AntNest: Fully Non-interactive Secure Multi-party Computation

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***Abstract*—In this paper, we focus on the research of non-interactive secure multi-party computation (MPC). At first, we propose a fully homomorphic non-interactive verifiable secret sharing (FHNVSS) scheme. In this scheme, shareholders can generate shares of any-degree polynomials of shared numbers without interaction, and the dealer can verify the correctness of shares sent by shareholders without interaction. We implemented the FHNVSS scheme in Python with a detailed performance evaluation. According to our tests, the performance of FHNVSS is satisfactory. For instance, when the request is a 10-degree polynomial of secret value, generating a response takes about 0.0017263 s; verifying a response takes about 0.1221394 s; recovering a result takes about 0.0003862 s. Besides, we make an extension on the FHNVSS scheme to obtain a fully non-interactive secure multi-party computation, called AntNest. In the AntNest scheme, distrustful players can jointly calculate a any-degree negotiated function, the inputs of which are inputs of all players, without interaction, and each player can verify the correctness of responses sent by players without interaction. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work to realize that players can jointly calculate any-degree function, the inputs of which are inputs of all players, without interaction.**

***Index Terms*—Secure multi-party computation, verifiable secret sharing, non-interactive, full homomorphism.**

I. Introduction

Secure multi-party computation (MPC) [1] is a significant technology, where distrustful players compute an agreed function of their inputs in a secure way. Even if some malicious players cheat, MPC can guarantee the correctness of output as well as the privacy of players' inputs.

There is a long-term problem that all existing information-theoretic secure MPCs have large round and communication complexity [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. In these constructions, it is the case that multiplication gates require communication to be processed (while addition/linear gates usually do not). In CRYPTO 2016, Damgård et al. [3] proposed that the number of rounds should be at least the (multiplicative) depth of the circuit, and the communication complexity is $O(ns)$ for a circuit of size s (n and s are the number of participants and the number of multiplication gates respectively).

Specifically, the issue of round and communication complexity existed because all such protocols follow the same typical "gate-by-gate" design pattern [3]: Players work through an arithmetic (boolean) circuit on secretly shared inputs, such that after they execute a sub-protocol that processes a gate, the output of gate is represented as a new secret sharing among these players. In particular, a Multiplication Gate Protocol (MGP) basically takes random shares of two values a, b from a field as input and random shares of ab as output.

In this paper, we mainly focus on non-interactive secure MPC, where players can jointly calculate a any-degree negotiated function, the inputs of which are inputs of all players, without interaction.

A. Our Results

Our contributions are summarized as follows:

- We present a *fully non-interactive verifiable secret sharing* (FHNVSS) scheme. In the scheme, shareholders can generate shares of any-degree polynomial of shared numbers without interaction, and the dealer can verify the correctness of shares sent by shareholders. A security analysis of FHNVSS scheme is presented.
- We present detailed performance evaluation of FHNVSS scheme by deploying it on a Ubuntu 16.04 environment laptop in Python. According to our tests, the performance of FHNVSS is satisfactory. For instance, when the request is a 10-degree polynomial of shared numbers, generating a response takes about 0.0017263 s; verifying a response takes about 0.1221394 s; recovering a result takes about 0.0003862 s.
- We propose a *Fully Non-interactive Secure Multi-party Computation*, called AntNest. In this AntNest scheme, distrustful players can jointly calculate an any-degree negotiated function, the input of which are inputs of all players, without interaction, they can verify correctness of responses sent by other players without interaction. A security analysis of AntNest is given.

B. Related Work

The round complexity and communication complexity of secure MPC have been two fundamental issues in cryptography. There are many studies about these two aspects. In this subsection, we will present related work about our study at

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first, then some comparisons between our previous paper [14] and this paper will be presented.

Round complexity. The round complexity of an ordered gate-by-gate protocol must be at least proportional to the multiplicative depth of the circuit [5]. The work of constant-round protocols for MPC was initially studied by Beaver et al. [15]. Subsequently, a long sequence of works constructed constant-round MPCs (e.g., 2-round [16], [13], [17], [4], 3-round [18], 4-round [19], [5], [10], 5-round [20], [21], [6] and 6-round [20]). In particular, in Eurocrypt 2004, Katz and Ostrovsky [21] established the exact round complexity of secure two-party computation with respect to blackbox proofs of security. In CRYPTO 2015, Ostrovsky et al. [10] provided a 4-round secure two-party computation protocol based on any enhanced trapdoor permutation, and Ishai et al. [13] obtained several results on the existence of 2-round MPC protocols over secure point-to-point channels, without broadcast or any additional setup. In Ecrypt 2017, Garg et al. [6] proposed several 5-rounds protocols by assuming quasi-polynomially-hard injective one-way functions (or 7 rounds assuming standard polynomially-hard collision-resistant hash functions). However, our scheme can solve any request of any-degree polynomial of secret numbers in 1-round.

Communication complexity. Initially, Rabin et al. [22] proposed that: To securely compute a multiplication of two secretly shared elements from a finite field based on one communication round, players have to exchange $O(n^2)$ field elements since each of n players must perform Shamir's secret sharing as part of the protocol. After that, Cramer et al. [23] further proposed a twist on Rabin's idea that enables one-round secure multiplication with just $O(n)$ bandwidth in certain settings, thus they reduced the communication complexity from quadratic to linear. Recently, in CRYPTO 2016, Damgård et al. [3] further presented that: In the honest majority setting, as well as for dishonest majority with preprocessing, any gate-by-gate protocol must communicate $O(n)$ bits for every multiplication gate, where n is the number of players. While, servers (shareholders) of our scheme can generate responses of any-degree polynomial of secret numbers without any interaction.

Comparisons with [14]. Recently, in Ref.[14], we proposed a secure multi-party computation scheme, where shareholders can generate shares of two-degree polynomials of secret numbers without interaction. Temporarily, the secure MPC scheme proposed in [14] is called Pre-Scheme, and it has the following limitations:

- Servers (shareholders) can only generate shares of two-degree polynomial of secret numbers. In other words, servers cannot get any shares of k-degree ($k > 2$) polynomial of secret numbers.
- Pre-Scheme used the pairing (pairing is an expensive computation) to verify the correctness of responses (these responses are shares of two-degree polynomial of secret numbers) sent by servers.
- [14] did not include a complete security analysis of Pre-Scheme.

Compared with the Pre-Scheme, improvements of AntNest are as follows:

- Theoretically, distrustful players can jointly calculate any-degree negotiated function, the input of which are inputs of all players, without interaction.
- Each player can verify other players compute honestly. In this verification process, AntNest does not use pairing to verify responses of players, while Pre-Scheme used.
- We will present a complete security analysis of AntNest. Moreover, this proof is also valid for the Pre-Scheme [14].

Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of FHNVSS and AntNest is shown in Sec.II. Sec.III briefly presents preliminaries. We introduce the FHNVSS scheme without verifiability and the verifiability of FHNVSS in Sec.IV-A and Sec.IV-B, respectively. A detailed performance evaluation is shown in Sec.V. A security analysis of FHNVSS is presented in Sec.VI. Construction and security analysis of AntNest are studied in Sec.VII. Finally, a short conclusion is presented in Sect.VIII.

II. An Overview of fully homomorphic non-interactive verifiable secret sharing and AntNest

In a fully homomorphic non-interactive verifiable secret sharing (FHNVSS) scheme, components include a dealer and a certain number of shareholders (servers). A (t, n) FHNVSS scheme works as follows:

- Step 1: The dealer generates n core-shares and a verification key (VK). After that, he opens VK, then anyone (including servers) can verify whether VK is correctly computed by dealer. If VK is invalid, then the dealer has to regenerate the core-shares and VK, else the participants join in the next step.
- Step 2: The dealer secretly sends these n core-shares to n servers respectively. After receiving a core-share, a server can verify whether his core-share is valid by using VK. If the server's core-share is invalid, then he can ignore it and ask dealer to resend a core-share to him.
- Step 3: The dealer encrypts secret numbers into encrypted numbers, then he sends the encrypted numbers to servers.
- Step 4: When the dealer needs to get a result that is a polynomial of secret numbers, he will send a query to n servers.
- Step 5: According to the query sent by dealer, an active server will independently generate a response with his core-share (this process has no interaction with other servers), then the server will send his response to dealer securely.
- Step 6: After receiving responses, the dealer can verify whether responses are correctly computed by corresponding servers. These verifications do not need interaction with other servers. If a response is invalid, then the dealer can ignore this response or ask the corresponding server to resend a response to him. Finally, the dealer can recover the desired result if he can collect at least t correct responses.

The FHNVSS scheme mainly has the following features:

- **Full homomorphism.** Servers can perform efficient homomorphic additions and multiplications on encrypted numbers without decrypting them.
- **Confidentiality.** Secret numbers shared by dealer are always confidential as long as less than t servers are malicious.
- **Verifiability.** Verification key, core-shares and responses are verifiable.
  - *Verification key.* When the verification key (VK) is opened, anyone can verify its validity.
  - *Core-shares.* When a server receives a core-share, he can verify whether this core-share is correctly computed by the dealer. Moreover, in this method, the malicious dealer and incorrect core-shares can be checked out.
  - *Responses.* When the dealer gets a response sent by a server, the dealer would verify whether this response is correctly computed by the server. In this way, malicious servers and incorrect responses can be checked out.

By making an extension on the (t, n) FHNVSS scheme, $t > 2$, we obtain a (t, n) AntNest scheme, where n players can jointly calculate a negotiated function, the input of which are numbers shared by all players. Each player independently works as a dealer of (t, n) FHNVSS scheme to share his inputs among the n players, and he also works as a server of (t, n) FHNVSS scheme to jointly compute the negotiated function. The work process of a (t, n) AntNest scheme is as follows:

- Step 1: Each player executes a (t, n) FHNVSS scheme independently. He generates n core-shares and a verification key (VK). In these n core-shares, one core-share belongs to this player, and other $n - 1$ will be sent to other $n - 1$ players respectively in the next step. Each player opens his VK. Anyone (including other players) can verify whether the VK is correctly computed by its generator. If a VK is invalid, its generator has to regenerate his VK. Once all VKs are valid, all players join in the next step.
- Step 2: Each player secretly sends his $n - 1$ core-shares (except his own core-share) to other $n-1$ servers respectively. After receiving a core-share, each player can verify whether this core-share is correctly computed by the sender via sender's VK. If a core-share is invalid, the receiver can ignore it and request corresponding sender to re-send it. Once all core-shares are valid, all players join in the next step.
- Step 3: Each player encrypts his input into encrypted numbers, then he broadcasts these encrypted numbers.
- Step 4: Players negotiate a function, which will be jointly calculated by players. Inputs of the negotiated function are inputs of all players.
- Step 5: According to the negotiated function, each player can generate a response with his core-shares and encrypted numbers shared by players, then he broadcasts his response.
- Step 6: After receiving a response, each player can verify whether this response is correctly computed via this sender's VK. This verification process does not need interaction. If a player receives an invalid response, then he can ignore it or request the corresponding player to re-send it.
- Once a player collects at least t valid responses, he will recover the correct result of negotiated function.

III. Preliminaries

In this section, we hope to present basic cryptography techniques of AntNest and the adversary model.

A. Shamir's Secret Sharing

Alice wants to secretly share a secret value s with n participants, and arbitrary t of the n participants can recover s, but less than t participants cannot get anything. In order do this, Alice needs to generate n shares of s, then secretly sends the n shares to the n participants respectively. After that, if someone can collect at least t correct shares, then he can recover the secret value s. This problem can be resolved by Shamir's (t, n) secret sharing (SSS) [24]. In this subsection, we will present the working process of the SSS.

Firstly, Alice randomly samples a polynomial $f(x)$ of degree t-1 from $\mathbb{F}_p[x]$ (p is a big prime number) as the following polynomial:

$$f(x) = a_{t-1}x^{t-1} + a_{t-2}x^{t-2} + \cdots + a_1x + s,$$

where s is the secret value as well as $a_1, \cdots, a_{t-1} \in \mathbb{F}_p$, $a_{t-1} \neq 0$.

Secondly, let P_1, P_2,...,P_n be the n participants and ID_i $(i = 1, 2, ..., n)$ denote P_i's address. Alice generates P_i's share as follow:

$$Share_i = f(ID_i),$$

where i=1, 2, ...,n. Then, Alice secretly sends $Share_1$, $Share_2$, ...,$Share_n$ to the n participants, respectively.

Finally, if someone collects t correct shares, then he can use the *lagrange interpolation* to reconstruct the polynomial $f(x)$. Without loss of generality, let the t shares be $Share_1$, $Share_2$, ...,$Share_t$. He can reconstruct the polynomial $f(x)$ as follow:

$$f(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{t} Share_i \prod_{j=1, j\neq i}^{t} \frac{x - ID_j}{ID_i - ID_j}.$$

Consequently, he can get $s = f(0)$.

Addition homomorphism of SSS. SSS naturally has the additional homomorphism. It means that the sum of shares is the share of the sum of corresponding secrets. Moreover, the threshold number is always immutable during this process since the degree of the sum of shared polynomials is equal to the degree of shared polynomials. Therefore, if a dealer can collect threshold number of sum shares, he can reconstruct the corresponding polynomial and then get the sum of secrets. Consequently, SSS naturally has the additional homomorphism.

Multiplication homomorphism of SSS. Similarly, SSS naturally also has the multiplicative homomorphism. It denotes

that the product of shares is the share of the product of corresponding secrets. However, the multiplicative homomorphism has a big limitation that is, with the degree growth of product of secrets, the degree result polynomial will become larger and larger. Under this process, it will eventually arrive at a threshold larger than n so that the final result cannot be reconstructed. Finally, the multiplicative homomorphism of SSS is restricted.

B. Pairing

In AntNest, the pairing computation is only used in the verification process of verification key. After that, pairing will not be used anymore. Namely, it however will not be used in the verification processes of core-shares and responses.

Let $\mathbb{G}$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ be the cyclic groups of a large prime order q. G is the generator of $\mathbb{G}$. A cryptography pairing [25] e (bilinear map): $\mathbb{G}\times\ \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is a map that has a property of bilinearity. The bilinearity means that

$$e(aG, bG) = e(G, G)^{ab},$$

where $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$.

Remark 1: In the proposed scheme, pairing is only used in verifying VK.

C. Adversary Model

In this subsection, we present the adversary models of FHNVSS and AntNest.

In a (t, n) FHNVSS scheme, which includes a dealer and n shareholders, we have the following assumptions:

- The dealer could generate the verification key (VK) and core-shares dishonestly, but he does not reveal any secret data to servers.
- A server could generate a response dishonestly, but the number of dishonest players is less than t.

In a (t, n) AntNest scheme, $t > 2$, which includes n players, we have the following assumptions:

- An honest player honestly generates the verification key (VK), core-shares and responses, and he does not reveal any his private data to other players.
- A malicious player could generates the verification key (VK), core-shares and responses dishonestly, and he could reveal his private data to other players.

IV. Construction of Fully Homomorphic Non-interactive Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme

In this section, we will present a fully homomorphic non-interactive verifiable secret sharing (FHNVSS) scheme. To clearly present the work process of FHNVSS, we will present the FHNVSS scheme without verifiability at first. Then we will give out the verifiability of FHNVSS. Finally, basic applications of FHNVSS combined with blockchain will be illustrated.

A. FHNVSS without verifiability

In this subsection, we will present the FHNVSS without verifiability, where data-senders (dealer and servers) are all honest. Namely, all data-recepients (servers and dealer) do not need to verify data received. While, in the next section, we will specifically show the verification processes of FHNVSS, where the dealer and servers could be dishonest, and a (t, n) FHNVSS will be taken as an example to present the scheme without verifiability. It contains a dealer and n servers. Let Sr_i denote the i-th server and ID_i be the ID of Sr_i.

1) Generation of Core-share, Request, Response and Result: Dealer randomly samples $f_1(x), f_2(x), ..., f_k(x)$, which are $(t-1)$-degree polynomials over $\mathbb{F}_q$ as follows:

$$\begin{array}{c} f_1(x) = w_{1,t-1}x^{t-1} + w_{1,t-2}x^{t-2} + ... + w_{1,1}x + s \\ f_2(x) = w_{2,t-1}x^{t-1} + w_{2,t-2}x^{t-2} + ... + w_{2,1}x + s^2 \\ ..... \\ f_k(x) = w_{k,t-1}x^{t-1} + w_{k,t-2}x^{t-2} + ... + w_{k,1}x + s^k \end{array} \quad (1)$$

i from 1 to n, dealer computes core-share for server Sr_i as follows:

$$\text{core-share}_i = (f_1(ID_i), f_2(ID_i), ..., f_k(ID_i)).$$

Request. Assume that the dealer wants to get the result $V = \sum_{i=0}^{k} b_i s^i$. Therefore, he will send a request to n servers, then servers will generate responses for him. Specifically, the request includes the following numbers:

$$\{b_k, b_{k-1}, ..., b_1, b_0\}$$

According to the request, a server will know that the dealer wants to get $\sum_{i=1}^{k} b_i s^i + b_0$, but the server does not know the secret value s.

Responses. If Sr_i is willing to respond the request, he will use his core-share$_i$ to generate a response $Resp_i$ as follow:

$$Resp_i = \sum_{j=1}^{k} b_j f_j(ID_i) + b_0.$$

Then, Sr_i sends $Resp_i$ to the dealer secretly.

Result. If the dealer can collect t valid responses like $Resp_i$ from t servers, then he can use the *Lagrange Interpolating* to recover a $(t-1)$-degree polynomial $H(x)$. Finally, the dealer can get the desired result $\sum_{i=0}^{k} b_i s^i$ by computing $H(x)|_{x=0}$.

Remark 2: The value k of $\sum_{i=0}^{k} b_i s^i$ is unlimited. Specifically, the dealer can purposefully set the k according to his requirements by providing enough core-shares to servers. Theoretically, servers of FHNVSS can process any-degree polynomials of secret numbers in theoretically as long as the dealer can provide enough core-shares to servers. For instance, servers can generate responses of 50-degree polynomials of secret number if their core-shares are as $f_1(ID_i), f_2(ID_i), ..., f_{50}(ID_i)$.

2) FHNVSS with Sharing Encrypted Numbers: The dealer has a set of secret numbers that are $d_1, d_2, ..., d_m$, which will be shared with servers. After randomly sampling $f_1(x)$ as mentioned in Eq.1, the dealer performs as follows:

- Encrypt $d_1, d_2, ..., d_m$ into $a_1, a_2, ..., a_m$ as follows:

$$a_j = d_j - s, j = 1, 2, ..., m.$$

- Generate core-shares (core-share$_1$, core-share$_2$, ..., core-share$_k$) as mentioned in Sec.IV-A1.
- Secretly sending core-share$_i$ to Sr_i, i from 1 to n.
- Open $a_1, a_2, ..., a_m$.

After that, the dealer can send a request about the numbers $d_1, d_2, ..., d_m$. For instance, a request may be as follow:

$$X_1X_2X_3 + X_4X_5X_6X_7 + X_8^5 + X_1^3X_9^6,$$

where X_j denotes the secret number d_j, but it does not expose d_j. Then servers can generate corresponding responses according to the request. According to this request and encrypted numbers, a server will generate a response with this request, encrypted numbers and his core-share. Next, we will present how dealer and servers work with $a_1, a_2, ..., a_m$.

At first, assume that: i) the maximum degree of addressable request is k, ii) the dealer has secretly sent core-share$_i$ to Sr_i, $i = 1, 2, ..., n$, and iii) he has also opened encrypted numbers $\{a_1, a_2, ..., a_m\}$. Then, servers can help the dealer to get any result like the following formula:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{w}\prod_{j=1}^{v_t}\mu_{t,d}d_{j_{t,d}},$$

where $v_t \leq k$ and $\mu_{t,d} \in \mathbb{F}_q$, $j_{t,d} \in \{1, 2, ..., m\}$. The dealer sends a string to servers like the following one:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{w}\prod_{j=1}^{v_t}\mu_{t,d}(X_{j_{t,d}}),$$

where $X_{j_{t,d}}$ denote a secret number $d_{j_{t,d}}$, but it does not expose $d_{j_{t,d}}$.

After receiving the above request, Sr_i can transmit the request into a polynomial of x as follow:

$$W(x) = \sum_{t=1}^{w}\prod_{j=1}^{v_t}\mu_{t,d}(x + a_{j_{t,d}}) = \sum_{j=0}^{k} b_j x^j.$$

At this moment, the polynomial $W(x)$ can be seen as the request mentioned in Sec. IV-A1. Therefore, servers can use $W(x)$ to generate responses. The work processes of generating responses, verifying responses and recovering result are the same as the corresponding work processes mentioned in Sec. IV-A1.

B. Verifiability of FHNVSS

In Sec. IV-A, we described the FHNVSS without verification, and we assumed that data-senders (dealer and servers) are honest. However, in practical applications, data-senders might incorrectly compute data which would lead to the corresponding data-recepients generates wrong results. Therefore, data-recepients (servers or dealer) should verify whether received data (core-shares or responses) are correctly computed by corresponding data-senders. In this way, malicious data-senders and incorrect data can be checked out. Therefore, in this section, we will present how data-recepients verify received data.

Specifically, compared with the FHNVSS without verifiability mentioned in Sec.IV-A, the full FHNVSS scheme adds four parts: (i) the dealer generates and opens the verification key (VK); (ii) anyone can verify the correctness of VK; (iii) the server can verify the correctness of his core-share; (iv) the dealer can verify the correctness of responses sent by servers.

We take the (t, n) FHNVSS as an example to present the work process of verification. The (t, n) FHNVSS scheme contains a dealer and n servers, and servers can respond at most k-degree request. Let $Sr_1, Sr_2, ..., Sr_n$ denote the n servers. Furthermore, the dealer can recover the desired result if at least t servers generate valid responses to the dealer. Moreover, ID_i is the ID of Sr_i, $i = 1, 2, ..., n$. Furthermore, let g denote a generator of a cyclic group. We will use g^a to compute a commitment of a to hide a. In the next text, we will present how to verify verification key (VK), core-shares and responses.

1) Verify Verification Key: Before the dealer sends the core-shares to servers, he would generates a verification key (VK) that will be used in the future verifications. The VK is constructed as follows:

- The dealer randomly samples $f_1(x), f_2(x), ..., f_k(x)$ from $\mathbb{F}_p[x]$ as mentioned in Eq.1
- Let $CM_{\{f(x)\}}$ denote the commitments of coefficients of $f(x)$. For instance, when $f(x) = w_3x^3 + w_2x^2 + w_1x + w_0$, then

$$CM_{\{f(x)\}} = \{g^{w_3}||g^{w_2}||g^{w_1}||g^{w_0}\}.$$

- The verification key (VK) is as follow:

$$VK = (CM_{\{f_1(x)\}}, CM_{\{f_2(x)\}}, ..., CM_{\{f_k(x)\}})$$

Let CM_X denote a commitment of X, which is a scalar. For instance, $CM_a = g^a$. According to constructions of VK, $CM_s, CM_{s^2}, ..., CM_{s^k}$ are included in the VK. A VK is valid iff j from 2 to k, if the following equation holds

$$e(CM_s, CM_{s^{j-1}}) = e(CM_{s^j}, g).$$

2) Verify Core-shares: Assume that the VK is valid and has been opened. The core-share of Sr_i is as follow:

$$\text{core-share}_i = (f_1(ID_i), f_2(ID_i), ..., f_k(ID_i)).$$

Because commitments of coefficients of $f_1(x)$, $f_2(x)$, ...,$f_k(x)$ have been provided in VK as well as VK is valid, so Sr_i can verify his core-share$_i$ with VK and ID_i. j from 1 to k, if the following equation holds, then the $f_j(ID_i)$ is valid.

$$g^{f_j(ID_i)} = \prod_{t=1}(CM_{w_{j,t}})^{ID_i^t}CM_{s^j}.$$

If $f_1(ID_i)$, $f_2(ID_i)$, ..., $f_k(ID_i)$ are valid, then Sr_i's core-share is valid.

3) Verify Responses: In (t, n) FHNVSS, the dealer can verify whether a response is correctly computed by the corresponding server. In this subsection, we will take the case of request being $\sum_{i=1}^{k} b_i s^i + b_0$ as an example to present the process of verifying response. Specifically, the dealer verifies the response $Resp_i$ $(i = 1, 2, ..., n)$ as follows:

According to Sec. IV-A1, we know

$$Resp_j = \textstyle\sum_{r=1}^{k} b_t(f_j(ID_i)) + b_0.$$

Consequently, the dealer can verify the $Resp_i$ as follows:

- $j = 1, 2, ..., k$, compute $CM_{f_j(ID_i)}$ as follows:

$$CM_{f_j(ID_i)} = \prod_{r=1}^{t-1} (CM_{w_{j,r}})^{ID_i^r} CM_{s^j}.$$

- $j = 1, 2, ..., k$, if the following equation holds, then the response $Resp_i$ is valid.

$$g^{Resp_i} = \prod_{r=1}^{k} (CM_{f_r(ID_i)})^{b_r} CM_{b_0}.$$

V. Performance Evaluation of FHNVSS

In this section, we will present a performance evaluation of FHNVSS by deploying it on a Ubuntu 16.04 environment laptop. Specifically, the FHNVSS was implemented in Python on a two core of a 2.60GHz Intel(R) Core (TM) i7-6500U CPU with 8G RAM. We used high-speed Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library [26] to compute point multiplication of elliptic curve and pairing, and utilized GNU Multiple Precision (GMP) Arithmetic Library [27] to calculate big number computation.

In the our experiments, FHNVSS was divided into seven algorithms:

(Gen_VK, Ver_VK, Gen_CS, Ver_CS, Gen_resp, Ver_resp, Recover).

These algorithms are used as follows:

- Gen_VK: Dealer uses Gen_VK to generate verification key (VK).
- Ver_VK: Servers can use Ver_VK to verify the validation of VK.
- Gen_CS: Dealer uses Gen_CS to generate core-shares for servers.
- Ver_CS: Servers can use Ver_CS and VK to verify core-shares sent by dealer.
- Gen_Resp: Servers can use Gen_Resp to generate responses according to the request sent by dealer.
- Ver_Resp: Dealer can use Ver_Resp and VK to verify the validation of responses sent by servers.
- Recover: Dealer can use Recover to recover desired result with the threshold number of valid responses.

In practical applications, these functions belong to different participants (dealer and servers). The affiliation of these functions is shown in Table I.

TABLE I: Functions of Participant

Participant	Functions of Participant
Dealer	Gen_VK, Gen_CS Ver_Resp, Recover
Server	Ver_VK, Ver_CS, Gen_Resp

We performed two types of tests as follows:

- **Test 1:** We deployed (3,7) FHNVSS (a total 7 servers, and the desired result can be recovered with at least 3 valid responses) on our laptop. Let k be the largest degree of addressable request, we set k from 4 to 10. We tested the performance of *Gen_core-share, Gen_VK, Ver_core-share* and *Ver_VK*. The results of Test 1 are shown in Table II.
- **Test 2:** We also deployed (3,7) FHNVSS on our laptop. Let the largest degree of addressable request be constant 10. We set the degree of request from 2 to 10. We tested the performance of *Rec_result, Gen_response* and *Ver_response*. The results of Test 2 are shown in Table III.

TABLE II: Performance of algorithms of FHNVSS with the change of the largest degree of addressable request (second)

k	Gen_CS	Ver_CS	Gen_VK	Ver_VK
4	0.000329733	0.003045559	0.127948046	0.148387432
5	0.000474215	0.004627943	0.155535466	0.237745762
6	0.000656843	0.005952125	0.201929808	0.368674755
7	0.000918154	0.007400751	0.259971857	0.536798954
8	0.001402143	0.010572672	0.317357063	0.766717434
9	0.001489878	0.012337208	0.375114679	1.056947708
10	0.002088308	0.014226913	0.435570243	1.331381321
11	0.002505302	0.017073154	0.493043661	1.681715012
12	0.003757325	0.021838427	0.572894812	2.194091082

We deployed (3,7) FHNVSS to show the performance of algorithms Gen_CS, Gen_VK, Ver_CS, Ver_VK. **k** denotes the largest degree of addressable request. The finite field is based on a 256-bit big prime number.

TABLE III: Performance of algorithms of FHNVSS with the change of degree of request (second)

Degree of request	Recover	Gen_Resp	Ver_Resp
2	0.000478268	0.001681805	0.007747173
3	0.000378373	0.001621246	0.016930582
4	0.000452042	0.001915455	0.023883823
5	0.000365019	0.001704931	0.032199383
6	0.000339508	0.001774073	0.049633026
7	0.000391245	0.001723289	0.065804005
8	0.000404119	0.001615524	0.081865788
9	0.000323057	0.001732349	0.096564293
10	0.000386238	0.001726389	0.122139454

We deployed (3,7) FHNVSS with the largest degree of addressable request being 10 to show the performance of algorithms Recover, Gen_Resp, Ver_Resp. Moreover, the finite field is based on a 256-bit big prime number.

VI. Security Analysis of FHNVSS

In this section, we will take the (t, n) FHNVSS as an example to discuss the security of the proposed FHNVSS, and the maximum degree of polynomial that the dealer can query is k. Because the FHNVSS is a threshold cryptography scheme, its security denotes that $t-1$ malicious servers cannot jointly recover the key secret value s.

According to Sec. IV-A, the secretly shared polynomials among servers are as follows:

$$f_1(x), f_2(x), ..., f_k(x).$$

Malicious servers know that $f_1(x)$, $f_2(x)$, $f_3(x)$, ..., $f_k(x)$ can be expressed as the following $(t-1)$-degree polynomials, but they do not know coefficients of these functions.

$$f_1(x) = w_{1,t-1}x^{t-1} + w_{1,t-2}x^{t-2} + ... + w_{1,1}x + s$$
$$f_2(x) = w_{2,t-1}x^{t-1} + w_{2,t-2}x^{t-2} + ... + w_{2,1}x + s^2$$
$$.....$$
$$f_k(x) = w_{k,t-1}x^{t-1} + w_{k,t-2}x^{t-2} + ... + w_{k,1}x + s^k$$

They hope to use their core-shares to solve the secret value s. If s is obtained, malicious servers will get all plaintext numbers shared by dealer.

Next, we will prove that $t-1$ malicious servers cannot solve the secret value s with their core-shares, although they work jointly. Without loss of generality, we assume that $Sr_1, Sr_2, ..., Sr_{t-1}$ are the $t-1$ malicious servers as well as other servers are honest. According to Sec. IV-A, we know that the core-share kept by Sr_i $(i = 1, 2, ..., t-1)$ is $(f_1(ID_i)$, $f_2(ID_i)$, $f_3(ID_i)$, ..., $f_k(ID_i))$ as shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV: Core-shares of servers

Server	Sr_1	Sr_2	...	Sr_{t-1}
Core-shares	$f_1(ID_1)$	$f_1(ID_2)$	...	$f_1(ID_{t-1})$
	$f_2(ID_1)$	$f_2(ID_2)$	...	$f_2(ID_{t-1})$
	$f_3(ID_1)$	$f_3(ID_2)$	...	$f_3(ID_{t-1})$
	...	...	...	...
	$f_k(ID_1)$	$f_k(ID_2)$	...	$f_k(ID_{t-1})$

In order to solve coefficients of $f_1(x)$, $f_2(x)$, $f_3(x)$, ..., $f_k(x)$, the $t-1$ malicious servers can construct linear equations by using their core-shares as follows:

$$\begin{cases} f_1(ID_1) = w_{1,t-1}ID_1^{t-1} + w_{1,t-2}ID_1^{t-2} + ... + w_{1,1}ID_1 + s \\ f_1(ID_2) = w_{1,t-1}ID_2^{t-1} + w_{1,t-2}ID_2^{t-2} + ... + w_{1,1}ID_2 + s \\ ..... \\ f_1(ID_{t-1}) = w_{1,t-1}ID_{t-1}^{t-1} + w_{1,t-2}ID_{t-1}^{t-2} + ... + w_{1,1}ID_{t-1} + s \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

$$\begin{cases} f_2(ID_1) = w_{2,t-1}ID_1^{t-1} + w_{2,t-2}ID_1^{t-2} + ... + w_{2,1}ID_1 + s^2 \\ f_2(ID_2) = w_{2,t-1}ID_2^{t-1} + w_{2,t-2}ID_2^{t-2} + ... + w_{2,1}ID_2 + s^2 \\ ..... \\ f_2(ID_{t-1}) = w_{2,t-1}ID_{t-1}^{t-1} + w_{2,t-2}ID_{t-1}^{t-2} + ... + w_{2,1}ID_{t-1} + s^2 \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

$$.....$$

$$\begin{cases} f_k(ID_1) = w_{k,t-1}ID_1^{t-1} + w_{k,t-2}ID_1^{t-2} + ... + w_{k,1}ID_1 + s^k \\ f_k(ID_2) = w_{k,t-1}ID_2^{t-1} + w_{k,t-2}ID_2^{t-2} + ... + w_{k,1}ID_2 + s^k \\ ..... \\ f_k(ID_{t-1}) = w_{k,t-1}ID_{t-1}^{t-1} + w_{k,t-2}ID_{t-1}^{t-2} + ... + w_{k,1}ID_{t-1} + s^k \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

For Eq.2, there are $t-1$ equations and t variables. The t variables are $b_{t-1}^f, b_{t-2}^f, ..., b_1^f, s$. Moreover, according to the theory of linear algebra, we know that s is a free variable. Namely, s can be an arbitrary number. Consequently, s cannot be determined by Eq.2.

For Eq.3, there are $t-1$ equations and t variables. The t variables are $b_{t-1}^{c_2}, b_{t-2}^{c_2}, ..., b_1^{c_2}, s$. Moreover, according to the theory of linear algebra, we can also know that s is a free variable. Consequently, s cannot be determined by Eq.2 and Eq.3.

Similarly, for Eq.4, s is a free variable still. Consequently, s cannot be determined by Eq.2, Eq.3,..., Eq.4.

In a word, s is always un-determined, and the $t-1$ malicious servers cannot recover the key secret value s although they jointly work together.

VII. AntNest

In this section, we will make an extension on (t, n) $(t > 2)$ FHNVSS to obtain a fully non-interactive multi-party computation scheme, called AntNest. In a (t, n) AntNest scheme, n players jointly compute a negotiated function, the inputs of which are inputs of all players, and honest player does not reveal his own private data (include his inputs) to others. Because the MPC scheme AntNest is based on FHNVSS, properties of non-interactive and verifiability are same as FHNVSS. That is to say, players can jointly compute with inputs of all players without interaction; players can verify VK, core-shares and responses without interaction. The construction of AntNest will be presented first, then we will discuss the security of AntNest.

A. Construction of AntNest

A (t, n) AntNest scheme includes n players $(n \geq t > 2)$. Each player works as a dealer of (t, n) FHNVSS to confidentially share his data with other players, and he also works as a server of FHNVSS to jointly compute a function negotiated by players, the inputs of which are data shared by all players. In the following content, we will take a (t, n) AntNest as an example to present the work process of the scheme. Let these n players be $P_1, P_2, ..., P_n$.

- Step 1: i from 1 to n, P_i executes a (t, n) FUNVSS scheme among the n players independently. In this process all n players act as n servers of this (t, n) FUNVSS scheme and the key secret sampled by P_i is s_i. Specifically, P_i executes algorithms Gen_VK and Gen_CS to generate a verification key (VK_i) and n core-shares $(CS_{i,1}, CS_{i,2}, ..., CS_{i,n})$ respectively. He opens the VK_i and securely sends $CS_{i,j}$ $(j = 1, 2, ..., n,\ j \neq i)$ to P_j, and he securely keeps the $CS_{i,i}$. The VK_i can be verified by other players with the algorithm Ver_VK. If VK_i is invalid, P_i has to re-generate this VK_i. $CS_{i,j}$ can be verified by P_j with the algorithm Ver_CS. If $CS_{i,j}$ is invalid, P_j can request P_i to re-send a $CS_{i,j}$ until a valid core-share is received. Once each player opens a valid verification key and sends valid core-shares to other players, they join in the next step.
- Step 2: i from 1 to n, P_i uses his secret numbers $(n_{i,1}, n_{i,2}, ..., n_{i,m_i})$ to generates his encrypted numbers $(encn_{i,1}, encn_{i,2}, ..., encn_{i,m_i})$ by computing
$$encn_{i,j} = cn_{i,j} - s_i, \quad (j = 1, 2, ..., m)$$
and sends them to other players. These numbers are as P_i's inputs of the function negotiated by players in the next step.
- Step 3: These n players negotiate a function, which will be jointly calculated by them. The inputs of this function are secret numbers shared by players. The function is a sum of n polynomials as follow:
$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} g_j(n_{j,1}, n_{j,2}, ..., n_{j,m_j}),$$
where g_j is a polynomial of $n_{j,1}, n_{j,2}, ..., n_{j,m_j}$.

- Step 4: i from 1 to n, j from 1 to n, according to the formula g_j in the negotiated function, P_i executes the algorithm Gen_Resp to generate a response $Resp_{j,i}$ with ($CS_{j,i}$) and ($encn_{i,1}$, $encn_{i,2}$, ..., $encn_{i,m_i}$). After that, he adds all $Resp_{1,i}$, $Resp_{2,i}$, ..., $Resp_{n,i}$ to obtain the final response $Resp_i$. Then he broadcasts his response $Resp_i$ to other players.
- Step 5: After receiving a response $Resp_i$, a player verifies it with $VK_1, VK_2, ..., VK_n$ and ID_i. Specifically, the player computes all $CM_{g_1(ID_i)}$, $CM_{g_2(ID_i)}$, ...,$CM_{g_n(ID_i)}$. After that, the player multiples these commitments to obtain a commitment as follow:

  $$CM_{final,i} = CM_{g_1(ID_i)} CM_{g_2(ID_i)} ..., CM_{g_n(ID_i)}.$$

  If $CM_{final,i} = g^{Resp_i}$, the response $Resp_i$ is valid, else the player can request the corresponding player re-send a response until a valid response is received.
- Step 6: Once a player collects at least t valid responses, he can use Lagrangian Interpolation to recover a polynomial $H(x)$. Then the correct result of negotiated function is equal to $H(x)|_{x=0}$.

B. Security analysis of AntNest

In this subsection, we will discuss the security of (t, n) AntNest ($n >\geq t > 2$).

- P_i's ($i = 1, 2, ..., n$) inputs are always confidential as long as the number of malicious players is less than t. P_i's inputs are shared among $P_1, P_2, ..., P_n$ via a (t, n) FHNVSS. A player can recover P_i's inputs iff he can get t valid core-shares of P_i such as ($CS_{i,1}$, $CS_{i,2}$, ..., $CS_{i,t}$). However, this player cannot get these core-shares as long as the number of malicious players is less than t. **Special case:** P_i's inputs are always confidential as long as he does not reveal his $CS_{i,i}$. A player recovers P_i's inputs iff he can get all core-shares $CS_{i,1}$, $CS_{i,2}$, ..., $CS_{i,n}$. However, this player cannot get $CS_{i,i}$ as long as P_i does not reveal it.
- **Only-one jointly computing.** Honest players will not reveal their inputs. The number of honest players is at least t ($t > 2$). For an honest/malicious player, the result of negotiated function includes at least two/three undetermined inputs, which are secretly kept by other honest players, for him. Consequently, this honest/malicious player cannot solve inputs of other honest players from result.
- **Multi-jointly computing with the same inputs.**
  - Negotiated functions should not be used to increase the advantage for solving inputs of players. For instance, the following case is unallowed. The first function is as follow:

    $$F_1 = x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4.$$

    The second negotiated function is as follow:

    $$F_2 = x_1 + x_2 + x_3 - x_4.$$

    Any player can obtain x_4 by computing $(F_1 - F_2)/2$.
  - Players can jointly compute at most $t - 2$ functions with the same inputs. For instance, in a $(4, 5)$ AntNest, five players are P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5 and x_i is the input of P_i ($i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5$). According to our point, in this instance, players can jointly compute at most 2 negotiated functions with the same inputs. Specifically, because the protocol is of $(4, 5)$, it could includes a malicious player who is willing to reveal his input to others. For example, the malicious player is P_5. Therefore, x_5 could be known by all players. Other four players are honest and they do not reveal their inputs. For anyone of honest players, the result of a negotiated function includes three undetermined inputs from other three honest players. Consequently, to keep inputs of honestly players being confidential, the number of negotiated functions is at most 2.

VIII. Conclusions

In this paper, we propose a fully homomorphic non-interactive verifiable secret sharing (FHNVSS) scheme. In this scheme, shareholders can generate shares of any-degree polynomial of shared numbers without interaction, and the dealer can verify whether shareholders are honest without interaction. We implemented the FHNVSS scheme in Python with a detailed performance evaluation. Besides, we make an extension on the FHNVSS scheme to obtain a fully non-interactive secure multi-party computation, called AntNest, where distrustful players can jointly calculate a any-degree negotiated function, the input of which are inputs of all players, without interaction, and each player can verify whether other players calculate honestly without interaction.

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Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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