 = |\boldsymbol{k}|$. Pick $\boldsymbol{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N^{m_2}$, $\boldsymbol{R}_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_{2,p_3}^{m_1}$. Output the secret key SK:

$$\mathsf{SK} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \cdot \boldsymbol{R}_3 \in \mathbb{G}^{m_1}.$$

- $\mathsf{Decrypt}(\mathsf{CT}, \mathsf{SK})$: Obtain Y, X from CT, SK. Suppose $R(X,Y) = 1$. Run $\boldsymbol{E} \leftarrow \mathsf{Pair}(X,Y)$. Compute

$$e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha s_0} \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [1,m_1], i' \in [1,w_1]} e(\boldsymbol{C}[i'], \mathsf{SK}[i])^{E_{i,i'}},$$

and obtain $M \leftarrow C_0 / e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha s_0}$.

Correctness. Since $R(X,Y) = 1$, we have

$$\prod_{i \in [1,m_1], i' \in [1,w_1]} e(\boldsymbol{C}[i'], \mathsf{SK}[i])^{E_{i,i'}} = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{k}\boldsymbol{E}\boldsymbol{c}^\top} = e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha s_0}.$$

Semi-Functional Algorithms.

- $\mathsf{SFSetup}(1^\lambda, \kappa)$: This is exactly the same as $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \kappa)$ except that it additionally outputs generators $\hat{g}_1 \in \mathbb{G}_{1,p_2}$, $\hat{g}_2 \in \mathbb{G}_{2,p_2}$ and semi-functional parameter $\hat{\boldsymbol{h}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N^n$.
- $\mathsf{SFEncrypt}(Y, M, \mathsf{PK}, \hat{g}_1, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})$: Upon inputs $Y, M, \mathsf{PK}, \hat{g}_1$ and $\hat{\boldsymbol{h}}$, first run $(\boldsymbol{c}; w_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc2}(Y)$. Pick $\boldsymbol{s} = (s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_{w_2}), \hat{\boldsymbol{s}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N^{w_2+1}$ Output the ciphertext as $\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{C}, C_0)$:

$$\boldsymbol{C} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{h})} \hat{g}_1^{\boldsymbol{c}(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} \in \mathbb{G}^{w_1}, \qquad C_0 = (e(g_1, g_2)^\alpha)^{s_0} M \in \mathbb{G}_T.$$

- $\mathsf{SFKeyGen}(X, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{PK}, \hat{g}_2, \mathsf{type}, \hat{\alpha}, \hat{\boldsymbol{h}})$: Upon inputs $X, \mathsf{MSK}, \mathsf{PK}, \hat{g}_2$ and $\mathsf{type} \in \{1,2,3\}, \hat{\alpha} \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, first run $(\boldsymbol{k}; m_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc1}(X)$. Pick $\boldsymbol{r}, \hat{\boldsymbol{r}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N^{m_2}, \boldsymbol{R}_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_{2,p_3}^{m_1}$. Output the secret key SK:

$$\mathsf{SK} = \begin{cases} g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \cdot \hat{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(0,\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} \cdot \boldsymbol{R}_3 & \text{if } \mathsf{type} = 1 \\ g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \cdot \hat{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\hat{\alpha},\hat{\boldsymbol{r}},\hat{\boldsymbol{h}})} \cdot \boldsymbol{R}_3 & \text{if } \mathsf{type} = 2 \\ g_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha,\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{h})} \cdot \hat{g}_2^{\boldsymbol{k}(\hat{\alpha},\boldsymbol{0},\boldsymbol{0})} \cdot \boldsymbol{R}_3 & \text{if } \mathsf{type} = 3 \end{cases}$$

Note that in computing type-1 (resp., type-3) semi-functional keys, $\hat{\alpha}$ (resp., $\hat{\boldsymbol{h}}$) is not needed.

D Proof for Correctness for Our Scheme

In this section, we prove the correctness of decryption of our generic construction in §4.2.

Claim 15. *If $R(X,Y) = 1$ then*

$$\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B} \begin{pmatrix} s_0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} = \sum_{i \in [1,m_1], i' \in [1,w_1]} E_{i,i'} \cdot (\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{R}, \mathbb{H})[i])^\top \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H})[i'].$$

Proof. To prove this, we first see that due to the correctness of the pair encoding, $R(X,Y) = 1$ implies

$$\alpha s_0 = \sum_{i \in [1,m_1], i' \in [1,w_1]} E_{i,i'} \cdot k(\alpha, \boldsymbol{r}, \boldsymbol{h})[i] \cdot c(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h})[i']. \tag{30}$$

Each term in the sum can be written as

$$
\begin{aligned}
&E_{i,i'} \cdot k(\alpha, \boldsymbol{r}, \boldsymbol{h})[i] \cdot c(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h})[i'] = \\
&E_{i,i'} \sum_{j' \in [0,w_2]} b_i a_{i',j'} \alpha s_{j'} + E_{i,i'} \sum_{\substack{j' \in [0,w_2] \\ k' \in [1,n]}} b_i a_{i',j',k'} \alpha h_{k'} s_{j'} \\
&\quad + E_{i,i'} \sum_{\substack{j \in [1,m_2] \\ j' \in [0,w_2]}} b_{i,j} a_{i',j'} r_j s_{j'} \\
&\quad + \underbrace{E_{i,i'} \sum_{\substack{j \in [1,m_2] \\ j' \in [0,w_2] \\ k' \in [1,n]}} b_{i,j} a_{i',j',k'} r_j h_{k'} s_{j'} + E_{i,i'} \sum_{\substack{j \in [1,m_2] \\ k \in [1,n] \\ j' \in [0,w_2]}} b_{i,j,k} a_{i',j'} r_j h_k s_{j'}}_{E_{i,i'} \sum_{\substack{j \in [1,m_2] \\ k \in [1,n] \\ j' \in [0,w_2]}} (b_{i,j} a_{i',j',k} + b_{i,j,k} a_{i',j'}) r_j h_k s_{j'}} \\
&\quad + \underbrace{E_{i,i'} \sum_{\substack{j \in [1,m_2] \\ k \in [1,n] \\ j' \in [0,w_2] \\ k' \in [1,n]}} b_{i,j,k} a_{i',j',k'} r_j h_k h_{k'} s_{j'}}_{=0},
\end{aligned}
\tag{31}
$$

where we note that the last term, denoted L, is 0 intuitively due to the *regularity* of encoding (the first rule, in Definition 1), which disallows the multiplication of $(r_j h_k)(h_{k'} s_{j'})$. More precisely, we fix i, i'. Then, for j, k which $b_{i,j,k} = 0$, L is trivially 0. Similarly, for j', k' which $a_{i',j',k'} = 0$, L is also trivially 0. For the remaining case of j, k, j', k' where $b_{i,j,k} \neq 0$ and $a_{i',j',k'} \neq 0$, we have that $E_{i,i'} = 0$ exactly due to the first rule of regularity.

This whole term of (31) can be viewed as a polynomial, denoted $p^{i,i'}(\boldsymbol{v})$, with variables in $\boldsymbol{v}$ consisting of

$$
\{\alpha s_{j'}\}_{j' \in [0,w_2]}, \qquad \{\alpha h_{k'} s_{j'}\}_{\substack{j' \in [0,w_2] \\ k' \in [1,n]}}, \qquad \{r_j s_{j'}\}_{\substack{j \in [1,m_2] \\ j' \in [0,w_2]}}, \qquad \{r_j h_k s_{j'}\}_{\substack{j \in [1,m_2] \\ k \in [1,n] \\ j' \in [0,w_2]}}. \tag{32}
$$

We then substituting variables $\boldsymbol{v}$ with $\boldsymbol{W}$ consisting of

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B} \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_{j'} \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}\}_{j' \in [0,w_2]}, \qquad \{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_{k'} \boldsymbol{B} \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_{j'} \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}\}_{\substack{j' \in [0,w_2] \\ k' \in [1,n]}}, \\
&\{(\boldsymbol{r}_j^\top \; 0)\, \boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{B} \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_{j'} \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}\}_{\substack{j \in [1,m_2] \\ j' \in [0,w_2]}}, \quad \{(\boldsymbol{r}_j^\top \; 0)\, \boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_k \boldsymbol{B} \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_{j'} \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}\}_{\substack{j \in [1,m_2] \\ k \in [1,n] \\ j' \in [0,w_2]}}.
\end{aligned}
\tag{33}
$$

in the respective manner (*i.e.,* elements in (33) are in the same order as those in (32)) and obtain $p^{i,i'}(\boldsymbol{W})$. Since Eq.(30) holds symbolically, we thus have

$$
\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B} \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} = \sum_{i \in [1,m_1], i' \in [1,w_1]} p^{i,i'}(\boldsymbol{W}).
$$

Therefore, it remains to prove that

$$
p^{i,i'}(\boldsymbol{W}) = E_{i,i'} \cdot (\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{R}, \mathbb{H})[i])^\top \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}(\boldsymbol{S}, \mathbb{H})[i']. \tag{34}
$$

To prove this, we write the term on the right-hand side of (34) using the definitions of $\boldsymbol{k}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}, \boldsymbol{c}_{\boldsymbol{B}}$ from (11) and (13) as

$$E_{i,i'}\left(b_i\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top + \left(\sum_{j\in[1,m_2]} b_{i,j}\left(\boldsymbol{r}_j^\top\ 0\right)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top\right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j\in[1,m_2]\\k\in[1,n]}} b_{i,j,k}\left(\boldsymbol{r}_j^\top\ 0\right)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top\boldsymbol{H}_k\right)\right)\cdot$$
$$\left(\left(\sum_{j'\in[0,w_2]} a_{i',j'}\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_{j'}\\0\end{pmatrix}\right) + \left(\sum_{\substack{j'\in[0,w_2]\\k'\in[1,n]}} a_{i',j',k'}\boldsymbol{H}_{k'}\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_{j'}\\0\end{pmatrix}\right)\right).$$

We then multiply it out and check the coefficient of each variable in $\boldsymbol{W}$ whether it equals to that in $p^{i,i'}(\boldsymbol{W})$, of which the coefficients are shown in (31). By inspection, we can see that this holds. One particular non-trivial point is that, the coefficient of $\left(\boldsymbol{r}_j^\top\ 0\right)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top\boldsymbol{H}_k\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_{j'}\\0\end{pmatrix}$ is $b_{i,j}a_{i',j',k} + b_{i,j,k}a_{i',j'}$ (and hence is the same as in $p^{i,i'}(\boldsymbol{W})$ as shown in Eq.(31)), exactly due to the associativity:

$$\left(\left(\boldsymbol{r}_j^\top\ 0\right)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top\right)\left(\boldsymbol{H}_k\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_{j'}\\0\end{pmatrix}\right) = \left(\left(\boldsymbol{r}_j^\top\ 0\right)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top\boldsymbol{H}_k\right)\left(\boldsymbol{B}\begin{pmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_{j'}\\0\end{pmatrix}\right).$$

This concludes the proof. □

E Variants of Security for Our Construction

In this section, we describe two more theorems for our framework.

Theorem 16. *Suppose that a pair encoding scheme* P *for predicate* R *is* $(1,1)$*-selectively and* $(1,1)$*-co-selectively master-key hiding in* $\mathcal{G}$*, and the Matrix-DH Assumption holds in* $\mathcal{G}$*. Then the construction* $\mathsf{ABE}(\mathsf{P})$ *in* $\mathcal{G}$ *of ABE for predicate* R *is fully secure. More precisely, for any PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, there exist PPT algorithms* $\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2, \mathcal{B}_3$*, whose running times are the same as* $\mathcal{A}$ *plus some polynomial times, such that for any* λ*,*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \le (2q_{\mathrm{all}}+1)\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}_{\mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda) + q_1\mathsf{Adv}^{(1,1)\text{-}\mathsf{CMH}}_{\mathcal{B}_2}(\lambda) + q_2\mathsf{Adv}^{(1,1)\text{-}\mathsf{SMH}}_{\mathcal{B}_3}(\lambda),$$

where q_1, q_2 *is the number of queries in phase 1,2, resp., and* $q_{\mathrm{all}} = q_1 + q_2$*.*

Proof. This follows the proof of our main theorem (Theorem 3). The only difference is that instead of switching all *post-challenge* keys *all at once* for the three games (normal to semi-functional type 1, to type 2, and to type 3), we switch each post-challenge key *one key per one game*, in just the same way as for each pre-challenge key (and as in the traditional dual system encryption proofs). This results in the cost q_2 for the reduction to the SMH security and the additional cost $2q_2 - 2$ for the reduction to $\mathcal{D}_d$-MatDH. □

Corollary 17. *Suppose that a pair encoding scheme* P *for predicate* R *is perfectly master-key hiding, and the Matrix-DH Assumption holds in* $\mathcal{G}$*. Then the construction* $\mathsf{ABE}(\mathsf{P})$ *in* $\mathcal{G}$ *of ABE for predicate* R *is fully secure. More precisely, for any PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, there exist PPT*

algorithms $\mathcal{B}$, whose running time is the same as $\mathcal{A}$ plus some polynomial time, such that for any λ,

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \leq (2q_{\mathrm{all}} + 1)\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}_{\mathcal{B}}(\lambda).$$

where $q_{\mathrm{all}} = q_1 + q_2$ denotes the number of all queries.

Proof. Since PMH trivially implies both $(1,1)$-CMH and $(1,1)$-SMH with zero advantage, we obtain the above corollary. □

F An Encoding Example: KP-ABE for Regular Languages

To illustrate how an encoding scheme will satisfy regularity (Definition 1), we show an instantiation example. We pick the encoding scheme for ABE for regular languages proposed in [1]. We show its regularity below. Thus, our generic construction gives a fully-secure ABE scheme for regular languages in prime-order groups. The underlying assumptions besides the Matrix-DH assumption are exactly those that are defined in [1] (the EDHE1 and EDHE2 assumptions) albeit *defined over prime-order groups*. The original assumptions are defined over prime-order subgroups inside composite-order groups; however, the hardness of factorization was not inherently used, so we can neglect other subgroups. We remark that this is the first such scheme. For self-containment, we first give the definition for the predicate, where we mostly copy texts from [1] here.

Predicate Definition of ABE for Regular Languages. In ABE for regular languages, we have a key associated to the description of a deterministic finite automata (DFA) M, while a ciphertext is associated to a string w, and $R(M, w) = 1$ if the automata M accepts the string w. A DFA M is a 5-tuple $(Q, \Lambda, \mathcal{T}, q_0, F)$ in which Q is the set of states $Q = \{q_0, q_1, \ldots, q_{n-1}\}$, Λ is the alphabet set, $\mathcal{T}$ is the set of transitions, in which each transition is of the form $(q_x, q_y, \sigma) \in Q \times Q \times \Lambda$, $q_0 \in Q$ is the start state, and $F \subseteq Q$ is the set of accepted states. We say that M accepts a string $w = (w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_\ell) \in \Lambda^*$ if there exists a sequence of states $\rho_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_\ell \in Q$ such that $\rho_0 = q_0$, for $i = 1$ to ℓ we have $(\rho_{i-1}, \rho_i, w_i) \in \mathcal{T}$, and $\rho_\ell \in F$. This primitive is important since it has a unique unbounded feature that one key for machine M can operate on input string w of *arbitrary* sizes. Such an ABE system was proposed by Waters [57] in the selective security model. The fully secure scheme was achieved via the framework of [1] in composite-order groups. We recap the encoding scheme in [1] as follows, where we simplify some notations of variables.

Pair Encoding Scheme 1: KP-ABE for Regular Languages of [1]

$\mathsf{Param} \to 8$. Denote $\boldsymbol{h} = (h_0, h_1, h_2, h_3, h_4, h_5, h_6, h_7)$.

$\mathsf{Enc1}(M) \to$ For any DFA $M = (Q, \mathbb{Z}_p, \mathcal{T}, q_0, q_{n-1})$, where $n = |Q|$, let $m = |\mathcal{T}|$, and parse $\mathcal{T} = \{(q_{x_t}, q_{y_t}, \sigma_t) | t \in [1, m]\}$.

$$\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha, \boldsymbol{r}, \boldsymbol{h}) = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4, k_5, \{k_{6,t}, k_{7,t}, k_{8,t}\}_{t\in[1,m]}) :$$
$$\left\{ \begin{array}{lll} k_1 = \alpha + rh_5 + uh_7, & k_2 = u, & k_3 = r, \\ k_4 = r_0, & k_5 = -u_0 + r_0 h_0, & k_{6,t} = r_t, \\ k_{7,t} = u_{x_t} + r_t(h_1 + h_2\sigma_t), & k_{8,t} = -u_{y_t} + r_t(h_3 + h_4\sigma_t) & \end{array} \right\}$$

where $u_{n-1} := h_6 r$ and $\boldsymbol{r} = (r, u, r_0, r_1, \ldots, r_m, \{u_x\}_{q_x \in Q \setminus \{q_{n-1}\}})$.

$\mathsf{Enc2}(w) \to$ For $w \in (\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$, let $\ell = |w|$, and parse $w = (w_1, \ldots, w_\ell)$.

$$\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h}) = (c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, \{c_{5,i}\}_{i\in[0,\ell]}, \{c_{6,i}\}_{i\in[1,\ell]}) :$$
$$\left\{ \begin{array}{llll} c_1 = s_0, & c_2 = s_0 h_7, & c_3 = -s_0 h_5 + s_{\ell+1} h_6, & \\ c_4 = s_1 h_0, & c_{5,i} = s_{i+1}, & c_{6,i} = s_i(h_1 + h_2 w_i) + s_{i+1}(h_3 + h_4 w_i) & \end{array} \right\}$$

where $\boldsymbol{s} = (s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_{\ell+1})$.

Correctness. The correctness can be shown by providing linear combination of $k_\iota c_j$ which summed up to αs_0. When $R(M, w) = 1$, we have that there is a sequence of states $\rho_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_\ell \in Q$ such that $\rho_0 = q_0$, for $i = 1$ to ℓ we have $(\rho_{i-1}, \rho_i, w_i) \in \mathcal{T}$, and $\rho_\ell \in F$. Let $(q_{x_{t_i}}, q_{y_{t_i}}, \sigma_{t_i}) = (\rho_{i-1}, \rho_i, w_i)$. Therefore, we have the following bilinear combination:

$$k_1 c_1 - k_2 c_2 + k_3 c_3 - k_4 c_4 + k_5 c_{5,0} + \sum_{i\in[1,\ell]} (-k_{6,t_i} c_{6,i} + k_{7,t_i} c_{5,i-1} + k_{8,t_i} c_{5,i}) = \alpha s. \tag{35}$$

Claim 18. *The above encoding scheme is regular pair encoding.*

Proof. We inspect each requirement from Definition 1 as follows.

1. In the linear combination of $k_\iota c_j$ terms when pairing as shown in Eq.(35), the two terms in each pair does not simultaneously contain elements from $\boldsymbol{h}$. For example, in the product $k_1 c_1$, the polynomial k_1 contains h_5, h_7, while c_1 has no h_i element. On the other hand, in the product $k_3 c_3$, the polynomial k_3 has no h_i element, while c_3 contains h_5, h_6.

2. In the encoding $\boldsymbol{k}(\alpha, \boldsymbol{r}, \boldsymbol{h})$, all the monomials that have randomness in $\boldsymbol{r}$ multiplied with elements from $\boldsymbol{h}$ are $rh_5, uh_7, r_0 h_0, r_t h_1, r_t h_2 \sigma_t, r_t h_3, r_t h_4 \sigma_t, rh_6$. We check that it is indeed the case that all the corresponding randomness terms, r, u, r_0, r_t, are given out (as singleton monomial $k_3, k_2, k_4, k_{6,t}$ respectively). On the other hand, since the other randomness elements, u_x's, are not multiplied with any h_i, they are not needed to be given out.

3. In the encoding $\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h})$, all the randomness $s_0, \ldots, s_{\ell+1}$ are multiplied with some h_i term, and we can see that all monomial s_j's exist in the encoding.

4. The monomial s_0 appear in the encoding $\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{h})$ (as c_1).

This concludes the proof. □

G A Concrete Instantiation: Unbounded KP-ABE-MSP

For concreteness, we provide the description for one of our instantiations: unbounded KP-ABE for monotone span programs ($\mathbf{New}_4$), obtained by using the encoding in [1, §7.1].

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: Run $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e, p) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$. Pick generators $g_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_1$, $g_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_2$. Pick $\boldsymbol{H}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{H}_6 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$ (that is, $n = 6$), and $\boldsymbol{B} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1} \subset \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times(d+1)}$. Choose $\tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{GL}_{p,d}$, define $\boldsymbol{D} := \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \tilde{\boldsymbol{D}} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\right) \in \mathbb{GL}_{p,d+1}$ and $\boldsymbol{Z} := \boldsymbol{B}^{-\top}\boldsymbol{D}$. Choose $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{(d+1)\times 1}$. Output

$$\mathsf{PK} = \left(e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \left\{ g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_i \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \right\}_{i\in[1,6]} \right),$$
$$\mathsf{MSK} = \left(g_2^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \left\{ g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_i^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{I}_d \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \right\}_{i\in[1,6]} \right).$$

- $\mathsf{Encrypt}(S \subset \mathbb{Z}_p, M, \mathsf{PK})$: Pick $\boldsymbol{s}_0, \forall_{j\in S}\boldsymbol{s}_j, \boldsymbol{w} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$. Output a ciphertext as $\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{C}_1, \boldsymbol{C}_2, \boldsymbol{C}_3, \boldsymbol{C}_4, \{\boldsymbol{C}_{5,j}, \boldsymbol{C}_{6,j}\}_{j\in S}, C_0)$ where

$$\boldsymbol{C}_1 = g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \qquad \boldsymbol{C}_2 = g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_6\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)},$$
$$\boldsymbol{C}_3 = g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_3\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)+\boldsymbol{H}_4\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{w} \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \qquad \boldsymbol{C}_4 = g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{w} \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)},$$
$$\boldsymbol{C}_{5,j} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{H}_5\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{w} \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)+\boldsymbol{H}_1\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)+j\boldsymbol{H}_2\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \qquad \boldsymbol{C}_{6,j} = g_1^{\boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_j \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)},$$

  and $C_0 = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} \cdot M \in \mathbb{G}_T$.

- $\mathsf{KeyGen}((A, \pi), \mathsf{MSK})$: Suppose A has dimension $m \times k$, and π maps $[1, m] \to \mathbb{Z}_p$. Pick $\boldsymbol{r}, \boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{r}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{r}_m, \boldsymbol{v}_2, \ldots, \boldsymbol{v}_k \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d\times 1}$. Output $\mathsf{SK} = (\boldsymbol{K}_1, \boldsymbol{K}_2, \boldsymbol{K}_3, \{\boldsymbol{K}_{4,i}, \boldsymbol{K}_{5,i}, \boldsymbol{K}_{6,i}\}_{i\in[1,m]}$ where

$$\boldsymbol{K}_1 = g_2^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}+\boldsymbol{H}_3^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r} \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)+\boldsymbol{H}_6^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{u} \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \qquad \boldsymbol{K}_2 = g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{u} \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)},$$
$$\boldsymbol{K}_3 = g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r} \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \qquad \boldsymbol{K}_{4,i} = g_2^{A_{i,1}\boldsymbol{H}_4^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r} \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)+\sum_{j=2}^{k} A_{i,j}\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{v}_j \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)+\boldsymbol{H}_5^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_i \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)},$$
$$\boldsymbol{K}_{5,i} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_i \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}, \qquad \boldsymbol{K}_{6,i} = g_2^{\boldsymbol{H}_1^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_i \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)+\pi(i)\boldsymbol{H}_2^\top \boldsymbol{Z}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{r}_i \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}.$$

- $\mathsf{Decrypt}(\mathsf{CT}, \mathsf{SK})$: Suppose (A, π) accepts the set S. Let $I = \{\, i \in [1, m] \mid \pi(i) \in S \,\}$. Compute row-span coefficients $\{\mu_i\}_{i\in I}$ such that $\sum_{i\in I} \mu_i A_i = (1, 0, \ldots, 0)$. Compute $e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)} = L_1 \cdot L_2$ where

$$L_1 := e(\boldsymbol{C}_1, \boldsymbol{K}_1)e(\boldsymbol{C}_2, \boldsymbol{K}_2)^{-1}e(\boldsymbol{C}_3, \boldsymbol{K}_3)^{-1},$$
$$L_2 := \prod_{i\in I} \left(e(\boldsymbol{C}_4, \boldsymbol{K}_{4,i})e(\boldsymbol{C}_{5,\pi(i)}, \boldsymbol{K}_{5,i})^{-1}e(\boldsymbol{C}_{6,\pi(i)}, \boldsymbol{K}_{6,i})\right)^{\mu_i},$$

  and obtain $M \leftarrow C_0 / e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\left(\begin{smallmatrix}\boldsymbol{s}_0 \\ 0\end{smallmatrix}\right)}$.

Correctness. From our definition of pairing: $e(g_1^{\boldsymbol{X}}, g_2^{\boldsymbol{Y}}) = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{Y}^\top \boldsymbol{X}}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
e(\boldsymbol{C}_1, \boldsymbol{K}_1) &= e(g_1, g_2)^{(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top + (\boldsymbol{r}^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_3 + (\boldsymbol{u}^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_6)\boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{0}}, \\
e(\boldsymbol{C}_2, \boldsymbol{K}_2) &= e(g_1, g_2)^{(\boldsymbol{u}^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_6 \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{0}}, \\
e(\boldsymbol{C}_3, \boldsymbol{K}_3) &= e(g_1, g_2)^{(\boldsymbol{r}^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top (\boldsymbol{H}_3 \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{0} + \boldsymbol{H}_4 \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{w}}{0})}.
\end{aligned}$$

Hence, $L_1 = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{0} - (\boldsymbol{r}^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_4 \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{w}}{0}}$. We also have

$$\begin{aligned}
e(\boldsymbol{C}_4, \boldsymbol{K}_{4,i}) &= e(g_1, g_2)^{\left(A_{i,1}(\boldsymbol{r}^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_4 + \sum_{j\in[2,k]} A_{i,j}(\boldsymbol{v}_j^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top + (\boldsymbol{r}_i^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_5\right)\boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{w}}{0}}, \\
e(\boldsymbol{C}_{5,\pi(i)}, \boldsymbol{K}_{5,i}) &= e(g_1, g_2)^{(\boldsymbol{r}_i^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \left(\boldsymbol{H}_5 \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{w}}{0} + \boldsymbol{H}_1 \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_{\pi(i)}}{0} + \pi(i)\boldsymbol{H}_2 \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_{\pi(i)}}{0}\right)}, \\
e(\boldsymbol{C}_{6,\pi(i)}, \boldsymbol{K}_{6,i}) &= e(g_1, g_2)^{((\boldsymbol{r}_i^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_1 + (\boldsymbol{r}_i^\top\ 0)\pi(i)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_2)\boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_{\pi(i)}}{0}}.
\end{aligned}$$

Write $L_2 = \prod_{i\in I} L_{2,i}^{\mu_i}$. We have

$$L_{2,i} = e(g_1, g_2)^{\left(A_{i,1}(\boldsymbol{r}^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_4 + \sum_{j=2}^{k} A_{i,j}(\boldsymbol{v}_j^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top\right)\boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{w}}{0}}.$$

Since $\sum_{i\in I} \mu_i A_{i,1} = 1$, $\sum_{i\in I} \mu_i A_{i,j} = 0$ for $j \in [2,k]$, we have $L_2 = e(g_1, g_2)^{(\boldsymbol{r}^\top\ 0)\boldsymbol{Z}^\top \boldsymbol{H}_4 \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{w}}{0}}$. Hence, we have $L_1 \cdot L_2 = e(g_1, g_2)^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \boldsymbol{B}\binom{\boldsymbol{s}_0}{0}}$. This concludes the correctness proof.

Security. The following corollary follows from our main theorem (Theorem 3), and Corollary 13 and 14 of [1], which state that the underlying encoding is $(1, \mathsf{poly})$-SMH and $(1,1)$-CMH under the EDHE3 and EDHE4 Assumption, respectively. The definitions of assumptions are described in H.

Corollary 19. *The above KP-ABE in symmetric groups (that is, with $\mathbb{G}_1 = \mathbb{G}_2$ and $g_1 = g_2$) is fully-secure under the Matrix-DH (in symmetric groups), $(1,t)$-EDHE3p, and $(1,m,k)$-EDHE4p Assumptions, where t is the attribute set size for the challenge ciphertext query, and m, k are the maximum numbers of rows and columns of access matrices among all key queries, respectively. More precisely, for any ppt adversary $\mathcal{A}$, let q_1 denote the number of queries in phase 1, there exist ppt algorithms $\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2, \mathcal{B}_3$, whose running times are the same as $\mathcal{A}$ plus some polynomial times, such that for any λ,*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ABE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \le (2q_1 + 3)\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_d\text{-}\mathsf{MatDH}}_{\mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda) + q_1 \mathsf{Adv}^{(1,m,k)\text{-}\mathsf{EDHE4p}}_{\mathcal{B}_2}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{(1,t)\text{-}\mathsf{EDHE3p}}_{\mathcal{B}_3}(\lambda).$$

H Assumptions

For self-containment, we capture the assumptions that are used for the encodings of our ABE-MSP. They are exactly the same as in [1, §7.3] with a slight syntactic change mentioned in Remark 3 and 5. Let $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{X}}_{\mathcal{A}}$ be the advantage of an adversary A against the assumption X (defined naturally, and analogously to, *e.g.,* the definition of the Matrix-DH Assumption in §2.2).

Definition 2 ((n,t)-EDHE3p Assumption [1])**.** The (n,t)-Expanded Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption-3 *in prime-order group* is defined as follows. Let $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, p) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$. (That is,

we use symmetric groups). Let $g \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}$. Let $a, c, b_1, \ldots, b_t, z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. Suppose that an adversary is given a target element $T \in \mathbb{G}_p$, and $\boldsymbol{D}$ consisting of

$$
\begin{array}{rl}
 & g, g^a, g^c, g^{c/z} \\
\forall_{j\in[1,t]} & g^{b_j} \\
\forall_{i\in[1,n],\ j,j'\in[1,t],j\neq j'} & g^{a^i b_j/b_{j'}^2}, g^{a^n c b_j/b_{j'}} \\
\forall_{i\in[1,2n],\ j\in[1,t]} & g^{a^i c b_j}, \\
\forall_{i\in[1,2n],i\neq n+1,\ j\in[1,t],} & g^{a^i c/b_j}, \\
\forall_{i\in[1,2n],\ j,j'\in[1,t],j\neq j'} & g^{a^i c b_j/b_{j'}^2}, \\
\forall_{i\in[1,n+1],\ j\in[1,t],} & g^{a^i/b_j^2}, \\
\forall_{i\in[n+1,2n],\ j,j'\in[1,t],} & g^{a^i c^2 b_j/b_{j'}}
\end{array}
$$

The assumption states that it is hard for any polynomial-time adversary to distinguish whether $T = g^{a^{n+1}z}$ or $T \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_p$.

Definition 3 ((n, m, k)-EDHE4p Assumption [1])**.** The (n, m, k)-Expanded Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption-4 *in prime-order group* is defined as follows. Let $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, p) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{G}(\lambda)$. (That is, we use symmetric groups). Let $g \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}$. Let $a, x, c, b_1, \ldots, b_m, \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. Suppose that an adversary is given a target element $T \in \mathbb{G}_p$, and $\boldsymbol{D}$ consisting of

$$
\begin{array}{rl}
 & g, g^c, g^{a^{n+1}x^k/z} \\
\forall_{j\in[1,k]} & g^{a^{n+1}x^j} \\
\forall_{i\in[1,n],\ j\in[1,k],\ \iota\in[1,m]} & g^{a^i x^j/b_\iota^2}, g^{cb_\iota}, g^{x^j}, g^{a^i x^j b_\iota} \\
\forall_{j\in[1,k],\ \iota,\iota'\in[1,m],\iota\neq\iota'} & g^{a^{n+1}x^j c b_\iota/b_{\iota'}} \\
\forall_{i\in[1,n],\ j\in[1,k],\ \iota,\iota'\in[1,m],\iota\neq\iota'} & g^{a^i x^j c b_\iota/b_{\iota'}^2} \\
\forall_{i\in[1,2n],\ j\in[1,2k],\ \iota,\iota'\in[1,m],\ (i,j,\iota)\neq(n+1,k+1,\iota')} & g^{a^i x^j b_\iota/b_{\iota'}^2}
\end{array}
$$

The assumption states that it is hard for any polynomial-time adversary to distinguish whether $T = g^{xcz}$ or $T \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_p$.

Contents