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Paper 2025/551

ANARKey: A New Approach to (Socially) Recover Keys

Aniket Kate, Purdue University / Supra Research
Pratyay Mukherjee, Supra Research
Hamza Saleem, Supra Research
Pratik Sarkar, Supra Research
Bhaskar Roberts, University of California, Berkeley
Abstract

In a social key recovery scheme, users back up their secret keys (typically using Shamir's secret sharing) with their social connections, known as a set of guardians. This places a heavy burden on the guardians, as they must manage their shares both securely and reliably. Finding and managing such a set of guardians may not be easy, especially when the consequences of losing a key are significant. We take an alternative approach of social recovery within a community, where each member already holds a secret key (with possibly an associated public key) and uses other community members as their guardians forming a mutual dependency among themselves. Potentially, each member acts as a guardian for upto $(n-1)$ other community members. Therefore, in this setting, using standard Shamir's sharing leads to a linear ($O(n)$) blow-up in the internal secret storage of the guardian for each key recovery. Our solution avoids this linear blowup in internal secret storage by relying on a novel secret-sharing scheme, leveraging the fact that each member already manages a secret key. In fact, our scheme does not require guardians to store anything beyond their own secret keys. We propose the first formal definition of a social key recovery scheme for general access structures in the community setting. We prove that our scheme is secure against any malicious and adaptive adversary that may corrupt up to $t$ parties. As a main technical tool, we use a new notion of secret sharing, that enables $(t+1)$ out of $n$ sharing of a secret even when the shares are generated independently -- we formalize this as bottom-up secret sharing (BUSS), which may be of independent interest. Finally, we provide an implementation benchmarking varying the number of guardians both in a regional, and geo-distributed setting. For instance, for 8 guardians, our backup protocol takes around 146-149 ms in a geo-distributed WAN setting, and 4.9-5.9 ms in the LAN setting; for recovery protocol, the timings are approximately the same for the WAN setting (as network latency dominates), and 1.2-1.4 ms for the LAN setting.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Key RecoveryKey ManagementSecret Sharing
Contact author(s)
aniket @ purdue edu
pratyay85 @ gmail com
h saleem @ supraoracles com
iampratiksarkar @ gmail com
bhaskarr @ berkeley edu
History
2025-03-26: approved
2025-03-25: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/551
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike
CC BY-NC-SA

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/551,
      author = {Aniket Kate and Pratyay Mukherjee and Hamza Saleem and Pratik Sarkar and Bhaskar Roberts},
      title = {{ANARKey}: A New Approach to (Socially) Recover Keys},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/551},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/551}
}
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