Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                



Dates are inconsistent

Dates are inconsistent

17 results sorted by ID

Possible spell-corrected query: compute-added Cryptography
2024/910 (PDF) Last updated: 2024-06-07
A Tight Security Proof for $\mathrm{SPHINCS^{+}}$, Formally Verified
Manuel Barbosa, François Dupressoir, Andreas Hülsing, Matthias Meijers, Pierre-Yves Strub
Public-key cryptography

$\mathrm{SPHINCS^{+}}$ is a post-quantum signature scheme that, at the time of writing, is being standardized as $\mathrm{SLH\text{-}DSA}$. It is the most conservative option for post-quantum signatures, but the original tight proofs of security were flawed—as reported by Kudinov, Kiktenko and Fedorov in 2020. In this work, we formally prove a tight security bound for $\mathrm{SPHINCS^{+}}$ using the EasyCrypt proof assistant, establishing greater confidence in the general security of the...

2023/1322 (PDF) Last updated: 2024-05-21
Boosting the Performance of High-Assurance Cryptography: Parallel Execution and Optimizing Memory Access in Formally-Verified Line-Point Zero-Knowledge
Samuel Dittmer, Karim Eldefrawy, Stéphane Graham-Lengrand, Steve Lu, Rafail Ostrovsky, Vitor Pereira
Cryptographic protocols

Despite the notable advances in the development of high-assurance, verified implementations of cryptographic protocols, such implementations typically face significant performance overheads, particularly due to the penalties induced by formal verification and automated extraction of executable code. In this paper, we address some core performance challenges facing computer-aided cryptography by presenting a formal treatment for accelerating such verified implementations based on multiple...

2023/408 (PDF) Last updated: 2024-06-11
Machine-Checked Security for $\mathrm{XMSS}$ as in RFC 8391 and $\mathrm{SPHINCS}^{+}$
Manuel Barbosa, François Dupressoir, Benjamin Grégoire, Andreas Hülsing, Matthias Meijers, Pierre-Yves Strub
Public-key cryptography

This work presents a novel machine-checked tight security proof for $\mathrm{XMSS}$ — a stateful hash-based signature scheme that is (1) standardized in RFC 8391 and NIST SP 800-208, and (2) employed as a primary building block of $\mathrm{SPHINCS}^{+}$, one of the signature schemes recently selected for standardization as a result of NIST’s post-quantum competition. In 2020, Kudinov, Kiktenko, and Fedoro pointed out a flaw affecting the tight security proofs of $\mathrm{SPHINCS}^{+}$ and...

2023/185 (PDF) Last updated: 2024-01-06
The Last Yard: Foundational End-to-End Verification of High-Speed Cryptography
Philipp G. Haselwarter, Benjamin Salling Hvass, Lasse Letager Hansen, Théo Winterhalter, Catalin Hritcu, Bas Spitters
Implementation

The field of high-assurance cryptography is quickly maturing, yet a unified foundational framework for end-to-end formal verification of efficient cryptographic implementations is still missing. To address this gap, we use the Coq proof assistant to formally connect three existing tools: (1) the Hacspec emergent cryptographic specification language; (2) the Jasmin language for efficient, high-assurance cryptographic implementations; and (3) the SSProve foundational verification framework for...

2023/010 (PDF) Last updated: 2023-11-16
Verifying Classic McEliece: examining the role of formal methods in post-quantum cryptography standardisation
Martin Brain, Carlos Cid, Rachel Player, Wrenna Robson
Implementation

Developers of computer-aided cryptographic tools are optimistic that formal methods will become a vital part of developing new cryptographic systems. We study the use of such tools to specify and verify the implementation of Classic McEliece, one of the code-based cryptography candidates in the fourth round of the NIST Post-Quantum standardisation Process. From our case study we draw conclusions about the practical applicability of these methods to the development of novel cryptography.

2022/1377 (PDF) Last updated: 2022-10-20
Improved Differential and Linear Trail Bounds for ASCON
Solane El Hirch, Silvia Mella, Alireza Mehrdad, Joan Daemen
Attacks and cryptanalysis

ASCON is a family of cryptographic primitives for authenticated encryption and hashing introduced in 2015. It is selected as one of the ten finalists in the NIST Lightweight Cryptography competition. Since its introduction, ASCON has been extensively cryptanalyzed, and the results of these analyses can indicate the good resistance of this family of cryptographic primitives against known attacks, like differential and linear cryptanalysis. Proving upper bounds for the differential...

2021/471 (PDF) Last updated: 2021-04-12
Size, Speed, and Security: An Ed25519 Case Study
Cesar Pereida García, Sampo Sovio
Public-key cryptography

Ed25519 has significant performance benefits compared to ECDSA using Weierstrass curves such as NIST P-256, therefore it is considered a good digital signature algorithm, specially for low performance IoT devices. However, such devices often have very limited resources and thus, implementations for these devices need to be as small and as performant as possible while being secure. In this paper we describe a scenario in which an obvious strategy to aggressively optimize an Ed25519...

2021/326 (PDF) Last updated: 2023-11-08
Bringing State-Separating Proofs to EasyCrypt - A Security Proof for Cryptobox
François Dupressoir, Konrad Kohbrok, Sabine Oechsner
Cryptographic protocols

Machine-checked cryptography aims to reinforce confidence in the primitives and protocols that underpin all digital security. However, machine-checked proof techniques remain in practice difficult to apply to real-world constructions. A particular challenge is structured reasoning about complex constructions at different levels of abstraction. The State-Separating Proofs (SSP) methodology for guiding cryptographic proofs by Brzuska, Delignat-Lavaud, Fournet, Kohbrok and Kohlweiss...

2019/1449 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-12-16
Formalising Oblivious Transfer in the Semi-Honest and Malicious Model in CryptHOL
David Butler, David Aspinall, Adria Gascon
Foundations

Multi-Party Computation (MPC) allows multiple parties to compute a function together while keeping their inputs private. Large scale implementations of MPC protocols are becoming practical thus it is important to have strong guarantees for the whole development process, from the underlying cryptography to the implementation. Computer aided proofs are a way to provide such guarantees. We use CryptHOL to formalise a framework for reasoning about two party protocols using the security...

2019/1393 (PDF) Last updated: 2020-07-09
SoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography
Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Karthik Bhargavan, Bruno Blanchet, Cas Cremers, Kevin Liao, Bryan Parno
Implementation

Computer-aided cryptography is an active area of research that develops and applies formal, machine-checkable approaches to the design, analysis, and implementation of cryptography. We present a cross-cutting systematization of the computer-aided cryptography literature, focusing on three main areas: (i) design-level security (both symbolic security and computational security), (ii) functional correctness and efficiency, and (iii) implementation-level security (with a focus on digital...

2018/502 (PDF) Last updated: 2018-05-26
Computer-aided proofs for multiparty computation with active security
Helene Haagh, Aleksandr Karbyshev, Sabine Oechsner, Bas Spitters, Pierre-Yves Strub
Cryptographic protocols

Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a general cryptographic technique that allows distrusting parties to compute a function of their individual inputs, while only revealing the output of the function. It has found applications in areas such as auctioning, email filtering, and secure teleconference. Given their importance, it is crucial that the protocols are specified and implemented correctly. In the programming language community, it has become good practice to use computer proof...

2018/306 (PDF) Last updated: 2023-06-08
State Separation for Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs
Chris Brzuska, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Cedric Fournet, Konrad Kohbrok, Markulf Kohlweiss
Foundations

The security analysis of real-world protocols involves reduction steps that are conceptually simple but still have to account for many protocol complications found in standards and implementations. Taking inspiration from universal composability, abstract cryptography, process algebras, and type-based verification frameworks, we propose a method to simplify large reductions, avoid mistakes in carrying them out, and obtain concise security statements. Our method decomposes monolithic games...

2016/244 (PDF) Last updated: 2024-06-07
Cryptanalysis of Simpira v1
Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Florian Mendel
Secret-key cryptography

Simpira v1 is a recently proposed family of permutations, based on the AES round function. The design includes recommendations for using the Simpira permutations in block ciphers, hash functions, or authenticated ciphers. The designers' security analysis is based on computer-aided bounds for the minimum number of active S-boxes. We show that the underlying assumptions of independence, and thus the derived bounds, are incorrect. For family member Simpira-4, we provide differential trails with...

2013/316 (PDF) Last updated: 2013-05-28
Certified computer-aided cryptography: efficient provably secure machine code from high-level implementations
José Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, François Dupressoir
Public-key cryptography

We present a computer-aided framework for proving concrete security bounds for cryptographic machine code implementations. The front-end of the framework is an interactive verification tool that extends the EasyCrypt framework to reason about relational properties of C-like programs extended with idealised probabilistic operations in the style of code-based security proofs. The framework also incorporates an extension of the CompCert certified compiler to support trusted libraries providing...

2012/695 (PDF) Last updated: 2013-07-03
Fully Automated Analysis of Padding-Based Encryption in the Computational Model
Gilles Barthe, Juan Manuel Crespo, Benjamin Grégoire, César Kunz, Yassine Lakhnech, Benedikt Schmidt, Santiago Zanella-Béguelin
Public-key cryptography

Computer-aided verification provides effective means of analyzing the security of cryptographic primitives. However, it has remained a challenge to achieve fully automated analyses yielding guarantees that hold against computational (rather than symbolic) attacks. This paper meets this challenge for public-key encryption schemes built from trapdoor permutations and hash functions. Using a novel combination of techniques from computational and symbolic cryptography, we present proof systems...

2011/340 (PDF) Last updated: 2011-06-27
Encrypting More Information in Visual Cryptography Scheme
Feng Liu, Peng Li, ChuanKun Wu
Secret-key cryptography

The visual cryptography scheme (VCS) is a scheme which encodes a secret image into several shares, and only qualified sets of shares can recover the secret image visually, other sets of shares cannot get any information about the content of the secret image. From the point of view of encrypting (carrying) the secret information, the traditional VCS is not an efficient method. The amount of the information that a VCS encrypts depends on the amount of secret pixels. And because of the...

2011/235 (PDF) Last updated: 2012-05-31
Computer-Aided Decision-Making with Trust Relations and Trust Domains (Cryptographic Applications)
Simon Kramer, Rajeev Goré, Eiji Okamoto
Foundations

We propose generic declarative definitions of individual and collective trust relations between interacting agents and agent collections, and trust domains of trust-related agents in distributed systems. Our definitions yield (1) (in)compatibility, implicational, and transitivity results for trust relationships, including a Datalog-implementability result for their logical structure; (2) computational complexity results for deciding potential and actual trust relationships and membership in...

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.