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Paper 2024/566

A $3$-Round Near-Linear Third-Party Private Set Intersection Protocol

Foo Yee Yeo
Jason H. M. Ying
Abstract

Third-party private set intersection (PSI) enables two parties, each holding a private set to compute their intersection and reveal the result only to an inputless third party. In this paper, we present an efficient third-party PSI protocol requiring only 3 communication rounds, while significantly lowering the computational workload compared to prior work. Our work is motivated by real-world applications such as contact tracing whereby expedition is essential while concurrently preserving privacy. Our construction attains a near-linear computational complexity of $O(n^{1+\varepsilon})$ for large dataset size $n$, where $\varepsilon>0$ is any fixed constant, and achieves post-quantum security. Our improvements stem from algorithmic changes and the incorporation of new techniques along with precise parameter selections to achieve a tight asymptotic bound. Furthermore, we also present a third-party PSI cardinality protocol which has not been explored in prior third-party PSI work. In a third-party PSI cardinality setting, only the third-party obtains the size of the intersection and nothing else. Our construction to achieve the cardinality functionality attains a quasilinear computational complexity for the third-party.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
private set intersectionPSI
Contact author(s)
fooyee yeo @ seagate com
jasonhweiming ying @ seagate com
History
2024-07-03: revised
2024-04-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/566
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
CC BY-NC-ND

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/566,
      author = {Foo Yee Yeo and Jason H. M. Ying},
      title = {A $3$-Round Near-Linear Third-Party Private Set Intersection Protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/566},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/566}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/566}
}
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