Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                



Dates are inconsistent

Dates are inconsistent

9 results sorted by ID

2019/959 (PDF) Last updated: 2021-06-28
Table Redundancy Method for Protecting against Fault Attacks
Seungkwang Lee, Nam-su Jho, Myungchul Kim
Secret-key cryptography

Fault attacks (FA) intentionally inject some fault into the encryption process for analyzing a secret key based on faulty intermediate values or faulty ciphertexts. One of the easy ways for software-based countermeasures is to use time redundancy. However, existing methods can be broken by skipping comparison operations or by using non-uniform distributions of faulty intermediate values. In this paper, we propose a secure software-based redundancy, aptly named table redundancy, applying...

2018/203 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-10-24
Impeccable Circuits
Anita Aghaie, Amir Moradi, Shahram Rasoolzadeh, Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi, Falk Schellenberg, Tobias Schneider
Implementation

By injecting faults, active physical attacks pose serious threats to cryptographic hardware where Concurrent Error Detection (CED) schemes are promising countermeasures. They are usually based on an Error-Detecting Code (EDC) which enables detecting certain injected faults depending on the specification of the underlying code. Here, we propose a methodology to enable correct, practical, and robust implementation of code-based CEDs. We show that straightforward hardware implementations of...

2016/289 (PDF) Last updated: 2016-04-18
Obfuscation Combiners
Marc Fischlin, Amir Herzberg, Hod Bin Noon, Haya Shulman
Cryptographic protocols

Obfuscation is challenging; we currently have practical candidates with rather vague security guarantees on the one side, and theoretical constructions which have recently experienced jeopardizing attacks against the underlying cryptographic assumptions on the other side. This motivates us to study and present robust combiners for obfuscators, which integrate several candidate obfuscators into a single obfuscator which is secure as long as a quorum of the candidates is indeed secure. We...

2014/912 (PDF) Last updated: 2014-11-05
Low-Cost Concurrent Error Detection for GCM and CCM
Xiaofei Guo, Ramesh Karri
Implementation

In many applications, encryption alone does not provide enough security. To enhance security, dedicated authenticated encryption (AE) mode are invented. Galios Counter Mode (GCM) and Counter with CBC-MAC mode (CCM) are the AE modes recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. To support high data rates, AE modes are usually implemented in hardware. However, natural faults reduce its reliability and may undermine both its encryption and authentication capability. We...

2014/497 (PDF) Last updated: 2015-09-05
NREPO:Normal Basis Recomputing with Permuted Operands
Xiaofei Guo, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, Chenglu Jin, Ramesh Karri
Implementation

Hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to natural and malicious faults. Concurrent Error Detection (CED) can be used to detect these faults. We present NREPO, a CED which does not require redundant computational resources in the design. Therefore, one can integrate it when computational resources are scarce or when the redundant resources are difficult to harness for CED. We integrate NREPO in a low-cost Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) implementation with...

2013/613 (PDF) Last updated: 2014-02-27
Recomputing with Permuted Operands: A Concurrent Error Detection Approach
Xiaofei Guo, Ramesh Karri
Implementation

Naturally occurring and maliciously injected faults reduce the reliability of cryptographic hardware and may leak confidential information. We develop a concurrent error detection (CED) technique called Recomputing with Permuted Operands (REPO). We show that it is cost effective in Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and a secure hash function Grøstl. We provide experimental results and formal proofs to show that REPO detects all single-bit and single-byte faults. Experimental results show...

2013/603 (PDF) Last updated: 2013-09-23
Invariance-Based Concurrent Error Detection for Advanced Encryption Standard
Xiaofei Guo, Ramesh Karri
Implementation

Naturally occurring and maliciously injected faults reduce the reliability of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and may leak confidential information. We developed an invariance-based concurrent error detection (CED) scheme which is independent of the implementation of AES encryption/decryption. Additionally, we improve the security of our scheme with Randomized CED Round Insertion and adaptive checking. Experimental results show that the invariance-based CED scheme detects all single-bit,...

2012/552 (PDF) Last updated: 2014-02-27
Provably Secure Concurrent Error Detection Against Differential Fault Analysis
Xiaofei Guo, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, Ramesh Karri
Secret-key cryptography

Differential fault analysis (DFA) poses a significant threat to Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). It has been demonstrated that DFA can use only a single faulty ciphertext to reveal the secret key of AES in an average of 230 computation. Traditionally, concurrent error detection (CED) is used to protect AES against DFA. However, we emphasize that conventional CED assumes a uniform distribution of faults, which is not a valid assumption in the context of DFA. In contrast, we show practical...

2007/072 Last updated: 2007-06-05
A Hybrid Approach to Concurrent Error Detection for a Compact ASIC Implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard
Namin Yu, Howard M. Heys
Implementation

In this paper, we investigate the application of concurrent error detection circuitry to a compact application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The specific objective of the design is to develop a method suitable for compact ASIC implementations targeted to embedded systems such that the system is resistant to fault attacks. To provide the error detection, recognizing that previously proposed schemes are not well suited to compact...

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.