

Efficient KDM-CCA Secure Public-Key Encryption for Polynomial Functions

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Abstract. KDM[\mathcal{F}]-CCA secure public-key encryption (PKE) protects the security of message $f(sk)$, with $f \in \mathcal{F}$, that is computed directly from the secret key, even if the adversary has access to a decryption oracle. An efficient KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA secure PKE scheme for affine functions was proposed by Lu, Li and Jia (LLJ, EuroCrypt2015). We point out that their security proof cannot go through based on the DDH assumption.

In this paper, we introduce a new concept *Authenticated Encryption with Auxiliary-Input* AIAE and define for it new security notions dealing with related-key attacks, namely *IND-RKA security* and *weak INT-RKA security*. We also construct such an AIAE w.r.t. a set of restricted affine functions from the DDH assumption. With our AIAE,

- we construct the first efficient KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA secure PKE w.r.t. affine functions with compact ciphertexts, which consist only of a constant number of group elements;
- we construct the first efficient KDM[$\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$]-CCA secure PKE w.r.t. polynomial functions of bounded degree d with almost compact ciphertexts, and the number of group elements in a ciphertext is polynomial in d , independent of the security parameter.

Our PKEs are both based on the DDH & DCR assumptions, free of NIZK and free of pairing.

Keywords: public-key encryption, key-dependent messages, chosen-ciphertext security, authenticated encryption, related-key attack

1 Introduction

Traditional Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA) security of a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme considers the security of messages chosen by an adversary, even if the adversary obtains the public key pk , challenge ciphertexts of the messages, and has access to a decryption oracle (which provides decryption services to the adversary but refuses to decrypt the challenge ciphertexts). Note that the adversary cannot compute messages directly from secret keys, since it does not possess the secret keys. Therefore, CCA security does not cover the corner, where messages closely depend on the secret keys, say the secret keys themselves or functions of the secret keys. This issue was first identified in [GM84]. Later the security of key-dependent messages was formalized as KDM-security [BRS02]. KDM-security is an important notion, and has found wide applications, like hard disk encryption [BHHO08], cryptographic protocols [CL01], etc.

KDM-security w.r.t. a set of functions \mathcal{F} is denoted by KDM[\mathcal{F}]-security. The larger \mathcal{F} is, the stronger the security is. Roughly speaking, n -KDM[\mathcal{F}]-security of PKE considers such a scenario: an adversary is given public keys $(pk_1, pk_2, \dots, pk_n)$ of n users and an encryption oracle. Whenever the adversary queries a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$, the encryption oracle will always reply with an encryption of a constant say 0, or always reply with an encryption of $f(sk_1, sk_2, \dots, sk_n)$. If the adversary

cannot tell which case it is, the PKE is n -KDM[\mathcal{F}]-CPA secure. If the adversary has also access to a decryption oracle in the scenario, then KDM[\mathcal{F}]-CPA security is improved to KDM[\mathcal{F}]-CCA security. Obviously, KDM-CCA security notion is stronger than KDM-CPA.

KDM[\mathcal{F}]-CPA Security. The BHHO scheme [BHHO08] was the first PKE achieving KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CPA security based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, where \mathcal{F}_{aff} denotes the set of affine functions. It was later generalized by Brakerski and Goldwasser [BG10] to KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CPA secure PKE schemes based on the Subgroup Indistinguishability Assumption (including the QR and the DCR assumptions). These schemes have incompact ciphertexts containing $O(\ell)$ group elements, where ℓ denotes the security parameter.

A variant of Regev’s scheme [Reg05] was shown to be KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CPA secure and has compact ciphertexts by Applebaum et al. [ACPS09].

Barak et al. [BHHI10] proposed KDM-CPA secure PKE w.r.t. a very large function set, i.e., the function set of boolean circuits of bounded size $p = p(\ell)$. However, their scheme is inflexible and highly impractical, since its encryption algorithm depends on the bound p and the number of users, and the ciphertext contains a garbled circuit of size at least $p = p(\ell)$.

Brakerski et al. [BGK11] amplified the BHHO scheme to KDM[$\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$]-CPA security w.r.t. the set of polynomial functions of bounded degree d . However, their ciphertext contains $O(\ell^{d+1})$ group elements.

It is Malkin et al. [MTY11] who designed the first efficient PKE scheme achieving KDM[$\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$]-CPA security. Their ciphertext contains only $O(d)$ group elements, thus d can be polynomial in ℓ in their case. The function set $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$ is characterized by a polynomial-size *Modular Arithmetic Circuit* in [MTY11].

KDM[\mathcal{F}]-CCA Security. KDM[\mathcal{F}]-CCA security of PKE is far more difficult to design than KDM[\mathcal{F}]-CPA security. Camenisch et al. [CCS09] gave the first solution, following Naor-Yung’s paradigm, which needs a KDM-CPA secure PKE, a CCA-secure PKE and a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proving that the two PKEs encrypt the same message.

NIZK is not practical in general, except Groth-Sahai proofs [GS08]. When following [CCS09]’s approach, the only possible way to get an efficient KDM-CCA secure PKE, is using Groth-Sahai proofs together with an efficient KDM-CPA secure PKE. However, many existing efficient KDM-CPA secure schemes, such as [ACPS09, MTY11], are not based on pairing-friendly groups, thus not compatible with Groth-Sahai’s efficient NIZK.

Another work by Galindo et al. [GHV12] is based on the Matrix DDH assumption over pairing-friendly groups. Their scheme has compact ciphertexts, but only obtains a bounded form of KDM-CCA security, i.e., the number of encryption queries is limited to be linear in the size of the secret key.

To get an efficient KDM-CCA secure PKE, Hofheinz [Hof13] proposed another approach, which uses a new tool called “lossy algebraic filter”. His work results in the first PKE enjoying both KDM-CCA security and compact ciphertexts (consisting only of a constant number of group elements). However, the function set $\mathcal{F}_{\text{circ}}$ only consists of selection functions $f(sk_1, \dots, sk_n) = sk_i$ and constant functions.

It is quite challenging to enlarge \mathcal{F} for KDM[\mathcal{F}]-CCA security while still keeping PKE efficient. One effort was recently made by Lu, Li and Jia [LLJ15], who proposed the first efficient KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA secure PKE with compact ciphertexts. We call their construction the LLJ scheme.

Table 1. Comparison between PKEs either achieving KDM-CCA security or against function set $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$. Here ℓ is the security parameter. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{circ}}$, \mathcal{F}_{aff} and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$ denote the set of selection functions, the set of affine functions and the set of polynomial functions of bounded degree d , respectively. “CCA” means the scheme is KDM-CCA secure. “Free of Pairing” asks whether the scheme is free of pairing. $|\text{CT}|$ shows the size of ciphertext. \mathbb{G} , \mathbb{Z}_{N^3} , \mathbb{Z}_{N^2} and $\mathbb{Z}_{\bar{N}}$ are the underlying groups. s can be any integer greater than 1. The symbol “?” means that the security proof is not rigorous.

Scheme	Set	CCA?	Free of Pairing?	$ \text{CT} $	Assumption
[BH00] + [CCS09]	\mathcal{F}_{aff}	✓	–	$(6\ell + 13) \mathbb{G} $	DDH
[BGK11]	$\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$	–	✓	$(\ell^{d+1}) \mathbb{G} $	DDH or LWE
[MTY11]	$\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$	–	✓	$(d + 2) \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} $	DCR
[Hof13]	$\mathcal{F}_{\text{circ}}$	✓	–	$6 \mathbb{Z}_{N^3} + 49 \mathbb{G} $	DDH & DCR
[LLJ15]	\mathcal{F}_{aff}	?	✓	$3 \mathbb{Z}_{N^2} + 3 \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + \mathbb{Z}_{\bar{N}} $	DDH & DCR
Our scheme in §5	\mathcal{F}_{aff}	✓	✓	$9 \mathbb{Z}_{N^2} + 9 \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + 2 \mathbb{Z}_{\bar{N}} $	DDH & DCR
Our scheme in §6	$\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$	✓	✓	$9 \mathbb{Z}_{N^2} + (8d^9 + 1) \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + 2 \mathbb{Z}_{\bar{N}} $	DDH & DCR

There is an essential building block called “Authenticated Encryption” ($\overline{\text{AE}}$) in their scheme. The KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA security heavily relies on a so-called INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA security of $\overline{\text{AE}}$. INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA security of $\overline{\text{AE}}$ means that a PPT adversary cannot forge a fresh forgery $(f^*, \overline{\text{ae.ct}}^*)$ such that $\overline{\text{AE}}.\text{Dec}_{f^*(k)}(\overline{\text{ae.ct}}^*) \neq \perp$, even if the adversary observes multiple outputs of $\overline{\text{AE}}.\text{Enc}_{f_j(k)}(m_j)$ with his choice of (f_j, m_j) . Unfortunately, we found that the INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA security proof of the specific $\overline{\text{AE}}$ does not go through to the DDH assumption, which in turn affects the KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA security proof of the LLJ scheme. Our essential observation is that the DDH adversary is not able to employ the fresh forgery from the adversary of $\overline{\text{AE}}$ to solve the DDH problem, since the DDH adversary does not have any trapdoor to convert the computing power (forgery) to a decision bit.

As for KDM[$\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$]-CCA security, [CCS09]’s paradigm is the unique path to it up to now. Unfortunately, the only efficient KDM[$\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$]-CPA secure scheme [MTY11] does not compose well with Groth-Sahai proofs, so it has to resort to the general NIZK. Other KDM[$\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$]-CPA secure schemes either is highly impractical [BH10] or has ciphertext containing $O(\ell^{d+1})$ group elements [BGK11], which grows exponentially with the degree d .

Our Contribution. We work on the design of efficient PKE with KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA security and KDM[$\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$]-CCA security.

- We identify the proof flaw in [LLJ15], where an efficient KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA secure PKE was claimed. We show that for “Authenticated Encryption” ($\overline{\text{AE}}$) used in the LLJ scheme, the INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA security reduction to the DDH assumption does not work. This proof flaw directly affects the KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA security proof of the LLJ scheme.
- We provide the first efficient KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA secure PKE w.r.t. affine functions with compact ciphertexts. Our scheme has ciphertexts consisting only of a constant number of group elements and is free of NIZK.
- We provide the first efficient KDM[$\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$]-CCA secure PKE w.r.t. polynomial functions of bounded degree d with almost compact ciphertexts. Our scheme is free of NIZK. The number of group elements in a ciphertext is polynomial in d , independent of the security parameter ℓ .

We summarize known PKEs either achieving KDM-CCA security or against function set $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$ in Table 1.

Our Approach. The challenge for $\text{KDM}[\mathcal{F}]$ -CCA security of PKE lies in the fact that the adversary \mathcal{A} has multiple access to the encryptions of $f(sk)$ and decryption oracle $\text{Dec}(sk, \cdot)$, with $f \in \mathcal{F}$ and sk the secret key. Let us consider only one secret key for simplicity. The information of sk might be leaked completely via encryptions of $f(sk)$.

To solve this problem, we follow a KEM+DEM style and construct our PKE with three building blocks: KEM, \mathcal{E} and AIAE, as shown in Fig. 1.

- We propose a new concept “Authenticated Encryption with Auxiliary-Input” (AIAE). We define for it new security notions dealing with related-key attacks, namely *weak INT- \mathcal{F}' -RKA security* and *IND- \mathcal{F}' -RKA security*.
- We design the other building blocks KEM and \mathcal{E} . KEM.Enc encapsulates a key k for AIAE, and the encapsulation kem.ct serves as an auxiliary input aux for AIAE.Enc . $\mathcal{E}.Enc$ encrypts m to get a ciphertext $\mathcal{E}.ct$, which serves as an input for AIAE.Enc .

We show how to achieve $\text{KDM}[\mathcal{F}]$ -CCA security with our three building blocks.

- $\mathcal{E}.Enc$ can behave like an entropy filter (the concept was named in [LLJ15]) for \mathcal{F} . That is, through some computationally indistinguishable change, some entropy of sk is always reserved even if multiple encryptions of $f_j(sk)$ are given to \mathcal{A} . Here $f_j \in \mathcal{F}$ is chosen by \mathcal{A} .
- The fresh keys k_j used by AIAE.Enc can be expressed as functions of a base key k^* , i.e., $k_j = f'_j(k^*)$, where $f'_j \in \mathcal{F}'$ for some function set \mathcal{F}' . We stress that \mathcal{F}' might be different from \mathcal{F} .
- KEM.Enc is able to use the remaining entropy of sk to protect the base key k^* , via some computationally indistinguishable change.
- The weak INT- \mathcal{F}' -RKA security of AIAE guarantees: given multiple AIAE ciphertext-auxiliary input pair $(\text{aiae.ct}_j, \text{aux}_j)$ encrypted by $f'_j(k^*)$, it is infeasible for a PPT algorithm to forge a new $(f', \text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux})$ satisfying (1) $\text{AIAE.Dec}_{f'(k^*)}(\text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux}) \neq \perp$; (2) if $\text{aux} = \text{aux}_j$ for some j then $f' = f'_j$.
- Decryption oracle can reject all invalid ciphertexts that are not properly generated by the encryption algorithm, via some computationally indistinguishable change. If the invalid ciphertext makes KEM.Dec decapsulate a key $f'(k^*)$, AIAE.Dec will output \perp , due to its weak INT- \mathcal{F}' -RKA security. Otherwise, the invalid ciphertext will be rejected by $\mathcal{E}.Dec$ or KEM.Dec , due to the remaining entropy of sk . As a result, no extra information about sk is leaked.
- The IND- \mathcal{F}' -RKA security of AIAE ensures: given multiple AIAE ciphertext-auxiliary input pair $(\text{aiae.ct}_j, \text{aux}_j)$ with key $f'_j(k^*)$ encrypting either m_0 or m_1 , it is infeasible for a PPT algorithm to distinguish which case it is, even if $f'_j \in \mathcal{F}'$ is submitted by the algorithm.
- By the IND- \mathcal{F}' -RKA security of AIAE, the encryption of $\mathcal{E}.ct$ can be replaced with an encryption of all zeros. Then the $\text{KDM}[\mathcal{F}]$ -CCA security follows.

With this approach, we can construct PKEs possessing $\text{KDM}[\mathcal{F}_{\text{aff}}]$ -CCA and $\text{KDM}[\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d]$ -CCA security respectively, by designing specific building blocks.

Comparison with LLJ. We inherit the idea of utilizing RKA security of AE to achieve KDM security from LLJ. However, our approach deviates from LLJ in three aspects.

1. The structure of our scheme is different from LLJ. It is also possible to explain the LLJ scheme with three components KEM, \mathcal{E} and $\overline{\text{AE}}$, see Appendix B. However, their components were composed in a different way. In the LLJ scheme, the output kem.ct of KEM serves as an additional input for $\mathcal{E}.Enc$. With their structure, \mathcal{E} is expected to authenticate kem.ct . In our approach, kem.ct is the auxiliary input of AIAE, thus can be authenticated by AIAE.




Fig. 1. Our approach of PKE construction. Here KEM and \mathcal{E} share the same public/secret key pair. AIAE.Enc uses k output by KEM to encrypt $\mathcal{E}.ct$ with auxiliary input $aux := kem.ct$, and outputs ciphertext $aiae.ct$.

2. The syntax and security requirements of our AIAE are different from LLJ's \overline{AE} . Their \overline{AE} does not support auxiliary input, and the security proof of their \overline{AE} instantiation has some problem, as shown in Section 3.
3. Our KEM and \mathcal{E} are newly designed building blocks which compose well with our AIAE. We give two designs of \mathcal{E} to support $KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]$ -CCA and $KDM[\mathcal{F}_{poly}^d]$ -CCA security respectively.

2 Preliminaries

Let $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ denote the security parameter. For $i, j \in \mathbb{N}$ with $i < j$, define $[i, j] := \{i, i+1, \dots, j\}$ and $[j] := \{1, 2, \dots, j\}$. Denote by $s \leftarrow_s \mathcal{S}$ the operation of picking an element s from set \mathcal{S} uniformly at random. For an algorithm \mathcal{A} , denote by $y \leftarrow_s \mathcal{A}(x; r)$, or simply $y \leftarrow_s \mathcal{A}(x)$, the operation of running \mathcal{A} with input x and randomness r and assigning output to y . Let ε denote the empty string. For a primitive XX and a security notion YY , we typically denote the advantage of a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} by $\text{Adv}_{XX, \mathcal{A}}^{YY}(\ell)$ and define $\text{Adv}_{XX}^{YY}(\ell) := \max_{\text{PPT } \mathcal{A}} \text{Adv}_{XX, \mathcal{A}}^{YY}(\ell)$. Let $2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$ denote the value upper bounded by $2^{-c\ell}$ for some constant $c > 0$.

Games. Our security proof will be game-based security reductions. A game G starts with an INITIALIZE procedure and ends with a FINALIZE procedure. There are also some optional procedures $\text{PROC}_1, \dots, \text{PROC}_n$ performing as oracles. All procedures are described using pseudo-code, where initially all variables are empty strings ε and all sets are empty. An adversary \mathcal{A} is executed in game G if it first calls INITIALIZE, obtaining its output. Then the adversary may make arbitrary oracle-queries to procedures PROC_i according to their specification, and obtain their outputs. Finally it makes one single call to FINALIZE. By $G^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow b$ we means that the game G outputs b after interacting with \mathcal{A} , and b is in fact the output of FINALIZE. By $a \stackrel{G}{=} b$ we mean that a equals b or is computed as b in game G .

2.1 Public-Key Encryption and KDM-CCA Security

A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme is made up of four PPT algorithms $\text{PKE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$: $\text{Setup}(1^\ell)$ generates a public parameter prm , which implicitly defines a secret key space \mathcal{SK} and a message space \mathcal{M} ; $\text{Gen}(\text{prm})$ takes as input the public parameter prm and generates a public/secret key pair (pk, sk) ; $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$ takes as input the public key pk and a message m , and outputs a ciphertext pke.ct ; $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{pke.ct})$ takes as input the secret key sk and a ciphertext pke.ct and

outputs either a message m or a failure symbol \perp . The correctness of PKE requires that, for all $\text{prm} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Setup}(1^\ell)$, all $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Gen}(\text{prm})$, all $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and all $\text{pke.ct} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$, it holds that $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{pke.ct}) = m$.

Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and \mathcal{F} be a family of functions from \mathcal{SK}^n to \mathcal{M} . We define the n -KDM $[\mathcal{F}]$ -CCA security via the security game in Fig. 2.

<p>Procedure INITIALIZE: $\text{prm} \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{Setup}(1^\ell)$. For $i \in [n]$ $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{Gen}(\text{prm})$. $\beta \leftarrow_{\\$} \{0, 1\}$. // challenge bit Return $(\text{prm}, \text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n)$.</p>	<p>Procedure ENC($f \in \mathcal{F}, i \in [n]$): $m_1 := f(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n)$. $m_0 := 0^{ m_1 }$. $\text{pke.ct} \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i, m_\beta)$. $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} \cup \{(\text{pke.ct}, i)\}$. Return pke.ct.</p>	<p>Procedure DEC($\text{pke.ct}, i \in [n]$): If $(\text{pke.ct}, i) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}}$, Return \perp. Return $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_i, \text{pke.ct})$.</p> <p>Procedure FINALIZE(β'): Return $(\beta' = \beta)$.</p>
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Fig. 2. n -KDM $[\mathcal{F}]$ -CCA security game for PKE.

Definition 1 (KDM $[\mathcal{F}]$ -CCA Security for PKE). A public-key encryption scheme PKE is n -KDM $[\mathcal{F}]$ -CCA secure if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , $\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{kdm-cca}}(\ell) := |\Pr[n\text{-KDM}[\mathcal{F}]\text{-CCA}^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2|$ is negligible in ℓ , where game n -KDM $[\mathcal{F}]$ -CCA is specified in Fig. 2.

2.2 Key Encapsulation Mechanism

A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) consists of three PPT algorithms $\text{KEM} = (\text{KEM.Gen}, \text{KEM.Enc}, \text{KEM.Dec})$: $\text{KEM.Gen}(1^\ell)$ outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk) ; $\text{KEM.Enc}(\text{pk})$ uses the public key pk to compute a key k and a ciphertext (or encapsulation) kem.ct ; $\text{KEM.Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{kem.ct})$ takes as input the secret key sk and a ciphertext kem.ct , and outputs either a key k or a failure symbol \perp . The correctness of KEM requires that, for all $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow_{\$} \text{KEM.Gen}(1^\ell)$ and all $(k, \text{kem.ct}) \leftarrow_{\$} \text{KEM.Enc}(\text{pk})$, it holds that $\text{KEM.Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{kem.ct}) = k$.

2.3 Authenticated Encryption: One-Time Security and Related-Key Attack Security

Definition 2 (Authenticated Encryption). An authenticated encryption (AE) scheme $\text{AE} = (\text{AE.Setup}, \text{AE.Enc}, \text{AE.Dec})$ consists of three PPT algorithms:

- $\text{AE.Setup}(1^\ell)$ outputs a system parameter prm_{AE} , which is an implicit input to AE.Enc and AE.Dec . The parameter prm_{AE} implicitly defines a message space \mathcal{M} and a key space \mathcal{K}_{AE} .
- $\text{AE.Enc}(k, m)$ takes as input a key $k \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$ and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and outputs a ciphertext ae.ct .
- $\text{AE.Dec}(k, \text{ae.ct})$ takes as input a key $k \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$ and a ciphertext ae.ct , and outputs a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ or a rejection symbol \perp .

Correctness of AE requires that, for all $\text{prm}_{\text{AE}} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{AE.Setup}(1^\ell)$, all $k \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$, all $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and all $\text{ae.ct} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{AE.Enc}(k, m)$, it holds that $\text{AE.Dec}(k, \text{ae.ct}) = m$.

The security notions for AE include One-time ciphertext-indistinguishability (IND-OT) and One-time ciphertext-integrity (INT-OT). The IND-OT and INT-OT securities of AE are formalized via the security games in Fig. 3.

<p>Procedure INITIALIZE: $\text{prm}_{\text{AE}} \leftarrow \text{AE.Setup}(1^\ell)$, $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$. $\beta \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. // challenge bit Return prm_{AE}.</p> <p>Procedure ENC(m_0, m_1): // one query If $m_0 \neq m_1$, Return \perp. $\text{ae.ct} \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(k, m_\beta)$. Return ae.ct.</p> <p>Procedure FINALIZE(β'): Return $(\beta' = \beta)$.</p>	<p>Procedure INITIALIZE: $\text{prm}_{\text{AE}} \leftarrow \text{AE.Setup}(1^\ell)$, $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$. Return prm_{AE}.</p> <p>Procedure ENC(m): // one query $\text{ae.ct} \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(k, m)$. Return ae.ct.</p> <p>Procedure FINALIZE(ae.ct^*): If $\text{ae.ct}^* = \text{ae.ct}$, Return 0. Return $(\text{AE.Dec}(k, \text{ae.ct}^*) \neq \perp)$.</p>
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Fig. 3. Games IND-OT (left) and INT-OT (right) for defining securities of AE.

Definition 3 (One-Time Security for AE). *An authenticated encryption scheme AE is one-time secure (OT-secure) if it is IND-OT secure and INT-OT secure, i.e., for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , both $\text{Adv}_{\text{AE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-ot}}(\ell) := |\Pr[\text{IND-OT}^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2|$ and $\text{Adv}_{\text{AE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{int-ot}}(\ell) := \Pr[\text{INT-OT}^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1]$ are negligible in ℓ , where games IND-OT and INT-OT are specified in Fig. 3.*

Let \mathcal{F} be a family of functions from \mathcal{K}_{AE} to \mathcal{K}_{AE} . The \mathcal{F} -Related-Key Attack for AE scheme was formalized in [LLJ15], and RKA security notions characterize the ciphertext indistinguishability (IND- \mathcal{F} -RKA) and integrity (INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA) even if the adversary has multiple access to the encryption oracle and designates a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$ each time such that the encryption oracle uses $f(k)$ as the key. See Fig. 4 for the IND- \mathcal{F} -RKA and INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA games.

<p>Procedure INITIALIZE: $\text{prm}_{\text{AE}} \leftarrow \text{AE.Setup}(1^\ell)$, $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$. $\beta \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. // challenge bit Return prm_{AE}.</p> <p>Procedure ENC($m_0, m_1, f \in \mathcal{F}$): If $m_0 \neq m_1$, Return \perp. $\text{ae.ct} \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(f(k), m_\beta)$. Return ae.ct.</p> <p>Procedure FINALIZE(β'): Return $(\beta' = \beta)$.</p>	<p>Procedure INITIALIZE: $\text{prm}_{\text{AE}} \leftarrow \text{AE.Setup}(1^\ell)$, $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$. Return prm_{AE}.</p> <p>Procedure ENC($m, f \in \mathcal{F}$): $\text{ae.ct} \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(f(k), m)$. $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} \cup \{(f, \text{ae.ct})\}$. Return ae.ct.</p> <p>Procedure FINALIZE($f^* \in \mathcal{F}, \text{ae.ct}^*$): If $(f^*, \text{ae.ct}^*) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}}$, Return 0. Return $(\text{AE.Dec}(f^*(k), \text{ae.ct}^*) \neq \perp)$.</p>
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Fig. 4. Games IND- \mathcal{F} -RKA (left) and INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA (right) for defining securities of AE.

Definition 4 (IND-RKA and INT-RKA Securities for AE). *An authenticated encryption scheme AE is IND- \mathcal{F} -RKA secure and INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA secure, if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , both $\text{Adv}_{\text{AE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-rka}}(\ell) := |\Pr[\text{IND-}\mathcal{F}\text{-RKA}^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2|$ and $\text{Adv}_{\text{AE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{int-rka}}(\ell) := \Pr[\text{INT-}\mathcal{F}\text{-RKA}^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1]$ are negligible in ℓ , where games IND- \mathcal{F} -RKA and INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA are specified in Fig. 4.*

2.4 DCR, DDH, DL and IV_d Assumptions

Let $\text{GenN}(1^\ell)$ be a PPT algorithm outputting (N, p, q) , where p, q are safe primes of ℓ bits and $N = pq$, such that $\bar{N} = 2N + 1$ is also a prime. Let $s \in \mathbb{N}$ and $T = 1 + N$. Define $\mathbb{QR}_{N^s} := \{a^2 \bmod N^s \mid a \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*\}$, $\mathbb{SCR}_{N^s} := \{a^{2N^{s-1}} \bmod N^s \mid a \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*\}$, and $\mathbb{RU}_{N^s} := \{T^r \bmod N^s \mid r \in [N^{s-1}]\}$. Then \mathbb{SCR}_{N^s} is a cyclic group of order $\phi(N)/4$, and $\mathbb{QR}_{N^s} = \mathbb{SCR}_{N^s} \otimes \mathbb{RU}_{N^s}$, where \otimes denotes internal direct product. Let $\mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}} := \{a^2 \bmod \bar{N} \mid a \in \mathbb{Z}_{\bar{N}}\}$, then $\mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$ is a cyclic group of order $N = pq$.

For $X \in \mathbb{RU}_{N^s}$, the discrete logarithm $\text{dlog}_T(X) \in [N^{s-1}]$ can be efficiently computed given only N and X [DJ01]. Note that $\mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^* = \mathbb{Z}_2 \otimes \mathbb{Z}'_2 \otimes \mathbb{SCR}_{N^s} \otimes \mathbb{RU}_{N^s}$, hence for any $u = u(\mathbb{Z}_2) \cdot u(\mathbb{Z}'_2) \cdot u(\mathbb{SCR}_{N^s}) \cdot T^x \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*$, $u^{\phi(N)} = T^{x \cdot \phi(N)} \in \mathbb{RU}_{N^s}$ and

$$\text{dlog}_T(u^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N) \bmod N^{s-1} = x. \quad (1)$$

Definition 5 (DCR Assumption). *The Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) Assumption holds w.r.t. GenN and group \mathbb{QR}_{N^s} if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the following advantage is negligible in ℓ :*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{dcr}}(\ell) := \left| \Pr[\mathcal{A}(N, u) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(N, v) = 1] \right|,$$

where $(N, p, q) \leftarrow_s \text{GenN}(1^\ell)$, $u \leftarrow_s \mathbb{QR}_{N^s}$, $v \leftarrow_s \mathbb{SCR}_{N^s}$.

The DCR assumption implies the Interactive Vector (IV_d) assumption according to [BG10]. We adopt the version in [LLJ15].

Definition 6 (IV_d Assumption). *The IV_d Assumption holds w.r.t. GenN and group \mathbb{QR}_{N^s} if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the following advantage is negligible in ℓ :*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{iv}_d}(\ell) := \left| \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\text{CHAL}_{IV_d}^b}(N, g_1, \dots, g_d) = b] - 1/2 \right|,$$

where $(N, p, q) \leftarrow_s \text{GenN}(1^\ell)$, $g_1, \dots, g_d \leftarrow_s \mathbb{SCR}_{N^s}$, $b \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}$, and the oracle $\text{CHAL}_{IV_d}^b(\cdot)$ can be queried by \mathcal{A} adaptively. \mathcal{A} submits $(\delta_1, \dots, \delta_d)$ to the oracle. $\text{CHAL}_{IV_d}^b(\delta_1, \dots, \delta_d)$ selects random $r \leftarrow_s [\lfloor N/4 \rfloor]$. If $b = 0$, the oracle returns (g_1^r, \dots, g_d^r) ; otherwise it returns $(g_1^r T^{\delta_1}, \dots, g_d^r T^{\delta_d})$, where $T = 1 + N$.

Definition 7 (DDH Assumption). *The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption holds w.r.t. GenN and group $\mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$ if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the following advantage is negligible in ℓ :*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ddh}}(\ell) := \left| \Pr[\mathcal{A}(N, p, q, g_1, g_2, g_1^x, g_2^x) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(N, p, q, g_1, g_2, g_1^x, g_2^y) = 1] \right|,$$

where $(N, p, q) \leftarrow_s \text{GenN}(1^\ell)$, $g_1, g_2 \leftarrow_s \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$, $x, y \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$.

Definition 8 (DL Assumption). *The Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption holds w.r.t. GenN and group \mathbb{SCR}_{N^s} if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the following advantage is negligible in ℓ :*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{dl}}(\ell) := \Pr[\mathcal{A}(N, p, q, g, g^x) = x],$$

where $(N, p, q) \leftarrow_s \text{GenN}(1^\ell)$, $g \leftarrow_s \mathbb{SCR}_{N^s}$, $x \leftarrow_s [\phi(N)/4]$.

2.5 Collision Resistant Hashing and Universal Hashing

Definition 9 (Collision Resistant Hashing). A family of functions $\mathcal{H} = \{H : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$ is collision-resistant if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the following advantage is negligible in ℓ :

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{A}}^{cr}(\ell) := \Pr [H \leftarrow_s \mathcal{H}, (x, x') \leftarrow_s \mathcal{A}(H) : H(x) = H(x') \wedge x \neq x'].$$

Definition 10 (Universal Hashing [WC81]). A family of functions $\mathcal{H} = \{H : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$ is universal, if for all distinct $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$, it follows that

$$\Pr [H \leftarrow_s \mathcal{H} : H(x) = H(x')] \leq 1/|\mathcal{Y}|.$$

We will sometimes abuse notation and say that a function H is universal if H is randomly chosen from a universal family of functions \mathcal{H} .

3 $\overline{\text{AE}}$ of the LLJ Scheme and Its INT-RKA Security

The LLJ scheme [LLJ15] makes use of an important primitive “Authenticated Encryption” $\overline{\text{AE}}$. Its KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA security heavily relies on the IND- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA security and INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA security of their $\overline{\text{AE}}$. LLJ claimed INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA security of their $\overline{\text{AE}}$, however, we point out that their security proof does not go through to the DDH assumption, which in turn affects the KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA security proof of the LLJ scheme.

Let us briefly review LLJ’s $\overline{\text{AE}}$ as follows. The public parameter is $\text{prm}_{\overline{\text{AE}}} = (N, \bar{N}, g)$ where $N = pq$, $\bar{N} = 2N + 1$, and g is a generator of group $\mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}_{\bar{N}}$. Let AE be an IND-OT and INT-OT secure authenticated encryption, and H be a 4-wise independent hash function. The secret key space is \mathbb{Z}_N .

- $\overline{\text{AE}}.\text{Enc}(k, m)$ computes $u = g^r$ with $r \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\kappa = H(u^k, u)$ and invokes $\chi \leftarrow_s \text{AE}.\text{Enc}(\kappa, m)$. It outputs the ciphertext $\langle u, \chi \rangle$.
- $\overline{\text{AE}}.\text{Dec}(k, \langle u, \chi \rangle)$ computes $\kappa = H(u^k, u)$ and outputs $m/\perp \leftarrow \text{AE}.\text{Dec}(\kappa, \chi)$.

In the LLJ scheme, $\overline{\text{AE}}$ should have RKA security w.r.t. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{aff}} = \{f : k \mapsto ak + b \mid a \neq 0\}$. Let us check their security proof. See Table 2. The proof idea is to use the DDH assumption to make sure that each κ_λ , $\lambda \in [Q_e]$, is random to the adversary. Then the INT-OT of AE guarantees that the adversary cannot make a fresh forgery ($f^* = (a^*, b^*), \langle u^*, \chi^* \rangle$) such that $\overline{\text{AE}}.\text{Dec}(a^*k + b^*, \langle u^*, \chi^* \rangle) \neq \perp$.

In [LLJ15], the indistinguishability of Game 1.($i - 1$) and Game 1. i is reduced to the DDH assumption. A PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} is constructed to solve the DDH problem by employing an INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA adversary \mathcal{A} . Given the challenge (g, g^{r_i}, g^k, Z) , \mathcal{B} wants to tell whether $Z = g^{kr_i}$ or $Z = g^{z_i}$ for a random z_i . \mathcal{B} simulates the INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA game for \mathcal{A} by computing $\kappa_i = H(Z^{a_i} g^{r_i b_i}, g^{r_i})$. If $Z = g^{kr_i}$, \mathcal{B} simulates Game 1.($i - 1$) for \mathcal{A} ; if $Z = g^{z_i}$, \mathcal{B} simulates Game 1. i for \mathcal{A} .

The problem is now that \mathcal{B} does not know the value of secret key k (it knows g^k). When \mathcal{A} submits a fresh forgery ($f^* = (a^*, b^*), \langle u^*, \chi^* \rangle$), \mathcal{B} is not able to see whether $\overline{\text{AE}}.\text{Dec}(a^*k + b^*, \langle u^*, \chi^* \rangle) \neq \perp$ or not without the knowledge of k . More precisely, \mathcal{B} can not compute $\kappa^* = H(u^{*a^*k+b^*}, u^*) = H((u^{*k})^{a^*} \cdot u^{*b^*}, u^*)$ from g^k and u^* , unless it is able to compute the CDH value u^{*k} from g^k and u^* . Without κ^* , it is hard for \mathcal{B} to decide whether $\text{AE}.\text{Dec}(\kappa^*, \chi^*) \neq \perp$ or not. In other words, \mathcal{B} cannot find an efficient (PPT) way to transform the computing power (forgery) of \mathcal{A} into its own decisional

Table 2. INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA security proof of $\overline{\text{AE}}$ in the LLJ scheme; we point out a flaw in the security reduction from Game 1.($i - 1$) to Game 1. i , denoted by “?”.

	ENC($m_\lambda, f_\lambda = (a_\lambda, b_\lambda)$) oracle, $\lambda \in [Q_e]$, where Q_e is the number of encryption queries	Assumptions
Game 0	$r_\lambda \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$; $u_\lambda := g^{r_\lambda}$; $\kappa_\lambda := \text{H}(u_\lambda^{(a_\lambda k + b_\lambda)}, u_\lambda)$; $\chi_\lambda \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, m_\lambda)$; return $\overline{\text{ae.ct}}_\lambda := \langle u_\lambda, \chi_\lambda \rangle$.	—
Game 1	Same as Game 0 except $\kappa_\lambda := \text{H}((g^{kr_\lambda})^{a_\lambda} g^{r_\lambda b_\lambda}, g^{r_\lambda})$.	Game 1 = Game 0
Game 1. i	For $\lambda = 1, \dots, i$, the same as Game 1 except $\kappa_\lambda := \text{H}((g^{z_\lambda})^{a_\lambda} g^{r_\lambda b_\lambda}, g^{r_\lambda})$ with $z_\lambda \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$; For $\lambda = i + 1, \dots, Q_e$, the same as Game 1.	DDH (?)
Game 2	Game 2 = Game 1. Q_e	INT-OT of AE

power (decision bit) to determine (g, g^{r_i}, g^k, Z) to be a DDH tuple or a random tuple. The failure of the INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA security proof results in the failure of the KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA proof of the LLJ scheme since INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA security is used to prevent a KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA adversary from learning more information about the secret key by querying some invalid ciphertexts for decryption.

4 Authenticated Encryption with Auxiliary-Input

We do not see any hope of successfully fixing the security proof of the LLJ’s $\overline{\text{AE}}$ in [LLJ15]. Alternatively, we resort to a different building block, namely AIAE. The intuition is as follows. If LLJ’s $\overline{\text{AE}}$ is regarded as (ElGamal + OT-AE), we can design a new AIAE as (Kurosawa-Desmedt [KD04] + OT-AE). But a new problem with our design arises: the secret key of KEM [KD04] consists of several elements, i.e., $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$. The affine function of \mathbf{k} is too complicated to prove the INT- \mathcal{F}_{aff} -RKA security. Fortunately, (a weak) INT-RKA security follows w.r.t. a smaller restricted affine function set $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}} = \{f : (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4) \mapsto a \cdot (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4) + (b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4) \mid a \neq 0\}$.

To make our AIAE serve KDM-CCA security of our PKE construction in Fig. 1, we have the following requirements.

- AIAE must have auxiliary input aux .
- A weak INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA security is defined for AIAE. Compared to INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA security, the weak version has an additional special rule for the adversary’s forgery $(\text{aux}^*, f^*, \text{aiae.ct}^*)$ to be successful: if the adversary has already queried (m, aux^*, f) to the encryption oracle ENC, it must hold that $f^* = f$.

Next, we introduce the formal definitions of *Authenticated Encryption with Auxiliary-Input*, its *IND- \mathcal{F} -RKA Security* and *Weak INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA Security*.

4.1 AIAE and Its Related-Key Attack Security

Definition 11 (AIAE). An auxiliary-input authenticated encryption (AIAE) scheme $\text{AIAE} = (\text{AIAE.Setup}, \text{AIAE.Enc}, \text{AIAE.Dec})$ consists of three PPT algorithms:

- $\text{AIAE.Setup}(1^\ell)$ outputs a system parameter prm_{AIAE} , which is an implicit input to AIAE.Enc and AIAE.Dec . The parameter prm_{AIAE} implicitly defines a message space \mathcal{M} , a key space $\mathcal{K}_{\text{AIAE}}$ and an auxiliary-input space $\mathcal{AU}\mathcal{X}$.

- $\text{AIAE.Enc}(k, m, \text{aux})$ takes as input a key $k \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AIAE}}$, a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and an auxiliary input $\text{aux} \in \mathcal{AUX}$, and outputs a ciphertext aiae.ct .
- $\text{AIAE.Dec}(k, \text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux})$ takes as input a key $k \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$, a ciphertext aiae.ct and an auxiliary input $\text{aux} \in \mathcal{AUX}$, and outputs a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ or a rejection symbol \perp .

Correctness of AIAE requires that, for all $\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{AIAE.Setup}(1^\ell)$, all $k \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AIAE}}$, all $m \in \mathcal{M}$, all $\text{aux} \in \mathcal{AUX}$ and all $\text{aiae.ct} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{AIAE.Enc}(k, m, \text{aux})$, we have that $\text{AIAE.Dec}(k, \text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux}) = m$.

If the auxiliary-input space $\mathcal{AUX} = \emptyset$ for all possible parameters prm_{AIAE} , the above definition is reduced to traditional AE.

Let \mathcal{F} be a family of functions from $\mathcal{K}_{\text{AIAE}}$ to $\mathcal{K}_{\text{AIAE}}$. We define the related-key security notions for auxiliary-input authenticated encryption scheme AIAE via Fig. 5.

<p>Procedure INITIALIZE: $\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{AIAE.Setup}(1^\ell)$, $k \leftarrow_{\\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{AIAE}}$. $\beta \leftarrow_{\\$} \{0, 1\}$. // challenge bit Return prm_{AIAE}.</p> <p>Procedure ENC($m_0, m_1, \text{aux}, f \in \mathcal{F}$): If $m_0 \neq m_1$, Return \perp. $\text{aiae.ct} \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{AIAE.Enc}(f(k), m_\beta, \text{aux})$. Return aiae.ct.</p> <p>Procedure FINALIZE(β'): Return ($\beta' = \beta$).</p>	<p>Procedure INITIALIZE: $\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{AIAE.Setup}(1^\ell)$, $k \leftarrow_{\\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{AIAE}}$. Return prm_{AIAE}.</p> <p>Procedure ENC($m, \text{aux}, f \in \mathcal{F}$): $\text{aiae.ct} \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{AIAE.Enc}(f(k), m, \text{aux})$. $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} \cup \{(\text{aux}, f, \text{aiae.ct})\}$. $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}} \cup \{(\text{aux}, f)\}$. Return aiae.ct.</p> <p>Procedure FINALIZE($\text{aux}^*, f^* \in \mathcal{F}, \text{aiae.ct}^*$): If $(\text{aux}^*, f^*, \text{aiae.ct}^*) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}}$, Return 0. If there exists $(\text{aux}, f) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}}$ such that $\text{aux} = \text{aux}^*$ but $f \neq f^*$, Return 0. // Special rule Return $(\text{AIAE.Dec}(f^*(k), \text{aiae.ct}^*, \text{aux}^*) \neq \perp)$.</p>
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Fig. 5. Games IND- \mathcal{F} -RKA (left) and weak-INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA (right) for defining securities of auxiliary-input authenticated encryption scheme AIAE. We note that the weak INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA security needs a special rule to return 0 in FINALIZE as shown in the shadow.

Definition 12 (IND- \mathcal{F} -RKA and Weak INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA Securities for AIAE). An auxiliary-input authenticated encryption scheme AIAE is IND- \mathcal{F} -RKA secure and weak INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA secure, if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , both $\text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-rka}}(\ell) := |\Pr[\text{IND-}\mathcal{F}\text{-RKA}^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2|$ and $\text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{weak-int-rka}}(\ell) := \Pr[\text{weak-INT-}\mathcal{F}\text{-RKA}^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1]$ are negligible in ℓ , where games IND- \mathcal{F} -RKA and weak-INT- \mathcal{F} -RKA are specified in Fig. 5.

4.2 Construction of AIAE from OT-secure AE and DDH Assumption

Let $\text{AE} = (\text{AE.Setup}, \text{AE.Enc}, \text{AE.Dec})$ be a traditional (without auxiliary-input) authenticated encryption scheme with key space \mathcal{K}_{AE} and message space \mathcal{M} . Let $\mathcal{H}_1 = \{\text{H}_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N\}$ and $\mathcal{H}_2 = \{\text{H}_2 : \mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}_N \rightarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}\}$ be two families of hash functions with $|\mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}|/|\mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}_N| (= |\mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}|/N) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$. The proposed scheme $\text{AIAE} = (\text{AIAE.Setup}, \text{AIAE.Enc}, \text{AIAE.Dec})$ with key space $\mathcal{K}_{\text{AIAE}} = (\mathbb{Z}_N)^4$, message space \mathcal{M} and auxiliary-input space $\mathcal{AUX} = \{0, 1\}^*$ is defined in Fig. 6.

$\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} \leftarrow \text{AIAE.Setup}(1^\ell):$ $(N, p, q) \leftarrow \text{GenN}(1^\ell),$ i.e., pick two ℓ -bit safe primes p and q , such that $2pq + 1$ is also a prime, and $N := pq.$ $\bar{N} := 2N + 1. \quad g_1, g_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}.$ $\mathcal{H}_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_1, \quad \mathcal{H}_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_2.$ $\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} := (N, p, q, \bar{N}, g_1, g_2, \mathcal{H}_1, \mathcal{H}_2).$ Return $\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}}.$	$\langle c_1, c_2, \chi \rangle \leftarrow \text{AIAE.Enc}(k, m, \text{aux}):$ Parse $k = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4) \in (\mathbb{Z}_N)^4.$ $w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}.$ $(c_1, c_2) := (g_1^w, g_2^w) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2.$ $t := \text{H}_1(c_1, c_2, \text{aux}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N.$ $\kappa := \text{H}_2(c_1^{k_1+k_3t} \cdot c_2^{k_2+k_4t}) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}.$ $\chi \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa, m).$ Return $\langle c_1, c_2, \chi \rangle.$	$m/\perp \leftarrow \text{AIAE.Dec}(k, \langle c_1, c_2, \chi \rangle, \text{aux}):$ Parse $k = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4) \in (\mathbb{Z}_N)^4.$ If $(c_1, c_2) \notin \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2 \vee (c_1, c_2) = (1, 1),$ Return $\perp.$ $t := \text{H}_1(c_1, c_2, \text{aux}) \in \mathbb{Z}_N.$ $\kappa := \text{H}_2(c_1^{k_1+k_3t} \cdot c_2^{k_2+k_4t}) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}.$ $m/\perp \leftarrow \text{AE.Dec}(\kappa, \chi).$ Return $m/\perp.$
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Fig. 6. Construction of the DDH-based AIAE from AE.

The correctness of AIAE follows from the correctness of AE directly. Note that the factors p, q of N in prm_{AIAE} are not needed in the encryption and decryption algorithms of AIAE. Jumping ahead, the factors p, q are necessary when the security of the PKEs presented in Sections 5 and 6 is reduced to the security of AIAE. We now show the RKA-security of AIAE through the following theorem.

Theorem 1. *If the underlying scheme AE is OT-secure, the DDH assumption holds w.r.t. GenN and $\mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$, \mathcal{H}_1 is collision resistant and \mathcal{H}_2 is universal, then the resulting scheme AIAE in Fig. 6 is IND- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA and weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA secure, where the restricted affine function set is defined as $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}} := \{f_{(a,b)} : (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^4 \mapsto (ak_1 + b_1, ak_2 + b_2, ak_3 + b_3, ak_4 + b_4) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^4 \mid a \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*, \mathbf{b} = (b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^4\}.$*

Proof of IND- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE in Theorem 1. The proof proceeds with a sequence of games, as shown in Fig. 7. Suppose that \mathcal{A} is a PPT adversary against the IND- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE, who makes at most Q_e times of ENC queries. Let $\text{Pr}_i[\cdot]$ (resp., $\text{Pr}_{i'}[\cdot]$) denote the probability of a particular event occurring in game G_i (resp., game G'_i).

- Game G_1 : This is the original IND- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security game. Let Win denote the event that $\beta' = \beta$. Then by definition, $\text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-rka}}(\ell) = |\text{Pr}_1[\text{Win}] - \frac{1}{2}|.$

Denote $\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} = (N, p, q, \bar{N}, g_1, g_2, \mathcal{H}_1, \mathcal{H}_2)$ and $k = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$. To answer the λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query $(m_{\lambda,0}, m_{\lambda,1}, \text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda)$, where $f_\lambda = \langle a_\lambda, \mathbf{b}_\lambda = (b_{\lambda,1}, b_{\lambda,2}, b_{\lambda,3}, b_{\lambda,4}) \rangle \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$, the challenger proceeds as follows:

1. pick $w_\lambda \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$ and compute $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_\lambda}, g_2^{w_\lambda}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2,$
2. compute a tag $t_\lambda := \text{H}_1(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda) \in \mathbb{Z}_N,$
3. compute an encryption key for AE scheme using a related key $f_\lambda(k)$:

$$\kappa_\lambda := \text{H}_2(c_{\lambda,1}^{(a_\lambda k_1 + b_{\lambda,1}) + (a_\lambda k_3 + b_{\lambda,3})t_\lambda} \cdot c_{\lambda,2}^{(a_\lambda k_2 + b_{\lambda,2}) + (a_\lambda k_4 + b_{\lambda,4})t_\lambda}) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}},$$

4. invoke $\chi_\lambda \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, m_{\lambda,\beta}),$

and returns the challenge ciphertext $\langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle$ to the adversary \mathcal{A} .

- Game $G_{1,i}, i \in [Q_e + 1]$: This game is the same as game G_1 , except that, the challenger does not use secret key k to answer the λ -th ($\lambda \in [i - 1]$) ENC query at all, and instead, it changes steps 1, 3 to steps 1', 3' as follows:

- 1'. pick $w_{\lambda,1}, w_{\lambda,2} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$ and compute $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_{\lambda,1}}, g_2^{w_{\lambda,2}}),$

<p>INITIALIZE: // Games G_1-G_2</p> <p>$(N, p, q) \leftarrow \text{GenN}(1^\ell)$.</p> <p>$\bar{N} := 2N + 1 = 2pq + 1$.</p> <p>$g_1, g_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$.</p> <p>$H_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_1, H_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_2$.</p> <p>$(k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\bar{N}}^4$.</p> <p>$\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} := (N, p, q, \bar{N}, g_1, g_2, H_1, H_2)$.</p> <p>$\mathbf{k} := (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$.</p> <p>$\beta \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. // challenge bit</p> <p>Return prm_{AIAE}.</p> <p>ENC$(m_{\lambda,0}, m_{\lambda,1}, \mathbf{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda)$:</p> <p>// $G_1, \mathbf{G}_{1,Q_e+1}, \mathbf{G}_2, \mathbf{G}_2$, the λ-th query</p> <p>Parse $f_\lambda = \langle a_\lambda, \mathbf{b}_\lambda \rangle \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$.</p> <p>$w_\lambda \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$.</p> <p>$(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_\lambda}, g_2^{w_\lambda}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 2px 0;"> <p>$w_{\lambda,1}, w_{\lambda,2} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$.</p> <p>$(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_{\lambda,1}}, g_2^{w_{\lambda,2}}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$.</p> </div> <p>$t_\lambda := H_1(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \mathbf{aux}_\lambda) \in \mathbb{Z}_N$.</p> <p>$\kappa_\lambda := H_2(c_{\lambda,1}^{(a_\lambda k_1 + b_{\lambda,1}) + (a_\lambda k_3 + b_{\lambda,3})t_\lambda}, c_{\lambda,2}^{(a_\lambda k_2 + b_{\lambda,2}) + (a_\lambda k_4 + b_{\lambda,4})t_\lambda}) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 2px 0;"> <p>$\kappa_\lambda \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$.</p> </div> <p>$\chi_\lambda \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, m_{\lambda,\beta})$.</p> <p>$\chi_\lambda \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, 0^{ m_{\lambda,0} })$.</p> <p>Return $\langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle$.</p>	<p>ENC$(m_{\lambda,0}, m_{\lambda,1}, \mathbf{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda)$:</p> <p>// Games $G_{1,i}, \mathbf{G}'_{1,i}$, the λ-th query</p> <p>Parse $f_\lambda = \langle a_\lambda, \mathbf{b}_\lambda \rangle \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$.</p> <p>If $1 \leq \lambda < i$,</p> <p>$w_{\lambda,1}, w_{\lambda,2} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$.</p> <p>$(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_{\lambda,1}}, g_2^{w_{\lambda,2}}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$.</p> <p>$\kappa_\lambda \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$.</p> <p>If $\lambda = i$,</p> <p>$w_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$.</p> <p>$(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}) := (g_1^{w_i}, g_2^{w_i}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 2px 0;"> <p>$w_{i,1}, w_{i,2} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$.</p> <p>$(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}) := (g_1^{w_{i,1}}, g_2^{w_{i,2}}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$.</p> </div> <p>$t_i := H_1(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}, \mathbf{aux}_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_N$.</p> <p>$\kappa_i := H_2(c_{i,1}^{(a_i k_1 + b_{i,1}) + (a_i k_3 + b_{i,3})t_i}, c_{i,2}^{(a_i k_2 + b_{i,2}) + (a_i k_4 + b_{i,4})t_i}) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$.</p> <p>If $i < \lambda \leq Q_e$,</p> <p>$w_\lambda \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$.</p> <p>$(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_\lambda}, g_2^{w_\lambda}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$.</p> <p>$t_\lambda := H_1(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \mathbf{aux}_\lambda) \in \mathbb{Z}_N$.</p> <p>$\kappa_\lambda := H_2(c_{\lambda,1}^{(a_\lambda k_1 + b_{\lambda,1}) + (a_\lambda k_3 + b_{\lambda,3})t_\lambda}, c_{\lambda,2}^{(a_\lambda k_2 + b_{\lambda,2}) + (a_\lambda k_4 + b_{\lambda,4})t_\lambda}) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$.</p> <p>$\chi_\lambda \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, m_{\lambda,\beta})$.</p> <p>Return $\langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle$.</p> <p>FINALIZE$(\beta')$: // Games G_1-G_2</p> <p>Return $(\beta' = \beta)$.</p>
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Fig. 7. Games $G_1, \{G_{1,i}, G'_{1,i}\}_{i \in [Q_e]}, G_{1,Q_e+1}, G_2$ for the proof of IND- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE.

3'. choose an encryption key $\kappa_\lambda \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$ randomly for the AE scheme.

The challenger still answers the λ -th ($\lambda \in [i, Q_e]$) ENC query as in G_1 , i.e., using steps 1, 3.

Clearly $G_{1,1}$ is identical to G_1 , thus $\Pr_1[\text{Win}] = \Pr_{1,1}[\text{Win}]$.

- Game $G'_{1,i}, i \in [Q_e]$: This game is the same as game $G_{1,i}$, except that the challenger answers the i -th ENC query using steps 1', 3 (rather than steps 1, 3 in game $G_{1,i}$), i.e.,
 - 1'. pick $w_{i,1}, w_{i,2} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$ and compute $(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}) := (g_1^{w_{i,1}}, g_2^{w_{i,2}})$,
 3. compute an encryption key for AE with

$$\kappa_i := H_2(c_{i,1}^{(a_i k_1 + b_{i,1}) + (a_i k_3 + b_{i,3})t_i}, c_{i,2}^{(a_i k_2 + b_{i,2}) + (a_i k_4 + b_{i,4})t_i}) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}.$$

The only difference between $G_{1,i}$ and $G'_{1,i}$ is the distribution of $(g_1, g_2, c_{i,1}, c_{i,2})$. In game $G_{1,i}$, $(g_1, g_2, c_{i,1}, c_{i,2})$ is a DDH tuple, while in game $G'_{1,i}$, it is a random tuple. It is straightforward to construct a PPT adversary to solve the DDH problem w.r.t. GenN and $\mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$, thus we have that $|\Pr_{1,i}[\text{Win}] - \Pr_{1,i'}[\text{Win}]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}}^{\text{ddh}}(\ell)$.

We analyze the difference between $G'_{1,i}$ and $G_{1,i+1}$ via the following lemma.

Lemma 1. For all $i \in [Q_e]$, $|\Pr_{1,i'}[\text{Win}] - \Pr_{1,i+1}[\text{Win}]| \leq 1/(N-1) + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

Proof. The only difference between games $G'_{1,i}$ and $G_{1,i+1}$ is the computation of κ_i in the i -th ENC query. In game $G'_{1,i}$, κ_i is properly computed, while in game $G_{1,i+1}$, it is chosen from \mathcal{K}_{AE} uniformly.

Denote $w := \text{dlog}_{g_1} g_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. We consider the information about the secret key $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$ that is used in game $G'_{1,i}$.

- For the λ -th ($\lambda \in [i-1]$) query, ENC does not use \mathbf{k} at all since κ_λ is randomly chosen.
- For the λ -th ($\lambda \in [i+1, Q_e]$) query, ENC can use $k_1 + wk_2$ and $k_3 + wk_4$ to compute κ_λ :

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa_\lambda &= \text{H}_2(c_{\lambda,1}^{(a_\lambda k_1 + b_{\lambda,1}) + (a_\lambda k_3 + b_{\lambda,3})t_\lambda} \cdot c_{\lambda,2}^{(a_\lambda k_2 + b_{\lambda,2}) + (a_\lambda k_4 + b_{\lambda,4})t_\lambda}) \\ &= \text{H}_2((g_1^{w_\lambda})^{(a_\lambda k_1 + b_{\lambda,1}) + (a_\lambda k_3 + b_{\lambda,3})t_\lambda} \cdot (g_1^{ww_\lambda})^{(a_\lambda k_2 + b_{\lambda,2}) + (a_\lambda k_4 + b_{\lambda,4})t_\lambda}) \\ &= \text{H}_2(g_1^{w_\lambda a_\lambda \cdot ((k_1 + wk_2) + t_\lambda \cdot (k_3 + wk_4))} \cdot g_1^{w_\lambda \cdot ((b_{\lambda,1} + wb_{\lambda,2}) + t_\lambda \cdot (b_{\lambda,3} + wb_{\lambda,4}))}), \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $w_\lambda = \text{dlog}_{g_1} c_{\lambda,1} = \text{dlog}_{g_2} c_{\lambda,2} \in \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$.

- For the i -th query, ENC uses $w_{i,1}k_1 + w_{i,2}wk_2$ and $w_{i,1}k_3 + w_{i,2}wk_4$ to compute κ_i , where $w_{i,1} = \text{dlog}_{g_1} c_{i,1}$, $w_{i,2} = \text{dlog}_{g_2} c_{i,2} \in \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$:

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa_i &= \text{H}_2(c_{i,1}^{(a_i k_1 + b_{i,1}) + (a_i k_3 + b_{i,3})t_i} \cdot c_{i,2}^{(a_i k_2 + b_{i,2}) + (a_i k_4 + b_{i,4})t_i}) \\ &= \text{H}_2((g_1^{w_{i,1}})^{(a_i k_1 + b_{i,1}) + (a_i k_3 + b_{i,3})t_i} \cdot (g_1^{ww_{i,2}})^{(a_i k_2 + b_{i,2}) + (a_i k_4 + b_{i,4})t_i}) \\ &= \text{H}_2(g_1^{\underbrace{a_i \cdot ((w_{i,1}k_1 + w_{i,2}wk_2) + t_i \cdot (w_{i,1}k_3 + w_{i,2}wk_4))}_{\triangleq X}} \cdot g_1^{(w_{i,1}b_{i,1} + w_{i,2}wb_{i,2}) + t_i \cdot (w_{i,1}b_{i,3} + w_{i,2}wb_{i,4})}). \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

With probability $1 - 1/(N-1)$, it holds that $w_{i,1} \neq w_{i,2}$, and in this case, the value of $(w_{i,1}k_1 + w_{i,2}wk_2)$ is independent of $k_1 + wk_2$ and uniformly distributed over \mathbb{Z}_N . Then as long as $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, X will be uniform over $\mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$ (which is generated by g_1) and independent of H_2 . Since H_2 is universal, by the Leftover Hash Lemma (cf. Lemma 7 in Appendix A), $\kappa_i = \text{H}_2(X)$ is statistically close to the uniform distribution over \mathcal{K}_{AE} . Thus $G'_{1,i}$ is statistically close to $G_{1,i+1}$, and $|\Pr_{1,i'}[\text{Win}] - \Pr_{1,i+1}[\text{Win}]| \leq 1/(N-1) + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$. ■

- Game G_2 : This game is the same as game G_{1,Q_e+1} , except that, to answer the λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query, the challenger changes step 4 to step 4':

4'. invoke $\chi_\lambda \leftarrow_s \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, 0^{|m_\lambda,0|})$.

In game G_{1,Q_e+1} , the challenger computes the AE encryption of $m_{\lambda,\beta}$ under encryption key κ_λ in ENC, while in game G_2 it computes the AE encryption of $0^{|m_\lambda,0|}$ in ENC. Both in games G_{1,Q_e+1} and G_2 , we have that each κ_λ is chosen uniformly from \mathcal{K}_{AE} and independent of other parts of the game. Therefore we can reduce the differences between G_{1,Q_e+1} and G_2 to the IND-OT security of AE by a standard hybrid argument, and have that $|\Pr_{1,Q_e+1}[\text{Win}] - \Pr_2[\text{Win}]| \leq Q_e \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{AE}}^{\text{ind-ot}}(\ell)$.

Now in game G_2 , since the challenger always encrypts the constant message $0^{|m_\lambda,0|}$, the challenge bit β is completely hidden. Then $\Pr_2[\text{Win}] = 1/2$.

Taking all things together, the IND- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE follows. ■

Proof of Weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE in Theorem 1. Again, we prove it through a sequence of games, as shown in Fig. 8. These games are defined almost the same as those in the

<p>INITIALIZE: // Games G_0-G_{1, Q_e+1} $(N, p, q) \leftarrow \text{GenN}(1^\ell)$. $\bar{N} := 2N + 1 = 2pq + 1$. $g_1, g_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$. $H_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_1$, $H_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_2$. $(k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^4$. $\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} := (N, p, q, \bar{N}, g_1, g_2, H_1, H_2)$. $\mathbf{k} := (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$. Return prm_{AIAE}.</p> <p>ENC($m_\lambda, \text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda$): // the λ-th query // Games $G_{1,i}$, $G'_{1,i}$ Parse $f_\lambda = \langle a_\lambda, \mathbf{b}_\lambda \rangle \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$. If $1 \leq \lambda < i$, $w_{\lambda,1}, w_{\lambda,2} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$. $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_{\lambda,1}}, g_2^{w_{\lambda,2}}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$. $\kappa_\lambda \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$. If $\lambda = i$, $w_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$. $(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}) := (g_1^{w_i}, g_2^{w_i}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$. $w_{i,1}, w_{i,2} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$. $(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}) := (g_1^{w_{i,1}}, g_2^{w_{i,2}}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$. $t_i := H_1(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}, \text{aux}_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. $\kappa_i := H_2 \left(c_{i,1}^{(a_i k_1 + b_{i,1}) + (a_i k_3 + b_{i,3}) t_i} \cdot c_{i,2}^{(a_i k_2 + b_{i,2}) + (a_i k_4 + b_{i,4}) t_i} \right) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$. If $i < \lambda \leq Q_e$, $w_\lambda \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$. $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_\lambda}, g_2^{w_\lambda}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$. $t_\lambda := H_1(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda) \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. $\kappa_\lambda := H_2 \left(c_{\lambda,1}^{(a_\lambda k_1 + b_{\lambda,1}) + (a_\lambda k_3 + b_{\lambda,3}) t_\lambda} \cdot c_{\lambda,2}^{(a_\lambda k_2 + b_{\lambda,2}) + (a_\lambda k_4 + b_{\lambda,4}) t_\lambda} \right) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$. $\chi_\lambda \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, m_\lambda)$. $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} \cup \{(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda, \langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle)\}$. $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}} \cup \{(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda)\}$. $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{TAG}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{TAG}} \cup \{(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda, t_\lambda)\}$. Return $\langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle$.</p>	<p>ENC($m_\lambda, \text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda$): // the λ-th query // Games G_0-G_1, G_{1, Q_e+1} Parse $f_\lambda = \langle a_\lambda, \mathbf{b}_\lambda \rangle \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$. $w_\lambda \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$. $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_\lambda}, g_2^{w_\lambda}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$. $w_{\lambda,1}, w_{\lambda,2} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$. $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_{\lambda,1}}, g_2^{w_{\lambda,2}}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$. $t_\lambda := H_1(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda) \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. $\kappa_\lambda := H_2 \left(c_{\lambda,1}^{(a_\lambda k_1 + b_{\lambda,1}) + (a_\lambda k_3 + b_{\lambda,3}) t_\lambda} \cdot c_{\lambda,2}^{(a_\lambda k_2 + b_{\lambda,2}) + (a_\lambda k_4 + b_{\lambda,4}) t_\lambda} \right) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$. $\kappa_\lambda \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$. $\chi_\lambda \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, m_\lambda)$. $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} \cup \{(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda, \langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle)\}$. $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}} \cup \{(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda)\}$. $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{TAG}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{TAG}} \cup \{(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda, t_\lambda)\}$. Return $\langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle$.</p> <p>FINALIZE($\text{aux}^*, f^*, \langle c_1^*, c_2^*, \chi^* \rangle$): // Games G_0, G_{1, Q_e+1} If $(\text{aux}^*, f^*, \langle c_1^*, c_2^*, \chi^* \rangle) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}}$, Return 0. If there exists $(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}}$ such that $\text{aux}_\lambda = \text{aux}^*$ but $f_\lambda \neq f^*$, Return 0. Parse $f^* = \langle a^*, \mathbf{b}^* \rangle \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$. If $(c_1^*, c_2^*) \notin \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2 \vee (c_1^*, c_2^*) = (1, 1)$, Return 0. $t^* := H_1(c_1^*, c_2^*, \text{aux}^*) \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. If there exists $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda, t_\lambda) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{TAG}}$ such that $t_\lambda = t^*$ but $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda) \neq (c_1^*, c_2^*, \text{aux}^*)$, Return 0. $\kappa^* := H_2 \left(c_1^{*(a^* k_1 + b_1^*) + (a^* k_3 + b_3^*) t^*} \cdot c_2^{*(a^* k_2 + b_2^*) + (a^* k_4 + b_4^*) t^*} \right) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$. Return $(\text{AE.Dec}(\kappa^*, \chi^*) \neq \perp)$.</p>
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Fig. 8. Games G_0 , G_1 , $\{G_{1,i}, G'_{1,i}\}_{i \in [Q_e]}$, G_{1, Q_e+1} for the proof of weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE.

previous proof. Suppose that \mathcal{A} is a PPT adversary against the weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE, who makes at most Q_e times of ENC queries.

- Game G_0 : This is the original weak-INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security game.

Denote $\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} = (N, p, q, \bar{N}, g_1, g_2, H_1, H_2)$ and $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$. To answer the λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query $(m_\lambda, \text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda)$, the challenger proceeds with steps 1~4, similar to the previous proof, and returns the challenge ciphertext $\langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle$ to the adversary \mathcal{A} . Moreover, the challenger will put $(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda, \langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle)$ to a set \mathcal{Q}_{ENC} , put $(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda)$ to a set $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}}$,

and put $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \mathbf{aux}_\lambda, t_\lambda)$ to a set \mathcal{Q}_{TAG} . Finally, the adversary outputs a forgery $(\mathbf{aux}^*, f^* = \langle a^*, \mathbf{b}^* = (b_1^*, b_2^*, b_3^*, b_4^*) \rangle, \langle c_1^*, c_2^*, \chi^* \rangle)$.

Denote by **Forge** the event that the following FINALIZE procedure outputs 1:

- If $(\mathbf{aux}^*, f^*, \langle c_1^*, c_2^*, \chi^* \rangle) \in \mathcal{Q}_{ENC}$, Return 0.
 - If there exists $(\mathbf{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda) \in \mathcal{Q}_{AUXF}$ such that $\mathbf{aux}_\lambda = \mathbf{aux}^*$ but $f_\lambda \neq f^*$, Return 0.
 - If $(c_1^*, c_2^*) \notin \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2 \vee (c_1^*, c_2^*) = (1, 1)$, Return 0.
 - $t^* := H_1(c_1^*, c_2^*, \mathbf{aux}^*)$, $\kappa^* := H_2(c_1^{*(a^*k_1+b_1^*)+(a^*k_3+b_3^*)t^*} \cdot c_2^{*(a^*k_2+b_2^*)+(a^*k_4+b_4^*)t^*})$.
- Return $(\text{AE.Dec}(\kappa^*, \chi^*) \neq \perp)$.

By definition, it follows that, $\text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{weak-int-rka}}(\ell) = \Pr_0[\text{Forge}]$.

- Game G_1 : This game is the same as game G_0 , except that, the challenger adds the following new rule to the FINALIZE procedure:

- If there exists $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \mathbf{aux}_\lambda, t_\lambda) \in \mathcal{Q}_{TAG}$ such that $t_\lambda = t^*$ but $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \mathbf{aux}_\lambda) \neq (c_1^*, c_2^*, \mathbf{aux}^*)$, Return 0.

Since $t_\lambda = H_1(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \mathbf{aux}_\lambda)$ and $t^* = H_1(c_1^*, c_2^*, \mathbf{aux}^*)$, any difference between G_0 and G_1 will imply a collision of H_1 . Thus $|\Pr_0[\text{Forge}] - \Pr_1[\text{Forge}]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{H}_1}^{cr}(\ell)$.

- Game $G_{1,i}$, $i \in [Q_e + 1]$: This game is the same as game G_1 , except that, the challenger does not use secret key \mathbf{k} to answer the λ -th ($\lambda \in [i - 1]$) ENC query at all, and instead, it changes the steps 1, 3 to the steps 1', 3' respectively, as in the previous proof.

Clearly $\Pr_1[\text{Forge}] = \Pr_{1,1}[\text{Forge}]$.

- Game $G'_{1,i}$, $i \in [Q_e]$: This game is the same as game $G_{1,i}$, except that the challenger answers the i -th ENC query using steps 1', 3 (rather than steps 1, 3 in game $G_{1,i}$), as in the previous proof.

The only difference between $G_{1,i}$ and $G'_{1,i}$ is the distribution of $(g_1, g_2, c_{i,1}, c_{i,2})$. In game $G_{1,i}$, $(g_1, g_2, c_{i,1}, c_{i,2})$ is a DDH tuple, while in game $G'_{1,i}$, it is a random tuple. It is straightforward to construct a PPT adversary to solve the DDH problem w.r.t. GenN and $\mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$. We stress that the PPT adversary (simulator) can detect the occurrence of event **Forge** efficiently since it can choose the secret key $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$ itself. Thus we can reduce the difference between $G_{1,i}$ and $G'_{1,i}$ to the DDH assumption smoothly via the following lemma.

Lemma 2. For all $i \in [Q_e]$, $|\Pr_{1,i}[\text{Forge}] - \Pr_{1,i'}[\text{Forge}]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}}^{ddh}(\ell)$.

Proof. We construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} to solve the DDH problem. \mathcal{B} is given $(N, p, q, g_1, g_2, g_1^{x_1}, g_2^{x_2})$, where $(N, p, q) \leftarrow_s \text{GenN}(1^\ell)$, $g_1, g_2 \leftarrow_s \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$, and aims to distinguish whether $x_1 = x_2 \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$ or $x_1, x_2 \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$.

\mathcal{B} will simulate game $G_{1,i}$ or $G'_{1,i}$ for adversary \mathcal{A} . First, \mathcal{B} picks $H_1 \leftarrow_s \mathcal{H}_1$, $H_2 \leftarrow_s \mathcal{H}_2$ randomly, sets $\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} := (N, p, q, \bar{N} = 2N + 1, g_1, g_2, H_1, H_2)$ and sends prm_{AIAE} to \mathcal{A} . Then \mathcal{B} generates the secret key $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$ itself.

To answer the λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query $(m_\lambda, \mathbf{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda)$, where $f_\lambda = \langle a_\lambda, \mathbf{b}_\lambda = (b_{\lambda,1}, b_{\lambda,2}, b_{\lambda,3}, b_{\lambda,4}) \rangle \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$, \mathcal{B} prepares the challenge ciphertext as follows:

- If $\lambda \in [i - 1]$, \mathcal{B} proceeds the same as in games $G_{1,i}$ and $G'_{1,i}$. That is, \mathcal{B} picks $w_{\lambda,1}, w_{\lambda,2} \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$ randomly and sets $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_{\lambda,1}}, g_2^{w_{\lambda,2}}) \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}^2$. Then \mathcal{B} chooses $\kappa_\lambda \leftarrow_s \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$ and invokes $\chi_\lambda \leftarrow_s \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, m_\lambda)$.

- If $\lambda \in [i + 1, Q_e]$, \mathcal{B} proceeds the same as in games $G_{1,i}$ and $G'_{1,i}$. That is, \mathcal{B} picks $w_\lambda \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$ randomly and sets $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_\lambda}, g_2^{w_\lambda}) \in \mathbb{QR}_N^2$. Then \mathcal{B} computes $t_\lambda := H_1(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda)$, $\kappa_\lambda := H_2(c_{\lambda,1}^{(a_\lambda k_1 + b_{\lambda,1}) + (a_\lambda k_3 + b_{\lambda,3})t_\lambda} \cdot c_{\lambda,2}^{(a_\lambda k_2 + b_{\lambda,2}) + (a_\lambda k_4 + b_{\lambda,4})t_\lambda})$, and invokes $\chi_\lambda \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, m_\lambda)$.
- If $\lambda = i$, \mathcal{B} embedded its DDH challenge to $(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}) := (g_1^{x_1}, g_2^{x_2})$. Then it computes $t_i := H_1(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}, \text{aux}_i)$, $\kappa_i := H_2(c_{i,1}^{(a_i k_1 + b_{i,1}) + (a_i k_3 + b_{i,3})t_i} \cdot c_{i,2}^{(a_i k_2 + b_{i,2}) + (a_i k_4 + b_{i,4})t_i})$, and invokes $\chi_i \leftarrow \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_i, m_i)$.

\mathcal{B} returns the challenge ciphertext $\langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle$ to \mathcal{A} . Moreover, \mathcal{B} puts $(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda, \langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle)$ to \mathcal{Q}_{ENC} , $(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda)$ to $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}}$, and $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda, t_\lambda)$ to \mathcal{Q}_{TAG} .

In the case of that $(N, p, q, g_1, g_2, g_1^{x_1}, g_2^{x_2})$ is a DDH tuple, i.e., $x_1 = x_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$, \mathcal{B} simulates game $G_{1,i}$ perfectly with \mathcal{A} ; in the case of that $(N, p, q, g_1, g_2, g_1^{x_1}, g_2^{x_2})$ is a random tuple, i.e., $x_1, x_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$, \mathcal{B} simulates game $G'_{1,i}$ perfectly with \mathcal{A} .

Finally \mathcal{B} receives a forgery $(\text{aux}^*, f^*, \langle c_1^*, c_2^*, \chi^* \rangle)$ from \mathcal{A} , where $f^* = \langle a^*, \mathbf{b}^* = (b_1^*, b_2^*, b_3^*, b_4^*) \rangle \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$. \mathcal{B} determines whether or not the FINALIZE procedure outputs 1 using the secret key $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$. That is,

- If $(\text{aux}^*, f^*, \langle c_1^*, c_2^*, \chi^* \rangle) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}}$, \mathcal{B} outputs 0 (to its DDH challenger).
- If there exists $(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}}$ such that $\text{aux}_\lambda = \text{aux}^*$ but $f_\lambda \neq f^*$, \mathcal{B} outputs 0.
- If $(c_1^*, c_2^*) \notin \mathbb{QR}_N^2 \vee (c_1^*, c_2^*) = (1, 1)$, \mathcal{B} outputs 0.
- $t^* := H_1(c_1^*, c_2^*, \text{aux}^*)$, $\kappa^* := H_2(c_1^{*(a^* k_1 + b_1^*) + (a^* k_3 + b_3^*)t^*} \cdot c_2^{*(a^* k_2 + b_2^*) + (a^* k_4 + b_4^*)t^*})$.
- If there exists $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda, t_\lambda) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{TAG}}$ such that $t_\lambda = t^*$ but $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda) \neq (c_1^*, c_2^*, \text{aux}^*)$, \mathcal{B} outputs 0.
- Output $(\text{AE.Dec}(\kappa^*, \chi^*) \neq \perp)$.

With the secret key $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$, \mathcal{B} simulates FINALIZE perfectly, the same as in games $G_{1,i}$ and $G'_{1,i}$, and \mathcal{B} outputs 1 to its DDH challenger if and only if FINALIZE outputs 1, i.e., the event Forge occurs.

As a consequence, $|\Pr_{1,i}[\text{Forge}] - \Pr_{1,i'}[\text{Forge}]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ddh}}(\ell)$ and Lemma 2 follows. \blacksquare

We analyze the difference between $G'_{1,i}$ and $G_{1,i+1}$ via the following lemma.

Lemma 3. For all $i \in [Q_e]$, $\Pr_{1,i'}[\text{Forge}] \leq \Pr_{1,i+1}[\text{Forge}] + \text{Adv}_{\text{AE}}^{\text{int-ot}}(\ell) + 1/(N-1) + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

Proof. The only difference between games $G'_{1,i}$ and $G_{1,i+1}$ is the computation of κ_i in the i -th ENC query. In game $G'_{1,i}$, κ_i is properly computed, while in game $G_{1,i+1}$, it is chosen from \mathcal{K}_{AE} uniformly.

Denote $w := \text{dlog}_{g_1} g_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. We consider the information about the secret key $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$ that is used in game $G'_{1,i}$.

- For the λ -th ($\lambda \in [i-1]$) query, ENC does not use \mathbf{k} at all since κ_λ is randomly chosen.
- For the λ -th ($\lambda \in [i+1, Q_e]$) query, similar to the proof of Lemma 1, ENC can use $k_1 + wk_2$ and $k_3 + wk_4$ to compute κ_λ .
- For the i -th query, similar to the proof of Lemma 1 (see Eq. (3)), ENC uses

$$(w_{i,1}k_1 + w_{i,2}wk_2) + t_i \cdot (w_{i,1}k_3 + w_{i,2}wk_4) \quad (4)$$

to compute κ_i , where $w_{i,1} = \text{dlog}_{g_1} c_{i,1}$, $w_{i,2} = \text{dlog}_{g_2} c_{i,2} \in \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$:

$$\kappa_i = H_2 \left(\underbrace{g_1^{a_i \cdot ((w_{i,1}k_1 + w_{i,2}wk_2) + t_i \cdot (w_{i,1}k_3 + w_{i,2}wk_4))}}_{\triangleq X} \cdot g_1^{(w_{i,1}b_{1,i} + w_{i,2}wb_{i,2}) + t_i \cdot (w_{i,1}b_{1,3} + w_{i,2}wb_{i,4})} \right).$$

- The FINALIZE procedure, which defines the event Forge, uses

$$(w_1^*k_1 + w_2^*wk_2) + t^* \cdot (w_1^*k_3 + w_2^*wk_4) \quad (5)$$

to compute κ^* , where $(w_1^* = \text{dlog}_{g_1} c_1^*, w_2^* = \text{dlog}_{g_2} c_2^*) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^2 \setminus \{(0, 0)\}$:

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa^* &= \text{H}_2(c_1^{*(a^*k_1+b_1^*)+(a^*k_3+b_3^*)t^*} \cdot c_2^{*(a^*k_2+b_2^*)+(a^*k_4+b_4^*)t^*}) \\ &= \text{H}_2((g_1^{w_1^*})^{(a^*k_1+b_1^*)+(a^*k_3+b_3^*)t^*} \cdot (g_1^{ww_2^*})^{(a^*k_2+b_2^*)+(a^*k_4+b_4^*)t^*}) \\ &= \text{H}_2(\underbrace{g_1^{a^* \cdot ((w_1^*k_1 + w_2^*wk_2) + t^* \cdot (w_1^*k_3 + w_2^*wk_4))}}_{\triangleq Y} \cdot g_1^{(w_1^*b_1^* + w_2^*wb_2^*) + t^* \cdot (w_1^*b_3^* + w_2^*wb_4^*)}). \end{aligned}$$

With probability $1 - 1/(N - 1)$, it holds that $w_{i,1} \neq w_{i,2}$. In this case, we divide the event Forge to the following two sub-events:

- Sub-event: Forge $\wedge t_i \neq t^*$.

Let us first consider the event $t_i \neq t^*$. We show that

$$|\Pr_{1,i'}[t_i \neq t^*] - \Pr_{1,i+1}[t_i \neq t^*]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}.$$

It is easy to see that (4) is independent of $k_1 + wk_2$ and $k_3 + wk_4$, and uniformly distributed over \mathbb{Z}_N . Then as long as $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, X will be uniformly distributed over \mathbb{QR}_N and independent of H_2 . By the Leftover Hash Lemma, $\kappa_i = \text{H}_2(X)$ is statistically close to the uniform distribution over \mathcal{K}_{AE} . Then $G'_{1,i}$ is statistically close to $G_{1,i+1}$ before \mathcal{A} queries FINALIZE. As a result, $t_i \neq t^*$ will occur with almost the same probability in games $G'_{1,i}$ and $G_{1,i+1}$.

Next we consider the event Forge conditioned on $t_i \neq t^*$. We show that

$$|\Pr_{1,i'}[\text{Forge} \mid t_i \neq t^*] - \Pr_{1,i+1}[\text{Forge} \mid t_i \neq t^*]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}. \quad (6)$$

It is straightforward to see that (4) is independent of $k_1 + wk_2$, $k_3 + wk_4$ and (5) when $t_i \neq t^*$. With a similar argument, $\kappa_i = \text{H}_2(X)$ is statistically close to the uniform distribution over \mathcal{K}_{AE} . Then $G'_{1,i}$ is statistically close to $G_{1,i+1}$ when $t_i \neq t^*$. Therefore (6) follows.

In conclusion, we have that

$$\Pr_{1,i'}[\text{Forge} \wedge t_i \neq t^*] \leq \Pr_{1,i+1}[\text{Forge} \wedge t_i \neq t^*] + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)} \leq \Pr_{1,i+1}[\text{Forge}] + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}.$$

- Sub-event: Forge $\wedge t_i = t^*$.

By the new rule added in game G_1 , Forge and $t_i = t^*$ will imply $(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}, \text{aux}_i) = (c_1^*, c_2^*, \text{aux}^*)$. In addition, Forge and $\text{aux}_i = \text{aux}^*$ will imply that $f_i = f^*$, this is due to the special rule in the weak-INT-RKA game (see Fig. 4). Then it is straightforward to check that (4) = (5), $X = Y$ and $\kappa_i = \kappa^*$, and (4) (which equals (5)) is independent of $k_1 + wk_2$ and $k_3 + wk_4$, thus uniformly distributed over \mathbb{Z}_N . Then as long as a_i (which equals a^*) $\in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, X (which equals Y) will be uniformly distributed over \mathbb{QR}_N and independent of H_2 . By the Leftover Hash Lemma, $\kappa_i = \kappa^* = \text{H}_2(X) = \text{H}_2(Y)$ is statistically close to the uniform distribution over \mathcal{K}_{AE} . Also in this sub-event, $(\text{aux}^*, f^*, c_1^*, c_2^*) = (\text{aux}_i, f_i, c_{i,1}, c_{i,2})$ implies $\chi^* \neq \chi_i$, therefore $\text{AE.Dec}(\kappa^*, \chi^*) \neq \perp$ will hold with probability at most $\text{Adv}_{\text{AE}}^{\text{int-ot}}(\ell)$. Then we have the following claim. We give the full description of the reduction in Appendix C.1.

Claim 1. $\Pr_{1,i'}[\text{Forge} \wedge t_i = t^*] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{AE}}^{\text{int-ot}}(\ell) + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

Combining the above two sub-events together, Lemma 3 follows. \blacksquare

Now in game $G_{1,Q_{e+1}}$, the challenger does not use the secret key \mathbf{k} to compute κ_λ at all, hence $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$ is uniformly random to the adversary \mathcal{A} . As a result, in the FINALIZE procedure defining the event Forge,

$$\kappa^* = \text{H}_2\left(\underbrace{g_1^{a^* \cdot ((w_1^* k_1 + w_2^* w k_2) + t^* \cdot (w_1^* k_3 + w_2^* w k_4))}}_{\triangleq Y} \cdot g_1^{(w_1^* b_1^* + w_2^* w b_2^*) + t^* \cdot (w_1^* b_3^* + w_2^* w b_4^*)}\right).$$

The term $(w_1^* k_1 + w_2^* w k_2) + t^* \cdot (w_1^* k_3 + w_2^* w k_4)$ is uniformly distributed over \mathbb{Z}_N . Then as long as $a^* \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, Y will be uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{QR}_{\mathbb{Z}_N}$ and independent of H_2 . By the Leftover Hash Lemma, $\kappa^* = \text{H}_2(Y)$ is statistically close to the uniform distribution over \mathcal{K}_{AE} . Thus $\text{AE.Dec}(\kappa^*, \chi^*) \neq \perp$ will hold with probability at most $\text{Adv}_{\text{AE}}^{\text{int-ot}}(\ell)$. Then $\Pr_{1,Q_{e+1}}[\text{Forge}] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{AE}}^{\text{int-ot}}(\ell) + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

Taking all things together, the weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE follows. \blacksquare

Remark 1. Our AIAE enjoys the following property: $\kappa = \text{H}_2(c_1^{k_1+k_3t} \cdot c_2^{k_2+k_4t})$ will be statistically close to the uniform distribution over \mathcal{K}_{AE} , as long as any element k_j in (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4) is chosen uniformly at random. As a result, the OT-security of AE will guarantee that $\text{AIAE.Dec}((k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4), \text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux}) = \perp$ holds for any $(\text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux})$ except with probability $\text{Adv}_{\text{AE}}^{\text{int-ot}}(\ell) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}}^{\text{weak-int-rka}}(\ell)$. This fact will be used in the security proof of the PKEs presented in Sections 5 and 6.

Remark 2. We stress that the problem in the INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security proof of LLJ's $\overline{\text{AE}}$ does not appear here. The weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of our AIAE can be reduced to the DDH assumption smoothly. More precisely, in the security analysis of games $G_{1,i}$ and $G'_{1,i}$ (cf. Lemma 2), the simulator chooses the secret key itself and uses it to detect the occurrence of event Forge efficiently. Therefore the simulator can always make use of the difference between $\Pr_{1,i}[\text{Forge}]$ and $\Pr_{1,i'}[\text{Forge}]$ to solve the DDH problem.

5 PKE with n -KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA Security

Let $\text{AIAE} = (\text{AIAE.Setup}, \text{AIAE.Enc}, \text{AIAE.Dec})$ be the DDH-based auxiliary-input authenticated encryption scheme constructed from OT-secure AE, with key space $(\mathbb{Z}_N)^4$ and a suitable message space \mathcal{M} (cf. Fig. 6). Following our approach in Fig. 1, we have to design the other two building blocks.

KEM: With respect to this AIAE, we design a KEM which can encapsulate a key tuple $(k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4) \in (\mathbb{Z}_N)^4$.

\mathcal{E} : With respect to the affine function \mathcal{F}_{aff} , we design a public-key encryption \mathcal{E} such that $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}$ can be changed to an entropy filter for affine functions in a computationally indistinguishable way.

The proposed PKE = (Setup, Gen, Enc, Dec) is defined in Fig. 9, where the shadowed parts describe algorithms of building blocks KEM and \mathcal{E} .

The correctness of PKE follows from the correctness of AIAE, \mathcal{E} and KEM directly. We now show its KDM-CCA-security through the following theorem.

<p>$\text{prm} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\ell)$:</p> <p>$\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} \leftarrow \text{AIAE.Setup}(1^\ell)$, where</p> <p>$\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} = (N, p, q, \bar{N}, \bar{g}_1, \bar{g}_2, \mathbf{H}_1, \mathbf{H}_2)$,</p> <p>$N = pq, \bar{N} = 2N + 1, \bar{g}_1, \bar{g}_2 \in \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$.</p> <p>$\text{prm}'_{\text{AIAE}} := (N, \bar{N}, \bar{g}_1, \bar{g}_2, \mathbf{H}_1, \mathbf{H}_2)$.</p> <p>$g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4, g_5 \leftarrow \text{SCR}_{N^s}$.</p> <p>Return $\text{prm} := (\text{prm}'_{\text{AIAE}}, g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4, g_5)$.</p> <hr/> <p>$\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$: $m \in [N^{s-1}]$</p> <p>// $(k, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Enc}(\text{pk})$:</p> <p>$k = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^4$. $r \leftarrow \llbracket \frac{N}{4} \rrbracket$.</p> <p>$(u_1, u_2, u_3, u_4, u_5) := (g_1^r, g_2^r, g_3^r, g_4^r, g_5^r) \bmod N^2$.</p> <p>$(e_1, e_2, e_3, e_4) := (h_1^r T^{k_1}, h_2^r T^{k_2}, h_3^r T^{k_3}, h_4^r T^{k_4}) \bmod N^2$.</p> <p>$\text{aux} := (u_1, \dots, u_5, e_1, \dots, e_4)$.</p> <p>// $\mathcal{E}.ct \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.Enc(\text{pk}, m)$:</p> <p>$\tilde{r}_1, \tilde{r}_2, \tilde{r}_3, \tilde{r}_4 \leftarrow \llbracket \frac{N}{4} \rrbracket$.</p> <p>$(\tilde{u}_1, \tilde{u}_2, \tilde{u}_3, \tilde{u}_4, \tilde{u}_5, \tilde{u}_6, \tilde{u}_7, \tilde{u}_8) := (g_1^{\tilde{r}_1}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_1}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_2}, g_3^{\tilde{r}_2}, g_3^{\tilde{r}_3}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_3}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_4}, g_5^{\tilde{r}_4}) \bmod N^s$.</p> <p>$\tilde{e} := h_1^{\tilde{r}_1} h_2^{\tilde{r}_2} h_3^{\tilde{r}_3} h_4^{\tilde{r}_4} T^m \bmod N^s$.</p> <p>$t := g_1^m \bmod N \in \mathbb{Z}_N$.</p> <p>$\mathcal{E}.ct := (\tilde{u}_1, \dots, \tilde{u}_8, \tilde{e}, t)$.</p> <p>$\text{aiae.ct} \leftarrow \text{AIAE.Enc}(k, \mathcal{E}.ct, \text{aux})$.</p> <p>Return $\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle$.</p>	<p>$(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{prm})$:</p> <p>$x_1, y_1, x_2, y_2, x_3, y_3, x_4, y_4 \leftarrow \llbracket \frac{N^2}{4} \rrbracket$.</p> <p>$(h_1, h_2, h_3, h_4) := (g_1^{-x_1} g_2^{-y_1}, g_2^{-x_2} g_3^{-y_2}, g_3^{-x_3} g_4^{-y_3}, g_4^{-x_4} g_5^{-y_4}) \bmod N^s$.</p> <p>$\text{pk} := (h_1, h_2, h_3, h_4)$.</p> <p>$\text{sk} := (x_1, y_1, x_2, y_2, x_3, y_3, x_4, y_4)$.</p> <p>Return (pk, sk).</p> <hr/> <p>$m/\perp \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle)$:</p> <p>// $k/\perp \leftarrow \text{KEM.Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{aux})$:</p> <p>Parse $\text{aux} = (u_1, \dots, u_5, e_1, \dots, e_4)$.</p> <p>If $e_1 u_1^{x_1} u_2^{y_1}, e_2 u_2^{x_2} u_3^{y_2}, e_3 u_3^{x_3} u_4^{y_3}, e_4 u_4^{x_4} u_5^{y_4} \in \mathbb{RU}_{N^2}$</p> <p>$(k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4) := (\text{dlog}_T(e_1 u_1^{x_1} u_2^{y_1}), \text{dlog}_T(e_2 u_2^{x_2} u_3^{y_2}), \text{dlog}_T(e_3 u_3^{x_3} u_4^{y_3}), \text{dlog}_T(e_4 u_4^{x_4} u_5^{y_4})) \bmod N$.</p> <p>$k := (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$.</p> <p>Else, Return \perp.</p> <p>$\mathcal{E}.ct/\perp \leftarrow \text{AIAE.Dec}(k, \text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux})$.</p> <p>// $m/\perp \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.Dec(\text{sk}, \mathcal{E}.ct)$:</p> <p>Parse $\mathcal{E}.ct = (\tilde{u}_1, \dots, \tilde{u}_8, \tilde{e}, t)$.</p> <p>If $\tilde{e} \tilde{u}_1^{x_1} \tilde{u}_2^{y_1} \tilde{u}_3^{x_2} \tilde{u}_4^{y_2} \tilde{u}_5^{x_3} \tilde{u}_6^{y_3} \tilde{u}_7^{x_4} \tilde{u}_8^{y_4} \in \mathbb{RU}_{N^s}$</p> <p>$m := \text{dlog}_T(\tilde{e} \tilde{u}_1^{x_1} \tilde{u}_2^{y_1} \tilde{u}_3^{x_2} \tilde{u}_4^{y_2} \tilde{u}_5^{x_3} \tilde{u}_6^{y_3} \tilde{u}_7^{x_4} \tilde{u}_8^{y_4}) \bmod N^{s-1}$.</p> <p>If $t = g_1^m \bmod N$,</p> <p>Return m.</p> <p>Else, Return \perp.</p>
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Fig. 9. Construction of PKE from AIAE. The shadowed parts describe algorithms of building blocks KEM and \mathcal{E} . Here p, q contained in prm_{AIAE} are not provided in $\text{prm}'_{\text{AIAE}}$, since they are not necessary in the encryption and decryption algorithms of AIAE.

Theorem 2. *If the underlying scheme AIAE is IND- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA and weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA secure, the DCR assumption holds w.r.t. GenN and group \mathbb{QR}_{N^s} , and the DL Assumption holds w.r.t. GenN and group SCR_{N^s} , then the resulting scheme PKE in Fig. 9 is n -KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA secure.*

Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that \mathcal{A} is a PPT adversary against the n -KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA security of PKE, who makes at most Q_e times of ENC queries and Q_d times of DEC queries. We prove the theorem by defining a sequence of games. A rough description of differences between adjacent games is summarized in Table 3. (We also illustrate the games via Figs. 13-15 in Appendix D.) Before presenting the full detailed proof, we first give a high-level description how n -KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA security is achieved.

- (1) For the n secret key tuples, each tuple can be divided into two parts: for $i \in [n]$, $\text{sk}_i = (x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{j=1}^4 = ((x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{j=1}^4 \bmod N, (x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{j=1}^4 \bmod \phi(N)/4)$.
- (2) Each secret key tuple can be generated by adding a random shift $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{j=1}^4$ to a fixed base $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4$, i.e., $\text{sk}_i = (x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{j=1}^4 := (x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 + (\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{j=1}^4$.
- (3) Every public key tuple $\text{pk}_i = (h_{i,1}, \dots, h_{i,4})$ only reveals information about the $(\bmod \phi(N)/4)$ part of the secret key tuple sk_i .

- (4) For each encryption query from the adversary (f_λ, i_λ) , if the ENC oracle encrypts $f_\lambda(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n)$, the ciphertext might reveal information about sk_i through $\mathcal{E}.\text{ct}$. We have to change this fact such that the leaked information about sk_i in ENC is bounded.
- By IV_d assumption, we can change the generation of $\mathcal{E}.\text{ct}$ by oracle ENC such that it does not reveal any information about $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$, i.e., the $(\bmod N)$ part of the base secret key tuple.
 - By IV_d assumption, we can change the generation of $\text{kem.ct}(= \text{aux})$ by oracle ENC such that it encapsulates a different key, other than the key used in AIAE.Enc. If AIAE.Enc uses key $(r_\lambda k_j^* + s_{\lambda,j})_{j=1}^4$, then KEM.Enc encapsulates $(r_\lambda \cdot (k_j^* - \alpha_j x_j - \alpha_{j+1} y_j) - r_\lambda \cdot (\alpha_j \bar{x}_{i_\lambda,j} + \alpha_{j+1} \bar{y}_{i_\lambda,j}) + s_{\lambda,j})_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$. Thus, (k_1^*, \dots, k_4^*) is now protected by $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$.
- (5) Oracle DEC might also leak information about $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$. Therefore, we change how oracle DEC works so that decryption does not use $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$ any more. Observe that as long as the ciphertext queried by the adversary satisfies $\forall j \in [5], u_j \in \text{SCR}_{N^2}$ and $\forall j \in [8], \tilde{u}_j \in \text{SCR}_{N^s}$, DEC can use $\phi(N)$ and the $(\bmod \phi(N)/4)$ part of secret key for decryption.
- If $\exists j \in [5], u_j \notin \text{SCR}_{N^2}$ in the ciphertext queried by the adversary, we expect that AIAE.Dec will reject, due to its weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security.
 - If $\exists j \in [8], \tilde{u}_j \notin \text{SCR}_{N^s}$ in the ciphertext queried by the adversary, we expect decryption will result in $t \neq g_1^m \bmod N$, so $\mathcal{E}.\text{Dec}$ will reject.
- (6) Consequently, both $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$ and (k_1^*, \dots, k_4^*) are random to the adversary, and AIAE.Enc always uses the restricted affine function of (k_1^*, \dots, k_4^*) for encryption. Then IND- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE implies the n -KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA security.

In the proof, G_1 - G_2 are dedicated to deal with the n -user case; the aim of G_3 - G_4 is to eliminate the use of the $(\bmod N)$ part of $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4$ in ENC; the aim of G_5 - G_6 is to use $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$ to hide the AIAE's base key (k_1^*, \dots, k_4^*) in ENC, however, DEC may still leak the information about $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$; the aim of G_7 - G_8 is to eliminate the use of $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$ in DEC; finally, in G_9 - G_{10} , the IND- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE is used to prove the n -KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA security of PKE, since (k_1^*, \dots, k_4^*) is perfectly hidden by $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$.

- Game G_0 : This is the original n -KDM[\mathcal{F}_{aff}]-CCA game. Let Win denote the event that $\beta' = \beta$. Then by definition, $\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{kdm\text{-cca}}(\ell) = |\Pr_0[\text{Win}] - \frac{1}{2}|$.

Denote by $\text{pk}_i = (h_{i,1}, \dots, h_{i,4})$ and $\text{sk}_i = (x_{i,1}, y_{i,1}, \dots, x_{i,4}, y_{i,4})$ the public and secret keys of the i -th user respectively, $i \in [n]$.

- Game G_1 : This game is the same as game G_0 , except that, when answering the DEC query $(\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle, i \in [n])$, the challenger outputs \perp if $\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle = \langle \text{aux}_\lambda, \text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \rangle$ for some $\lambda \in [Q_e]$, where $\langle \text{aux}_\lambda, \text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \rangle$ is the challenge ciphertext for the λ -th ENC query (f_λ, i_λ) .

Case 1: $(\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle, i) = (\langle \text{aux}_\lambda, \text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \rangle, i_\lambda)$.

DEC will output \perp in game G_0 since $(\langle \text{aux}_\lambda, \text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \rangle, i_\lambda)$ is prohibited by DEC.

Case 2: $\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle = \langle \text{aux}_\lambda, \text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \rangle$ but $i \neq i_\lambda$.

We show that in game G_0 , DEC will output \perp , due to $e_{\lambda,1} u_{\lambda,1}^{x_{i,1}} u_{\lambda,2}^{y_{i,1}} \notin \mathbb{RU}_{N^2}$, with overwhelming probability. Recall that $u_{\lambda,1} = g_1^{r_\lambda}$, $u_{\lambda,2} = g_2^{r_\lambda}$, $e_{\lambda,1} = h_{i_\lambda,1}^{r_\lambda} T^{k_{\lambda,1}}$, so

$$e_{\lambda,1} u_{\lambda,1}^{x_{i,1}} u_{\lambda,2}^{y_{i,1}} = h_{i_\lambda,1}^{r_\lambda} T^{k_{\lambda,1}} \cdot (g_1^{r_\lambda})^{x_{i,1}} (g_2^{r_\lambda})^{y_{i,1}} = (h_{i_\lambda,1} h_{i,1}^{-1})^{r_\lambda} T^{k_{\lambda,1}} \bmod N^2,$$

Table 3. Brief description of the security proof of Theorem 2.

	Changes between adjacent games	Assumptions
G_0	The original n -KDM-CCA security game.	—
G_1	DEC: Reject if $\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle = \langle \text{aux}_\lambda, \text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \rangle$ for some $\lambda \in [Q_e]$.	$G_0 \approx_s G_1$
G_2	INITIALIZE: sample secret keys with $(x_{i,1}, y_{i,1}, \dots, x_{i,4}, y_{i,4}) := (x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) + (\bar{x}_{i,1}, \bar{y}_{i,1}, \dots, \bar{x}_{i,4}, \bar{y}_{i,4})$.	$G_1 = G_2$
G_3	ENC(f_λ, i_λ): use the secret keys to run KEM.Enc and \mathcal{E} .Enc	$G_2 = G_3$
G_4	ENC(f_λ, i_λ): when ENC oracle encrypts affine function of secret keys, \mathcal{E} .ct is computed with $(\tilde{u}_{\lambda,j})_{j \in [8]} := (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}} T^{\delta_1}, \dots, g_5^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}} T^{\delta_8})$ instead of $(g_1^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}}, \dots, g_5^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}})$. ENC does not use $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$ any more if $(\delta_j)_{j \in [8]}$ is carefully chosen.	$G_3 \approx_c G_4$ by IV ₅
G_5	ENC(f_λ, i_λ): kem.ct = aux of KEM.Enc is computed with $(u_{\lambda,j})_{j \in [5]} := ((g_j^{r_\lambda} T^{\alpha_j})^{r_\lambda})_{j \in [5]}$ instead of $(g_j^{r_\lambda})_{j \in [5]}$. Now KEM.Enc encapsulates four keys $(k_{\lambda,j} - r_\lambda \cdot (\alpha_j x_{i,j} + \alpha_{j+1} y_{i,j}))_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$ but $(k_{\lambda,j})_{j=1}^4$ is the key used in AIAE.Enc.	$G_4 \approx_c G_5$ by IV ₅
G_6	ENC(f_λ, i_λ): Sample $k_{\lambda,j} := r_\lambda k_j^* + s_{\lambda,j}$ for $j \in [4]$. Now KEM.Enc encapsulates four keys $(r_\lambda (k_j^* - \alpha_j x_j - \alpha_{j+1} y_j) - r_\lambda (\alpha_j \bar{x}_{i,j} + \alpha_{j+1} \bar{y}_{i,j}) + s_{\lambda,j})_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$ but $(r_\lambda k_j^* + s_{\lambda,j})_{j=1}^4$ is the key used in AIAE.Enc.	$G_5 = G_6$
G_7	DEC: Use $\phi(N)$ and secret keys to answer decryption queries.	$G_6 = G_7$
G_8	DEC: Add an additional rejection rule. Reject if $\text{Bad}' := (\exists u_j \notin \text{SCR}_{N^2})$ or $\text{Bad} := (\forall u_j \in \text{SCR}_{N^2}) \wedge (\exists \tilde{u}_j \notin \text{SCR}_{N^s})$ happens. Bad' and Bad can be detected by using $\phi(N)$. Now only the $(\bmod \phi(N)/4)$ part of secret key and $\phi(N)$ are used in DEC. The randomness of $(\alpha_j x_j + \alpha_{j+1} y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$ perfectly hides (k_1^*, \dots, k_4^*) in ENC, thus (k_1^*, \dots, k_4^*) is uniform. $(r_\lambda k_j^* + s_{\lambda,j})_{j=1}^4$ is the key used in AIAE.Enc. Bad' may lead to a fresh successful forgery for AIAE.	$G_7 = G_8$ if neither Bad' nor Bad happens. Pr[Bad'] = negl due to weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE
G_9	INITIALIZE: Sample an independent random tuple $(\bar{k}_1^*, \dots, \bar{k}_4^*)$. ENC(f_λ, i_λ): Use $(r_\lambda \bar{k}_j^* + s_{\lambda,j})_{j=1}^4$ in AIAE.Enc.	$G_8 = G_9$ to the adversary
G_{10}	ENC: Encrypt zeros instead of the affine function of secret keys. $\widetilde{\text{Bad}}$ happens with negligible probability, since $t \neq g_1^m \bmod N$ in DEC. Adversary \mathcal{A} wins with probability 1/2.	$G_9 \approx_c G_{10}$ by IND- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of AIAE. Pr[$\widetilde{\text{Bad}}$] = negl

where $h_{i_\lambda,1}$ and $h_{i,1}$ are parts of public key of different users i_λ and i respectively and are uniformly distributed over SCR_{N^s} . So $h_{i_\lambda,1} h_{i,1}^{-1} \neq 1$, hence $e_{\lambda,1} u_{\lambda,1}^{x_{i,1}} u_{\lambda,2}^{y_{i,1}} \notin \text{RU}_{N^2}$, except with probability $2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

By a union bound, G_0 and G_1 are identical except with probability $Q_d \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$, therefore $|\text{Pr}_0[\text{Win}] - \text{Pr}_1[\text{Win}]| \leq Q_d \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

- Game G_2 : This game is the same as game G_1 , except that, the challenger samples the secret keys $\text{sk}_i = (x_{i,1}, y_{i,1}, \dots, x_{i,4}, y_{i,4})$, $i \in [n]$, in a different way. First, it chooses random $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4)$ and $(\bar{x}_{i,1}, \bar{y}_{i,1}, \dots, \bar{x}_{i,4}, \bar{y}_{i,4})$, $i \in [n]$, from $[[N^2/4]]$, then it computes $(x_{i,1}, y_{i,1}, \dots, x_{i,4}, y_{i,4}) = (x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) + (\bar{x}_{i,1}, \bar{y}_{i,1}, \dots, \bar{x}_{i,4}, \bar{y}_{i,4}) \bmod [N^2/4]$ for $i \in [n]$.

Obviously, the secret keys $\text{sk}_i = (x_{i,1}, y_{i,1}, \dots, x_{i,4}, y_{i,4})$ are uniformly distributed. Hence G_2 is identical to G_1 , and $\Pr_1[\text{Win}] = \Pr_2[\text{Win}]$.

- Game G_3 : This game is the same as game G_2 , except that, when responding to the adversary's λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query (f_λ, i_λ) , instead of using the public keys $\text{pk}_{i_\lambda} = (h_{i_\lambda,1}, \dots, h_{i_\lambda,4})$, the challenger uses the secret keys $\text{sk}_{i_\lambda} = (x_{i_\lambda,1}, y_{i_\lambda,1}, \dots, x_{i_\lambda,4}, y_{i_\lambda,4})$ to prepare $(e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4})$ and \tilde{e}_λ as follows:

- $(e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4}) := (u_{\lambda,1}^{-x_{i_\lambda,1}} u_{\lambda,2}^{-y_{i_\lambda,1}} T^{k_{\lambda,1}}, \dots, u_{\lambda,4}^{-x_{i_\lambda,4}} u_{\lambda,5}^{-y_{i_\lambda,4}} T^{k_{\lambda,4}}) \bmod N^2$,
- $\tilde{e}_\lambda := \tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}^{-x_{i_\lambda,1}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,2}^{-y_{i_\lambda,1}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,3}^{-x_{i_\lambda,2}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,4}^{-y_{i_\lambda,2}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,5}^{-x_{i_\lambda,3}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,6}^{-y_{i_\lambda,3}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,7}^{-x_{i_\lambda,4}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8}^{-y_{i_\lambda,4}} T^{m_\beta} \bmod N^s$.

Observe that for $j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$,

$$\begin{aligned} e_{\lambda,j} &\stackrel{\mathsf{G}_2}{=} h_{i_\lambda,j}^{r_\lambda} T^{k_{\lambda,j}} = (g_j^{-x_{i_\lambda,j}} g_{j+1}^{-y_{i_\lambda,j}})^{r_\lambda} T^{k_{\lambda,j}} \stackrel{\mathsf{G}_3}{=} u_{\lambda,j}^{-x_{i_\lambda,j}} u_{\lambda,j+1}^{-y_{i_\lambda,j}} T^{k_{\lambda,j}} \bmod N^2, \\ \tilde{e}_\lambda &\stackrel{\mathsf{G}_2}{=} h_{i_\lambda,1}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}} \dots h_{i_\lambda,4}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}} T^{m_\beta} = (g_1^{-x_{i_\lambda,1}} g_2^{-y_{i_\lambda,1}})^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}} \dots (g_4^{-x_{i_\lambda,4}} g_5^{-y_{i_\lambda,4}})^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}} T^{m_\beta} \\ &\stackrel{\mathsf{G}_3}{=} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}^{-x_{i_\lambda,1}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,2}^{-y_{i_\lambda,1}} \dots \tilde{u}_{\lambda,7}^{-x_{i_\lambda,4}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8}^{-y_{i_\lambda,4}} T^{m_\beta} \bmod N^s. \end{aligned}$$

Thus G_3 is identical to G_2 , and $\Pr_2[\text{Win}] = \Pr_3[\text{Win}]$.

- Game G_4 : This game is the same as game G_3 , except that, in the case of the challenge bit $\beta = 1$, to answer the λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query (f_λ, i_λ) , the challenger does not use $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$ to compute \tilde{e}_λ any more, and instead, it computes $(\tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8})$ and \tilde{e}_λ as follows:

- $(\tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8}) := (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,2}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,2}}, g_3^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,2}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,2}},$
 $g_3^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,3}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,3}}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,3}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,3}}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,4}}, g_5^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,4}}) \bmod N^s$,
- $\tilde{e}_\lambda := h_{i_\lambda,1}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}} \dots h_{i_\lambda,4}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^4 (a_{i,j}(\tilde{x}_{i,j} - \bar{x}_{i_\lambda,j}) + b_{i,j}(\tilde{y}_{i,j} - \bar{y}_{i_\lambda,j})) + c} \bmod N^s$,

where $f_\lambda = (\{a_{i,1}, b_{i,1}, \dots, a_{i,4}, b_{i,4}\}_{i \in [n]}, c) \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{aff}}$.

Observe that,

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{e}_\lambda &\stackrel{\mathsf{G}_4}{=} \prod_{j=1}^4 h_{i_\lambda,j}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,j}} \cdot T^{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^4 (a_{i,j}(\tilde{x}_{i,j} - \bar{x}_{i_\lambda,j}) + b_{i,j}(\tilde{y}_{i,j} - \bar{y}_{i_\lambda,j})) + c} \\ &= \prod_{j=1}^4 h_{i_\lambda,j}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,j}} \cdot T^{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^4 (a_{i,j}(x_{i,j} - x_{i_\lambda,j}) + b_{i,j}(y_{i,j} - y_{i_\lambda,j})) + c} \\ &= \prod_{j=1}^4 (g_j^{-x_{i_\lambda,j}} g_{j+1}^{-y_{i_\lambda,j}})^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,j}} \cdot T^{m_1 - \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^4 (a_{i,j} x_{i_\lambda,j} + b_{i,j} y_{i_\lambda,j})} \\ &= \prod_{j=1}^4 (g_j^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,j}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,j}})^{-x_{i_\lambda,j}} (g_{j+1}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,j}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,j}})^{-y_{i_\lambda,j}} \cdot T^{m_1} \\ &= \tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}^{-x_{i_\lambda,1}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,2}^{-y_{i_\lambda,1}} \dots \tilde{u}_{\lambda,7}^{-x_{i_\lambda,4}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8}^{-y_{i_\lambda,4}} T^{m_1} \bmod N^s, \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

where the third equality follows from $m_1 = \sum_{i=1}^n (a_{i,1} x_{i,1} + b_{i,1} y_{i,1} + \dots + a_{i,4} x_{i,4} + b_{i,4} y_{i,4}) + c$.

We analyze the difference between G_3 and G_4 via the following lemma.

Lemma 4. *There exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B}_1 against the IV_5 assumption w.r.t. GenN and QR_{N^s} , such that $|\Pr_3[\text{Win}] - \Pr_4[\text{Win}]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}, \mathcal{B}_1}^{iv_5}(\ell)$.*

Proof. According to the last line of Eq. (7), \tilde{e}_λ can be computed from $(\tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8})$ in the same way as in G_3 and G_4 . Hence the only difference between G_3 and G_4 is the distribution of $(\tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8})$ themselves.

It is straightforward to construct a PPT adversary $\mathcal{B}_1^{\text{CHAL}_{\text{IV}_5}^b}(N, g_1, \dots, g_5)$ to solve the IV_5 problem. \mathcal{B}_1 is given (N, g_1, \dots, g_5) and has access to its $\text{CHAL}_{\text{IV}_5}^b$ oracle. Now \mathcal{B}_1 simulates game G_3 or G_4 for adversary \mathcal{A} . First, \mathcal{B}_1 prepares the parameter prm and generates public and secret keys $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$, $i \in [n]$, as G_3 and G_4 . To answer the λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query (f_λ, i_λ) , where $f_\lambda = (\{a_{i,1}, b_{i,1}, \dots, a_{i,4}, b_{i,4}\}_{i \in [n]}, c) \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{aff}}$, \mathcal{B}_1 proceeds as follows: it queries its own $\text{CHAL}_{\text{IV}_5}^b$ oracle with $(\sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,1}, \sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,1}, *, *, *)$, $(*, \sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,2}, \sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,2}, *, *)$, $(*, *, \sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,3}, \sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,3}, *)$, $(*, *, *, \sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,4}, \sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,4})$, where the symbol “*” denotes dummy messages. Then \mathcal{B}_1 obtains its challenges $(\tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,2}, \tilde{*}, \tilde{*}, \tilde{*})$, $(\tilde{*}, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,3}, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,4}, \tilde{*}, \tilde{*})$, $(\tilde{*}, \tilde{*}, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,5}, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,6}, \tilde{*})$, $(\tilde{*}, \tilde{*}, \tilde{*}, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,7}, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8})$, and neglects “ $\tilde{*}$ ” terms. According to the $\text{CHAL}_{\text{IV}_5}^b$ oracle, $(\tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8})$ is

$$\text{Case 1 } (b = 0): \quad (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,2}}, g_3^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,2}}, g_3^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,3}}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,3}}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}}, g_5^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}}) \text{ or}$$

$$\text{Case 2 } (b = 1): \quad (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,2}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,2}}, g_3^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,2}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,2}}, \\ g_3^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,3}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,3}}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,3}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,3}}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n a_{i,4}}, g_5^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}} T^{\sum_{i=1}^n b_{i,4}}).$$

Next \mathcal{B}_1 uses the obtained $(\tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8})$ and the secret keys to compute \tilde{e}_λ via Eq. (7) for \mathcal{A} . In the meantime, \mathcal{B}_1 can also simulate DEC for \mathcal{A} since it knows the secret keys. Finally, \mathcal{B}_1 outputs 1 if the event Win occurs.

In Case 1, \mathcal{B}_1 perfectly simulates game G_3 for \mathcal{A} . In Case 2, \mathcal{B}_1 perfectly simulates game G_4 for \mathcal{A} . Any difference between $\text{Pr}_3[\text{Win}]$ and $\text{Pr}_4[\text{Win}]$ results in \mathcal{B}_1 's advantage over the IV_5 problem. \blacksquare

- Game G_5 : This game is the same as game G_4 , except that, the challenger chooses random $r^* \in [1, N/4]$ and $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_5 \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ beforehand (in INITIALIZE). In addition, to respond to the λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query (f_λ, i_λ) , the challenger computes $(u_{\lambda,1}, \dots, u_{\lambda,5})$ as follows:

- $(u_{\lambda,1}, \dots, u_{\lambda,5}) := ((g_1^{r^*} T^{\alpha_1})^{r_\lambda}, \dots, (g_5^{r^*} T^{\alpha_5})^{r_\lambda}) \bmod N^2$.

The only difference between G_4 and G_5 is the distribution of $(u_{\lambda,1}, \dots, u_{\lambda,5})$. In game G_4 , $(u_{\lambda,1}, \dots, u_{\lambda,5}) = (g_1^{r_\lambda}, \dots, g_5^{r_\lambda}) \bmod N^2$, while in game G_5 , $(u_{\lambda,1}, \dots, u_{\lambda,5}) = ((g_1^{r^*} T^{\alpha_1})^{r_\lambda}, \dots, (g_5^{r^*} T^{\alpha_5})^{r_\lambda}) \bmod N^2$. Similar to the previous lemma, it is straightforward to construct a PPT adversary to solve IV_5 problem by employing the power of adversary \mathcal{A} . Thus $|\text{Pr}_4[\text{Win}] - \text{Pr}_5[\text{Win}]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}}^{\text{iv}_5}(\ell)$, and its proof is similar to the previous one.

- Game G_6 : This game is the same as game G_5 , except that, the challenger chooses a random tuple $\mathbf{k}^* = (k_1^*, k_2^*, k_3^*, k_4^*)$ beforehand (in INITIALIZE). In addition, to respond to the λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query (f_λ, i_λ) , the challenger uses a different way to generate $\mathbf{k}_\lambda = (k_{\lambda,1}, k_{\lambda,2}, k_{\lambda,3}, k_{\lambda,4})$ and $(e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4})$:

- pick $\mathbf{s}_\lambda = (s_{\lambda,1}, s_{\lambda,2}, s_{\lambda,3}, s_{\lambda,4}) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^4$ and $r_\lambda \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{[1, N/4]}$ uniformly, and compute $\mathbf{k}_\lambda = (k_{\lambda,1}, k_{\lambda,2}, k_{\lambda,3}, k_{\lambda,4}) := (r_\lambda k_1^* + s_{\lambda,1}, \dots, r_\lambda k_4^* + s_{\lambda,4})$.
- $(e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4}) := (h_{i_{\lambda,1}}^{r^* r_\lambda} T^{r_\lambda \cdot (k_1^* - \alpha_1 x_{i_{\lambda,1}} - \alpha_2 y_{i_{\lambda,1}}) + s_{\lambda,1}}, \dots, h_{i_{\lambda,4}}^{r^* r_\lambda} T^{r_\lambda \cdot (k_4^* - \alpha_4 x_{i_{\lambda,4}} - \alpha_5 y_{i_{\lambda,4}}) + s_{\lambda,4}})$.

Clearly \mathbf{k}_λ is uniformly distributed over \mathbb{Z}_N^4 , as in game G_5 . At the same time, observe that for $j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$,

$$\begin{aligned} e_{\lambda,j} &\stackrel{\text{G}_5}{=} u_{\lambda,j}^{-x_{i_{\lambda,j}}} u_{\lambda,j+1}^{-y_{i_{\lambda,j}}} T^{k_{\lambda,j}} = (g_j^{r^*} T^{\alpha_j})^{-r_\lambda \cdot x_{i_{\lambda,j}}} (g_{j+1}^{r^*} T^{\alpha_{j+1}})^{-r_\lambda \cdot y_{i_{\lambda,j}}} T^{k_{\lambda,j}} \\ &= (g_j^{-x_{i_{\lambda,j}}} g_{j+1}^{-y_{i_{\lambda,j}}})^{r^* r_\lambda} T^{k_{\lambda,j} - r_\lambda \cdot (\alpha_j x_{i_{\lambda,j}} + \alpha_{j+1} y_{i_{\lambda,j}})} \\ &\stackrel{\text{G}_6}{=} h_{i_{\lambda,j}}^{r^* r_\lambda} T^{r_\lambda \cdot (k_j^* - \alpha_j x_{i_{\lambda,j}} - \alpha_{j+1} y_{i_{\lambda,j}}) + s_{\lambda,j}} \bmod N^2. \end{aligned}$$

Thus G_6 is identical to G_5 , and $\Pr_5[\text{Win}] = \Pr_6[\text{Win}]$.

- Game G_7 : This game is the same as game G_6 , except for a modification to answering the DEC queries $(\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle, i \in [n])$. The challenger uses the i -th user's secret key $\text{sk}_i = (x_{i,1}, y_{i,1}, \dots, x_{i,4}, y_{i,4})$ together with $\phi(N)$ to compute the decryption of ciphertext $\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle$, where $\text{aux} = (u_1, \dots, u_5, e_1, \dots, e_4)$. More precisely, it computes $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, \dots, k_4)$ and m as follows:

- $(\alpha'_1, \dots, \alpha'_5) := (\text{dlog}_T(u_1^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N), \dots, \text{dlog}_T(u_5^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)) \bmod N$,
 $(\gamma'_1, \dots, \gamma'_4) := (\text{dlog}_T(e_1^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N), \dots, \text{dlog}_T(e_4^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)) \bmod N$,
 $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, \dots, k_4) := (\alpha'_1 x_{i,1} + \alpha'_2 y_{i,1} + \gamma'_1, \dots, \alpha'_4 x_{i,4} + \alpha'_5 y_{i,4} + \gamma'_4) \bmod N$,
- $\mathcal{E}.\text{ct} = (\tilde{u}_1, \dots, \tilde{u}_8, \tilde{e}, t) / \perp \leftarrow \text{AIAE.Dec}(\mathbf{k}, \text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux})$,
- $(\tilde{\alpha}_1, \dots, \tilde{\alpha}_8) := (\text{dlog}_T(\tilde{u}_1^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N), \dots, \text{dlog}_T(\tilde{u}_8^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)) \bmod N^{s-1}$,
 $\tilde{\gamma} := \text{dlog}_T(\tilde{e}^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N) \bmod N^{s-1}$,
 $m := \tilde{\alpha}_1 x_{i,1} + \tilde{\alpha}_2 y_{i,1} + \tilde{\alpha}_3 x_{i,2} + \tilde{\alpha}_4 y_{i,2} + \tilde{\alpha}_5 x_{i,3} + \tilde{\alpha}_6 y_{i,3} + \tilde{\alpha}_7 x_{i,4} + \tilde{\alpha}_8 y_{i,4} + \tilde{\gamma} \bmod N^{s-1}$.

According to Eq. (1), for $j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} k_j &\stackrel{G_6}{=} \text{dlog}_T(e_j u_j^{x_{i,j}} u_{j+1}^{y_{i,j}}) = \text{dlog}_T((e_j u_j^{x_{i,j}} u_{j+1}^{y_{i,j}})^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N) \bmod N \\ &= \text{dlog}_T(u_j^{\phi(N) \cdot x_{i,j}})/\phi(N) + \text{dlog}_T(u_{j+1}^{\phi(N) \cdot y_{i,j}})/\phi(N) + \text{dlog}_T(e_j^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N) \\ &\stackrel{G_7}{=} \underbrace{\text{dlog}_T(u_j^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)}_{\alpha'_j} \cdot x_{i,j} + \underbrace{\text{dlog}_T(u_{j+1}^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)}_{\alpha'_{j+1}} \cdot y_{i,j} + \underbrace{\text{dlog}_T(e_j^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)}_{\gamma'_j}, \\ m &\stackrel{G_6}{=} \text{dlog}_T(\tilde{e} \tilde{u}_1^{x_{i,1}} \tilde{u}_2^{y_{i,1}} \tilde{u}_3^{x_{i,2}} \tilde{u}_4^{y_{i,2}} \tilde{u}_5^{x_{i,3}} \tilde{u}_6^{y_{i,3}} \tilde{u}_7^{x_{i,4}} \tilde{u}_8^{y_{i,4}}) \bmod N^{s-1} \\ &\stackrel{G_7}{=} \underbrace{\text{dlog}_T(\tilde{u}_1^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)}_{\tilde{\alpha}_1} \cdot x_{i,1} + \dots + \underbrace{\text{dlog}_T(\tilde{u}_8^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)}_{\tilde{\alpha}_8} \cdot y_{i,4} + \underbrace{\text{dlog}_T(\tilde{e}^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)}_{\tilde{\gamma}}. \end{aligned}$$

These changes are conceptual. So G_7 is identical to G_6 , and $\Pr_6[\text{Win}] = \Pr_7[\text{Win}]$.

- Game G_8 : This game is the same as game G_7 , except that, the challenger adds an additional rejection rule when answering DEC queries as follows:

- if $\alpha'_1 \neq 0 \vee \dots \vee \alpha'_5 \neq 0 \vee \tilde{\alpha}_1 \neq 0 \vee \dots \vee \tilde{\alpha}_8 \neq 0$, return \perp .

That is, the challenger will not output m in DEC unless $\alpha'_1 = \dots = \alpha'_5 = 0$ and $\tilde{\alpha}_1 = \dots = \tilde{\alpha}_8 = 0$ holds. Thus the values of $(x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$, in particular $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$, are not used any more in DEC.

Let Bad denote the event that \mathcal{A} makes a DEC query $(\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle, i \in [n])$, such that

$$e_1 u_1^{x_{i,1}} u_2^{y_{i,1}}, \dots, e_4 u_4^{x_{i,4}} u_5^{y_{i,4}} \in \mathbb{R}\mathbb{U}_{N^2} \wedge \text{AIAE.Dec}(\mathbf{k}, \text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux}) \neq \perp \quad (8)$$

$$\wedge \tilde{e} \tilde{u}_1^{x_{i,1}} \tilde{u}_2^{y_{i,1}} \tilde{u}_3^{x_{i,2}} \tilde{u}_4^{y_{i,2}} \tilde{u}_5^{x_{i,3}} \tilde{u}_6^{y_{i,3}} \tilde{u}_7^{x_{i,4}} \tilde{u}_8^{y_{i,4}} \in \mathbb{R}\mathbb{U}_{N^s} \wedge t = g_1^m \bmod N \quad (9)$$

$$\wedge (\alpha'_1 \neq 0 \vee \dots \vee \alpha'_5 \neq 0 \vee \tilde{\alpha}_1 \neq 0 \vee \dots \vee \tilde{\alpha}_8 \neq 0).$$

Clearly, games G_7 and G_8 are the same until Bad happens. Therefore, we have that $|\Pr_7[\text{Win}] - \Pr_8[\text{Win}]| \leq \Pr_8[\text{Bad}]$.

To prove that G_7 and G_8 are indistinguishable, we have to show that $\Pr_8[\text{Bad}]$ is negligible. This is not an easy task, and we further divide Bad to two disjoint sub-events:

* Bad' denotes the event that \mathcal{A} makes a DEC query such that

$$\text{Conditions (8), (9) hold} \wedge (\alpha'_1 \neq 0 \vee \dots \vee \alpha'_5 \neq 0).$$

* $\widetilde{\text{Bad}}$ denotes the event that \mathcal{A} makes a DEC query such that

$$\text{Conditions (8), (9) hold} \wedge (\alpha'_1 = \dots = \alpha'_5 = 0) \wedge (\tilde{\alpha}_1 \neq 0 \vee \dots \vee \tilde{\alpha}_8 \neq 0).$$

Then $\Pr_8[\text{Bad}] \leq \Pr_8[\text{Bad}'] + \Pr_8[\widetilde{\text{Bad}}]$. We give an upper bound for $\Pr_8[\text{Bad}']$ via the following lemma. The analysis of $\Pr_8[\widetilde{\text{Bad}}]$ is deferred to subsequent games.

Lemma 5. $\Pr_8[\text{Bad}'] \leq 2Q_d \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}}^{\text{weak-int-rka}}(\ell) + Q_d \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

Proof. In game G_8 , the challenger will not output m in DEC unless $\alpha'_1 = \dots = \alpha'_5 = 0$ and $\tilde{\alpha}_1 = \dots = \tilde{\alpha}_8 = 0$ holds. As a result, the information of $\phi(N)$ and the $(\text{mod } \phi(N)/4)$ part of all the secret keys, i.e., $(x_{i,1}, y_{i,1}, \dots, x_{i,4}, y_{i,4}) \text{ mod } \phi(N)/4$, $i \in [n]$, is enough for answering DEC queries. In particular, the values of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \text{ mod } N$ are not needed in DEC.

We further divide Bad' to the following two sub-events:

* $\text{Bad}'\text{-1}$ denotes the event that \mathcal{A} makes a DEC query such that

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Conditions (8), (9) hold} \wedge (\alpha'_1 \neq 0 \vee \dots \vee \alpha'_5 \neq 0) \\ &\wedge (\exists j \in [4], \alpha'_j/\alpha_j \neq \alpha'_{j+1}/\alpha_{j+1} \text{ mod } N). \end{aligned}$$

* $\text{Bad}'\text{-2}$ denotes the event that \mathcal{A} makes a DEC query such that

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Conditions (8), (9) hold} \wedge (\alpha'_1 \neq 0 \vee \dots \vee \alpha'_5 \neq 0) \\ &\wedge (\alpha'_1/\alpha_1 = \dots = \alpha'_5/\alpha_5 \text{ mod } N). \end{aligned}$$

Recall that $(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_5)$ are chosen in INITIALIZE.

We will consider the two sub-events in game G_8 separately via the following two claims.

Claim 2. $\Pr_8[\text{Bad}'\text{-1}] \leq Q_d \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}}^{\text{weak-int-rka}}(\ell) + Q_d \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

Proof. In game G_8 , the values of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \text{ mod } N$ are not used in DEC, and the computation of $t_\lambda = g_1^{m_\beta} \text{ mod } N$ in ENC only uses the values of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \text{ mod } \phi(N)/4$, since the order of $g_1 \in \text{SCR}_{N^s}$ is $\phi(N)/4$. Thus the only information about $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \text{ mod } N$ leaked to \mathcal{A} is through the computation of $(e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4})$ in ENC, which may leak the values of $(\alpha_1 x_1 + \alpha_2 y_1), (\alpha_2 x_2 + \alpha_3 y_2), (\alpha_3 x_3 + \alpha_4 y_3), (\alpha_4 x_4 + \alpha_5 y_4) \text{ mod } N$: for $j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$,

$$\begin{aligned} e_{\lambda,j} &= h_{i_{\lambda,j}}^{r^* r_\lambda} T^{r_\lambda \cdot (k_j^* - \alpha_j x_{i_{\lambda,j}} - \alpha_{j+1} y_{i_{\lambda,j}}) + s_{\lambda,j}} \text{ mod } N^2 \\ &= h_{i_{\lambda,j}}^{r^* r_\lambda} T^{r_\lambda \cdot \underbrace{(k_j^* - \alpha_j x_j - \alpha_{j+1} y_j - \alpha_j \bar{x}_{i_{\lambda,j}} - \alpha_{j+1} \bar{y}_{i_{\lambda,j}})}_{\triangleq \hat{k}_j} + s_{\lambda,j}} \text{ mod } N^2. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

If $\text{Bad}'\text{-1}$ occurs, for concreteness, say that $\alpha'_1/\alpha_1 \neq \alpha'_2/\alpha_2 \text{ mod } N$, then

$$k_1 = \alpha'_1 x_{i,1} + \alpha'_2 y_{i,1} + \gamma'_1 = \alpha'_1 x_1 + \alpha'_2 y_1 + \alpha'_1 \bar{x}_{i,1} + \alpha'_2 \bar{y}_{i,1} + \gamma'_1 \text{ mod } N,$$

the value of k_1 is independent of $(\alpha_1 x_1 + \alpha_2 y_1) \text{ mod } N$, thus uniformly distributed over \mathbb{Z}_N from the point of view of \mathcal{A} . By Remark 1, for $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$ where $k_1 \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N$, $\text{AIAE.Dec}(\mathbf{k}, \text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux}) \neq \perp$ happens with probability at most $\text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}}^{\text{weak-int-rka}}(\ell) + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

Then $\Pr_8[\text{Bad}'-1] \leq Q_d \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}}^{\text{weak-int-rka}}(\ell) + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)})$ by a union bound. \blacksquare

Claim 3. $\Pr_8[\text{Bad}'-2] \leq Q_d \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}}^{\text{weak-int-rka}}(\ell)$.

Proof. Similar to the discussion in the proof of the previous claim, in game G_8 , the only information about $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$ and $\mathbf{k}^* = (k_1^*, k_2^*, k_3^*, k_4^*)$ involved is through ENC, which uses the value of $\hat{k}_1 := (k_1^* - \alpha_1 x_1 - \alpha_2 y_1)$, $\hat{k}_2 := (k_2^* - \alpha_2 x_2 - \alpha_3 y_2)$, $\hat{k}_3 := (k_3^* - \alpha_3 x_3 - \alpha_4 y_3)$, $\hat{k}_4 := (k_4^* - \alpha_4 x_4 - \alpha_5 y_4) \bmod N$ via computing $(e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4})$ (see Eq. (10)), and also uses $\mathbf{k}_\lambda = r_\lambda \cdot (k_1^*, k_2^*, k_3^*, k_4^*) + (s_{\lambda,1}, \dots, s_{\lambda,4})$ as the encryption key of AIAE.Enc.

Note that because of the randomness of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$, $(\hat{k}_1, \hat{k}_2, \hat{k}_3, \hat{k}_4)$ are uniformly distributed and independent of $(k_1^*, k_2^*, k_3^*, k_4^*)$. Therefore it is possible to construct an algorithm to simulate DEC and ENC of game G_8 without $\mathbf{k}^* = (k_1^*, k_2^*, k_3^*, k_4^*)$ and $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$. The algorithm can also simulate AIAE.Enc as long as it has access to a weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA encryption oracle of the AIAE scheme.

More precisely, we construct a PPT adversary $\mathcal{B}_2(\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}})$, which has access to ENC_{AIAE} oracle, against the weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of the AIAE scheme, where $\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} = (N, p, q, \dots)$. \mathcal{B}_2 does not choose $\mathbf{k}^* = (k_1^*, k_2^*, k_3^*, k_4^*)$ in INITIALIZE any more, and it implicitly sets \mathbf{k}^* to be the encryption key used by its weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA challenger. \mathcal{B}_2 does not choose $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$ either, and instead, it chooses $\hat{\mathbf{k}} = (\hat{k}_1, \hat{k}_2, \hat{k}_3, \hat{k}_4)$ uniformly from \mathbb{Z}_N^4 . \mathcal{B}_2 picks $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod \phi(N)/4$ and $(\bar{x}_{i,1}, \bar{y}_{i,1}, \dots, \bar{x}_{i,4}, \bar{y}_{i,4}) \in [[N^2/4]]$, $i \in [n]$, randomly. To simulate ENC, \mathcal{B}_2 can use $(\bar{x}_{i,\lambda,j}, \bar{y}_{i,\lambda,j}, \hat{k}_j)_{j=1}^4$ to compute $(e_{\lambda,j})_{j=1}^4$ via Eq. (10), and use $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{j=1}^4$, $i \in [n]$, to compute \tilde{e}_λ . Note that \mathcal{B}_2 is able to compute $t_\lambda = g_1^{m_\beta} \bmod N$, even if $\beta = 1$, because it knows the $(\bmod \phi(N)/4)$ part of all the secret keys, i.e., $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod \phi(N)/4$ and $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{j=1}^4 \bmod \phi(N)/4$, $i \in [n]$. Then \mathcal{B}_2 submits $(\mathcal{E}.\text{ct}_\lambda, \text{aux}_\lambda, \langle r_\lambda, \mathbf{s}_\lambda = (s_{\lambda,1}, \dots, s_{\lambda,4}) \rangle)$ to its own ENC_{AIAE} oracle, and obtains aiae.ct_λ . The final ciphertext is $\langle \text{aux}_\lambda, \text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \rangle$. According to the weak-INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security game, the ENC_{AIAE} oracle will encrypt $\mathcal{E}.\text{ct}_\lambda$ with the auxiliary input aux_λ under the transformed key $\mathbf{k}_\lambda = r_\lambda \cdot \mathbf{k}^* + \mathbf{s}_\lambda$, that is, the ENC_{AIAE} oracle behaves as $\text{AIAE.Enc}(\mathbf{k}_\lambda, \mathcal{E}.\text{ct}_\lambda, \text{aux}_\lambda)$. Thus \mathcal{B}_2 's simulation of ENC is identical to G_8 . For DEC, \mathcal{B}_2 answers decryption queries with $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$ and the $(\bmod \phi(N)/4)$ part of all the secret keys, just like G_8 .

Suppose \mathcal{A} makes a DEC query $(\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle, i \in [n])$, such that Bad'-2 occurs. For concreteness, say that $r := \alpha'_1/\alpha_1 = \dots = \alpha'_5/\alpha_5 \neq 0 \bmod N$, then for $j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$,

$$\begin{aligned} k_j &= \alpha'_j x_{i,j} + \alpha'_{j+1} y_{i,j} + \gamma'_j = r \cdot (\alpha_j x_{i,j} + \alpha_{j+1} y_{i,j}) + \gamma'_j \bmod N \\ &= r \cdot k_j^* - r \cdot (k_j^* - \alpha_j x_{i,j} - \alpha_{j+1} y_{i,j}) + \gamma'_j \bmod N \\ &= r \cdot k_j^* - r \cdot \underbrace{(k_j^* - \alpha_j x_j - \alpha_{j+1} y_j - \alpha_j \bar{x}_{i,j} - \alpha_{j+1} \bar{y}_{i,j})}_{=\hat{k}_j} + \gamma'_j \bmod N \\ &= r \cdot k_j^* - r \cdot \underbrace{(\hat{k}_j - \alpha_j \bar{x}_{i,j} - \alpha_{j+1} \bar{y}_{i,j})}_{\triangleq \mathbf{s}_j} + \gamma'_j = r \cdot k_j^* + s_j \bmod N. \end{aligned}$$

Thus $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, \dots, k_4) = r \cdot \mathbf{k}^* + \mathbf{s}$, where $\mathbf{s} := (s_1, \dots, s_4)$. \mathcal{B}_2 can compute $\langle r, \mathbf{s} = (s_1, \dots, s_4) \rangle$ as above using $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j}, \hat{k}_j)_{j=1}^4$, and outputs $(\text{aux}, \langle r, \mathbf{s} \rangle, \text{aiae.ct})$ to its weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA challenger as a forgery. We analyze the success probability of \mathcal{B}_2 as follows:

Firstly, a valid decryption query from \mathcal{A} satisfies $\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle \neq \langle \text{aux}_\lambda, \text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \rangle$ for all $\lambda \in [Q_e]$, thus $(\text{aux}, \langle r, s \rangle, \text{aiae.ct}) \neq (\text{aux}_\lambda, \langle r_\lambda, s_\lambda \rangle, \text{aiae.ct}_\lambda)$ will hold for all $\lambda \in [Q_e]$, i.e., \mathcal{B}_2 always outputs a fresh forgery.

Secondly, if $\text{aux} = \text{aux}_\lambda$ for some $\lambda \in [Q_e]$, then it is easy to have that $\alpha'_1 = \alpha_1 \cdot r_\lambda, \dots, \alpha'_5 = \alpha_5 \cdot r_\lambda$ and thus $r = r_\lambda$. Furthermore for $j \in [4]$, it clearly holds that $\gamma'_j = r_\lambda \cdot (\hat{k}_j - \alpha_j \bar{x}_{i,j} - \alpha_{j+1} \bar{y}_{i,j}) + s_{\lambda,j}$ (cf. Eq. (10)), thus $s_j = -r \cdot (\hat{k}_j - \alpha_j \bar{x}_{i,j} - \alpha_{j+1} \bar{y}_{i,j}) + \gamma'_j = s_{\lambda,j}$ and $\mathbf{s} = \mathbf{s}_\lambda$. That is, if $\text{aux} = \text{aux}_\lambda$ for some $\lambda \in [Q_e]$, then it holds that $\langle r, \mathbf{s} \rangle = \langle r_\lambda, \mathbf{s}_\lambda \rangle$. Obviously it satisfies the additional special rule required for the weak INT- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security.

Finally, if Bad'-2 occurs in this decryption query, then $\text{AIAE.Dec}(\mathbf{k}, \text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux}) \neq \perp$, where $\mathbf{k} = r \cdot \mathbf{k}^* + \mathbf{s}$, will imply that \mathcal{B}_2 's forgery is successful.

In conclusion, we have that $\Pr_8[\text{Bad}'-2] \leq Q_d \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}, \mathcal{B}_2}^{\text{weak-int-rka}}(\ell)$. \blacksquare

Combining the above two claims, it holds that

$$\Pr_8[\text{Bad}'] \leq 2Q_d \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}}^{\text{weak-int-rka}}(\ell) + Q_d \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\ell)},$$

and Lemma 5 follows. \blacksquare

- Game G_9 : This game is the same as game G_8 , except that, the challenger chooses another random tuple $\bar{\mathbf{k}}^* = (\bar{k}_1^*, \bar{k}_2^*, \bar{k}_3^*, \bar{k}_4^*)$ besides $\mathbf{k}^* = (k_1^*, k_2^*, k_3^*, k_4^*)$ in INITIALIZE. In addition, to answer the λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query (f_λ, i_λ) , the challenger uses a different key for AIAE to compute aiae.ct_λ :

- set $\bar{\mathbf{k}}_\lambda = (\bar{k}_{\lambda,1}, \bar{k}_{\lambda,2}, \bar{k}_{\lambda,3}, \bar{k}_{\lambda,4}) := (r_\lambda \bar{k}_1^* + s_{\lambda,1}, \dots, r_\lambda \bar{k}_4^* + s_{\lambda,4})$;
- invoke $\text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \leftarrow_{\mathcal{S}} \text{AIAE.Enc}(\bar{\mathbf{k}}_\lambda, \mathcal{E}.ct_\lambda, \text{aux}_\lambda)$.

But the challenger still uses $\mathbf{k}^* = (k_1^*, k_2^*, k_3^*, k_4^*)$ to compute $(e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4})$.

In game G_8 , the only place that needs the value of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$ is the computation of $(e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4})$ in ENC. More precisely, for $j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$,

$$\begin{aligned} e_{\lambda,j} &= h_{i_\lambda,j}^{r^* r_\lambda} T^{r_\lambda \cdot (k_j^* - \alpha_j x_{i_\lambda,j} - \alpha_{j+1} y_{i_\lambda,j}) + s_{\lambda,j}} \bmod N^2 \\ &= h_{i_\lambda,j}^{r^* r_\lambda} T^{r_\lambda \cdot (k_j^* - \alpha_j x_j - \alpha_{j+1} y_j - \alpha_j \bar{x}_{i_\lambda,j} - \alpha_{j+1} \bar{y}_{i_\lambda,j}) + s_{\lambda,j}} \bmod N^2. \end{aligned}$$

We stress that the computation of $t_\lambda = g_1^{m_\beta} \bmod N$ in ENC only uses the values of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod \phi(N)/4$, since the order of $g_1 \in \text{SCR}_{N^s}$ is $\phi(N)/4$. We also note that neither $\mathbf{k}^* = (k_1^*, k_2^*, k_3^*, k_4^*)$ nor $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$ is involved in DEC since DEC rejects the ciphertext unless $\alpha'_1 = \dots = \alpha'_5 = 0$ and $\tilde{\alpha}_1 = \dots = \tilde{\alpha}_8 = 0$. As a result, $\mathbf{k}^* = (k_1^*, k_2^*, k_3^*, k_4^*)$ is totally hidden by the entropy of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$ and is uniformly random to \mathcal{A} .

Thus the challenger can use an independent $\bar{\mathbf{k}}^* = (\bar{k}_1^*, \dots, \bar{k}_4^*)$ to compute $\bar{\mathbf{k}}_\lambda$, and use $\bar{\mathbf{k}}_\lambda$ to do the encryption of the AIAE scheme in ENC, as in G_9 .

Then games G_8 and G_9 are identically distributed from the point of view of \mathcal{A} , thus we have $\Pr_8[\text{Win}] = \Pr_9[\text{Win}]$ and $\Pr_8[\text{Bad}] = \Pr_9[\text{Bad}]$.

- Game G_{10} : This game is the same as game G_9 , except that, to answer the λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query (f_λ, i_λ) , the challenger computes aiae.ct_λ as follows:

- invoke $\text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \leftarrow_{\mathcal{S}} \text{AIAE.Enc}(\bar{\mathbf{k}}_\lambda, 0^{\ell_{\mathcal{M}}}, \text{aux}_\lambda)$.

That is, the challenger computes the AIAE encryption of a constant $0^{\ell_{\mathcal{M}}}$ instead of $\mathcal{E}.\text{ct}_\lambda$ in ENC.

Note that in games \mathbf{G}_9 and \mathbf{G}_{10} , the key $\bar{\mathbf{k}}^* = (\bar{k}_1^*, \bar{k}_2^*, \bar{k}_3^*, \bar{k}_4^*)$ is used only in the computation of the AIAE encryption, where it uses $\bar{\mathbf{k}}_\lambda = r_\lambda \cdot \bar{\mathbf{k}}^* + \mathbf{s}_\lambda$, $\mathbf{s}_\lambda = (s_{\lambda,1}, \dots, s_{\lambda,4})$, as the encryption key. The difference between \mathbf{G}_9 and \mathbf{G}_{10} can be reduced to the IND- $\mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$ -RKA security of the AIAE scheme directly. Thus we have that both $|\Pr_9[\text{Win}] - \Pr_{10}[\text{Win}]|$, $|\Pr_9[\widetilde{\text{Bad}}] - \Pr_{10}[\widetilde{\text{Bad}}]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{AIAE}}^{\text{ind-rka}}(\ell)$.

Now in \mathbf{G}_{10} , the challenger computes the AIAE encryption of a constant $0^{\ell_{\mathcal{M}}}$ in ENC, thus the challenge bit β is completely hidden. Then $\Pr_{10}[\text{Win}] = \frac{1}{2}$.

We give an upper bound for $\Pr_{10}[\widetilde{\text{Bad}}]$ via the following lemma.

Lemma 6. $\Pr_{10}[\widetilde{\text{Bad}}] \leq (Q_d + 1) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\ell)} + \text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}}^{\text{dl}}(\ell)$.

Proof. In game \mathbf{G}_{10} , neither DEC nor ENC uses the values of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod \phi(N)/4$. The only information leaked about them lies in the public keys pk_i , $i \in [n]$, which reveal the values of $(w_1x_1 + w_2y_1)$, $(w_2x_2 + w_3y_2)$, $(w_3x_3 + w_4y_3)$, $(w_4x_4 + w_5y_4) \bmod \phi(N)/4$, where we denote $w_j := \text{dlog}_g g_j \bmod \phi(N)/4$ for some base $g \in \text{SCR}_{N^s}$, $j \in [5]$.

We may divide $\widetilde{\text{Bad}}$ to the following two sub-events:

* $\widetilde{\text{Bad-1}}$ denotes the event that \mathcal{A} makes a DEC query such that

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Conditions (8), (9) hold} \wedge (\alpha'_1 = \dots = \alpha'_5 = 0) \wedge (\tilde{\alpha}_1 \neq 0 \vee \dots \vee \tilde{\alpha}_8 \neq 0) \\ & \wedge (\tilde{\alpha}_1/w_1 \neq \tilde{\alpha}_2/w_2 \vee \tilde{\alpha}_3/w_2 \neq \tilde{\alpha}_4/w_3 \vee \tilde{\alpha}_5/w_3 \neq \tilde{\alpha}_6/w_4 \vee \tilde{\alpha}_7/w_4 \neq \tilde{\alpha}_8/w_5). \end{aligned}$$

* $\widetilde{\text{Bad-2}}$ denotes the event that \mathcal{A} makes a DEC query such that

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Conditions (8), (9) hold} \wedge (\alpha'_1 = \dots = \alpha'_5 = 0) \wedge (\tilde{\alpha}_1 \neq 0 \vee \dots \vee \tilde{\alpha}_8 \neq 0) \\ & \wedge (\tilde{\alpha}_1/w_1 = \tilde{\alpha}_2/w_2 \wedge \tilde{\alpha}_3/w_2 = \tilde{\alpha}_4/w_3 \wedge \tilde{\alpha}_5/w_3 = \tilde{\alpha}_6/w_4 \wedge \tilde{\alpha}_7/w_4 = \tilde{\alpha}_8/w_5). \end{aligned}$$

We will consider the two sub-events in game \mathbf{G}_{10} separately via the following two claims.

Claim 4. $\Pr_{10}[\widetilde{\text{Bad-1}}] \leq Q_d \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

Proof. If $\widetilde{\text{Bad-1}}$ occurs, for concreteness, say that $\tilde{\alpha}_1/w_1 \neq \tilde{\alpha}_2/w_2$, then

$$g_1^m = g_1^{\tilde{\alpha}_1 x_{i,1} + \tilde{\alpha}_2 y_{i,1} + \dots} = g_1^{\tilde{\alpha}_1 x_1 + \tilde{\alpha}_2 y_1 + \tilde{\alpha}_1 \bar{x}_{i,1} + \tilde{\alpha}_2 \bar{y}_{i,1} + \dots} \bmod \phi(N)/4 \bmod N,$$

and the value of $(\tilde{\alpha}_1 x_1 + \tilde{\alpha}_2 y_1) \bmod \phi(N)/4$ is independent of $(w_1 x_1 + w_2 y_1) \bmod \phi(N)/4$. Thus $g_1^m \bmod N$ is uniformly distributed over SCR_{N^s} from the point of view of \mathcal{A} , and $t = g_1^m \bmod N$ will not hold except with a negligible probability $2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

Then by a union bound, $\Pr_{10}[\widetilde{\text{Bad-1}}] \leq Q_d \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$. ■

Claim 5. There exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B}_3 against the DL assumption w.r.t. GenN and SCR_{N^s} , such that $\Pr_{10}[\widetilde{\text{Bad-2}}] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}, \mathcal{B}_3}^{\text{dl}}(\ell) + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

Proof. In game \mathbf{G}_{10} , if $\widetilde{\text{Bad-2}}$ occurs, then we can construct a PPT adversary $\mathcal{B}_3(N, p, q, g, h)$ to compute the discrete logarithm of h based on g , where $g, h \in \text{SCR}_{N^s}$. With (N, p, q, g, h) , \mathcal{B}_3 simulates INITIALIZE as follows. \mathcal{B}_3 picks z_j, z'_j uniformly from $[\phi(N)/4]$, and sets $g_j := g^{z_j} h^{z'_j}$ for

$j \in [5]$. Then g_j is uniformly distributed over SCR_{N^s} . Next, \mathcal{B}_3 samples secret keys and computes public keys just the same way as INITIALIZE in \mathbf{G}_{10} . Since \mathcal{B}_3 knows $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$ and all the secret keys, it can perfectly simulate ENC and DEC the same way as \mathbf{G}_{10} does. Furthermore, z'_j is hidden by z_j perfectly from the point of view of \mathcal{A} . If we denote $w := \text{dlog}_g h \bmod \phi(N)/4$, then for $j \in [5]$, $w_j = \text{dlog}_{g_j} g_j = z_j + wz'_j \bmod \phi(N)/4$.

If $\widetilde{\text{Bad-2}}$ occurs in DEC, for concreteness, say that $\tilde{\alpha}_1/w_1 = \tilde{\alpha}_2/w_2 \neq 0 \bmod \phi(N)/4$, i.e., $g_1^{\tilde{\alpha}_2} = g_2^{\tilde{\alpha}_1} \neq 1$, then \mathcal{B}_3 can compute w by solving the equation $w_1 \tilde{\alpha}_2 = w_2 \tilde{\alpha}_1 \bmod \phi(N)/4$, or equivalently,

$$z_1 \tilde{\alpha}_2 + wz'_1 \tilde{\alpha}_2 = z_2 \tilde{\alpha}_1 + wz'_2 \tilde{\alpha}_1 \bmod \phi(N)/4.$$

Since z'_j is hidden from the point of view of \mathcal{A} , then $(z'_1 \tilde{\alpha}_2 - z'_2 \tilde{\alpha}_1) \bmod \phi(N)/4$ is multiplicative invertible except with probability $2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$. Thus \mathcal{B}_3 will succeed in computing the discrete logarithm of h based on g , and output $w = (z'_1 \tilde{\alpha}_2 - z'_2 \tilde{\alpha}_1)^{-1} \cdot (z_2 \tilde{\alpha}_1 - z_1 \tilde{\alpha}_2) \bmod \phi(N)/4$ to its challenger. Clearly, we have $\Pr_{10}[\widetilde{\text{Bad-2}}] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}, \mathcal{B}_3}^{dl}(\ell) + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$. \blacksquare

Combining the above two claims, it holds that

$$\Pr_{10}[\widetilde{\text{Bad}}] \leq (Q_d + 1) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\ell)} + \text{Adv}_{\text{GenN}}^{dl}(\ell),$$

and Lemma 6 follows. \blacksquare

Taking all things together, the n -KDM $[\mathcal{F}_{\text{aff}}]$ -CCA security of PKE follows. \blacksquare

6 PKE with n -KDM $[\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d]$ -CCA Security

6.1 The Basic Idea

We consider how to construct a PKE which is n -KDM-CCA secure w.r.t. the set of polynomial functions of bounded degree d , denoted by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$, where d can be polynomial in security parameter ℓ . We will consider adversaries submitting f in the format of *Modular Arithmetic Circuit* (MAC) [MTY11] (cf. Definition 13 in Appendix A), i.e., a polynomial-size circuit which computes f . In particular, we do not require a prior bound on the size of circuits, but only require a prior bound d on the degree of the polynomials. Our construction still follows the approach in Fig. 1. In fact, our n -KDM $[\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d]$ -CCA secure PKE shares the same building blocks KEM and AIAE with the previous PKE in Fig. 9 which has n -KDM $[\mathcal{F}_{\text{aff}}]$ -CCA security. What we should do is to design a new building block \mathcal{E} , which can function as an entropy filter for polynomial functions. Our new \mathcal{E} still share the same secret/public key pair with KEM. Hence for $i \in [n]$, we have $\text{sk}_i = (x_{i,1}, y_{i,1}, \dots, x_{i,4}, y_{i,4})$ and $\text{pk}_i = (h_{i,1}, \dots, h_{i,4})$ with $h_{i,1} = g_1^{-x_{i,1}} g_2^{-y_{i,1}}, \dots, h_{i,4} = g_4^{-x_{i,4}} g_5^{-y_{i,4}} \bmod N^s$.

6.2 Reducing Polynomials of $8n$ Variables to Polynomials of 8 Variables

How to Reduce $8n$ -Variable Polynomial f_λ in ENC($f_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n]$). In the n -KDM $[\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d]$ -CCA game, the adversary will submit $(f_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n])$ to ENC as its λ -th KDM encryption query. Here f_λ is a degree- d polynomial $f_\lambda((x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]})$ of the n secret keys, which has $8n$ variables. Note that f_λ will contain at most $\binom{8n+d}{8n} = \Theta(d^{8n})$ monomials, which is exponentially large.

To reduce the number of monomials, we can always change the polynomial $f_\lambda((x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]})$ of $8n$ variables to a polynomial $f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]})$ of 8 variables as follows. Then f'_λ will contain at most $\binom{8+d}{8} = \Theta(d^8)$ monomials, which is polynomial in ℓ .

In INITIALIZE, the secret keys can be generated with $x_{i,j} := x_j + \bar{x}_{i,j}$ and $y_{i,j} := y_j + \bar{y}_{i,j} \bmod \lfloor N^2/4 \rfloor$ for $i \in [n]$ and $j \in [4]$. Then with the values of $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}$, we can represent $(x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}$ as shifts of $(x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}$:

$$x_{i,j} = x_{i_\lambda,j} + \bar{x}_{i,j} - \bar{x}_{i_\lambda,j}, \quad y_{i,j} = y_{i_\lambda,j} + \bar{y}_{i,j} - \bar{y}_{i_\lambda,j},$$

and reduce the polynomial f_λ in $8n$ variables $(x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}$ to a polynomial f'_λ in 8 variables $(x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}$:

$$\begin{aligned} f_\lambda((x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}) &= f_\lambda(\underbrace{(x_{i_\lambda,j} + \bar{x}_{i,j} - \bar{x}_{i_\lambda,j})}_{x_{i,j}}, \underbrace{(y_{i_\lambda,j} + \bar{y}_{i,j} - \bar{y}_{i_\lambda,j})}_{y_{i,j}})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]} \\ &= f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}) = \sum_{0 \leq c_1 + \dots + c_8 \leq d} a_{(c_1, \dots, c_8)} \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1}^{c_1} y_{i_\lambda,1}^{c_2} x_{i_\lambda,2}^{c_3} y_{i_\lambda,2}^{c_4} x_{i_\lambda,3}^{c_5} y_{i_\lambda,3}^{c_6} x_{i_\lambda,4}^{c_7} y_{i_\lambda,4}^{c_8}. \end{aligned}$$

The resulting polynomial f'_λ is also of degree at most d , and the coefficients $a_{(c_1, \dots, c_8)}$ are determined by $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}$ completely.

How to Determine Coefficients $a_{(c_1, \dots, c_8)}$ for f'_λ Efficiently with Only $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}$. Repeat choosing values of $(x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}$ randomly, feeding MAC (which functions as f_λ) with input of $(x_{i_\lambda,j} + \bar{x}_{i,j} - \bar{x}_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j} + \bar{y}_{i,j} - \bar{y}_{i_\lambda,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}$, where $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}$ always takes the values chosen in INITIALIZE, and recording the output of MAC. After about $\binom{8+d}{8} = \Theta(d^8)$ times, we can extract all $a_{(c_1, \dots, c_8)}$ by simply solving a system of linear equations (with $a_{(c_1, \dots, c_8)}$ unknowns):

$$\begin{aligned} f_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j} + \bar{x}_{i,j} - \bar{x}_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j} + \bar{y}_{i,j} - \bar{y}_{i_\lambda,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}) \\ = \sum_{0 \leq c_1 + \dots + c_8 \leq d} a_{(c_1, \dots, c_8)} \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1}^{c_1} y_{i_\lambda,1}^{c_2} x_{i_\lambda,2}^{c_3} y_{i_\lambda,2}^{c_4} x_{i_\lambda,3}^{c_5} y_{i_\lambda,3}^{c_6} x_{i_\lambda,4}^{c_7} y_{i_\lambda,4}^{c_8}. \end{aligned}$$

This can be done in time polynomial in ℓ .

6.3 How to Design \mathcal{E} : A Warmup

Let us first consider a simple case: design \mathcal{E} w.r.t. a specific type of monomials

$$f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}) = a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1} x_{i_\lambda,2} y_{i_\lambda,2} x_{i_\lambda,3} y_{i_\lambda,3} x_{i_\lambda,4} y_{i_\lambda,4}.$$

We describe the encryption and decryption algorithms $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}$, $\mathcal{E}.\text{Dec}$ in Fig. 10.

Security proof. We can prove KDM-CCA security w.r.t. the specific type of monomials, i.e., $a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1} x_{i_\lambda,2} y_{i_\lambda,2} x_{i_\lambda,3} y_{i_\lambda,3} x_{i_\lambda,4} y_{i_\lambda,4}$, in a similar way as the proof of Theorem 2 (cf. Table 3). The only difference lies in games G_3 - G_4 , which are related to \mathcal{E} . We replace G_3 - G_4 with the following three steps (Step 1 - Step 3), as shown in Fig. 11. More precisely, we change the $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}$ part of ENC so that it can reserve the entropy of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$, behaving like an entropy filter w.r.t. this specific kind of monomials.

Suppose that the adversary submits $(f_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n])$ to ENC. Our aim is to reserve the entropy of $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$ from $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}(\text{pk}_{i_\lambda}, f_\lambda((x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}))$.

$\mathcal{E}.ct \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.Enc(pk = (h_1, h_2, h_3, h_4), m):$ For $l \in [0, 8]$, $\tilde{r}_{l,1}, \tilde{r}_{l,2}, \tilde{r}_{l,3}, \tilde{r}_{l,4} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z} \left[\frac{N}{4} \right].$ $(\tilde{u}_{l,1}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{l,8}) := (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{l,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{l,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{l,2}}, g_3^{\tilde{r}_{l,2}},$ $g_3^{\tilde{r}_{l,3}}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_{l,3}}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_{l,4}}, g_5^{\tilde{r}_{l,4}}) \bmod N^s.$ $\tilde{v}_l := h_1^{\tilde{r}_{l,1}} h_2^{\tilde{r}_{l,2}} h_3^{\tilde{r}_{l,3}} h_4^{\tilde{r}_{l,4}} \bmod N^s.$ <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td>$\tilde{u}_{0,1}$</td><td>$\tilde{u}_{0,2}$</td><td>\dots</td><td>$\tilde{u}_{0,8}$</td></tr> <tr><td>$\tilde{u}_{1,1} \cdot \tilde{v}_0$</td><td>$\tilde{u}_{1,2}$</td><td>$\dots$</td><td>$\tilde{u}_{1,8}$</td></tr> <tr><td>$\tilde{u}_{2,1}$</td><td>$\tilde{u}_{2,2} \cdot \tilde{v}_1$</td><td>$\dots$</td><td>$\tilde{u}_{2,8}$</td></tr> <tr><td>$\vdots$</td><td>$\vdots$</td><td>$\ddots$</td><td>$\vdots$</td></tr> <tr><td>$\tilde{u}_{8,1}$</td><td>$\tilde{u}_{8,2}$</td><td>$\dots$</td><td>$\tilde{u}_{8,8} \cdot \tilde{v}_7$</td></tr> </table> $\tilde{e} := \tilde{v}_8 \cdot T^m \bmod N^s.$ $t := g_1^m \bmod N \in \mathbb{Z}_N.$ Return $\mathcal{E}.ct := (\text{table}, \tilde{e}, t).$	$\tilde{u}_{0,1}$	$\tilde{u}_{0,2}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{0,8}$	$\tilde{u}_{1,1} \cdot \tilde{v}_0$	$\tilde{u}_{1,2}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{1,8}$	$\tilde{u}_{2,1}$	$\tilde{u}_{2,2} \cdot \tilde{v}_1$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{2,8}$	\vdots	\vdots	\ddots	\vdots	$\tilde{u}_{8,1}$	$\tilde{u}_{8,2}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{8,8} \cdot \tilde{v}_7$	$m/\perp \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.Dec(sk = (x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4), \mathcal{E}.ct):$ Parse $\mathcal{E}.ct = (\text{table}, \tilde{e}, t).$ <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td>$\hat{u}_{0,1}$</td><td>$\hat{u}_{0,2}$</td><td>\dots</td><td>$\hat{u}_{0,8}$</td></tr> <tr><td>$\hat{u}_{1,1}$</td><td>$\hat{u}_{1,2}$</td><td>\dots</td><td>$\hat{u}_{1,8}$</td></tr> <tr><td>\vdots</td><td>\vdots</td><td>\ddots</td><td>\vdots</td></tr> <tr><td>$\hat{u}_{8,1}$</td><td>$\hat{u}_{8,2}$</td><td>\dots</td><td>$\hat{u}_{8,8}$</td></tr> </table> $\hat{v}_0 := \hat{u}_{0,1}^{-x_1} \hat{u}_{0,2}^{-y_1} \hat{u}_{0,3}^{-x_2} \hat{u}_{0,4}^{-y_2} \hat{u}_{0,5}^{-x_3} \hat{u}_{0,6}^{-y_3} \hat{u}_{0,7}^{-x_4} \hat{u}_{0,8}^{-y_4} \bmod N^s.$ $\hat{v}_1 := (\hat{u}_{1,1}/\hat{v}_0)^{-x_1} \hat{u}_{1,2}^{-y_1} \hat{u}_{1,3}^{-x_2} \hat{u}_{1,4}^{-y_2} \hat{u}_{1,5}^{-x_3} \hat{u}_{1,6}^{-y_3} \hat{u}_{1,7}^{-x_4} \hat{u}_{1,8}^{-y_4} \bmod N^s.$ $\hat{v}_2 := \hat{u}_{2,1}^{-x_1} (\hat{u}_{2,2}/\hat{v}_1)^{-y_1} \hat{u}_{2,3}^{-x_2} \hat{u}_{2,4}^{-y_2} \hat{u}_{2,5}^{-x_3} \hat{u}_{2,6}^{-y_3} \hat{u}_{2,7}^{-x_4} \hat{u}_{2,8}^{-y_4} \bmod N^s.$ \vdots $\hat{v}_8 := \hat{u}_{8,1}^{-x_1} \hat{u}_{8,2}^{-y_1} \hat{u}_{8,3}^{-x_2} \hat{u}_{8,4}^{-y_2} \hat{u}_{8,5}^{-x_3} \hat{u}_{8,6}^{-y_3} \hat{u}_{8,7}^{-x_4} (\hat{u}_{8,8}/\hat{v}_7)^{-y_4} \bmod N^s.$ If $\tilde{e}/\hat{v}_8 \in \mathbb{R}U_{N^s}$, $m := \text{dlog}_T(\tilde{e}/\hat{v}_8) \bmod N^{s-1}.$ If $t = g_1^m \bmod N$, Return $m.$ Otherwise, Return $\perp.$	$\hat{u}_{0,1}$	$\hat{u}_{0,2}$	\dots	$\hat{u}_{0,8}$	$\hat{u}_{1,1}$	$\hat{u}_{1,2}$	\dots	$\hat{u}_{1,8}$	\vdots	\vdots	\ddots	\vdots	$\hat{u}_{8,1}$	$\hat{u}_{8,2}$	\dots	$\hat{u}_{8,8}$
$\tilde{u}_{0,1}$	$\tilde{u}_{0,2}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{0,8}$																																		
$\tilde{u}_{1,1} \cdot \tilde{v}_0$	$\tilde{u}_{1,2}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{1,8}$																																		
$\tilde{u}_{2,1}$	$\tilde{u}_{2,2} \cdot \tilde{v}_1$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{2,8}$																																		
\vdots	\vdots	\ddots	\vdots																																		
$\tilde{u}_{8,1}$	$\tilde{u}_{8,2}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{8,8} \cdot \tilde{v}_7$																																		
$\hat{u}_{0,1}$	$\hat{u}_{0,2}$	\dots	$\hat{u}_{0,8}$																																		
$\hat{u}_{1,1}$	$\hat{u}_{1,2}$	\dots	$\hat{u}_{1,8}$																																		
\vdots	\vdots	\ddots	\vdots																																		
$\hat{u}_{8,1}$	$\hat{u}_{8,2}$	\dots	$\hat{u}_{8,8}$																																		

Fig. 10. \mathcal{E} designed for the specific type of monomials $a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1} x_{i_\lambda,2} y_{i_\lambda,2} x_{i_\lambda,3} y_{i_\lambda,3} x_{i_\lambda,4} y_{i_\lambda,4}.$

Step 0: In INITIALIZE, the secret keys are generated with $x_{i,j} := x_j + \bar{x}_{i,j}$ and $y_{i,j} := y_j + \bar{y}_{i,j} \bmod \lfloor N^2/4 \rfloor$ for $i \in [n]$, $j \in [4]$. This is the same as G_2 in the proof of Theorem 2.

Step 1: Use $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}$ to re-explain $(f_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n])$ as $(f'_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n])$, and determine the coefficient a of the monomial

$$f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}) = a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1} x_{i_\lambda,2} y_{i_\lambda,2} x_{i_\lambda,3} y_{i_\lambda,3} x_{i_\lambda,4} y_{i_\lambda,4}.$$

Step 2: Use secret key $sk_{i_\lambda} = (x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}$ (together with public key $pk_{i_\lambda} = (h_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}$) to implement $\mathcal{E}.Enc$ (This corresponds to G_3 in the proof of Theorem 2).

- Setup table, just like $\mathcal{E}.Enc$.
- Compute $\hat{v}_0, \dots, \hat{v}_8$ from table, just like $\mathcal{E}.Dec$.
- Use \hat{v}_8 instead of \tilde{v}_8 to compute \tilde{e} with $\tilde{e} := \hat{v}_8 \cdot T^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]})} \bmod N^s$, and $t := g_1^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]})} \bmod N.$

It is easy to check that $\hat{v}_0, \dots, \hat{v}_8$ computed from table (via $\mathcal{E}.Dec$) are identical to $\tilde{v}_0, \dots, \tilde{v}_8$ that are used to generate table (via $\mathcal{E}.Enc$). Thus this change is conceptual.

Step 3: This corresponds to G_4 in the proof of Theorem 2.

- table is set up in a similar way as in $\mathcal{E}.Enc$, but with the following difference. The item of row 1 and column 1 in table now is computed as $\hat{u}_{1,1} = (\tilde{u}_{1,1} T^a) \cdot \tilde{v}_0$ instead of $\hat{u}_{1,1} = \tilde{u}_{1,1} \cdot \tilde{v}_0$. This change is computationally indistinguishable, due to the IV_5 assumption. (We refer to a detailed analysis in Appendix C.2.)
- Compute $\hat{v}_0, \dots, \hat{v}_8$ from table, just like $\mathcal{E}.Dec$.
- $\tilde{e} := \hat{v}_8 \cdot T^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]})} \bmod N^s$, and $t := g_1^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]})} \bmod N.$

It is easy to check that $\hat{v}_0 = \tilde{v}_0, \hat{v}_1 = \tilde{v}_1 \cdot T^{-ax_{i_\lambda,1}}, \hat{v}_2 = \tilde{v}_2 \cdot T^{-ax_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1}}, \dots, \hat{v}_8 = \tilde{v}_8 \cdot T^{-ax_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1} \dots x_{i_\lambda,4} y_{i_\lambda,4}} = \tilde{v}_8 \cdot T^{-f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]})}$, thus $\tilde{e} = \hat{v}_8 \cdot T^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]})} = \tilde{v}_8$. Therefore




Fig. 11. Security proof of $\mathcal{E}.Enc$ as an entropy filter for specific monomials $a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1} x_{i_\lambda,2} y_{i_\lambda,2} x_{i_\lambda,3} y_{i_\lambda,3} x_{i_\lambda,4} y_{i_\lambda,4}$.

we can also implement Step 3 equivalently as follows.

Step 3 (Equivalent Form):

- table is set up in a similar way as in $\mathcal{E}.Enc$, but with the following difference. The item of row 1 and column 1 in table is computed as $\hat{u}_{1,1} = (\tilde{u}_{1,1} T^a) \cdot \tilde{v}_0$ instead of $\hat{u}_{1,1} = \tilde{u}_{1,1} \cdot \tilde{v}_0$.
- $\tilde{e} := \tilde{v}_8 \bmod N^s$, and $t := g_1^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}) \bmod \phi(N)/4} \bmod N$.

In this step, $\mathcal{E}.Enc$ does not use $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$ at all (only uses $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}$ and $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod \phi(N)/4$).

Consequently, through the computationally indistinguishable change, the entropy of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$ is reserved by the $\mathcal{E}.Enc$ part of ENC.

Similarly, DEC can be changed to do decryptions without $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$. This can be done with $\phi(N)$ and the $(\bmod \phi(N)/4)$ part of secret key. (This corresponds to G₇-G₈ in the proof of Theorem 2). Use $\phi(N)$ to make sure that all items in table of $\mathcal{E}.ct$ belong to \mathbb{SCR}_{N^s} . If not, reject immediately. As a result, DEC does not leak any information of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$. This change is computationally indistinguishable, just like the analysis of $\Pr[\text{Bad}]$ as in the proof of Theorem 2.

6.4 The General \mathcal{E} Designed for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$

The previous subsection showed how to design \mathcal{E} for a specific type of monomials. A general f'_λ of degree d contains at most $\binom{8+d}{8} = \Theta(d^8)$ monomials. To design a general \mathcal{E} for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d$, we have to consider all possible types of monomials. For each type of non-constant monomial, we create a table and each table is associated with a \tilde{v} , which is called a *title*, and those \tilde{v} 's are used to hide message in \tilde{e} . We describe $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}$ and $\mathcal{E}.\text{Dec}$ in Fig. 12.

There are totally $\binom{8+d}{8} - 1$ types of non-constant monomials of degree at most d if we neglect the coefficients. Each type of non-constant monomial $x_{i_\lambda,1}^{c_1} y_{i_\lambda,1}^{c_2} x_{i_\lambda,2}^{c_3} y_{i_\lambda,2}^{c_4} x_{i_\lambda,3}^{c_5} y_{i_\lambda,3}^{c_6} x_{i_\lambda,4}^{c_7} y_{i_\lambda,4}^{c_8}$ is associated with a tuple $\mathbf{c} = (c_1, \dots, c_8)$, which determines degrees of each variable. Denote by \mathcal{S} the set containing all such tuples, i.e., $\mathcal{S} := \{\mathbf{c} = (c_1, \dots, c_8) \mid 1 \leq c_1 + \dots + c_8 \leq d\}$.

For each $\mathbf{c} = (c_1, \dots, c_8) \in \mathcal{S}$, we generate $\text{table}^{(\mathbf{c})}$ and its title $\tilde{v}^{(\mathbf{c})}$ for monomial $x_{i_\lambda,1}^{c_1} y_{i_\lambda,1}^{c_2} x_{i_\lambda,2}^{c_3} y_{i_\lambda,2}^{c_4} x_{i_\lambda,3}^{c_5} y_{i_\lambda,3}^{c_6} x_{i_\lambda,4}^{c_7} y_{i_\lambda,4}^{c_8}$ via the algorithm `TableGen` illustrated in Fig. 12. Intuitively, `TableGen` generates $\text{table}^{(\mathbf{c})}$ of $1 + c_1 + \dots + c_8$ rows. The 0-th row of $\text{table}^{(\mathbf{c})}$ is $\tilde{u}_{0,1}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{0,8}$. The form of other rows are similar to row 0 with a small difference: the next c_1 rows in the 1-st column are multiplied with $\tilde{v}_0, \tilde{v}_1, \dots, \tilde{v}_{c_1-1}$ respectively; the next c_2 rows in the 2-nd column are multiplied with $\tilde{v}_{c_1}, \tilde{v}_{c_1+1}, \dots, \tilde{v}_{c_1+c_2-1}$ respectively, and so forth. `TableGen` also generates a title $\tilde{v}^{(\mathbf{c})}$ for $\text{table}^{(\mathbf{c})}$. The product of all the titles, i.e., $\prod_{\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{S}} \tilde{v}^{(\mathbf{c})}$, is used to hide T^m in \tilde{e} .

On the other hand, the title $\hat{v}^{(\mathbf{c})} = \tilde{v}^{(\mathbf{c})}$ can be recovered from $\text{table}^{(\mathbf{c})}$ with secret key $\text{sk} = (x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4)$ via the `CalculateV` algorithm in Fig. 12. Therefore, one can always use the secret key to extract the titles $(\tilde{v}^{(\mathbf{c})})_{\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{S}}$ from tables $(\text{table}^{(\mathbf{c})})_{\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{S}}$ one by one with `CalculateV` and then recover m correctly.

Security proof. The proof of $\text{KDM}[\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}^d]$ -CCA security is similar to that of Theorem 2 (cf. Table 3). But games G_3 - G_4 should be replaced with the following three steps (Step 1 - Step 3), so that the $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}$ part of ENC can be changed to work as an entropy filter, i.e., reserving the entropy of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$, w.r.t. any polynomial of degree at most d .

Suppose that the adversary submits $(f_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n])$ to ENC. Our aim is to reserve the entropy of $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$ from $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}(\text{pk}_{i_\lambda}, f_\lambda((x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}))$.

Step 0: In INITIALIZE, the secret keys are generated with $x_{i,j} := x_j + \bar{x}_{i,j}$ and $y_{i,j} := y_j + \bar{y}_{i,j} \bmod \lfloor N^2/4 \rfloor$ for $i \in [n], j \in [4]$. This is the same as G_2 in the proof of Theorem 2.

Step 1: Use $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}$ to re-explain $(f_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n])$ as $(f'_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n])$, and determine the coefficients $a_{(c_1, \dots, c_8)}$ of each monomial of f'_λ , as discussed in Subsection 6.2. Note that $a_{(c_1, \dots, c_8)} = 0$ if the associated monomial does not appear in f'_λ . Then

$$f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}) = \sum_{(c_1, \dots, c_8) \in \mathcal{S}} a_{(c_1, \dots, c_8)} \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1}^{c_1} y_{i_\lambda,1}^{c_2} x_{i_\lambda,2}^{c_3} y_{i_\lambda,2}^{c_4} x_{i_\lambda,3}^{c_5} y_{i_\lambda,3}^{c_6} x_{i_\lambda,4}^{c_7} y_{i_\lambda,4}^{c_8} + \delta,$$

where $\delta = a_{(0, \dots, 0)}$ denotes the constant term of f'_λ .

Step 2: Use secret key $\text{sk}_{i_\lambda} = (x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}$ (together with public key $\text{pk}_{i_\lambda} = (h_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]}$) to implement $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}$ (This corresponds to G_3 in the proof of Theorem 2).

- For each $\mathbf{c} = (c_1, \dots, c_8) \in \mathcal{S}$
 - (1) $(\text{table}^{(\mathbf{c})}, \tilde{v}^{(\mathbf{c})}) \leftarrow_{\$} \text{TableGen}(\text{pk}_{i_\lambda}, \mathbf{c})$,
 - (2) $\hat{v}^{(\mathbf{c})} \leftarrow \text{CalculateV}(\text{sk}_{i_\lambda}, \text{table}^{(\mathbf{c})}, \mathbf{c})$.

$\mathcal{E}.ct \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.Enc(pk, m):$ For each $c = (c_1, \dots, c_8) \in \mathcal{S}$ $(table^{(c)}, \tilde{v}^{(c)}) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.TableGen(pk, c).$ $\tilde{e} := \prod_{c \in \mathcal{S}} \tilde{v}^{(c)} \cdot T^m \bmod N^s.$ $t := g_1^m \bmod N \in \mathbb{Z}_N.$ Return $\mathcal{E}.ct := ((table^{(c)})_{c \in \mathcal{S}}, \tilde{e}, t).$	$m/\perp \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.Dec(sk, \mathcal{E}.ct):$ Parse $\mathcal{E}.ct = ((table^{(c)})_{c \in \mathcal{S}}, \tilde{e}, t).$ For each $c = (c_1, \dots, c_8) \in \mathcal{S}$ $\hat{v}^{(c)} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.CalculateV(sk, table^{(c)}, c).$ If $\tilde{e} \cdot (\prod_{c \in \mathcal{S}} \hat{v}^{(c)})^{-1} \in \mathbb{R}U_{N^s}$ $m := \text{dlog}_T(\tilde{e} \cdot (\prod_{c \in \mathcal{S}} \hat{v}^{(c)})^{-1}) \bmod N^{s-1}.$ If $t = g_1^m \bmod N$, Return $m.$ Otherwise, Return $\perp.$																																																				
$\mathcal{E}.TableGen(pk = (h_1, h_2, h_3, h_4), c = (c_1, \dots, c_8)):$ For each $l \in \{0, 1, \dots, \sum_{j=1}^8 c_j\}$ $\tilde{r}_{l,1}, \tilde{r}_{l,2}, \tilde{r}_{l,3}, \tilde{r}_{l,4} \leftarrow \mathcal{E} \left[\left[\frac{N}{4} \right] \right].$ $(\tilde{u}_{l,1}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{l,8}) := (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{l,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{l,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{l,2}}, g_3^{\tilde{r}_{l,2}}, g_3^{\tilde{r}_{l,3}}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_{l,3}}, g_4^{\tilde{r}_{l,4}}, g_5^{\tilde{r}_{l,4}}) \bmod N^s.$ $\tilde{v}_l := h_1^{\tilde{r}_{l,1}} h_2^{\tilde{r}_{l,2}} h_3^{\tilde{r}_{l,3}} h_4^{\tilde{r}_{l,4}} \bmod N^s.$ <table style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td rowspan="14" style="padding-right: 10px; vertical-align: middle;">$table^{(c)} :=$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{0,1}$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{0,2}$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\dots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{0,8}$</td> <td rowspan="14" style="padding-left: 10px; vertical-align: middle; font-size: 2em;">}</td> <td rowspan="2" style="padding-left: 5px; vertical-align: middle;">c_1</td> <td rowspan="2" style="padding-left: 5px; vertical-align: middle;">rows</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{1,1} \cdot \tilde{v}_0$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{1,2}$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\dots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{1,8}$</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\vdots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\vdots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\ddots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\vdots</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{c_1,1} \cdot \tilde{v}_{c_1-1}$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; 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padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{c_1+c_2,1}$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{c_1+c_2,2} \cdot \tilde{v}_{c_1+c_2-1}$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\dots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{c_1+c_2,8}$</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\vdots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\vdots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\vdots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\vdots</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^7 c_j+1,1}$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^7 c_j+1,2}$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\dots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^7 c_j+1,8} \cdot \tilde{v}_{\sum_{j=1}^7 c_j}$</td> <td rowspan="2" style="padding-left: 5px; vertical-align: middle;">c_8</td> <td rowspan="2" style="padding-left: 5px; vertical-align: middle;">rows</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\vdots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\vdots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\ddots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\vdots</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^8 c_j,1}$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^8 c_j,2}$</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">\dots</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^8 c_j,8} \cdot \tilde{v}_{\sum_{j=1}^8 c_j-1}$</td> </tr> </table>		$table^{(c)} :=$	$\tilde{u}_{0,1}$	$\tilde{u}_{0,2}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{0,8}$	}	c_1	rows	$\tilde{u}_{1,1} \cdot \tilde{v}_0$	$\tilde{u}_{1,2}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{1,8}$	\vdots	\vdots	\ddots	\vdots	$\tilde{u}_{c_1,1} \cdot \tilde{v}_{c_1-1}$	$\tilde{u}_{c_1,2}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{c_1,8}$	$\tilde{u}_{c_1+1,1}$	$\tilde{u}_{c_1+1,2} \cdot \tilde{v}_{c_1}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{c_1+1,8}$	c_2	rows	\vdots	\vdots	\ddots	\vdots	$\tilde{u}_{c_1+c_2,1}$	$\tilde{u}_{c_1+c_2,2} \cdot \tilde{v}_{c_1+c_2-1}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{c_1+c_2,8}$	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots	$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^7 c_j+1,1}$	$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^7 c_j+1,2}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^7 c_j+1,8} \cdot \tilde{v}_{\sum_{j=1}^7 c_j}$	c_8	rows	\vdots	\vdots	\ddots	\vdots	$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^8 c_j,1}$	$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^8 c_j,2}$	\dots	$\tilde{u}_{\sum_{j=1}^8 c_j,8} \cdot \tilde{v}_{\sum_{j=1}^8 c_j-1}$
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	Return $(table^{(c)}, \tilde{v}^{(c)} := \tilde{v}_{\sum_{j=1}^8 c_j}).$																																																				
	$\mathcal{E}.CalculateV(sk = (x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4), table^{(c)}, c = (c_1, \dots, c_8)):$ Parse $table^{(c)} = \left\{ \left[\hat{u}_{l,1} \mid \hat{u}_{l,2} \mid \dots \mid \hat{u}_{l,8} \right] \right\}_{l \in \{0,1,\dots,\sum_{j=1}^8 c_j\}}.$ $\hat{v}_0 := \hat{u}_{0,1}^{-x_1} \hat{u}_{0,2}^{-y_1} \hat{u}_{0,3}^{-x_2} \hat{u}_{0,4}^{-y_2} \hat{u}_{0,5}^{-x_3} \hat{u}_{0,6}^{-y_3} \hat{u}_{0,7}^{-x_4} \hat{u}_{0,8}^{-y_4} \bmod N^s.$ For each $l \in \{1, \dots, c_1\}$ $\hat{v}_l := (\hat{u}_{l,1}/\hat{v}_{l-1})^{-x_1} \hat{u}_{l,2}^{-y_1} \hat{u}_{l,3}^{-x_2} \hat{u}_{l,4}^{-y_2} \hat{u}_{l,5}^{-x_3} \hat{u}_{l,6}^{-y_3} \hat{u}_{l,7}^{-x_4} \hat{u}_{l,8}^{-y_4} \bmod N^s.$ For each $l \in \{c_1 + 1, \dots, c_1 + c_2\}$ $\hat{v}_l := \hat{u}_{l,1}^{-x_1} (\hat{u}_{l,2}/\hat{v}_{l-1})^{-y_1} \hat{u}_{l,3}^{-x_2} \hat{u}_{l,4}^{-y_2} \hat{u}_{l,5}^{-x_3} \hat{u}_{l,6}^{-y_3} \hat{u}_{l,7}^{-x_4} \hat{u}_{l,8}^{-y_4} \bmod N^s.$ \vdots For each $l \in \{\sum_{j=1}^7 c_j + 1, \dots, \sum_{j=1}^8 c_j\}$ $\hat{v}_l := \hat{u}_{l,1}^{-x_1} \hat{u}_{l,2}^{-y_1} \hat{u}_{l,3}^{-x_2} \hat{u}_{l,4}^{-y_2} \hat{u}_{l,5}^{-x_3} \hat{u}_{l,6}^{-y_3} \hat{u}_{l,7}^{-x_4} (\hat{u}_{l,8}/\hat{v}_{l-1})^{-y_4} \bmod N^s.$ Return $\hat{v}^{(c)} := \hat{v}_{\sum_{j=1}^8 c_j}.$																																																				

Fig. 12. Top: $\mathcal{E}.Enc$ (left) and $\mathcal{E}.Dec$ (right) of \mathcal{E} designed for \mathcal{F}_{poly}^d ; Middle: $\mathcal{E}.TableGen$, which generates $table^{(c)}$ together with a title $\tilde{v}^{(c)}$; Bottom: $\mathcal{E}.CalculateV$, which calculates a title $\hat{v}^{(c)}$ from $table^{(c)}$ using secret key.

- Use $(\hat{v}^{(c)})_{c \in \mathcal{S}}$ instead of $(\tilde{v}^{(c)})_{c \in \mathcal{S}}$ to compute \tilde{e} with $\tilde{e} := \prod_{c \in \mathcal{S}} \hat{v}^{(c)} \cdot T^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda, j}, y_{i_\lambda, j})_{j \in [4]})} \bmod N^s$, and $t := g_1^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda, j}, y_{i_\lambda, j})_{j \in [4]})} \bmod N$.

It is easy to check that for each $\mathbf{c} = (c_1, \dots, c_8) \in \mathcal{S}$, $\hat{v}^{(c)}$ computed from $\text{table}^{(c)}$ via `CalculateV` is identical to $\tilde{v}^{(c)}$ associated with $\text{table}^{(c)}$ via `TableGen`. Thus this change is conceptual.

Step 3: This corresponds to \mathbf{G}_4 in the proof of Theorem 2.

- For each $\mathbf{c} = (c_1, \dots, c_8) \in \mathcal{S}$
 - (1) Compute $\text{table}^{(c)}$ via $(\text{table}^{(c)}, \tilde{v}^{(c)}) \leftarrow_s \text{TableGen}(\text{pk}_{i_\lambda}, \mathbf{c})$, but with one difference. The item of row 1 and column $j := \min\{i \mid 1 \leq i \leq 8, c_i \neq 0\}$ in $\text{table}^{(c)}$ now is computed as $\hat{u}_{1,j} = (\tilde{u}_{1,j} T^{a(c_1, \dots, c_8)}) \cdot \tilde{v}_0$ instead of $\hat{u}_{1,j} = \tilde{u}_{1,j} \cdot \tilde{v}_0$. This change is computationally indistinguishable, due to the IV_5 assumption.
 - (2) Invoke $\hat{v}^{(c)} \leftarrow \text{CalculateV}(\text{sk}_{i_\lambda}, \text{table}^{(c)}, \mathbf{c})$ to extract a title $\hat{v}^{(c)}$ from the modified $\text{table}^{(c)}$.
- $\tilde{e} := \prod_{c \in \mathcal{S}} \hat{v}^{(c)} \cdot T^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda, j}, y_{i_\lambda, j})_{j \in [4]})} \bmod N^s$, and $t := g_1^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda, j}, y_{i_\lambda, j})_{j \in [4]})} \bmod N$.

Observe that for each $\mathbf{c} = (c_1, \dots, c_8) \in \mathcal{S}$,

$$\hat{v}^{(c)} = \tilde{v}^{(c)} \cdot T^{-a(c_1, \dots, c_8) x_{i_\lambda, 1}^{c_1} y_{i_\lambda, 1}^{c_2} x_{i_\lambda, 2}^{c_3} y_{i_\lambda, 2}^{c_4} x_{i_\lambda, 3}^{c_5} y_{i_\lambda, 3}^{c_6} x_{i_\lambda, 4}^{c_7} y_{i_\lambda, 4}^{c_8}}.$$

Then $\tilde{e} = \prod_{c \in \mathcal{S}} \hat{v}^{(c)} \cdot T^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda, j}, y_{i_\lambda, j})_{j \in [4]})}$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \prod_{c \in \mathcal{S}} \tilde{v}^{(c)} \cdot \prod_{c \in \mathcal{S}} T^{-a(c_1, \dots, c_8) x_{i_\lambda, 1}^{c_1} y_{i_\lambda, 1}^{c_2} x_{i_\lambda, 2}^{c_3} y_{i_\lambda, 2}^{c_4} x_{i_\lambda, 3}^{c_5} y_{i_\lambda, 3}^{c_6} x_{i_\lambda, 4}^{c_7} y_{i_\lambda, 4}^{c_8}} \cdot T^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda, j}, y_{i_\lambda, j})_{j \in [4]})} \\ &= \prod_{c \in \mathcal{S}} \tilde{v}^{(c)} \cdot T^\delta, \end{aligned}$$

where δ is the constant term of f'_λ . Therefore we can implement Step 3 equivalently as follows.

Step 3 (Equivalent Form):

- For each $\mathbf{c} = (c_1, \dots, c_8) \in \mathcal{S}$

Compute $\text{table}^{(c)}$ via $(\text{table}^{(c)}, \tilde{v}^{(c)}) \leftarrow_s \text{TableGen}(\text{pk}_{i_\lambda}, \mathbf{c})$, but with one difference. The item of row 1 and column $j := \min\{i \mid 1 \leq i \leq 8, c_i \neq 0\}$ in $\text{table}^{(c)}$ now is computed as $\hat{u}_{1,j} = (\tilde{u}_{1,j} T^{a(c_1, \dots, c_8)}) \cdot \tilde{v}_0$ instead of $\hat{u}_{1,j} = \tilde{u}_{1,j} \cdot \tilde{v}_0$.
- $\tilde{e} := \prod_{c \in \mathcal{S}} \tilde{v}^{(c)} \cdot T^\delta \bmod N^s$, and $t := g_1^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda, j}, y_{i_\lambda, j})_{j \in [4]})} \bmod \phi(N)/4 \bmod N$.

In this step, $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}$ does not use $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$ at all (only uses $(\bar{x}_{i,j}, \bar{y}_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}$ and $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod \phi(N)/4$).

As a result, through the computationally indistinguishable change, the entropy of $(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_4, y_4) \bmod N$ is reserved by the $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}$ part of ENC .

Similarly, DEC can be changed to do decryptions without $(x_j, y_j)_{j=1}^4 \bmod N$, the same argument as in Subsection 6.3.

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A Modular Arithmetic Circuit and Leftover Hash Lemma

Definition 13 (Modular Arithmetic Circuit [MTY11]). *A Modular Arithmetic Circuit (MAC) is a circuit whose inputs and constants belong to \mathbb{Z}_K for some $K \in \mathbb{N}$. Each gate in this circuit is $+$, $-$ or \cdot over \mathbb{Z}_K with unbounded number of fan-out. The size of a MAC is defined as the number of gates in this circuit.*

We state a simplified version of Leftover Hash Lemma [HILL99] with uniform input.

Lemma 7 (Leftover Hash Lemma). *Let $\mathcal{H} = \{H : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$ be a family of universal hash functions. Let X be the uniform distribution over \mathcal{X} . Then for $H \leftarrow_s \mathcal{H}$, where H and X are independent, it holds that*

$$\Delta((H, H(X)), (H, U_{\mathcal{Y}})) \leq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{|\mathcal{Y}|/|\mathcal{X}|},$$

where $U_{\mathcal{Y}}$ is the uniform distribution over \mathcal{Y} . In particular, if $|\mathcal{Y}|/|\mathcal{X}| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$, $(H, H(X))$ is statistically close to the uniform distribution over $\mathcal{H} \times \mathcal{Y}$.

B The LLJ Scheme

We review the encryption algorithm of the LLJ scheme as follows.

The public parameter is $\text{prm} = (N, g_1, g_2, \bar{N}, g)$ where $N = pq$, g_1 and g_2 are generators of group SCR_{N^s} , $\bar{N} = 2N + 1$, and g is a generator of group $\mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$.

The secret key is $x_1, x_2 \in [\lfloor N^2/4 \rfloor]$ and public key is $h = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}$.

Let H be a universal hash function.

The ciphertext $(u_1, u_2, e, \overline{\text{ae.ct}})$ is computed as follows.

- $k \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N$, $r \leftarrow_s [\lfloor N/4 \rfloor]$ and $\tilde{r} \leftarrow_s [\lfloor N/4 \rfloor]$.
- $u_1 = g_1^r \bmod N^2$, $u_2 = g_2^r \bmod N^2$, $e = h^r T^k \bmod N^2$.
- $\tilde{u}_1 = g_1^{\tilde{r}} \bmod N^s$, $\tilde{u}_2 = g_2^{\tilde{r}} \bmod N^s$, $\tilde{e} = h^{\tilde{r}} T^m \bmod N^s$, $t = H(u_1 || u_2 || e || (g_1^m \bmod N))$.
- $\overline{\text{ae.ct}} \leftarrow_s \overline{\text{AE}}. \text{Enc}(k, t || \tilde{u}_1 || \tilde{u}_2 || \tilde{e})$.

We explain their encryption algorithm with three components.

- $\text{KEM}. \text{Enc}(h)$ outputs a key k and $\text{kem.ct} = u_1 || u_2 || e$, where $u_1 = g_1^r \bmod N^2$, $u_2 = g_2^r \bmod N^2$, $e = h^r T^k \bmod N^2$, with $k \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N$ and $r \leftarrow_s [\lfloor N/4 \rfloor]$.
- $\mathcal{E}. \text{Enc}(h, m, \text{kem.ct} = u_1 || u_2 || e)$ outputs $\mathcal{E}. \text{ct} = t || \tilde{u}_1 || \tilde{u}_2 || \tilde{e}$, where $\tilde{u}_1 = g_1^{\tilde{r}} \bmod N^s$, $\tilde{u}_2 = g_2^{\tilde{r}} \bmod N^s$, $\tilde{e} = h^{\tilde{r}} T^m \bmod N^s$, $t = H(u_1 || u_2 || e || (g_1^m \bmod N))$, with $\tilde{r} \leftarrow_s [\lfloor N/4 \rfloor]$.
- $\overline{\text{ae.ct}} \leftarrow_s \overline{\text{AE}}. \text{Enc}(k, \mathcal{E}. \text{ct} = t || \tilde{u}_1 || \tilde{u}_2 || \tilde{e})$.

C Omitted Proofs

C.1 Proof of Claim 1

We construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} against the INT-OT security of the AE scheme. Suppose that the INT-OT challenger picks a secret key $\hat{\kappa} \leftarrow_s \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$ randomly. \mathcal{B} has access to the oracle $\text{ENC}_{\text{AE}}(\cdot) = \text{AE}. \text{Enc}(\hat{\kappa}, \cdot)$ one time.

\mathcal{B} will simulate game $G'_{1,i}$ for adversary \mathcal{A} . First, \mathcal{B} prepares prm_{AIAE} the same way as in $G'_{1,i}$. That is, invoke $(N, p, q) \leftarrow_s \text{GenN}(1^\ell)$, compute $\bar{N} := 2N + 1$, pick $g_1, g_2 = g_1^w \leftarrow_s \mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}}$, $H_1 \leftarrow_s \mathcal{H}_1$, $H_2 \leftarrow_s \mathcal{H}_2$ randomly, and set $\text{prm}_{\text{AIAE}} := (N, p, q, \bar{N}, g_1, g_2, H_1, H_2)$. \mathcal{B} sends prm_{AIAE} to \mathcal{A} .

\mathcal{B} does not generate the secret key $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$ explicitly, and instead, it picks $\bar{k}_{1,2}, \bar{k}_{3,4} \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N$ randomly, and implicitly sets $k_1 + wk_2 = \bar{k}_{1,2}$ and $k_3 + wk_4 = \bar{k}_{3,4}$, where $w = \text{dlog}_{g_1} g_2$.

To answer the λ -th ($\lambda \in [Q_e]$) ENC query $(m_\lambda, \text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda)$, where $f_\lambda = \langle a_\lambda, \mathbf{b}_\lambda = (b_{\lambda,1}, b_{\lambda,2}, b_{\lambda,3}, b_{\lambda,4}) \rangle \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$, \mathcal{B} prepares the challenge ciphertxts as follows:

- If $\lambda \in [i-1]$, \mathcal{B} does not use the secret key \mathbf{k} at all, and proceeds the same way as in game $G'_{1,i}$. That is, \mathcal{B} picks $w_{\lambda,1}, w_{\lambda,2} \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$ randomly and sets $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_{\lambda,1}}, g_2^{w_{\lambda,2}}) \in \mathbb{QR}_N^2$. Then \mathcal{B} chooses $\kappa_\lambda \leftarrow_s \mathcal{K}_{\text{AE}}$ and invokes $\chi_\lambda \leftarrow_s \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, m_\lambda)$.
- If $\lambda \in [i+1, Q_e]$, \mathcal{B} can always use the value of $\bar{k}_{1,2} = k_1 + wk_2$ and $\bar{k}_{3,4} = k_3 + wk_4$ to prepare the response. That is, \mathcal{B} picks $w_\lambda \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$ randomly and sets $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}) := (g_1^{w_\lambda}, g_2^{w_\lambda}) \in \mathbb{QR}_N^2$. Then \mathcal{B} computes $t_\lambda := \text{H}_1(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda)$,

$$\kappa_\lambda = \text{H}_2\left(g_1^{w_\lambda a_\lambda \cdot (\bar{k}_{1,2} + t_\lambda \cdot \bar{k}_{3,4})} \cdot g_1^{w_\lambda \cdot ((b_{\lambda,1} + wb_{\lambda,2}) + t_\lambda \cdot (b_{\lambda,3} + wb_{\lambda,4}))}\right),$$

and invokes $\chi_\lambda \leftarrow_s \text{AE.Enc}(\kappa_\lambda, m_\lambda)$.

According to Eq. (2) in the proof of Lemma 1, the simulation is perfect.

- If $\lambda = i$, \mathcal{B} does not use the secret key \mathbf{k} at all, and instead, it will resort to its own $\text{ENC}_{\text{AE}}(\cdot)$ oracle. More precisely, \mathcal{B} picks $w_{i,1}, w_{i,2} \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \{0\}$ randomly, computes $(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}) := (g_1^{w_{i,1}}, g_2^{w_{i,2}}) \in \mathbb{QR}_N^2$ and $t_i := \text{H}_1(c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}, \text{aux}_i)$. Then \mathcal{B} implicitly sets $\kappa_i = \hat{\kappa}$ as the secret key used by its challenger, and queries its $\text{ENC}_{\text{AE}}(\cdot)$ oracle with m_i and gets the challenge χ_i .

According to the $\text{ENC}_{\text{AE}}(\cdot)$ oracle, we have $\chi_i \leftarrow_s \text{AE.Enc}(\hat{\kappa}, m_i)$. As discussed in the proof of Lemma 3, in game $G'_{1,i}$, κ_i is statistically close to the uniform distribution over \mathcal{K}_{AE} . Therefore, the simulation of \mathcal{B} is identical to game $G'_{1,i}$ except with a negligible probability $2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$.

\mathcal{B} returns the challenge ciphertxt $\langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle$ to \mathcal{A} . Moreover, \mathcal{B} puts $(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda, \langle c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \chi_\lambda \rangle)$ to \mathcal{Q}_{ENC} , $(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda)$ to $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}}$, and $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda, t_\lambda)$ to \mathcal{Q}_{TAG} .

Finally \mathcal{B} receives a forgery $(\text{aux}^*, f^*, \langle c_1^*, c_2^*, \chi^* \rangle)$ from \mathcal{A} , where $f^* = \langle a^*, \mathbf{b}^* = (b_1^*, b_2^*, b_3^*, b_4^*) \rangle \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{raff}}$. \mathcal{B} prepares its own forgery w.r.t. the AE scheme as follows.

- If $(\text{aux}^*, f^*, \langle c_1^*, c_2^*, \chi^* \rangle) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}}$, \mathcal{B} aborts the game.
- If there exists $(\text{aux}_\lambda, f_\lambda) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{AUXF}}$ such that $\text{aux}_\lambda = \text{aux}^*$ but $f_\lambda \neq f^*$, \mathcal{B} aborts.
- If $(c_1^*, c_2^*) \notin \mathbb{QR}_N^2 \vee (c_1^*, c_2^*) = (1, 1)$, \mathcal{B} aborts.
- $t^* := \text{H}_1(c_1^*, c_2^*, \text{aux}^*)$.
- If there exists $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda, t_\lambda) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{TAG}}$ such that $t_\lambda = t^*$ but $(c_{\lambda,1}, c_{\lambda,2}, \text{aux}_\lambda) \neq (c_1^*, c_2^*, \text{aux}^*)$, \mathcal{B} aborts.
- If $t^* \neq t_i$, \mathcal{B} aborts. If $t^* = t_i$, \mathcal{B} outputs χ^* to its INT-OT challenger.

We analyze the success probability of \mathcal{B} . As discussed in the proof of Lemma 3, the sub-event $\text{Forge} \wedge t_i = t^*$ will imply that $(\text{aux}^*, f^*, c_1^*, c_2^*) = (\text{aux}_i, f_i, c_{i,1}, c_{i,2})$, $\chi^* \neq \chi_i$, $\kappa^* = \kappa_i$ and $\text{AE.Dec}(\kappa^*, \chi^*) \neq \perp$. Since \mathcal{B} implicitly sets $\kappa_i = \hat{\kappa}$ as the secret key used by its challenger, then $\chi^* \neq \chi_i$, $\kappa^* = \kappa_i$ and $\text{AE.Dec}(\kappa^*, \chi^*) \neq \perp$ implies that $\chi^* \neq \chi_i$ and $\text{AE.Dec}(\hat{\kappa}, \chi^*) \neq \perp$, i.e., χ^* outputted by \mathcal{B} is a fresh forgery.

In summary, \mathcal{B} simulates game $G'_{1,i}$ perfectly with \mathcal{A} except with a negligible probability $2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$, and \mathcal{B} outputs a fresh forgery as long as the sub-event $\text{Forge} \wedge t_i = t^*$ occurs. Thus, we have that $\Pr_{1,i}[\text{Forge} \wedge t_i = t^*] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{AE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{int-ot}}(\ell) + 2^{-\Omega(\ell)}$ and the claim follows.

C.2 Proof of Indistinguishability between Steps 2 and 3 in Subsection 6.3

To show that the difference between Step 2 and Step 3 can be reduced to the IV_5 assumption, we can construct a PPT adversary $\mathcal{B}^{\text{CHAL}_{\text{IV}_5}^b}(N, g_1, \dots, g_5)$ to solve the IV_5 problem. First, \mathcal{B} generates secret and public keys in INITIALIZE as Step 0 does. When \mathcal{A} submits an encryption query $(f_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n])$, \mathcal{B} re-explains $(f_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n])$ as $(f'_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n])$ as Step 1 does and obtains the coefficient a . Then \mathcal{B} simulates $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}$ as follows.

- For the 0-th row of table, \mathcal{B} computes $(\tilde{u}_{0,1}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{0,8})$ and \tilde{v}_0 as in Step 2 and Step 3.
- For the 1-st row, \mathcal{B} queries its own $\text{CHAL}_{\text{IV}_5}^b$ oracle with $(a, 0, *, *, *)$, and obtains its challenge $(\tilde{u}_{1,1}^*, \tilde{u}_{1,2}^*, \tilde{*}, \tilde{*}, \tilde{*})$, that is

$$\text{Case } (b = 0): (\tilde{u}_{1,1}^*, \tilde{u}_{1,2}^*) = (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{1,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{1,1}}) = (\tilde{u}_{1,1}, \tilde{u}_{1,2}) \text{ or}$$

$$\text{Case } (b = 1): (\tilde{u}_{1,1}^*, \tilde{u}_{1,2}^*) = (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{1,1}} T^a, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{1,1}}) = (\tilde{u}_{1,1} T^a, \tilde{u}_{1,2}).$$

\mathcal{B} sets $\hat{u}_{1,1} := \tilde{u}_{1,1}^* \cdot \tilde{v}_0$, which is $\hat{u}_{1,1} = \tilde{u}_{1,1} \cdot \tilde{v}_0$ if $b = 0$ and $\hat{u}_{1,1} = \tilde{u}_{1,1} T^a \cdot \tilde{v}_0$ if $b = 1$. Then \mathcal{B} generates the rest elements $(\tilde{u}_{1,3}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{1,8})$ in the 1-st row of table using its public keys, and sets the 1-st row of table to be $\boxed{\hat{u}_{1,1} = \tilde{u}_{1,1}^* \cdot \tilde{v}_0} \mid \boxed{\tilde{u}_{1,2}^*} \mid \boxed{\tilde{u}_{1,3}} \mid \dots \mid \boxed{\tilde{u}_{1,8}}$.

\mathcal{B} also computes \tilde{v}_1^* from $(\tilde{u}_{1,1}^*, \tilde{u}_{1,2}^*, \tilde{u}_{1,3}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{1,8})$ via $\tilde{v}_1^* := \tilde{u}_{1,1}^{*-x_{i_\lambda,1}} \tilde{u}_{1,2}^{*-y_{i_\lambda,1}} \tilde{u}_{1,3}^{-x_{i_\lambda,2}} \dots \tilde{u}_{1,8}^{-y_{i_\lambda,4}}$, which equals

$$\text{Case } (b = 0): \tilde{v}_1^* = \tilde{v}_1 \text{ or}$$

$$\text{Case } (b = 1): \tilde{v}_1^* = \tilde{v}_1 T^{-a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1}}.$$

- For the 2-nd row, \mathcal{B} queries its own $\text{CHAL}_{\text{IV}_5}^b$ oracle with $(0, a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1}, *, *, *)$, remember that \mathcal{B} has the secret keys, and obtains its challenge $(\tilde{u}_{2,1}^*, \tilde{u}_{2,2}^*, \tilde{*}, \tilde{*}, \tilde{*})$, that is

$$\text{Case } (b = 0): (\tilde{u}_{2,1}^*, \tilde{u}_{2,2}^*) = (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{2,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{2,1}}) = (\tilde{u}_{2,1}, \tilde{u}_{2,2}) \text{ or}$$

$$\text{Case } (b = 1): (\tilde{u}_{2,1}^*, \tilde{u}_{2,2}^*) = (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{2,1}} T^{a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{2,1}}) = (\tilde{u}_{2,1}, \tilde{u}_{2,2} T^{a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1}}).$$

\mathcal{B} sets $\hat{u}_{2,2} := \tilde{u}_{2,2}^* \cdot \tilde{v}_1^*$, that is, $\hat{u}_{2,2} = \tilde{u}_{2,2} \cdot \tilde{v}_1$ if $b = 0$ and $\hat{u}_{2,2} = (\tilde{u}_{2,2} T^{a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1}}) (\tilde{v}_1 T^{-a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1}}) = \tilde{u}_{2,2} \cdot \tilde{v}_1$ if $b = 1$. Thus $\hat{u}_{2,2} = \tilde{u}_{2,2} \cdot \tilde{v}_1$ in both cases. Then \mathcal{B} generates the rest elements $(\tilde{u}_{2,3}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{2,8})$ in the 2-nd row of table using its public keys, and sets the 2-nd row of table to be $\boxed{\tilde{u}_{2,1}^*} \mid \boxed{\hat{u}_{2,2} = \tilde{u}_{2,2}^* \cdot \tilde{v}_1^*} \mid \boxed{\tilde{u}_{2,3}}$ \dots $\boxed{\tilde{u}_{2,8}}$.

\mathcal{B} also computes \tilde{v}_2^* from $(\tilde{u}_{2,1}^*, \tilde{u}_{2,2}^*, \tilde{u}_{2,3}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{2,8})$ via $\tilde{v}_2^* := \tilde{u}_{2,1}^{*-x_{i_\lambda,1}} \tilde{u}_{2,2}^{*-y_{i_\lambda,1}} \tilde{u}_{2,3}^{-x_{i_\lambda,2}} \dots \tilde{u}_{2,8}^{-y_{i_\lambda,4}}$, which equals

$$\text{Case } (b = 0): \tilde{v}_2^* = \tilde{v}_2 \text{ or}$$

$$\text{Case } (b = 1): \tilde{v}_2^* = \tilde{v}_2 T^{-a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1}}.$$

- For the 3-rd row, \mathcal{B} queries its own $\text{CHAL}_{\text{IV}_5}^b$ oracle with $(*, a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1}, 0, *, *)$, and obtains its challenge $(\tilde{*}, \tilde{u}_{3,3}^*, \tilde{u}_{3,4}^*, \tilde{*}, \tilde{*})$, that is

$$\text{Case } (b = 0): (\tilde{u}_{3,3}^*, \tilde{u}_{3,4}^*) = (g_2^{\tilde{r}_{3,2}}, g_3^{\tilde{r}_{3,2}}) = (\tilde{u}_{3,3}, \tilde{u}_{3,4}) \text{ or}$$

$$\text{Case } (b = 1): (\tilde{u}_{3,3}^*, \tilde{u}_{3,4}^*) = (g_2^{\tilde{r}_{3,2}} T^{a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1}}, g_3^{\tilde{r}_{3,2}}) = (\tilde{u}_{3,3} T^{a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1}}, \tilde{u}_{3,4}).$$

\mathcal{B} sets $\hat{u}_{3,3} := \tilde{u}_{3,3}^* \cdot \tilde{v}_2^*$, similarly, it is easy to check that $\hat{u}_{3,3} = \tilde{u}_{3,3} \cdot \tilde{v}_2$ in both cases. Then \mathcal{B} generates the rest elements in the 3-rd row of table using its public keys, and sets the 3-rd row of table to be $\boxed{\tilde{u}_{3,1}}$ $\boxed{\tilde{u}_{3,2}}$ $\boxed{\hat{u}_{3,3} = \tilde{u}_{3,3}^* \cdot \tilde{v}_2^*}$ $\boxed{\tilde{u}_{3,4}^*}$ $\boxed{\tilde{u}_{3,5}}$ \dots $\boxed{\tilde{u}_{3,8}}$.

\mathcal{B} also computes \tilde{v}_3^* from $(\tilde{u}_{3,1}, \tilde{u}_{3,2}, \tilde{u}_{3,3}^*, \tilde{u}_{3,4}^*, \tilde{u}_{3,5}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{3,8})$ via $\tilde{v}_3^* := \tilde{u}_{3,1}^{-x_{i_\lambda,1}} \tilde{u}_{3,2}^{-y_{i_\lambda,1}} \tilde{u}_{3,3}^{*-x_{i_\lambda,2}} \tilde{u}_{3,4}^{*-y_{i_\lambda,2}} \tilde{u}_{3,5}^{-x_{i_\lambda,3}} \dots \tilde{u}_{3,8}^{-y_{i_\lambda,4}}$, which equals

$$\text{Case } (b = 0): \tilde{v}_3^* = \tilde{v}_3 \text{ or}$$

$$\text{Case } (b = 1): \tilde{v}_3^* = \tilde{v}_3 T^{-a \cdot x_{i_\lambda,1} y_{i_\lambda,1} x_{i_\lambda,2}}.$$

- For the 4~8-th rows, \mathcal{B} computes table similarly as above.
- Finally \mathcal{B} computes $\hat{v}_0, \dots, \hat{v}_8$ from table, just as in Step 2 and Step 3 (also as the original $\mathcal{E}.\text{Dec}$ algorithm), and computes $\tilde{e} := \hat{v}_8 \cdot T^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]})} \bmod N^s$, $t := g_1^{f'_\lambda((x_{i_\lambda,j}, y_{i_\lambda,j})_{j \in [4]})} \bmod N$ using the secret keys.

If $b = 0$, \mathcal{B} perfectly simulates Step 2. If $b = 1$, \mathcal{B} perfectly simulates Step 3. Any difference between Steps 2 and 3 results in \mathcal{B} 's advantage over the IV_5 problem.

D Figures for Proof of Theorem 2

```

INITIALIZE:
    // Games G0-G10, [G2-G10], G5-G10, G6-G10, G7-G10, G9-G10
    prmAIAE ←$ AIAE.Setup(1ℓ), where prmAIAE = (N, p, q, N̄, ḡ1, ḡ2, H1, H2).
    prm'AIAE := (N, N̄, ḡ1, ḡ2, H1, H2).
    g1, g2, g3, g4, g5 ←$ SCRNs.
    prm := (prm'AIAE, g1, g2, g3, g4, g5).
    φ(N) := (p - 1)(q - 1).
    [x1, y1, ..., x4, y4 ←$ [⌊N2/4⌋];]
    For i ∈ [n]
        [xi,1, yi,1, ..., xi,4, yi,4 ←$ [⌊N2/4⌋].]
        [x̄i,1, ȳi,1, ..., x̄i,4, ȳi,4 ←$ [⌊N2/4⌋].]
        [(xi,1, yi,1, ..., xi,4, yi,4) := (x1 + x̄i,1, y1 + ȳi,1, ..., x4 + x̄i,4, y4 + ȳi,4) mod ⌊N2/4⌋.]
        [(hi,1, hi,2, hi,3, hi,4) := (g1x̄i,1 g2ȳi,1, ..., g4x̄i,4 g5ȳi,4) mod Ns.]
        pki := (hi,1, hi,2, hi,3, hi,4).
        ski := (xi,1, yi,1, ..., xi,4, yi,4).
    β ←$ {0, 1}. // challenge bit
    r* ←$ [⌊N/4⌋]. α1, α2, α3, α4, α5 ←$ ZN.
    k* = (k1*, k2*, k3*, k4*) ←$ ZN4.
    k̄* = (k̄1*, k̄2*, k̄3*, k̄4*) ←$ ZN4.
    Return (prm, pk1, ..., pkn).

```

Fig. 13. Games G_0 - G_{10} for the proof of Theorem 2.

$\text{ENC}(f_\lambda, i_\lambda \in [n]):$ // the λ -th query
 // Games \mathbf{G}_0 - \mathbf{G}_{10} , \mathbf{G}_3 - \mathbf{G}_{10} , \mathbf{G}_4 - \mathbf{G}_{10} , \mathbf{G}_5 - \mathbf{G}_{10} , \mathbf{G}_6 - \mathbf{G}_{10} , \mathbf{G}_9 - \mathbf{G}_{10} , \mathbf{G}_{10}
 Parse $f_\lambda = (\{a_{i,j}, b_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [4]}, c) \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{aff}}$.
 $m_1 := \sum_{i=1}^n (a_{i,1}x_{i,1} + b_{i,1}y_{i,1} + \dots + a_{i,4}x_{i,4} + b_{i,4}y_{i,4}) + c$.
 $m_0 := 0^{|m_1|}$.
 $\mathbf{k}_\lambda = (k_{\lambda,1}, k_{\lambda,2}, k_{\lambda,3}, k_{\lambda,4}) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^4$.
 $r_\lambda \leftarrow \lfloor \frac{N}{4} \rfloor$.
 $\mathbf{s}_\lambda = (s_{\lambda,1}, s_{\lambda,2}, s_{\lambda,3}, s_{\lambda,4}) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^4$.
 // $\mathbf{k}_\lambda := r_\lambda \cdot \mathbf{k}^* + \mathbf{s}_\lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_N^4$.
 $(k_{\lambda,1}, k_{\lambda,2}, k_{\lambda,3}, k_{\lambda,4}) := (r_\lambda k_1^* + s_{\lambda,1}, r_\lambda k_2^* + s_{\lambda,2}, r_\lambda k_3^* + s_{\lambda,3}, r_\lambda k_4^* + s_{\lambda,4}) \bmod N$.
 // $\bar{\mathbf{k}}_\lambda := r_\lambda \cdot \bar{\mathbf{k}}^* + \mathbf{s}_\lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_N^4$.
 $(\bar{k}_{\lambda,1}, \bar{k}_{\lambda,2}, \bar{k}_{\lambda,3}, \bar{k}_{\lambda,4}) := (r_\lambda \bar{k}_1^* + s_{\lambda,1}, r_\lambda \bar{k}_2^* + s_{\lambda,2}, r_\lambda \bar{k}_3^* + s_{\lambda,3}, r_\lambda \bar{k}_4^* + s_{\lambda,4}) \bmod N$.
 $(u_{\lambda,1}, \dots, u_{\lambda,5}) := (g_1^{r_\lambda}, \dots, g_5^{r_\lambda}) \bmod N^2$.
 $(u_{\lambda,1}, \dots, u_{\lambda,5}) := ((g_1^{r_\lambda} T^{\alpha_1})^{r_\lambda}, \dots, (g_5^{r_\lambda} T^{\alpha_5})^{r_\lambda}) \bmod N^2$.
 $(e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4}) := (h_{i_{\lambda,1}}^{r_\lambda} T^{k_{\lambda,1}}, \dots, h_{i_{\lambda,4}}^{r_\lambda} T^{k_{\lambda,4}}) \bmod N^2$.
 $(e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4}) := (u_{\lambda,1}^{-x_{i_{\lambda,1},1}} u_{\lambda,2}^{-y_{i_{\lambda,1},1}} T^{k_{\lambda,1}}, \dots, u_{\lambda,4}^{-x_{i_{\lambda,4},4}} u_{\lambda,5}^{-y_{i_{\lambda,4},4}} T^{k_{\lambda,4}}) \bmod N^2$.
 $(e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4}) :=$
 $(h_{i_{\lambda,1}}^{r_\lambda} T^{r_\lambda \cdot (k_1^* - \alpha_1 x_{i_{\lambda,1},1} - \alpha_2 y_{i_{\lambda,1},1}) + s_{\lambda,1}}, \dots, h_{i_{\lambda,4}}^{r_\lambda} T^{r_\lambda \cdot (k_4^* - \alpha_4 x_{i_{\lambda,4},4} - \alpha_5 y_{i_{\lambda,4},4}) + s_{\lambda,4}}) \bmod N^2$.
 $\text{aux}_\lambda := (u_{\lambda,1}, \dots, u_{\lambda,5}, e_{\lambda,1}, \dots, e_{\lambda,4})$.
 $\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}, \tilde{r}_{\lambda,2}, \tilde{r}_{\lambda,3}, \tilde{r}_{\lambda,4} \leftarrow \lfloor \frac{N}{4} \rfloor$.
 $(\tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,2}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,7}, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8}) := (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}}, g_2^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}}, \dots, g_4^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}}, g_5^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}}) \bmod N^s$.
 $\tilde{e}_\lambda := h_{i_{\lambda,1}}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}} h_{i_{\lambda,2}}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,2}} h_{i_{\lambda,3}}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,3}} h_{i_{\lambda,4}}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}} T^{m_\beta} \bmod N^s$.
 $\tilde{e}_\lambda := \tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}^{-x_{i_{\lambda,1},1}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,2}^{-y_{i_{\lambda,1},1}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,3}^{-x_{i_{\lambda,2},2}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,4}^{-y_{i_{\lambda,2},2}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,5}^{-x_{i_{\lambda,3},3}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,6}^{-y_{i_{\lambda,3},3}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,7}^{-x_{i_{\lambda,4},4}} \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8}^{-y_{i_{\lambda,4},4}} T^{m_\beta} \bmod N^s$.
 If $\beta = 1$
 $(\tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,2}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,7}, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8}) := (g_1^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}} T^{\sum_i a_{i,1}}, \dots, g_5^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}} T^{\sum_i b_{i,4}}) \bmod N^s$.
 $\tilde{\rho}_{i_\lambda} := \sum_i (a_{i,1}(\tilde{x}_{i,1} - \tilde{x}_{i_\lambda,1}) + b_{i,1}(\tilde{y}_{i,1} - \tilde{y}_{i_\lambda,1}) + \dots + b_{i,4}(\tilde{y}_{i,4} - \tilde{y}_{i_\lambda,4}))$.
 $\tilde{e}_\lambda := h_{i_{\lambda,1}}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,1}} h_{i_{\lambda,2}}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,2}} h_{i_{\lambda,3}}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,3}} h_{i_{\lambda,4}}^{\tilde{r}_{\lambda,4}} T^{\tilde{\rho}_{i_\lambda} + c} \bmod N^s$.
 $t_\lambda := g_1^{m_\beta} \bmod N \in \mathbb{Z}_N$.
 $\mathcal{E}.\text{ct}_\lambda := (\tilde{u}_{\lambda,1}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{\lambda,8}, \tilde{e}_\lambda, t_\lambda)$.
 $\text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \leftarrow \text{AIAE.Enc}(\mathbf{k}_\lambda, \mathcal{E}.\text{ct}_\lambda, \text{aux}_\lambda)$.
 $\text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \leftarrow \text{AIAE.Enc}(\bar{\mathbf{k}}_\lambda, \mathcal{E}.\text{ct}_\lambda, \text{aux}_\lambda)$.
 $\text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \leftarrow \text{AIAE.Enc}(\bar{\mathbf{k}}_\lambda, 0^{\ell_{\mathcal{M}}}, \text{aux}_\lambda)$.
 $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{ENC}} \cup \{(\langle \text{aux}_\lambda, \text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \rangle, i_\lambda)\}$.
 Return $\langle \text{aux}_\lambda, \text{aiae.ct}_\lambda \rangle$.

Fig. 14. Games \mathbf{G}_0 - \mathbf{G}_{10} for the proof of Theorem 2.

```

DEC( $\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle, i \in [n]$ ):
    // Games  $\mathbf{G}_0\text{-}\mathbf{G}_{10}$ ,  $\overline{\mathbf{G}_1\text{-}\mathbf{G}_{10}}$ ,  $\mathbf{G}_7\text{-}\mathbf{G}_{10}$ ,  $\overline{\mathbf{G}_8\text{-}\mathbf{G}_{10}}$ 
    If  $(\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle, i) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\mathcal{ENC}}$ , Return  $\perp$ .
    If  $(\langle \text{aux}, \text{aiae.ct} \rangle, \cdot) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\mathcal{ENC}}$ , Return  $\perp$ .
    Parse  $\text{aux} = (u_1, \dots, u_5, e_1, \dots, e_4)$ .
    If  $e_1 u_1^{x_{i,1}} u_2^{y_{i,1}}, \dots, e_4 u_4^{x_{i,4}} u_5^{y_{i,4}} \in \mathbb{R}\mathbb{U}_{N^2}$ 
         $(k_1, \dots, k_4) := (\text{dlog}_T(e_1 u_1^{x_{i,1}} u_2^{y_{i,1}}), \dots, \text{dlog}_T(e_4 u_4^{x_{i,4}} u_5^{y_{i,4}})) \bmod N$ .
         $(\alpha'_1, \dots, \alpha'_5) := (\text{dlog}_T(u_1^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N), \dots, \text{dlog}_T(u_5^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)) \bmod N$ .
         $(\gamma'_1, \dots, \gamma'_4) := (\text{dlog}_T(e_1^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N), \dots, \text{dlog}_T(e_4^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)) \bmod N$ .
         $(k_1, \dots, k_4) := (\alpha'_1 x_{i,1} + \alpha'_2 y_{i,1} + \gamma'_1, \dots, \alpha'_4 x_{i,4} + \alpha'_5 y_{i,4} + \gamma'_4) \bmod N$ .
         $k := (k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4)$ .
    Else, Return  $\perp$ .
     $\mathcal{E}.ct/\perp \leftarrow \text{AIAE.Dec}(k, \text{aiae.ct}, \text{aux})$ .
    Parse  $\mathcal{E}.ct = (\tilde{u}_1, \dots, \tilde{u}_8, \tilde{e}, t)$ .
    If  $\tilde{e} \tilde{u}_1^{x_{i,1}} \tilde{u}_2^{y_{i,1}} \dots \tilde{u}_7^{x_{i,4}} \tilde{u}_8^{y_{i,4}} \in \mathbb{R}\mathbb{U}_{N^s}$ 
         $m := \text{dlog}_T(\tilde{e} \tilde{u}_1^{x_{i,1}} \tilde{u}_2^{y_{i,1}} \dots \tilde{u}_7^{x_{i,4}} \tilde{u}_8^{y_{i,4}}) \bmod N^{s-1}$ .
         $(\tilde{\alpha}_1, \dots, \tilde{\alpha}_8) := (\text{dlog}_T(\tilde{u}_1^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N), \dots, \text{dlog}_T(\tilde{u}_8^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N)) \bmod N^{s-1}$ .
         $\tilde{\gamma} := \text{dlog}_T(\tilde{e}^{\phi(N)})/\phi(N) \bmod N^{s-1}$ .
         $m := \tilde{\alpha}_1 x_{i,1} + \tilde{\alpha}_2 y_{i,1} + \dots + \tilde{\alpha}_7 x_{i,4} + \tilde{\alpha}_8 y_{i,4} + \tilde{\gamma} \bmod N^{s-1}$ .
        If  $\alpha'_1 \equiv \dots \equiv \alpha'_5 \equiv \tilde{\alpha}_1 \equiv \dots \equiv \tilde{\alpha}_8 \equiv 0$ 
            If  $t = g_1^m \bmod N$ , Return  $m$ .
    Else, Return  $\perp$ .

FINALIZE( $\beta'$ ): // Games  $\mathbf{G}_0\text{-}\mathbf{G}_{10}$ 
Return ( $\beta' = \beta$ ).

```

Fig. 15. Games $\mathbf{G}_0\text{-}\mathbf{G}_{10}$ for the proof of Theorem 2.

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