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Paper 2024/709

Masked Computation the Floor Function and its Application to the FALCON Signature

Pierre-Augustin Berthet, Institut Mines-Télécom, Hensoldt SAS France
Justine Paillet, Université Jean Monnet, Hensoldt SAS France
Cédric Tavernier, Hensoldt SAS France
Abstract

FALCON is candidate for standardization of the new Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) primitives by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). However, it remains a challenge to define efficient countermeasures against side-channel attacks (SCA) for this algorithm. FALCON is a lattice-based signature that relies on rational numbers which is unusual in the cryptography field. While recent work proposed a solution to mask the addition and the multiplication, some roadblocks remain, most noticeably how to protect the floor function. We propose in this work to complete the existing first trials of hardening FALCON against SCA. We perform the mathematical proofs of our methods as well as formal security proof in the probing model using the Non-Interference concepts.

Note: Revision 1 : Changed the paper structure for clarity and added the performances of a complete masked FALCON

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Floor FunctionFloating-Point ArithmeticPost-Quantum CryptographyFALCONSide-Channel AnalysisMasking
Contact author(s)
berthet @ telecom-paris fr
justine paillet @ univ-st-etienne fr
cedric tavernier @ hensoldt net
History
2024-09-12: revised
2024-05-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/709
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/709,
      author = {Pierre-Augustin Berthet and Justine Paillet and Cédric Tavernier},
      title = {Masked Computation the Floor Function and its Application to the {FALCON} Signature},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/709},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/709}
}
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