# How to leverage hardness of constant-degree expanding polynomials over $\mathbb{R}$ to build $i\mathcal{O}^\star$

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**Abstract.** In this work, we introduce and construct $D$-restricted Functional Encryption (FE) for any constant $D \geq 3$, based only on the SXDH assumption over bilinear groups. This generalizes the notion of 3-restricted FE recently introduced and constructed by Ananth et al. (ePrint 2018) in the generic bilinear group model.

A $D = (d + 2)$-restricted FE scheme is a secret key FE scheme that allows an encryptor to efficiently encrypt a message of the form $M = (\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$. Here, $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times n}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$. Function keys can be issued for a function $f = \Sigma_{\boldsymbol{I}=(i_1,..,i_d,j,k)} \; c_{\boldsymbol{I}} \cdot \boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1] \cdots \boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d] \cdot \boldsymbol{y}[j] \cdot \boldsymbol{z}[k]$ where the coefficients $c_{\boldsymbol{I}} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$. Knowing the function key and the ciphertext, one can learn $f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$, if this value is bounded in absolute value by some polynomial in the security parameter and $n$. The security requirement is that the ciphertext hides $\boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}$, although it is not required to hide $\boldsymbol{x}$. Thus $\boldsymbol{x}$ can be seen as a public attribute.

$D$-restricted FE allows for useful evaluation of constant-degree polynomials, while only requiring the SXDH assumption over bilinear groups. As such, it is a powerful tool for leveraging hardness that exists in constant-degree expanding families of polynomials over $\mathbb{R}$. In particular, we build upon the work of Ananth et al. to show how to build indistinguishability obfuscation ($i\mathcal{O}$) assuming only SXDH over bilinear groups, LWE, and assumptions relating to weak pseudorandom properties of constant-degree expanding polynomials over $\mathbb{R}$.

## 1 Introduction

Program obfuscation transforms a computer program $P$ into an equivalent program $O(P)$ such that any secrets present within $P$ are "as hard as possible" to extract from $O(P)$. This property can be formalized by the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation ($i\mathcal{O}$) [9, 32]. Formally, $i\mathcal{O}$ requires that given any two

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$^\star$ This paper is a merge of two independent works, one by Jain and Sahai, and the other by Lin and Matt.

equivalent programs $P_1$ and $P_2$ of the same size, a computationally bounded adversary cannot distinguish $O(P_1)$ from $O(P_2)$. $i\mathcal{O}$ has far-reaching application [26, 50], significantly expanding the scope of problems to which cryptography can be applied [50, 38, 25, 19, 28, 35, 12, 31, 34, 16].

The work of [26] gave the first mathematical candidate $i\mathcal{O}$ construction, and since then several additional candidates have been proposed and studied [24, 21, 29, 22, 33, 15, 8, 49, 3, 7, 17, 13, 20, 36, 14, 33, 18, 47, 46, 23, 39, 44, 5, 43].

*Constructing $i\mathcal{O}$ without MMaps.* Until 2018, all known constructions relied on multilinear maps [21, 22, 24, 29]. Unfortunately, multilinear map constructions are complex and surviving multilinear map security models [27, 11, 45] are themselves complex and difficult to analyze, as they have had to be modified in light of a sequence of attacks on multilinear map candidates [17, 13, 20, 36, 14, 33, 18, 47, 46].

This state of affairs is troubling scientifically, as we would like to be able to reduce the security of $i\mathcal{O}$ to problems that are simple to state, and where the underlying mathematics has a long history of study.

*Everything old is new again: low-degree polynomials over the reals.* Humanity has studied solving systems of (low-degree) polynomials over the reals for hundreds of years. Is it possible to use *hardness* associated with polynomial systems over the reals cryptographically? Surprisingly, despite hundreds of years of study, remarkably little is known about average-case hardness corresponding to *expanding* polynomial systems, where the number of real variables is $n$, and the polynomial equations over them is $n^{1+\epsilon}$ for $\epsilon > 0$.

The recent works of [4, 42, 1] introduced a new way constructing $i\mathcal{O}$ without relying on multilinear maps, by looking to hardness that may be present in degree two [4, 42, 1] or degree three [4] expanding polynomial systems over the reals.

The primary goal of our work is to extend the approach proposed by [4] to be able to use hardness associated with suitable expanding polynomial systems of *any constant degree.*

*Leveraging low degree pseudorandomness over Z to build $i\mathcal{O}$.* The key idea behind the work of [4] is to posit the existence of weak pseudorandom objects that are closely related to polynomials of degree 2 or 3 over the integers. They then introduce the crucial notion of 3-restricted functional encryption, which is a notion of functional encryption that allows for a *restricted* but still useful evaluation of degree-3 polynomials. This notion allows for the *natural* application of expanding families of degree-3 polynomials. (See below for further discussion on restricted-FE and its uses.)

Departing from previous work [5, 40, 43] that required at least trilinear maps to construct any meaningful FE for degree-3 functions, [4] show how to construct 3-restricted FE using only *bilinear maps*. Finally, by combining 3-restricted FE with the weak pseudorandom objects mentioned above, they achieve $i\mathcal{O}$ (also assuming LWE).

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The goals of our present work are two-fold:

– To show how to extend the above approach beyond degree 3, to any constant degree $D$ for $D \geq 3$. To do so, the key ingredient we construct is $D$-restricted FE, again *only* using bilinear maps regardless of the constant $D$.
– Furthermore, we construct $D$-restricted FE assuming only the SXDH assumption to hold over the bilinear map groups, instead of the generic bilinear model that was needed in [4].

We now elaborate.

*D-restricted FE.* A $D$-restricted FE scheme naturally generalizes the notion of 3-restricted FE scheme from [4]. We will write $D = d+2$ for notational convenience. Such a scheme is a secret key FE scheme that allows an encryptor to encrypt a message of the form $M = (\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$, where $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{F}^{d \times n}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$. Function keys can be issued for a function $f = \Sigma_{\boldsymbol{I} = (i_1, .., i_d, j, k)} \; c_{\boldsymbol{I}} \cdot \boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1] \cdots \boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d] \cdot \boldsymbol{y}[j] \cdot \boldsymbol{z}[k]$ with coefficients $c_{\boldsymbol{I}} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$. Knowing the key and the ciphertext, one can learn $f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$, if this value is bounded in absolute value by some polynomial in the security parameter and $n$. The security requirement is that the ciphertext hides $\boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}$, although it is not required to hide $\boldsymbol{x}$. Thus $\boldsymbol{x}$ can be seen as a public attribute. For implications to $i\mathcal{O}$, we require that encryption complexity should grow only linearly in $n$ (up to a polynomial factor in the security parameter).

Observe that for a given family of degree-$D$ polynomials $Q$ fixed in a function key, the notion of $D$-restricted FE allows an encryptor to choose the values of all variables $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}$ at the time of encryption, and the decryptor will obtain $Q(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$. This allows for the most natural use of degree-$D$ polynomials. We stress this point because other, less natural uses, are possible without using $D$-restricted FE, but these are unsatisfactory: One example would be where along with the polynomial $Q$ the values of all variables $\boldsymbol{x}$ would also be fixed inside the function key. This would reduce the degree-$D$ polynomials $Q$ to quadratic polynomials, and just quadratic FE would then suffice (see, e.g., [42, 1]). However, again, this latter, less natural, approach would not allow $\boldsymbol{x}$ to be chosen freshly with each encryption. With our notion of $D$-restricted FE, such an unnatural setting – where some variables are fixed but others are freshly chosen with each encryption – can be avoided completely.

*Why is it important to go beyond degree 3?* At the core of the new works that construct $i\mathcal{O}$ without multilinear maps is the following key question: For some constant $D$, do there exist "expanding" distributions of polynomials $q_1, \ldots, q_m$ of degree $D$, where $m = n^{1+\epsilon}$ with polynomially-bounded coefficients, such that if one obtains $\boldsymbol{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ by sampling each $x_i$ from a "nice" distribution with polynomially-bounded support, then is it hard to solve for $\boldsymbol{x}$ given $q_1(\boldsymbol{x}), \ldots, q_m(\boldsymbol{x})$? Remarkably, even though this question has a many-hundred year history within mathematics and nearly every branch of science, surprisingly little is known about *hardness* in this setting! And yet the hardness of such inversion problems is necessary (though not sufficient, see below) for this new line of work on constructing $i\mathcal{O}$.

Recently, [10] gave evidence that such problems may *not* be hard for $D = 2$. The case for $D = 3$ is less studied, and seems related to questions like the hardness of RANDOM 3-SAT. However, it seems that increasing $D$ to larger constants should give us more confidence that hard distributions exist. For example, for $D = 5$ and larger, this becomes related to the hardness of natural generalizations of the Goldreich PRG [30, 48]. It is also likely that as $D$ grows, hardness "kicks in" for smaller values of $n$, similar to how the hardness of RANDOM k-SAT for constant $k > 3$ can be observed experimentally for much smaller values of $n$, than for RANDOM 3-SAT. Thus, our study could impact efficiency, as well.

Since studying the hardness of solving expanding families of polynomial equations over $\mathbb{R}$ is an exciting new line of cryptanalytic research, it is particularly important to study what values of $D$ are cryptographically interesting. Before our work, only $D = 2$ and $D = 3$ were known to lead to $i\mathcal{O}$; our work shows that hardness for any constant degree $D$ is interesting and cryptographically useful.

We stress that ensuring the hardness of solving for $\boldsymbol{x}$ given $q_1(\boldsymbol{x}), \ldots, q_m(\boldsymbol{x})$ is just the first step. Our work also clarifies the actual hardness assumptions that we need to imply $i\mathcal{O}$ as the following two assumptions. Since $D > 2$, let $D = d + 2$ for the rest of the discussion.

*Weak LWE with leakage.* This assumption says that there exists distributions $\chi$ over the integers and $Q$ over families of multilinear degree-D polynomials such that the following two distributions are weakly indistinguishable, meaning that no efficient adversary can correctly identify the distribution from which a sample arose with probability above $\frac{1}{2} + 1/4\lambda$.

Distribution $\mathcal{D}_1$: Fix a prime modulus $\mathbf{p} = O(2^\lambda)$. Run $Q(n, B, \epsilon)$ to obtain polynomials $(q_1, ..., q_{\lfloor n^{1+\epsilon} \rfloor})$. Sample a secret $\boldsymbol{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\lambda$ and sample $\boldsymbol{a}_{j,i} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\lambda$ for $j \in [d], i \in [n]$. Finally, for every $j \in [d], i \in [n]$, sample $e_{j,i}, y_i, z_i \leftarrow \chi$, and write $\boldsymbol{e_j} = (e_{j,1}, \ldots, e_{j,n})$, $\boldsymbol{y} = (y_1, \ldots, y_n)$, $\boldsymbol{z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_n)$. Output:

$$\{\boldsymbol{a}_{j,i}, \langle \boldsymbol{a}_{j,i}, \boldsymbol{s} \rangle + e_{j,i} \bmod p\}_{j \in [d], i \in [n]}$$

along with

$$\{q_k, q_k(\boldsymbol{e_1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{e_d}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})\}_{k \in [n^{1+\epsilon}]}$$

Distribution $\mathcal{D}_2$ is the same as $\mathcal{D}_1$, except that we additionally sample $e'_{j,i} \leftarrow \chi$ for $j \in [d], i \in [n]$. The output is now

$$\{\boldsymbol{a}_{j,i}, \langle \boldsymbol{a}_{j,i}, \boldsymbol{s} \rangle + e'_{j,i} \bmod p\}_{j \in [d], i \in [n]}$$

along with

$$\{q_k, q_k(\boldsymbol{e_1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{e_d}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})\}_{k \in [n^{1+\epsilon}]}$$

We can think of the polynomials $q_k(\boldsymbol{e_1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{e_d}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$ as "leaking" some information about the LWE errors $e_{j,i}$. The assumption above states that such leakage provides only a limited advantage to the adversary. Critically, the fact that there are $n^2 > n^{1+\epsilon}$ quadratic monomials involving just $\boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}$ above, which are not used in the LWE samples at all, is crucial to avoiding linearization

attacks over $\mathbb{Z}_p$ in the spirit of Arora-Ge [6]. For more discussion of the security of the above assumption in the context of $D = 3$, see [10].

The second assumption deals only with expanding degree-$D$ polynomials over the reals, and requires that these polynomials are weakly perturbation resilient.

*Weak Perturbation-Resilience.* The second assumption is that there exists polynomials that for the same parameters above the following two distributions are weakly indistinguishable. By weakly indistinguishability we mean that no efficient adversary can correctly identify the distribution from which a sample arose with probability above $1 - 2/\lambda$. Let $\delta_i \in \mathbb{Z}$ be such that $|\delta_i| < B(\lambda, n)$ for some polynomial $B$ and $i \in [n^{1+\epsilon}]$:

Distribution $\mathcal{D}_1$ consists of the evaluated polynomial samples. That is, we output:

$$\{q_k, q_k(\boldsymbol{e_1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{e_d}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})\}_{k \in [n^{1+\epsilon}]}$$

Distribution $\mathcal{D}_2$ consists of the evaluated polynomial samples with added perturbations $\delta_i$ for $i \in [n^{1+\epsilon}]$. That is, we output:

$$\{q_k, q_k(\boldsymbol{e_1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{e_d}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}) + \delta_k\}_{k \in [n^{1+\epsilon}]}$$

These assumptions are sketched here informally; the formal definitions are given in Section 5.

*Our Results:* Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we construct a $(d + 2)$ restricted FE scheme from the SXDH assumption.

**Theorem 1.** *Assuming $SXDH$ over bilinear maps, there is a construction of a $(d + 2)$ restricted FE scheme for any constant $d \geq 1$.*

Then, we give candidates of perturbation resilient generators that can be implemented using a $(d + 2)$ restricted FE scheme. Finally, using such a perturbation resilient generator and $(d + 2)$ restricted FE, we construct $i\mathcal{O}$ via the approach given by [4]. Here is our final theorem.

**Theorem 2.** *For any constant integer $d \geq 1$, two distinguishing gaps $\mathsf{adv}_1, \mathsf{adv}_2$, if $\mathsf{adv}_1 + \mathsf{adv}_2 \leq 1 - 2/\lambda$ then assuming,*

- *Subexponentially hard LWE.*
- *Subexponentially hard SXDH.*
- *PRGs with*
  - *Stretch of $k^{1+\epsilon}$ (length of input being $k$ bits) for some constant $\epsilon > 0$.*
  - *Block locality $d + 2$.*
  - *Security with distinguishing gap bounded by $\mathsf{adv}_1$ against adversaries of sub-exponential size.*
- *$\mathsf{d}\Delta\mathsf{RG}$ with distinguishing gap bounded by $\mathsf{adv}_2$ against adversaries of size $2^\lambda$. Details about the notion of $\mathsf{d}\Delta\mathsf{RG}$ can be found in Sections 5 and 6.*

*there exists a secure $i\mathcal{O}$ scheme for P/poly.*

We additionally note that the work of [42] provides a construction of $i\mathcal{O}$ from a different notion of weak randomness generators called pseudo flawed-smudging generators, and a partially hiding FE scheme that can compute them. Their notion of partially hiding FE is implied by our degree $(d + 2)$ restricted FE. Therefore, if using our candidates of perturbation resilient generators as candidates of pseudo flawed-smudging generators, we can obtain $i\mathcal{O}$ via the the approach of [42], as summarized in the theorem below.

**Theorem 3.** *For any constant integer $d \geq 1$, assuming,*

- *LWE,*
- *SXDH,*
- *PRGs with*
  - *Stretch of $k^{1+\epsilon}$ (length of input being $k$ bits) for some constant $\epsilon > 0$,*
  - *Constant locality and additional mild structural properties (see [42] for details),*
- *Pseudo flawed-smudging generators with degree $d$ public computation and degree 2 private computation. Details about the notion of pseudo flawed-smudging generators can be found in Section 5.2 and [42].*

*where all primitives are secure against adversaries of polynomial sizes with sub-exponentially small distinguishing gaps. Then, there exists a subexponentially secure $i\mathcal{O}$ scheme for P/poly.*

For simplicity, we focus on working with the notion of $\Delta\mathsf{RG}$ here and provide more details on how to work with pseudo flawed-smudging generators in [37].

We now proceed with a more detailed, but still informal, technical overview of our techniques.

## 2 Technical Overview

$(d + 2)$-*restricted FE.* The key technical tool constructed in this work is the notion of $(d + 2)-$restricted FE ($\mathsf{dFE}$ for short) for any constant integer $d \geq 1$. We recall that a $\mathsf{dFE}$ scheme over $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ is a secret key functional encryption scheme for the functions $f$ of the following form: $f : \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{n \times (d+2)} \to \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$. To be precise, $f$ takes as input $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$ where $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{n \times (d)}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$. Then it computes $f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}) = \Sigma_{\boldsymbol{I}=(i_1,..,i_d,j,k)} c_{\boldsymbol{I}} \cdot \boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1] \cdots \boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d] \cdot \boldsymbol{y}[j] \cdot \boldsymbol{z}[k]$ where each coefficient $c_{\boldsymbol{I}} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$. We require the decryption to be efficient only if the output is bounded in norm by a polynomial bound $B(\lambda, n)$. Security of a $\mathsf{dFE}$ scheme intuitively requires that a ciphertext only reveals the $d$ public components $\boldsymbol{x}$ and the output of the decryption.

Before we describe our construction, we first recall the construction of 3-restricted FE from [4]:

*3-restricted FE [4].* Before getting to 3 restricted FE, we first recap how secret key quadratic functional encryption schemes [41] work at a high level. Let's say that the encryptor wants to encrypt $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$. The master secret key consists of two secret random vectors $\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$ that are used for enforcement of computations done on $\boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}$ respectively. The idea is that the encryptor encodes $\boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ using some randomness $r$, and similarly encodes $\boldsymbol{z}$ and $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ together as well. These encodings are created using bilinear maps in one of the two base groups. These encodings are constructed so that the decryptor can compute an encoding of $[g(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}) - rg(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$ in the target group for *any* quadratic function $g$. The function key for the given function $f$ is constructed in such a manner that it allows the decryptor to compute the encoding $[rf(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$ in the target group. Thus the output $[f(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})]_t$ can be recovered in the exponent by computing the sum of $[rf(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$ and $[f(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}) - rf(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$ in the exponent. As long as $f(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$ is polynomially small, this value can then be recovered efficiently.

Clearly the idea above only works for degree-2 computations, if we use bilinear maps. However, the work of [4] built upon this idea nevertheless to construct a 3-restricted FE scheme. Recall, in a 3-restricted FE one wants to encrypt three vectors $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$. While $\boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}$ are required to be hidden, $\boldsymbol{x}$ is not required to be hidden.

In their scheme, in addition to $\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$ in case of a quadratic FE, another vector $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$ is also sampled that is used to enforce the correctness of the $\boldsymbol{x}$ part of the computation. As before, given the ciphertext one can compute $[\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$ for $j, k \in [n]$. But this is clearly not enough, as these encodings do not involve $\boldsymbol{x}$ in any way. Thus, in addition, an encoding of $r(\boldsymbol{x}[i] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[i])$ is also given in the ciphertext for $i \in [n]$. Inside the function key, there are corresponding encodings of $\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]$ for $j, k \in [n]$ which the decryptor can pair with encoding of $r(\boldsymbol{x}[i] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[i])$ to form the encoding $[r(\boldsymbol{x}[i] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[i])\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$ in the target group.

Now observe that,

$$\boldsymbol{x}[i] \cdot \big(\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]\big) + r(\boldsymbol{x}[i] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[i]) \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]$$
$$=\boldsymbol{x}[i]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]$$

Above, since $\boldsymbol{x}[i]$ is public, the decryptor can herself take $(\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k])$, which she already has, and multiply it with $\boldsymbol{x}[i]$ in the exponent. This allows her to compute an encoding of $[\boldsymbol{x}[i]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$. Combining these encodings appropriately, she can obtain $[g(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}) - rg(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$ for any degree-3 multilinear function $g$. Given the function key for $f$ and the ciphertext, one can compute $[rf(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$ which can be used to unmask the output. This is because the ciphertext contains an encoding of $r$ in one of the base groups and the function key contains an encoding of $f(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})$ in the other group and pairing them results in $[rf(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$.

The work of [4] shows how to analyze the security of the construction above in a generic bilinear group model.

*Towards constructing $(d + 2)-$restricted FE.* Now let's consider how we can extend the approach discussed above for the case of $d = 2$. Suppose now we want to

encrypt $\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}$. Here $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}$ are supposed to be private while $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{u}$ are not required to be hidden. Let's now also have $\boldsymbol{\phi} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$ to enforce $\boldsymbol{u}$ part of the computation. How can we generalize the idea above to allow for degree-4 computations? One straightforward idea is to release encodings of $r(\boldsymbol{u}[i_1]\boldsymbol{x}[i_2] - \boldsymbol{\phi}[i_1]\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2])$ for $i_1, i_2 \in [n]$ in the ciphertext instead of encodings of $r(\boldsymbol{x}[i_2] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2])$ like before. This would permit the computation of $[f(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}) - rf(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$. However, such an approach would not be efficient enough for our needs: we require the complexity of encryption to be linear in $n$. However, the approach above would need to provide $n^2$ encodings corresponding to $r(\boldsymbol{u}[i_1]\boldsymbol{x}[i_2] - \boldsymbol{\phi}[i_1]\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2])$ for every $i_1, i_2 \in [n]$.

*Our first idea: A "ladder" of enforcement.* Let's now take a step back. Notice that our 3-restricted FE scheme already allows one to compute $[\boldsymbol{x}[i_2]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$ for any $i_2, j, k \in [n]$. We want to leverage this existing capability to bootstrap to degree-4 computations.

Suppose the decryptor is also able to generate the encoding $[r(\boldsymbol{u}[i_1] - \boldsymbol{\phi}[i_1]) \cdot \boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$ for any $i_1, i_2, j, k \in [n]$. Then, she can generate the encoding $[\boldsymbol{u}[i_1]\boldsymbol{x}[i_2]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - \boldsymbol{\phi}[i_1]\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$ as follows:

$$r(\boldsymbol{u}[i_1] - \boldsymbol{\phi}[i_1])\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k] + \boldsymbol{u}[i_1] \cdot \big(\boldsymbol{x}[i_2]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]\big)$$
$$= \boldsymbol{u}[i_1]\boldsymbol{x}[i_2]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\phi}[i_1]\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]$$

Notice that $\boldsymbol{u}$ is public so the decryptor can herself take $(\boldsymbol{x}[i_2]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k])$, which she already has, and multiply it with $\boldsymbol{u}[i_1]$ in the exponent. To allow the computation of $[r(\boldsymbol{u}[i_1] - \boldsymbol{\phi}[i_1])\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$ we can provide additionally encodings of $(\boldsymbol{u}[i_1] - r\boldsymbol{\phi}[i_1])$ in the ciphertexts for $i_1 \in [n]$ and corresponding encodings of $\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]$ for $i_2, j, k \in [n]$ in the function key that can be paired together.

What next? As before, the decryptor can homomorphically compute on these encodings and learn $[f(\boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}) - rf(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$. Finally, the decryptor can compute $[rf(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$ by pairing an encoding of $r$ given in the ciphertext and and encoding of $f(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})$ given in the function key. Thus, the output can be unmasked in the exponent.

Observe that this solution preserves linear efficiency of the ciphertext. As of now we have not told anything about how security is argued. From computation point of view, this solution indeed turns out to be insightful as this process can now be generalized to form a ladder of enforcement for any constant degree-$D$ computations.

*Laddered computations for any constant degree $(d + 2)$.* First let's set up some notation. Let $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times n}$ be the public part of the plain-text and $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$. Let $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times n}$ be the vector of random field elements corresponding to $\boldsymbol{x}$. Similarly, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ and $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$ be the vector of random elements corresponding to $\boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}$ respectively.

The next observation is the following. Suppose the decryptor can generate the following terms by pairing encodings present in the ciphertext and encodings present in the functional key, for every $\boldsymbol{I} = (i_1, .., i_d, j, k) \in [n]^D$.

- $[\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\beta_j\gamma_k]_t$ for $j, k \in [n]$.
- $[r(\boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]) \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$
- $[r(\boldsymbol{x}[d-1, i_{d-1}] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d-1, i_{d-1}]) \cdot \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$
- $\ldots$
- $[r(\boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[1, i_1]) \cdot \boldsymbol{\alpha}[2, i_2] \cdots \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$

As before, the decryptor can also obtain an encoding $[rf(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$ corresponding to the degree-$D$ multilinear function $f$ in the function key.

The main observation to generalize the $D = 4$ case discussed above is then the following. Consider the first two terms: $[\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] + r\beta_j\gamma_k]_t$ and $[r(\boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d])\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$ and note that:

$$\boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d](\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\beta_j\gamma_k) + r(\boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d])\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]$$
$$= \boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]$$

This observation allows the decryptor to compute an encoding

$$\mathsf{Int}_d = [\boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$$

using encodings of the first two types in the list above.

Next observe that using the encoding,

$$[r(\boldsymbol{x}[d-1, i_{d-1}] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d-1, i_{d-1}]) \cdot \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$$

and encoding $\mathsf{Int}_d$ one can compute

$$\mathsf{Int}_{d-1} = [\boldsymbol{x}[d-1, i_{d-1}]\boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[d-1, i_{d-1}]\boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$$

This is because,

$$\boldsymbol{x}[d-1, i_{d-1}] \cdot (\boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k])$$
$$+ r(\boldsymbol{x}[d-1, i_{d-1}] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d-1, i_{d-1}]) \cdot \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]$$
$$= \boldsymbol{x}[d-1, i_{d-1}]\boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[d-1, i_{d-1}]\boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]$$

Continuing this way up a "ladder" the decryptor can compute

$$\mathsf{Mon}_{\boldsymbol{I}} = [\Pi_{\ell \in [d]}\boldsymbol{x}[\ell, i_\ell]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\Pi_{\ell \in [d]}\boldsymbol{\alpha}[\ell, i_\ell]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t$$

Observe that the term $\Pi_{\ell \in [d]}\boldsymbol{x}[\ell, i_\ell]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\Pi_{\ell \in [d]}\boldsymbol{\alpha}[\ell, i_\ell]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]$ corresponding to $\mathsf{Mon}_{\boldsymbol{I}}$ can be generated as a linear combination of terms from the list above. Once $\mathsf{Mon}_{\boldsymbol{I}}$ is computed then the decryptor can do the following. Since $f = \Sigma_{\boldsymbol{I}=(i_1,..,i_d,j,k)}c_{\boldsymbol{I}}\boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1] \cdots \boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k]$, the decryptor can then compute:

$$\mathsf{Mon}_f = [f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}) - rf(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$$

Finally using $[rf(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t$ the decryptor can recover $[f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})]_t$.

*How to base security on SXDH?* So far, we have just described a potential computation pattern that allows the decryptor to obtain the function output given a function key and a ciphertext. Any scheme that allows constructing the terms described above in the ladder is guaranteed to satisfy correctness. But how do we argue security?

We rely on a primitive called Canonical Function Hiding Inner Product Encryption (cIPE for short). A cIPE scheme allows the decryptor to compute the inner product of a vector encoded in the ciphertext, with a vector encoded in the function key. Also, intuitively, cIPE guarantees that the vector embedded in the function key is also hidden given the function key. More precisely, given any vectors $\boldsymbol{v}, \boldsymbol{v}', \boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{u}'$ such that $\langle \boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v} \rangle = \langle \boldsymbol{u}', \boldsymbol{v}' \rangle$, no efficient adversary can distinguish between a ciphertext encoding $\boldsymbol{u}$ and a function key encoding $\boldsymbol{v}$, from a ciphertext encoding $\boldsymbol{u}'$ and a function key encoding $\boldsymbol{v}'$.

Furthermore, syntactically speaking, in a cIPE scheme, we will require the following to be true:

- The encryption algorithm just computes exponentiation and multiplication operations in $G_1$. The encryption of a vector $(a_1, .., a_4)$ can just be computed knowing $g_1^{a_i}$ for $i \in [4]$ and the master secret key.
- Key generation algorithm just computes exponentiation and multiplication operation in $G_2$. The function key for a vector $(b_1, .., b_4)$ can just be computed knowing $g_2^{b_i}$ for $i \in [4]$ and the master secret key.
- The decryption process just computes pairing operations and then computes group multiplications over $G_t$. The output is produced in $G_t$. The element $g_t^a$ is represented as $[a]_t$ for the rest of the paper.

Such a cIPE scheme was given by [40], where it was instantiated from SXDH over bilinear maps. That work also used cIPE to build quadratic FE from SXDH. We will also make use of cIPE in our construction of $D$-restricted FE. Note, however, that unlike in the case of quadratic FE, our construction, and crucially our proof of security, will also need to incorporate the "ladder" enforcement mechanism sketched above. We are able to do so still relying only on the SXDH assumption.

We note that the size of the vectors encrypted using a cIPE scheme cannot grow with $n$, to achieve linear efficiency. In fact, we just use four-dimensional vectors.

*Realizing the Ladder: Warm-up Construction for $d + 2 = 4$.* Here is a warm-up construction for the case of $d = 2$ (i.e. $D$=4).
$\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$: On input security parameter $1^\lambda$ and length $1^n$,

- Run cIPE setup as follows. $\mathbf{sk}_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{cIPE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^4)$. Thus these keys are used to encrypt vectors in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^4$.
- Then run cIPE setup algorithm $2 \cdot n$ times. That is, for every $\ell \in [2]$ and $i_\ell \in [n]$, compute $\mathbf{sk}^{(\ell, i_\ell)} \leftarrow \mathsf{cIPE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^4)$.
- Sample $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{2 \times n}$. Also sample $\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$.

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- For every set $\boldsymbol{I} = (i_1, i_2, j, k)$ in $[n]^4$ do the following. Let $\boldsymbol{I}' = (i_2, j, k)$ and $\boldsymbol{I}'' = (j, k)$. Compute $\mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}'}^{(1,i_1)} =$

$$\mathsf{cIPE.KeyGen}(\mathbf{sk}^{(1,i_1)}, (\boldsymbol{\alpha}[2,i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k], \boldsymbol{\alpha}[1,i_1]\boldsymbol{\alpha}[2,i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k], 0, 0))$$

Similarly, compute $\mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}''}^{(2,i_2)} =$

$$\mathsf{cIPE.KeyGen}(\mathbf{sk}^{(2,i_2)}, (\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k], \boldsymbol{\alpha}[2,i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k], 0, 0))$$

- Output $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathbf{sk}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}, \mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell,i_\ell,\boldsymbol{I}}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}, \mathbf{sk}_0)$

$\underline{\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{MSK}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})}$: The input message $M = (\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$ consists of a public attribute $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{F}_\mathbf{p}^{2 \times n}$ and private vectors $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{F}_\mathbf{p}^n$. Perform the following operations:

- Parse $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathbf{sk}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}, \mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell,i_\ell,\boldsymbol{I}}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}, \mathbf{sk}_0)$.
- Sample $r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_\mathbf{p}$.
- Compute $\mathsf{CT}_0 = \mathsf{cIPE.Enc}(\mathbf{sk}_0, (r, 0, 0, 0))$.
- Sample $\mathbf{sk}' \leftarrow \mathsf{cIPE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^4)$.
- Compute $\mathsf{CTC}_j \leftarrow \mathsf{cIPE.Enc}(\mathbf{sk}, (\boldsymbol{y}[j], \boldsymbol{\beta}[j], 0, 0))$ for $j \in [n]$
- Compute $\mathsf{CTK}_k \leftarrow \mathsf{cIPE.KeyGen}(\mathbf{sk}, (\boldsymbol{z}[k], -r\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k], 0, 0))$ for $k \in [n]$.
- For every $\ell \in [2]$, $i_\ell \in [n]$, compute $\mathsf{CT}^{(\ell,i_\ell)} = \mathsf{cIPE.Enc}(\mathbf{sk}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}, (r\boldsymbol{x}[\ell,i_\ell], -r, 0, 0))$.
- Output $\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{x}, \mathsf{CT}_0, \{\mathsf{CTC}_j, \mathsf{CTK}_k, \mathsf{CT}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell \in [2], i_\ell \in [n], j \in [n], k \in [n]})$

$\underline{\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}, f)}$: On input the master secret key $\mathsf{MSK}$ and function $f$,

- Parse $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathbf{sk}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}, \mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell,i_\ell,\boldsymbol{I}}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}, \mathbf{sk}_0)$.
- Compute $\theta_f = f(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})$.
- Compute $\mathsf{Key}_{0,f} = \mathsf{cIPE.KeyGen}(\mathbf{sk}_0, (\theta_f, 0, 0, 0))$
- Output $sk_f = (\mathsf{Key}_{0,f}, \{\mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell,i_\ell,\boldsymbol{I}})$.

Observe how the computation proceeds. This scheme allows to generate all terms in the ladder described above as follows:

Consider all terms associated with the vector $\boldsymbol{I} = (i_1, i_2, j, k) \in [n]^4$.

- $[\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\beta_j\gamma_k]_t = \mathsf{cIPE.Dec}(\mathsf{CTK}_k, \mathsf{CTC}_j)$
- $[r(\boldsymbol{x}[2,i_2] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[2,i_2])\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t = \mathsf{cIPE.Dec}(\mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}''}^{(2,i_2)}, \mathsf{CT}^{(2,i_2)})$ where $\boldsymbol{I}'' = (j, k)$.
- $[r(\boldsymbol{x}[1,i_1] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[1,i_1])\boldsymbol{\alpha}[2,i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_t = \mathsf{cIPE.Dec}(\mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}'}^{(1,i_1)}, \mathsf{CT}^{(1,i_1)})$ where $\boldsymbol{I}'' = (i_2, j, k)$
- $[rf(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_t = \mathsf{cIPE.Dec}(\mathsf{Key}_{0,f}, \mathsf{CT}_0)$.

Thus, we can compute $[f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})]_t$. We now briefly describe how security is proven.

*Security Proof: Key Points.* We use SXDH and function hiding property of the cIPE scheme crucially to argue security. The hybrid strategy is the following.

1. First we switch $\boldsymbol{y}$ to $\boldsymbol{0}$ vector in the challenge ciphertext, changing one component at a time.
2. To maintain correctness of output, we simultaneously introduce an offset in the function key to maintain correctness of decryption.
3. Once $\boldsymbol{y}$ is switched, $\boldsymbol{z}$ can be switched to vector $\boldsymbol{0}$, due to the function hiding property of the cIPE scheme. This is because the inner products remain the same in both the case as $\boldsymbol{y}$ is always $\boldsymbol{0}$ and inner product of any vector with all zero vector is 0. Finally, we are in the hybrid where the challenge ciphertext just depends on $\boldsymbol{x}$ and in particular totally independent of $\boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}$.

Step (1) is most challenging here, and requires careful pebbling and hardwiring arguments made using SXDH and function hiding security property of cIPE. We point the reader to the full version for a detailed proof.

*New $\Delta$RG candidates:* Our construction of $D$-restricted FE enables us to meaningfully consider $\Delta$RG candidates that are implementable by $D$-restricted FE using degree-$D$ polynomials. This enables a much richer class of potential $\Delta$RG candidates than those implementable by 3-restricted FE [4]. In Section 6, we describe a few of the new avenues for constructing $\Delta$RG candidates that we open by our construction of $D$-restricted FE.

*Reader's Guide.* The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we recall the definition of indistinguishability obfuscation and other prerequisites for the paper. In Section 4 we define formally the notions of $(d+2)$ restricted FE. Thereafter, in Section 5 perturbation resilient generator ($\Delta$RG for short) is defined. Both primitives are central to this paper. In Section 6 we give candidate constructions of $\Delta$RG and show how to implement it using a $(d+2)$ restricted FE scheme. In Section 7 we show how to construct $(d+2)$ restricted FE using SXDH. Finally, in Section 8 we stitch all these primitives to show how to build obfuscation.

## 3 Preliminaries

We denote the security parameter by $\lambda$. For a distribution $X$ we denote by $x \leftarrow X$ the process of sampling a value $x$ from the distribution $X$. Similarly, for a set $\mathcal{X}$ we denote by $x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$ the process of sampling $x$ from the uniform distribution over $\mathcal{X}$. For an integer $n \in \mathbb{N}$ we denote by $[n]$ the set $\{1, \ldots, n\}$. A function $\mathsf{negl} : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$ is negligible if for every constant $c > 0$ there exists an integer $N_c$ such that $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda) < \lambda^{-c}$ for all $\lambda > N_c$.

By $\approx_c$ we denote computational indistinguishability. We say that two ensembles $\mathcal{X} = \{\mathcal{X}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\mathcal{Y} = \{\mathcal{Y}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ are computationally indistinguishable if for

every probabilistic polynomial time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ there exists a negligible function $\mathsf{negl}$ such that $\left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_\lambda}[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, x) = 1] - \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}_\lambda}[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, y) = 1] \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$.

For a field element $a \in \mathbb{F}_\mathbf{p}$ represented in $[-p/2, p/2]$, we say that $-B < a < B$ for some positive integer $B$ if its representative in $[-p/2, p/2]$ lies in $[-B, B]$.

**Definition 1 (Distinguishing Gap).** *For any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and two distributions $\mathcal{X} = \{\mathcal{X}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\mathcal{Y} = \{\mathcal{Y}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, define $\mathcal{A}$'s distinguishing gap in distinguishing these distributions to be $|\Pr_{x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_\lambda}[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, x) = 1] - \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}_\lambda}[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, y) = 1]|$*

By boldfaced letters such as $\boldsymbol{v}$ we will denote multidimensional matrices. Whenever dimension is unspecified we mean them as vectors.

Throughout, we denote by an adversary an interactive machine that takes part in a protocol with the challenger. Thus, we model such an adversary as a tuple of circuits $(C_1, ..., C_t)$ where $t$ is the number of messages exchanged. Each circuit takes as input the state output by the previous circuit, among other messages. The size of adversary is defined as sum of size of each circuit.

### 3.1 Indistinguishability Obfuscation ($i\mathcal{O}$)

The notion of indistinguishability obfuscation ($i\mathcal{O}$), first conceived by Barak et al. [9], guarantees that the obfuscation of two circuits are computationally indistinguishable as long as they both are equivalent circuits, i.e., the output of both the circuits are the same on every input. Formally,

**Definition 2 (Indistinguishability Obfuscator ($i\mathcal{O}$) for Circuits).** *A uniform PPT algorithm $i\mathcal{O}$ is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit family $\{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, where $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ consists of circuits $C$ of the form $C : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ with $n = n(\lambda)$, if the following holds:*

- **Completeness:** *For every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, every input $x \in \{0,1\}^n$, we have that*

$$\Pr\left[C'(x) = C(x) \; : \; C' \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C)\right] = 1$$

- **Indistinguishability:** *For any PPT distinguisher $D$, there exists a negligible function $\mathsf{negl}(\cdot)$ such that the following holds: for all sufficiently large $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for all pairs of circuits $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ such that $C_0(x) = C_1(x)$ for all inputs $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ and $|C_0| = |C_1|$, we have:*

$$\left| \Pr\left[D(\lambda, i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C_0)) = 1\right] - \Pr[D(\lambda, i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C_1)) = 1] \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

- **Polynomial Slowdown**: *For every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, we have that $|i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C)| = \mathrm{poly}(\lambda, C)$.*

### 3.2 Bilinear Maps and Assumptions

Let $\mathsf{PPGen}$ be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input $1^\lambda$ returns a description $(e, G_1, G_2, G_T, g_1, g_2, \mathbf{p})$ of asymmetric pairing groups where $G_1$, $G_2$ and $G_T$ are groups of order $\mathbf{p}$ for a $2\lambda$ bit prime $\mathbf{p}$. $g_1$ and $g_2$ are generators of $G_1$ and $G_2$ respectively. $e : G_1 \times G_2 \to G_T$ is an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map. Define $g_t = e(g_1, g_2)$ as the generator of $G_T$.

**Representation:** We use the following representation to describe group elements. For any $b \in \{1, 2, T\}$ define by $[x]_b$ for $x \in \mathbb{F}_\mathbf{p}$ as $g_b^x$. This notation will be used throughout. We now describe SXDH assumption relative to $\mathsf{PPGen}$.

**Definition 3.** *(SXDH Assumption relative to $\mathsf{PPGen}$.) We say that SXDH assumption holds relative to $\mathsf{PPGen}$, if $(e, G_1, G_2, G_T, g_1, g_2, \mathbf{p}) \leftarrow \mathsf{PPGen}$, then for any group $g_\ell$ for $\ell \in \{1, 2, t\}$, it holds that, for any polynomial time adversary $\mathcal{A}$:*

$$\left| \Pr_{r,s,u \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_\mathbf{p}} [\mathcal{A}([r]_\ell, [s]_\ell, [r \cdot s]_\ell) = 1] - \Pr_{r,s,u \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_\mathbf{p}} [\mathcal{A}([r]_\ell, [s]_\ell, [u]_\ell) = 1] \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

*Further, if $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ is $O(2^{-\lambda^c})$ for some $c > 0$, then we say that subexponential SXDH holds relative to $\mathsf{PPGen}$.*

### 3.3 Canonical Function Hiding Inner Product FE

We now describe the notion of a canonical function hiding inner product FE proposed by [40]. A canonical function hiding scheme FE scheme consists of the following algorithms:

- $\mathsf{PPSetup}(1^\lambda) \to \mathsf{pp}$. On input the security parameter, $\mathsf{PPSetup}$, outputs parameters $\mathsf{pp}$, which contain description of the groups and the plain text space $\mathbb{Z}_\mathbf{p}$.
- $\mathsf{Setup}(\mathsf{pp}, 1^n) \to \mathbf{sk}$. The setup algorithm takes as input the length of vector $1^n$ and parameters $\mathsf{pp}$ and outputs a secret key $\mathbf{sk}$. We assume that $\mathsf{pp}$ is always implicitly given as input to this algorithm and the algorithms below (sometimes we omit this for ease of notation).
- $\mathsf{Enc}(\mathbf{sk}, \boldsymbol{x}) \to \mathsf{CT}$. The encryption algorithm takes as input a vector $x \in \mathbb{Z}_\mathbf{p}^n$ and outputs a ciphertext $\mathsf{CT}$.
- $\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathbf{sk}, \boldsymbol{y}) \to \mathbf{sk}_{\boldsymbol{y}}$. The key generation algorithm on input the master secret key $\mathbf{sk}$ and a function vector $y \in \mathbb{Z}_\mathbf{p}^n$ and outputs a function key $\mathbf{sk}_{\boldsymbol{y}}$
- $\mathsf{Dec}(1^B, \mathbf{sk}_{\boldsymbol{y}}, \mathsf{CT}) \to m^*$. The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext $\mathsf{CT}$, a function key $\mathbf{sk}_{\boldsymbol{y}}$ and a bound $B$ and it outputs a value $m^*$. Further, it is run in two steps. First step $\mathsf{Dec}_0$, computes $[\langle \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \rangle]_T$ (if the keys and ciphertexts were issued for $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}$) and then the second step, $\mathsf{Dec}_1$, computes its discrete log, if this value lies in $[-B, B]$

A cIPE scheme satisfies linear efficiency, correctness, function hiding security and a canonical structure requirement. All of these are described in the full version.

# 4 Key Notion 1: $(d+2)-$restricted FE

In this section we describe the notion of a $(d+2)$-restricted functional encryption scheme (denoted by dFE). Let $d$ denote any positive integer constant. Informally, a dFE scheme is a functional encryption scheme that supports homogeneous polynomials of degree $d+2$ having degree 1 in $d+2$ input vectors. $d$ out of those $d+2$ vectors are public. This is a generalization of the notion of a three restricted FE scheme proposed by [4].

*Notation:* Throughout, we denote by boldfaced letters (multi-dimensional) matrices, where dimensions are either explicitly or implicitly defined.

*Function class of interest:* Consider a set of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE}} = \mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE},\lambda,\mathbf{p},n} = \{f : \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{n(d+2)} \to \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}\}$ where $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ is a finite field of order $\mathbf{p}(\lambda)$. Here $n$ is seen as a function of $\lambda$. Each $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\lambda,\mathbf{p},n}$ takes as input $d+2$ vectors $(\boldsymbol{x}[1],...,\boldsymbol{x}[d],\boldsymbol{y},\boldsymbol{z})$ of length $n$ over $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ and computes a polynomial of the form $\Sigma c_{i_1,...,i_d,j,k} \cdot \boldsymbol{x}[1,i_1] \cdot ... \cdot \boldsymbol{x}[d,i_d] \cdot \boldsymbol{y}[j] \cdot \boldsymbol{z}[k]$, where $c_{i_1,..,i_d,j,k}$ are coefficients from $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ for very $i_1,...,i_d,j,k \in [n]^{d+2}$.

*Syntax.* Consider the set of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE},\lambda,\mathbf{p},n}$ as described above. A $(d+2)-$restricted functional encryption scheme dFE for the class of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE}}$ (described above) consists of the following PPT algorithms:

- **Setup,** $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$: On input security parameter $\lambda$ (and the number of inputs $n = poly(\lambda)$), it outputs the master secret key MSK.
- **Encryption,** $\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{MSK}, \boldsymbol{x}[1],...,\boldsymbol{x}[d], \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$: On input the encryption key MSK and input vectors $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times n}$, $\boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}$ (all in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$) it outputs ciphertext CT. Here $\boldsymbol{x}$ is seen as a public attribute and $\boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}$ are thought of as private messages.
- **Key Generation,** $\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}, f)$: On input the master secret key MSK and a function $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE}}$, it outputs a functional key $sk[f]$.
- **Decryption,** $\mathsf{Dec}(sk[f], 1^B, \mathsf{CT})$: On input functional key $sk[f]$, a bound $B = poly(\lambda)$ and a ciphertext CT, it outputs the result *out*.

We define the correctness property below.

*B-Correctness.* Consider any function $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE}}$ and any plaintext $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ (dimensions are defined above). Consider the following process:

- $sk[f] \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}, f)$.
- $\mathsf{CT} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{MSK}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$
- If $f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}) \in [-B, B]$, set $\theta = f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$, otherwise set $\theta = \bot$.

The following should hold:

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{Dec}(sk[f], 1^B, \mathsf{CT}) = \theta\right] \geq 1 - \mathsf{negl}(\lambda),$$

for some negligible function negl.

**Linear Efficiency:** We require that for any message $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$ where $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times n}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$ the following happens:

- Let $\mathsf{MSK} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$.
- Compute $\mathsf{CT} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{MSK}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$.

The size of encryption circuit computing $\mathsf{CT}$ is less than $n \times (d+2) \log_2 \mathbf{p} \cdot poly(\lambda)$. Here $poly$ is some polynomial independent of $n$.

## 4.1 Semi-functional Security

We define the following auxiliary algorithms.

**Semi-functional Key Generation,** $\mathsf{sfKG}(\mathsf{MSK}, f, \theta)$: On input the master secret key $\mathsf{MSK}$, function $f$ and a value $\theta$, it computes the semi-functional key $sk[f, \theta]$.

**Semi-functional Encryption,** $\mathsf{sfEnc}(\mathsf{MSK}, \boldsymbol{x}, 1^{|\boldsymbol{y}|}, 1^{|\boldsymbol{z}|})$: On input the master encryption key $\mathsf{MSK}$, a public attribute $\boldsymbol{x}$ and length of messages $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}$, it computes a semi-functional ciphertext $\mathsf{ct}_{\mathsf{sf}}$.

We define two security properties associated with the above two auxiliary algorithms. We will model the security definitions along the same lines as semi-functional FE.

**Definition 4 (Indistinguishability of Semi-functional Ciphertexts).** *A $(d+2)$-restricted functional encryption scheme $\mathsf{dFE}$ for a class of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE},\lambda,\mathbf{p},n}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ is said to satisfy the **indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property** if there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that for sufficiently large $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ of size $2^{\lambda^c}$, the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds in the following experiment is $2^{-\lambda^c}$.*

$\mathsf{Expt}(1^\lambda, \mathbf{b})$:

1. $\mathcal{A}$ *specifies the following:*
   - *Challenge message $M^* = (\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$. Here $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}$ is in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$ and $\boldsymbol{x}$ is in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times n}$.*
   - *It can also specify additional messages $\{M_k = (\boldsymbol{x}_k, \boldsymbol{y}_k, \boldsymbol{z}_k)\}_{k \in [q]}$ Here $\boldsymbol{y}_k, \boldsymbol{z}_k$ is in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$ and $\boldsymbol{x}_k$ is in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times n}$. Here $q$ is a polynomial in $n, \lambda$.*
   - *It also specifies functions $f_1, \ldots, f_\eta$ and hardwired values $\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_\eta$ where $\eta$ is a polynomial in $n, \lambda$.*
2. *The challenger checks if $\theta_k = f_k(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$ for every $k \in [\eta]$. If this check fails, the challenger aborts the experiment.*
3. *The challenger computes the following*
   - *Compute $sk[f_k, \theta_k] \leftarrow \mathsf{sfKG}(\mathsf{MSK}, f_k, \theta_k)$, for every $k \in [\eta]$.*
   - *If $\mathbf{b} = 0$, compute $\mathsf{CT}^* \leftarrow \mathsf{sfEnc}(\mathsf{MSK}, \boldsymbol{x}, 1^{|\boldsymbol{y}|}, 1^{|\boldsymbol{z}|})$. Else, compute $\mathsf{CT}^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{MSK}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$.*
   - $\mathsf{CT}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{MSK}, M_i)$, *for every $i \in [q]$.*
4. *The challenger sends $\left(\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [q]}, \mathsf{CT}^*, \{sk[f_k, \theta_k]\}_{k \in [\eta]}\right)$ to $\mathcal{A}$.*
5. *The adversary outputs a bit $b'$.*

*We say that the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds in $\mathsf{Expt}(1^\lambda, \mathbf{b})$ with probability $\varepsilon$ if it outputs $b' = \mathbf{b}$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$.*

We now define the indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property.

**Definition 5 (Indistinguishability of Semi-functional Keys).** *A $(d+2)$-restricted FE scheme $\mathsf{dFE}$ for a class of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE}, \lambda, \mathbf{p}, n}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ is said to satisfy the **indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property** if there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that for all sufficiently large $\lambda$, any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ of size $2^{\lambda^c}$, the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds in the following experiment is $2^{-\lambda^c}$.*

$\mathsf{Expt}(1^\lambda, \mathbf{b})$:

1. *$\mathcal{A}$ specifies the following:*
   - *It can specify messages $M_j = \{(\boldsymbol{x}_i, \boldsymbol{y}_i, \boldsymbol{z}_i)\}_{j \in [q]}$ for some polynomial $q$. Here $\boldsymbol{y}_i, \boldsymbol{z}_i$ is in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$ and $\boldsymbol{x}_i$ is in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times n}$.*
   - *It specifies functions $f_1, \ldots, f_\eta \in \mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE}}$ and hardwired values $\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_\eta \in \mathbb{F}_p$. Here $\eta$ is some polynomial in $\lambda, n$.*
2. *Challenger computes the following :*
   - *If $\mathbf{b} = 0$, compute $sk[f_i]^* \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}, f_i)$ for all $i \in [\eta]$. Otherwise, compute $sk[f_i]^* \leftarrow \mathsf{sfKG}(\mathsf{MSK}, f_i, \theta_i)$ for all $i \in [\eta]$.*
   - *$\mathsf{CT}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{MSK}, M_j)$, for every $j \in [q]$.*
3. *Challenger then sends $\left(\{\mathsf{CT}_i\}_{i \in [q]}, \{sk[f_i]^*\}_{i \in [\eta]}\right)$ to $\mathcal{A}$.*
4. *$\mathcal{A}$ outputs $b'$.*

*The success probability of $\mathcal{A}$ is defined to be $\varepsilon$ if $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $b' = \mathbf{b}$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$.*

If a $(d+2)$-restricted FE scheme satisfies both the above definitions, then it is said to satisfy semi-functional security.

**Definition 6 (Semi-functional Security).** *Consider a $(d+2)$-restricted FE scheme $\mathsf{dFE}$ for a class of functions $\mathcal{F}$. We say that $\mathsf{dFE}$ satisfies **semi-functional security** if it satisfies the indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property (Definition 4) and the indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property (Definition 5).*

**Remark:** Two remarks are in order:

1. First, we define sub-exponential security here as that notion is useful for our construction of $i\mathcal{O}$. The definition can be adapted to polynomial security naturally.
2. Semi-functional security implies the indistinguishability based notion naturally. This is pointed out in [5].

## 5 Key Notion 2: Perturbation Resilient Generator

Now we describe the notion of a Perturbation Resilient Generator ($\Delta$RG for short), proposed by [4]. A $\Delta$RG consists of the following algorithms:

- Setup($1^\lambda, 1^n, B$) $\rightarrow$ (pp, Seed). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter $\lambda$, the length parameter $1^n$ and a polynomial $B = B(\lambda)$ and outputs a seed Seed $\in \{0,1\}^*$ and public parameters pp.
- Eval(pp, Seed) $\rightarrow$ ($h_1, ..., h_\ell$). The evaluation algorithm outputs a vector $(h_1, ..., h_\ell) \in \mathbb{Z}^\ell$. Here $\ell$ is the stretch of $\Delta$RG.

We have following properties of a $\Delta$RG scheme.

*Efficiency:* We require for Setup($1^\lambda, 1^n, B$) $\rightarrow$ (pp, Seed) and Eval(pp, Seed) $\rightarrow$ $(h_1, ..., h_\ell)$,

- $|\text{Seed}| = n \cdot poly(\lambda)$ for some polynomial *poly* independent of $n$. The size of Seed is linear in $n$.
- For all $i \in [\ell]$, $|h_i| < poly(\lambda, n)$. The norm of each output component $h_i$ in $\mathbb{Z}$ is bounded by some polynomial in $\lambda$ and $n$.

*Perturbation Resilience:* We require that for large enough security parameter $\lambda$, for every polynomial $B$, there exists a large enough polynomial $n_B(\lambda)$ such that for any $n > n_B$, there exists an efficient sampler $\mathcal{H}$ such that for Setup($1^\lambda, 1^n, B$) $\rightarrow$ (pp, Seed) and Eval(pp, Seed) $\rightarrow$ $(h_1, ..., h_\ell)$, we have that for any distinguisher $D$ of size $2^\lambda$ and any $a_1, ..., a_\ell \in [-B, B]^\ell$

$$|\Pr[D(x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_1) = 1] - \Pr[D(x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_2) = 1]| < 1 - 2/\lambda$$

Here $\mathcal{D}_1$ and $\mathcal{D}_2$ are defined below:

- Distribution $\mathcal{D}_1$: Compute Setup($1^\lambda, 1^n, B$) $\rightarrow$ (pp, Seed) and Eval(pp, Seed) $\rightarrow$ $(h_1, ..., h_\ell)$. Output (pp, $h_1, ..., h_\ell$).
- Distribution $\mathcal{D}_2$: Compute Setup($1^\lambda, 1^n, B$) $\rightarrow$ (pp, Seed) and $\mathcal{H}$(pp, Seed) $\rightarrow$ $(h_1, .., h_\ell)$. Output (pp, $h_1 + a_1, ..., h_\ell + a_\ell$).

**Remark:** Note that one could view $\Delta$RG as a candidate sampler $\mathcal{H}$ itself.

Now we describe the notion of Perturbation Resilient Generator implementable by a $(d+2)$-restricted FE scheme (d$\Delta$RG for short.)

### 5.1 $\Delta$RG implementable by $(d+2)-$restricted FE

A $\Delta$RG scheme implementable by $(d+2)$-Restricted FE (d$\Delta$RG for short) is a perturbation resilient generator with additional properties. We describe syntax again for a complete specification.

– Setup$(1^\lambda, 1^n, B) \to (\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{Seed})$. The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter $\lambda$, the length parameter $1^n$ and a polynomial $B = B(\lambda)$ and outputs a seed $\mathsf{Seed}$ and public parameters $\mathsf{pp}$. Here, $\mathsf{Seed} = (\mathsf{Seed.pub}(1),$ $\mathsf{Seed.pub}(2), ..., \mathsf{Seed.pub}(d), \mathsf{Seed.priv}(1), \mathsf{Seed.priv}(2))$ is a vector on $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ for a modulus $\mathbf{p}$, which is also the modulus used in $(d+2)$-restricted FE scheme. There are $d + 2$ components of this vector, where $d$ of the $d + 2$ components are public and two components are private, each in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{npoly(\lambda)}$. Also each part can be partitioned into subcomponents as follows. $\mathsf{Seed.pub}(j) = (\mathsf{Seed.pub}(j,1), ..., \mathsf{Seed.pub}(j,n))$ for $j \in [d]$, $\mathsf{Seed.priv}(j) = (\mathsf{Seed.priv}(j,1),$ $...., \mathsf{Seed.priv}(j,n))$ for $j \in [2]$. Here, each sub component is in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{poly(\lambda)}$ for some fixed polynomial $poly$ independent of $n$. Also, $\mathsf{pp} = (\mathsf{Seed.pub}(1), ...,$ $\mathsf{Seed.pub}(d), q_1, .., q_\ell)$ where each $q_i$ is a degree $d + 2$ multilinear polynomial described below. We require syntactically there exists two algorithms $\mathsf{SetupSeed}$ and $\mathsf{SetupPoly}$ such that $\mathsf{Setup}$ can be decomposed follows:
  1. $\mathsf{SetupSeed}(1^\lambda, 1^n, B) \to \mathsf{Seed}$. The $\mathsf{SetupSeed}$ algorithm outputs the seed.
  2. $\mathsf{SetupPoly}(1^\lambda, 1^n, B) \to q_1, ..., q_\ell$. The $\mathsf{SetupPoly}$ algorithm outputs $q_1, .., q_\ell$.
– Eval$(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{Seed}) \to (h_1, ..., h_\ell)$. The evaluation algorithm outputs a vector $(h_1, ..., h_\ell) \in \mathbb{Z}^\ell$. Here for $i \in [\ell]$, $h_i = q_i(\mathsf{Seed})$ and $\ell$ is the stretch of $\mathsf{d}\Delta\mathsf{RG}$. Here $q_i$ is a homogeneous multilinear degree $d + 2$ polynomial where each monomial has degree 1 in $\{\mathsf{pub}(j)\}_{j \in [d+2]}$ and $\{\mathsf{priv}(j)\}_{j \in [2]}$ components of the seed.

The security and efficiency requirements are the same as before.

**Remark:** To construct $i\mathcal{O}$ we need the stretch of $\mathsf{d}\Delta\mathsf{RG}$ to be equal to $\ell = n^{1+\epsilon}$ for some constant $\epsilon > 0$.

## 5.2 Pseudo Flawed-Smudging Generators

Related to $\Delta$RGs are pseudo flawed-smudging generators (PFGs) introduced by Lin and Matt [42]. As $\Delta$RGs, PFGs are geared for the purpose of generating a smudging noise $\boldsymbol{Y}$ to hide a small polynomially bounded noise $\boldsymbol{a}$. We first give a high-level description of PFGs and then compare them to $\Delta$RGs. For formal definitions and a further discussion of PFGs, we refer the reader to [42].

Intuitively, the output of a PFG "hides" the noise vector $\boldsymbol{a}$ at *all but a few* coordinates with noticeable probability. More formally, the output distribution of a PFG is indistinguishable to a, so-called, *flawed-smudging distribution* $\mathcal{Y}$. A distribution $\mathcal{Y}$ is flawed-smudging if the following holds with some inverse polynomial probability $\delta = 1/poly(\lambda)$ over the choice of $\boldsymbol{Y} \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$: For some polynomial $B = poly(\lambda)$, every $B$-bounded noise vector distribution $\chi$, and $\boldsymbol{Y} \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$, $\boldsymbol{a} \leftarrow \chi$, there is a random variable $I$ correlated with $\boldsymbol{a}$ and $\boldsymbol{Y}$, representing a small, $|I| = o(\lambda)$, subset of "compromised" coordinates, so that the joint distribution of $(I, \boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{Y} + \boldsymbol{a})$ is statistically close to that of $(I, \boldsymbol{a}', \boldsymbol{Y} + \boldsymbol{a})$, where $\boldsymbol{a}'$ is a fresh sample from $\chi$ conditioned on agreeing with $\boldsymbol{a}$ at coordinates in $I$ (i.e., $a_i' = a_i$ for all $i \in I$).

Compared to $\Delta$RGs, there is a "good case" occurring with probability $\delta$, in which most coordinates of $\boldsymbol{a}$ are hidden. On the other hand, the output $\boldsymbol{h}$ of a

$\Delta$RG guarantees that $\boldsymbol{h}$ and $\boldsymbol{h} + \boldsymbol{a}$ are *computationally indistinguishable* up to advantage $1 - \delta$. Hence, $\Delta$RGs are weaker in this respect since the guarantee is only computational instead of statistical as for PFGs. However, the output of a PFG may in the good case still reveal $\boldsymbol{a}$ at a few coordinates (i.e., $\boldsymbol{a}$ and $\boldsymbol{a}'$ agree at a few coordinates), whereas the output of a $\Delta$RG hides $\boldsymbol{a}$ completely. In that respect, PFGs are weaker.

Despite the technical differences discussed above, the core guarantees of $\Delta$RGs and PFGs are similar. All candidates discussed in the following are therefore candidates for both notions.

# 6 d$\Delta$RG Candidates

We now describe our candidate for d$\Delta$RG implementable by a $(d+2)-$ restricted FE scheme. All these candidates use a large enough prime modulus $\mathbf{p} = O(2^\lambda)$, which is the same as the modulus used by $(d+2)-$restricted FE. Then, let $\chi$ be a distribution used to sample input elements over $\mathbb{Z}$. Let $Q$ denote a polynomial sampler. Next we give candidate in terms of $\chi$ and $Q$ but give concrete instantiations later.

## 6.1 d$\Delta$RG Candidate

- Setup$(1^\lambda, 1^n, B) \rightarrow (\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{Seed})$. Sample a secret $\boldsymbol{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{1 \times \mathsf{n}_{\Delta\mathsf{RG}}}$ for $\mathsf{n}_{\Delta\mathsf{RG}} = poly(\lambda)$ such that $\mathsf{LWE}_{\mathsf{n}_{\Delta\mathsf{RG}}, n \cdot d, \mathbf{p}, \chi}$ holds. Here $\chi$ is a bounded distribution with bound $poly(\lambda)$. Let $\mathcal{Q}$ denote an efficiently samplable distribution of homogeneous degree $(d + 2)$ polynomials (instantiated later). Then proceed with SetupSeed as follows:
  1. Sample $\boldsymbol{a}_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{1 \times \mathsf{n}_{\Delta\mathsf{RG}}}$ for $i \in [d], j \in [n]$.
  2. Sample $e_{i,j} \leftarrow \chi$ for $i \in [d], j \in [n]$.
  3. Compute $r_{i,j} = \langle \boldsymbol{a}_{i,j}, \boldsymbol{s} \rangle + e_{i,j} \mod \mathbf{p}$ in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ for $i \in [d], j \in [n]$.
  4. Define $\boldsymbol{w}_{i,j} = (\boldsymbol{a}_{i,j}, r_{i,j})$ for $i \in [d], j \in [d]$.
  5. Set $\mathsf{Seed.pub}(j, i) = \boldsymbol{w}_{j,i}$ for $j \in [d], i \in [n]$.
  6. Sample $y_i, z_i \leftarrow \chi$ for $i \in [n]$.
  7. Set $\boldsymbol{t} = (-\boldsymbol{s}, 1)$. Note that $\langle \boldsymbol{w}_{j,i}, \boldsymbol{t} \rangle = e_{j,i}$ for $j \in [d], i \in [n]$.
  8. Set $\boldsymbol{y}_i' = y_i \otimes^d \boldsymbol{t}$. (tensor $\boldsymbol{t}$, $d$ times)
  9. Set $\mathsf{Seed.priv}(1, i) = \boldsymbol{y}_i'$ for $i \in [n]$.
  10. Set $\mathsf{Seed.priv}(2, i) = z_i$ for $i \in [n]$.
  Now we describe SetupPoly. Fix $\eta = n^{1+\epsilon}$.
  1. Write $\boldsymbol{e}_j = (e_{j,1}, \ldots, e_{j,n})$ for $j \in [d], \boldsymbol{y} = (y_1, \ldots, y_n)$ and $\boldsymbol{z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_n)$.
  2. Sample polynomials $q_\ell'$ for $\ell \in [\eta]$ as follows.
  3. $q_\ell' = \Sigma_{\boldsymbol{I} = (i_1, \ldots, i_d, j, k)} c_{\boldsymbol{I}} e_{1,i_1} \cdots e_{d,i_d} y_j z_k$ where coefficients $c_{\boldsymbol{I}}$ are bounded by $poly(\lambda)$. These polynomials are sampled according to $\mathcal{Q}$
  4. Define $q_i$ to be a multilinear homogeneous degree $d + 2$ polynomial that takes as input $\mathsf{Seed} = (\{\boldsymbol{w}_{j,i}\}_{j \in [d], i \in [n]}, \boldsymbol{y}_1', \ldots, \boldsymbol{y}_n', \boldsymbol{z})$. Then it computes each monomial $c_{\boldsymbol{I}} e_{1,i_1} \cdots e_{d,i_d} y_j z_k$ as follows and then adds all the results (thus computes $q_i'(\boldsymbol{e}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{e}_d, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$):

- Compute $c_{\boldsymbol{I}}\langle \boldsymbol{w}_{1,i_1}, \boldsymbol{t}\rangle \cdots \langle \boldsymbol{w}_{d,i_d}, \boldsymbol{t}\rangle y_j z_k$. This step requires $\boldsymbol{y}_i' = y_i \otimes^d \boldsymbol{t}$ to perform this computation.
  5. Output $q_1, ..., q_\eta$.
- $\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{Seed}) \rightarrow (h_1, ..., h_\eta)$. The evaluation algorithm outputs a vector $(h_1, ..., h_\eta) \in \mathbb{Z}^\eta$. Here for $i \in [\eta]$, $h_i = q_i(\mathsf{Seed})$ and $\eta$ is the stretch of $\mathsf{d}\triangle\mathsf{RG}$. Here $q_i$ is a degree $d + 2$ homogenenous multilinear polynomial (defined above) which is degree 1 in $d$ public and 2 private components of the seed.

*Efficiency:*

1. Note that $\mathsf{Seed}$ contains $n \cdot d$ LWE samples $\boldsymbol{w}_{i,j}$ for $i \in [d], j \in [n]$ of dimension $\mathsf{n}_{\triangle\mathsf{RG}}$. Along with the samples, it contains elements $\boldsymbol{y}_i' = y_i \otimes^d \boldsymbol{t}$ for $i \in [n]$ and elements $z_i$ for $i \in [n]$. Note that the size of these elements are bounded by $poly(\lambda)$ and is independent of $n$.
2. The values $h_i = q_i(\mathsf{Seed}) = \Sigma_{\boldsymbol{I}=(i_1,..,i_d,j,k)} c_{\boldsymbol{I}} e_{1,i_1} \cdots e_{d,i_d} y_j z_k$. Since $\chi$ is a bounded distribution, bounded by $poly(\lambda, n)$, and coefficients $c_{\boldsymbol{I}}$ are also polynomially bounded, each $|h_i| < poly(\lambda, n)$ for $i \in [m]$.

## 6.2 Instantiations

We now give various instantiations of $Q$. Let $\chi$ be the discrete gaussian distribution with 0 mean and standard deviation $n$. The following candidate is proposed by [10] based on the investigation of the hardness of families of expanding polynomials over the reals.

*Instantiation 1: 3SAT Based Candidate.* Let $t = B^2\lambda$. Sample each polynomial $q_i'$ for $i \in [\eta]$ as follows. $q_i'(\boldsymbol{x}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}_t, \boldsymbol{y}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{y}_t, \boldsymbol{z}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{z}_t) = \Sigma_{j \in [t]} q_{i,j}'(\boldsymbol{x_j}, \boldsymbol{y_j}, \boldsymbol{z_j})$. Here $\boldsymbol{x}_j \in \chi^{d \times n}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}_j, \boldsymbol{z}_j \in \chi^n$ for $j \in [t]$. In other words, $q_i'$ is a sum of $t$ polynomials $q_{i,j}'$ over $t$ disjoint set of variables. Let $d = 1$ for this candidate.

Now we describe how to sample $q_{i,j}'$ for $j \in [\eta]$.

1. Sample randomly inputs $\boldsymbol{x}^*, \boldsymbol{y}^*, \boldsymbol{z}^* \in \{0,1\}^n$.
2. To sample $q_{i,j}'$ do the following. Sample three indices randomly and independently $i_1, i_2, i_3 \leftarrow [n]$. Sample three signs $b_{1,i,j}, b_{2,i,j}, b_{3,i,j} \in \{0,1\}$ uniformly such that $b_{1,i,j} \oplus b_{2,i,j} \oplus b_{3,i,j} \oplus \boldsymbol{x}^*[i_1] \oplus \boldsymbol{y}^*[i_2] \oplus \boldsymbol{z}^*[i_3] = 1$.
3. Set $q_{i,j}'(\boldsymbol{x_j}, \boldsymbol{y_j}, \boldsymbol{z_j}) = 1 - (b_{1,i,j} \cdot \boldsymbol{x_j}[i_1] + (1 - b_{1,i,j}) \cdot (1 - \boldsymbol{x_j}[i_1])) \cdot (b_{2,i,j} \cdot \boldsymbol{y_j}[i_2] + (1 - b_{2,i,j}) \cdot (1 - \boldsymbol{y_j}[i_2])) \cdot ((b_{3,i,j} \cdot \boldsymbol{z_j}[i_3] + (1 - b_{3,i,j}) \cdot (1 - \boldsymbol{z_j}[i_3]))$

**Remark:**

1. Note that any clause of the form $a_1 \vee a_2 \vee a_3$ can be written as $1 - (1 - a_1)(1 - a_2)(1 - a_3)$ over integers where $a_1, a_2, a_3$ are literals in first case and take values in $\{0, 1\}$, and thus any random satisfiable 3SAT formula can be converted to polynomials in this manner.
2. Similarly, the above construction can be generalised to degree $(d + 2)$-SAT style construction by considering $(d + 2)-$SAT for any constant positive integer $d$ and translating them to polynomials.

*Instantiation 2: Goldreich's One-way Function Based Candidate.* Goldreich's one-way function [30] consists of a predicate $P$ involving $d + 2$ variables and computes a boolean function that can be expressed a degree $d + 2$ polynomial over the integers. Our candidate $q'_{i,j}(\boldsymbol{x_j}, \boldsymbol{y_j}, \boldsymbol{z_j})$ consists of the following step.

1. Sample $d + 2$ indices $i_1, ..., i_{d+2} \in [n]$.
2. Output $q'_{i,j} = P(\boldsymbol{x_j}[1, i_1], \ldots, \boldsymbol{x_j}[d, i_d], \boldsymbol{y_j}[i_{d+1}], \boldsymbol{z_j}[i_{d+2}])$.

For $d = 3$, [48] provided with the following candidate.

$P(a_1, .., a_5) = a_1 \oplus a_2 \oplus a_3 \oplus a_4 a_5$ where each $a_i \in \{0, 1\}$. Note that this can be naturally converted to a polynomial as follows. Rewrite $a \oplus b = (1-a)b + (1-b)a$ and this immediately gives rise to a polynomial over the integers.

## 6.3 Simplifying Assumptions

In this section, we remark that the d$\mathit{\Delta}$RG assumption can be simplified from being an exponential family of assumptions to two simpler assumptions as follows. We provide two sub-assumptions, which together imply d$\mathit{\Delta}$RG assumptions.

*LWE with degree $d + 2$ leakage.* There exists a polynomial sampler $Q$ and a constant $\epsilon > 0$, such that for every large enough $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, and every polynomial bound $B = B(\lambda)$ there exist large enough polynomial $n_B = \lambda^c$ such that for every positive integer $n > n_B$, there exists a $poly(n)-$bounded discrete gaussian distribution $\chi$ such that the following two distrbutions are close (we define closeness later). We define the following two distributions:

Distribution $\mathcal{D}_1$:

- Fix a prime modulus $p = O(2^\lambda)$.
- (**Sample Polynomials.**) Run $Q(n, B, \epsilon) = (q_1, ..., q_{\lfloor n^{1+\epsilon} \rfloor})$.
- (**Sample Secret.**) Sample a secret $\boldsymbol{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\lambda$
- Sample $\boldsymbol{a}_{j,i} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\lambda$ for $j \in [d], i \in [n]$.
- (**Sample LWE Errors.**) For every $j \in [d], i \in [n]$, sample $e_{j,i}, y_i, z_i \leftarrow \chi$. Write $\boldsymbol{e}_j = (e_{j,1}, \ldots, e_{j,n})$ for $j \in [d]$, $\boldsymbol{y} = (y_1, \ldots, y_n)$ and $\boldsymbol{z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_n)$.
- Output $\{\boldsymbol{a}_{j,i}, \langle \boldsymbol{a}_{j,i}, \boldsymbol{s} \rangle + e_{j,i} \mod p\}_{j \in [d], i \in [n]}$ and $\{q_k, q_k(\boldsymbol{e}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{e}_d, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})\}_{k \in [\lfloor n^{1+\epsilon} \rfloor]}$

Distribution $\mathcal{D}_2$:

- Fix a prime modulus $p = O(2^\lambda)$.
- (**Sample Polynomials.**) Run $Q(n, B, \epsilon) = (q_1, ..., q_{\lfloor n^{1+\epsilon} \rfloor})$.
- (**Sample Secret.**) Sample a secret $\boldsymbol{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\lambda$
- Sample $\boldsymbol{a}_{j,i} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\lambda$ for $j \in [d], i \in [n]$.
- (**Sample independent LWE Errors.**) For every $j \in [d], i \in [n]$, sample $e_{j,i}, e'_{j,i}, y_i, z_i \leftarrow \chi$. [4] Write $\boldsymbol{e}'_j = (e'_{j,1}, \ldots, e'_{j,n})$, $\boldsymbol{e}_j = (e_{j,1}, \ldots, e_{j,n})$ for $j \in [d]$, $\boldsymbol{y} = (y_1, \ldots, y_n)$ and $\boldsymbol{z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_n)$.

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[4] Thus, we can observe that $\chi$ should be a distribution such that LWE assumption holds with respect to $\chi$ and parameters specified above

- Output $\{\boldsymbol{a}_{j,i}, \langle \boldsymbol{a}_{j,i}, \boldsymbol{s} \rangle + e'_{j,i} \mod p\}_{j\in[d], i\in[n]}$ and
  $\{q_k, q_k(\boldsymbol{e}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{e}_d, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})\}_{k\in[\lfloor n^{1+\epsilon}\rfloor]}$

The assumption states that there exists a constant $\epsilon_{adv} > 0$ such that for any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ of size $2^{\lambda^{\epsilon_{adv}}}$, the following holds:

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}_1) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}_2) = 1]| < 1/2\lambda$$

**Remark.** This assumption says that to a bounded adversary, the advantage of distinguishing the tuple consisting of polynomials samples, along with correlated LWE samples with tuple consisting of polynomials samples, along with uncorrelated LWE samples is bounded by $1/2\lambda$. Second assumption says that the tuple of polynomial samples looks close to independent discrete gaussian variables with a large enough variance and 0 mean. Below we define the notion of a $(B, \delta)-$smooth distribution.

**Definition 7.** $(B, \delta)-$*Smooth distribution* $\mathcal{N}$ *is an efficiently samplable distribution over* $\mathbb{Z}$ *with the property that* $\Delta(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{N} + b) \le \delta$ *for any* $b \in [-B, B]$.

*Weak Pseudo-Independence Generator Assumption [2, 42].* For the parameters defined above, the assumption states that there exists a constant $\epsilon_{adv} > 0$ such that for any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ of size $2^{\lambda^{\epsilon_{adv}}}$, the following holds:

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}_1) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}_2) = 1]| < 1 - 3/\lambda$$

where distributions are defined below.
Distribution $\mathcal{D}_1$:

- Fix a prime modulus $p = O(2^\lambda)$.
- (**Sample Polynomials.**) Run $Q(n, B, \epsilon) = (q_1, ..., q_{\lfloor n^{1+\epsilon}\rfloor})$.
- For every $j \in [d], i \in [n]$, sample $e_{j,i}, y_i, z_i \leftarrow \chi$. Write $\boldsymbol{e}_j = (e_{j,1}, \ldots, e_{j,n})$ for $j \in [d]$, $\boldsymbol{y} = (y_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{y}_n)$ and $\boldsymbol{z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_n)$.
- Output $\{q_k, q_k(\boldsymbol{e}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{e}_d, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})\}_{k\in[\lfloor n^{1+\epsilon}\rfloor]}$

Distribution $\mathcal{D}_2$:

- Fix a prime modulus $p = O(2^\lambda)$.
- (**Sample Polynomials.**) Run $Q(n, B, \epsilon) = (q_1, ..., q_{\lfloor n^{1+\epsilon}\rfloor})$.
- Output $\{q_k, h_k \leftarrow \mathcal{N}\}_{k\in[\lfloor n^{1+\epsilon}\rfloor]}$

Here $\mathcal{N}$ is a $(B, \frac{1}{n^2\lambda})-$smooth distribution.
Thus we have,

*Claim.* Assuming,

1. LWE with degree $d + 2$ leakage.
2. Weak Pseudo-Independence Generator Assumption

There exists a d$\Delta$RG scheme.

*Proof.* (Sketch.) This is immediate and the proof goes in three hybrids. First, we use LWE with degree $d+2$ leakage assumption with $1/2\lambda$ security loss. In the next hybrid, we sample from $\mathcal{N}$ given to us by Weak Pseudo-Independence Generator Assumption. With that, we have another $1 - 3/\lambda$ loss in the security. Finally, we move to a hybrid where all perturbations are 0. This leads to a security loss of $n^{1+\epsilon} \times \frac{1}{n^2\lambda} < \frac{1}{n^{1-\epsilon}\lambda}$ due to statistical distance. Adding these security losses, we prove the claim. Thus $\mathcal{H}$ just uses $\mathcal{N}$ to sample each component independently.

# 7 Constructing $(d + 2)$ restricted FE from bilinear maps

In this section we describe our construction for a $d + 2-$restricted FE scheme.
We now describe our construction as follows:

## 7.1 Construction

*Ingredients:* Our main ingredient is a secret-key canonical function-hiding inner product functional encryption scheme cIPE (see Section 3.3).

*Notation:* We denote by $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ the field on which the computation is done in slotted encodings.

1. By boldfaced letters, we denote (multi-dimensional) matrices, where dimensions are specified. Messages are of the form $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$. Here, $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times n}$. $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{n}$.
2. **Function class of interest:** We consider the set of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE}} = \mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dFE},\lambda,\mathbf{p},n} = \{f : \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{n(d+2)} \to \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}\}$ where $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ is a finite field of order $\mathbf{p}(\lambda)$. Here $n$ is seen as a function of $\lambda$. Each $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\lambda,\mathbf{p},n}$ takes as input $d + 2$ vectors $(\boldsymbol{x}[1], \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}[d], \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$ over $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ and computes a polynomial of the form $\Sigma c_{i_1,\ldots,i_d,j,k} \cdot \boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1] \cdots \boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d] \cdot \boldsymbol{y}[j] \cdot \boldsymbol{z}[k]$, where $c_{i_1,\ldots,i_d,j,k}$ are coefficients from $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$.

**Notation.** For a secret key generated for the cIPE encryption algorithm, by using primed variables such as $sk'$ we denote the secret key that is not generated during the setup of the dFE scheme but during its encryption algorithm. We describe the construction below.

$\underline{\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)}$: On input security parameter $1^\lambda$ and length $1^n$,

- Sample $\mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{cIPE.PPSetup}(1^\lambda)$. We assume $\mathsf{pp} = (e, G_1, G_2, G_T, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}})$.
- Run cIPE setup as follows. $\mathbf{sk}_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{cIPE.Setup}(\mathsf{pp}, 1^4)$. Thus these keys are used to encrypt vectors in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^4$.
- Then run cIPE setup algorithm $n \cdot d$ times. That is, for every $\ell \in [d]$ and $i_\ell \in [n]$, compute $\mathbf{sk}^{(\ell,i_\ell)} \leftarrow \mathsf{cIPE.Setup}(\mathsf{pp}, 1^4)$.
- Sample $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times n}$. Also sample $\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{n}$.
- For $\ell \in [d]$, $i_\ell \in [n]$ and every set $\boldsymbol{I} = (i_{\ell+1}, \ldots, i_d, j, k) \in [n]^{d-\ell+2}$, compute $\mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}}^{(\ell,i_\ell)} = \mathsf{cIPE.KeyGen}(\mathbf{sk}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}, (\boldsymbol{\alpha}[\ell + 1, i_{\ell+1}] \cdots \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k], \boldsymbol{\alpha}[\ell, i_\ell] \cdots \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k], 0, 0))$.

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- Output $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathbf{sk}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}, \mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell,i_\ell,\boldsymbol{I}}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}, \mathbf{sk}_0)$

$\underline{\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{MSK}, f)}$: On input the master secret key MSK and function $f$,

- Parse $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathbf{sk}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}, \mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell,i_\ell,\boldsymbol{I}}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}, \mathbf{sk}_0)$.
- Compute $\theta_f = f(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})$.
- Compute $\mathsf{Key}_{0,f} = \mathsf{cIPE.KeyGen}(\mathbf{sk}_0, (\theta_f, 0, 0, 0))$
- Output $sk_f = (\mathsf{Key}_{0,f}, \{\mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell,i_\ell,\boldsymbol{I}})$

$\underline{\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{MSK}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})}$: The input message $M = (\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$ consists of a public attribute $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{F}_\mathbf{p}^{d \times n}$ and private vectors $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{F}_\mathbf{p}^n$. Perform the following operations:

- Parse $\mathsf{MSK} = (\{\mathbf{sk}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}, \mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell,i_\ell,\boldsymbol{I}}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}, \mathbf{sk}_0)$.
- Sample $r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_\mathbf{p}$.
- Compute $\mathsf{CT}_0 = \mathsf{cIPE.Enc}(\mathbf{sk}_0, (r, 0, 0, 0))$.
- Sample $\mathbf{sk}' \leftarrow \mathsf{cIPE.Setup}(\mathsf{pp}, 1^4)$.
- Compute $\mathsf{CTC}_j \leftarrow \mathsf{cIPE.Enc}(\mathbf{sk}', (\boldsymbol{y}[j], \boldsymbol{\beta}[j], 0, 0))$ for $j \in [n]$
- Compute $\mathsf{CTK}_k \leftarrow \mathsf{cIPE.KeyGen}(\mathbf{sk}', (\boldsymbol{z}[k], -r\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k], 0, 0))$ for $k \in [n]$.
- For $\ell \in [d], i_\ell \in [n]$, compute $\mathsf{CT}^{(\ell,i_\ell)} = \mathsf{cIPE.Enc}(\mathbf{sk}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}, (r\boldsymbol{x}[\ell, i_\ell], -r, 0, 0))$.
- Output $\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{x}, \mathsf{CT}_0, \{\mathsf{CTC}_j, \mathsf{CTK}_k, \mathsf{CT}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell \in [d], i_\ell \in [n], j \in [n], k \in [n]})$

$\underline{\mathsf{Dec}(1^B, sk_f, \mathsf{CT})}$:

- Parse $\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{x}, \mathsf{CT}_0, \{\mathsf{CTC}_j, \mathsf{CTK}_k, \mathsf{CT}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell \in [d], i_\ell \in [n], j \in [n], k \in [n]})$.
- Parse $sk_f = \{\mathsf{Key}_{0,f}, \mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}\}_{\ell,i_\ell,\boldsymbol{I}}$.
- For every $\ell \in [d]$ and $\boldsymbol{I} = (i_\ell, \ldots, i_d, j, k) \in [n]^{d-\ell+3}$ do the following. Let $\boldsymbol{I}'$ be such that $\boldsymbol{I} = i_\ell \| \boldsymbol{I}'$. In other words, $\boldsymbol{I}'$ has all but first element of $\boldsymbol{I}$. Compute $\mathsf{Mon}_{\boldsymbol{I}'}^{(\ell,i_\ell)} = \mathsf{cIPE.Dec}(\mathsf{Key}_{\boldsymbol{I}'}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}, \mathsf{CT}^{(\ell,i_\ell)}) = [r(\boldsymbol{x}[\ell, i_\ell] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[\ell, i_\ell])\boldsymbol{\alpha}[\ell - 1, i_{\ell-1}] \cdots \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_T$.
- Compute $\mathsf{Mon}_0 = \mathsf{cIPE.Dec}(\mathsf{Key}_{0,f}, \mathsf{CT}_0) = [rf(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_T$.
- Compute $\mathsf{Mon}^{(j,k)} = \mathsf{cIPE.Dec}(\mathsf{CTK}_k, \mathsf{CTC}_j) = [\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_T$.
- Let $f = \Sigma_{\boldsymbol{I} = (i_1,\ldots,i_d,j,k)} c_{\boldsymbol{I}} \boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1] \cdots \boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k]$. Now fix $\boldsymbol{I} = (i_1, \ldots, i_d, j, k)$. For the monomial corresponding to $\boldsymbol{I}$ compute $\mathsf{Int}_{\boldsymbol{I}} = [\boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1] \cdots \boldsymbol{x}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[1, i_1] \cdots \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]]_T$ as follows.
  1. For $v \in [d]$, denote $\boldsymbol{I}_v = (i_v, \ldots, i_d, j, k)$ and $\boldsymbol{I}'_v = (i_{v+1}, \ldots, i_d, j, k)$ .
  2. Compute $\mathsf{Int}_{\boldsymbol{I}} = \Pi_{v \in [d]} \mathsf{Mon}^{(v,i_v)}_{\boldsymbol{I}'_v}{}^{\rho_{\boldsymbol{I}_v}}$. We describe $\rho_{\boldsymbol{I}_v}$ shortly.
  3. We want these coefficients $\rho_{\boldsymbol{I}_v}$ such that $\mathsf{Int}_{\boldsymbol{I}} = [\Sigma_{v \in [d]} \rho_v(\boldsymbol{x}[v, i_v]\boldsymbol{\alpha}[v + 1, i_{v+1}] \cdots \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[v, i_v] \cdots \boldsymbol{\alpha}[d, i_d]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k])]_T$.
  4. This defines $\rho_{\boldsymbol{I}_1} = 1$ and $\rho_{\boldsymbol{I}_v} = \boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1], \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}[v - 1, i_{v-1}]$ for $v \in [d]$.
  5. This can be verified for $d = 2$ as follows.

  $$\boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1]\boldsymbol{x}[2, i_2](\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]) + \boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1]r(\boldsymbol{x}[2, i_2]$$
  $$-\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2])\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k] + r(\boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1] - \boldsymbol{\alpha}[1, i_1])\boldsymbol{\alpha}[i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\gamma}[k]$$
  $$=\boldsymbol{x}[1, i_1]\boldsymbol{x}[2, i_2]\boldsymbol{y}[j]\boldsymbol{z}[k] - r\boldsymbol{\alpha}[1, i_1]\boldsymbol{\alpha}[2, i_2]\boldsymbol{\beta}[j]\boldsymbol{\beta}[k]$$

  In this way, the process holds for any $d$.
- Finally compute $\mathsf{Int}_1 = \Pi_{\boldsymbol{I} = (i_1,\ldots,i_d)} \mathsf{Int}_{\boldsymbol{I}}^{c_{\boldsymbol{I}}} = [f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z}) - rf(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})]_T$.
- Compute $\mathsf{Int}_1 \cdot \mathsf{Mon}_0 = [f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})]_T$. Using brute force, check if $|f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})| < B$. If that is the case, output $f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{z})$ otherwise output $\bot$.

We now discuss correctness and linear efficiency:

*Correctness:* Correctness is implicit from the description of the decryption algorithm.

*Linear Efficiency:* Note that a ciphertext is of the following form:

$$\mathsf{CT} = (\boldsymbol{x}, \mathsf{CT}_0, \{\mathsf{CTC}_j, \mathsf{CTK}_k, \mathsf{CT}^{(\ell, i_\ell)}\}_{\ell \in [d], i_\ell \in [n], j \in [n], k \in [n]})$$

Thus there are $n \times (d+1) + 1$ cIPE ciphertexts and $n$ cIPE function keys for vectors of length 4. Hence, the claim holds due to the efficiency of cIPE.

Due to lack of space we defer the security proof to the full version. Here is our theorem statement.

**Theorem 4.** *Assuming SXDH holds relative to* PPGen, *the construction described in Section 7 satisfies semi-functional security.*

# 8 Construction of $i\mathcal{O}$

Following the template of [4] we prove the following theorems. The details can be found in the full version.

**Theorem 5.** *For any constant integer $d \geq 1$, Assuming*

- *Subexponentially hard LWE.*
- *Subexponentially hard SXDH*
- *PRGs with*
  - *Stretch of $k^{1+\epsilon}$ (length of input being $k$ bits) for some constant $\epsilon > 0$.*
  - *Block locality $d + 2$.*
  - *Security with* negl *distinguishing gap against adversaries of sub-exponential size.*
- *d$\Delta$RG with a stretch of $k^{1+\epsilon'}$ for some constant $\epsilon' > 0$[5].*

*there exists an $i\mathcal{O}$ scheme for P/poly.*

Here is the version with the tradeoff.

**Theorem 6.** *For any constant integer $d \geq 1$, two distinguishing gaps $\mathsf{adv}_1, \mathsf{adv}_2$, if $\mathsf{adv}_1 + \mathsf{adv}_2 \leq 1 - 2/\lambda$ then assuming,*

- *Subexponentially hard LWE.*
- *Subexponentially hard SXDH.*
- *PRGs with*
  - *Stretch of $k^{1+\epsilon}$ (length of input being $k$ bits) for some constant $\epsilon > 0$.*
  - *Block locality $d + 2$.*
  - *Security with distinguishing gap bounded by $\mathsf{adv}_1$ against adversaries of sub-exponential size.*

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[5] Instantiations can be found in Section 6.2

- d$\Delta$RG *with distinguishing gap bounded by* $\mathsf{adv}_2$ *against adversaries of size* $2^\lambda$ [6].

*there exists a secure* $i\mathcal{O}$ *scheme for* P/poly.

Alternatively, the construction from Section 7 can also be used to instantiate a partially hiding FE scheme as in [42]. Together with a pseudo flawed-smudging generator (see Section 5.2) that can be computed by that FE scheme, we can follow the approach from [42] to obtain the following theorem. See the full version for details.

**Theorem 7.** *For any constant integer* $d \geq 1$, *assuming,*

- *LWE,*
- *SXDH,*
- *PRGs with*
    - *Stretch of* $k^{1+\epsilon}$ *(length of input being* $k$ *bits) for some constant* $\epsilon > 0$,
    - *Constant locality and additional mild structural properties (see [42] for details),*
- *Pseudo flawed-smudging generators with degree* $d$ *public computation and degree 2 private computation.*

*where all primitives are secure against adversaries of polynomial sizes with subexponentially small distinguishing gaps. Then, there exists a subexponentially secure* $i\mathcal{O}$ *scheme for* P/poly.

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[6] Instantiations can be found in Section 6.2

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