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Paper 2023/865

A Closer Look at the S-box: Deeper Analysis of Round-Reduced ASCON-HASH

Xiaorui Yu, East China Normal University
Fukang Liu, Tokyo Institute of Technology
Gaoli Wang, East China Normal University
Siwei Sun, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Willi Meier, FHNW
Abstract

ASCON, a lightweight permutation-based primitive, has been selected as NIST’s lightweight cryptography standard. ASCON-HASH is one of the hash functions provided by the cipher suite ASCON. At ToSC 2021, the collision attack on 2-round ASCON-HASH with time complexity 2^{103} was proposed. Due to its small rate, it is always required to utilize at least 2 message blocks to mount a collision attack because each message block is only of size 64 bits. This significantly increases the difficulty of the analysis because one almost needs to analyze equivalently at least $2L$ rounds of ASCON in order to break $L$ rounds. In this paper, we make some critical observations on the round function of ASCON, especially a 2-round property. It is found that such properties can be exploited to reduce the time complexity of the 2-round collision attack to 2^{62.6}. Although the number of attacked rounds is not improved, we believe our techniques shed more insight into the properties of the ASCON permutation and we expect they can be useful for the future research. Following the same analysis method and with SMT technique, we practically find some semi-free-start collision attacks for 4-round ASCON-HASH and ASCON-Xof with STP solver.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
ASCONASCON-HASHCollision AttackAlgebraic Technique
Contact author(s)
51215902051 @ stu ecnu edu cn
liufukangs @ gmail com
glwang @ sei ecnu edu cn
siweisun isaac @ gmail com
willimeier48 @ gmail com
History
2023-06-12: approved
2023-06-07: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/865
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/865,
      author = {Xiaorui Yu and Fukang Liu and Gaoli Wang and Siwei Sun and Willi Meier},
      title = {A Closer Look at the S-box: Deeper Analysis of Round-Reduced {ASCON}-{HASH}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/865},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/865}
}
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