Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions abo... more Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief (contra Singer 1972; Greene 2008). This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions are more reliable than ‘impersonal’ intuitions, and vice versa. Thus, Singer’s (2005) evolutionary debunking argument proves too much, and should not be taken seriously. However, Singer’s debunking argument is typical of an entire class of arguments that seeks to debunk normative principles by reference to evolution. This entire class of argument, I argue, there...
Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disci... more Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disciplines? Here, I address both factual and theoretical matters relating to the causes, effects, and potential redress of the lack of women in philosophy. First, I debunk extant claims that women are more likely than men to disagree with their philosophy professors and male peers; that women are more sensitive to disagreements in the philosophy classroom than men are; and that the gender imbalance in philosophy is no worse than in many cognate disciplines. Second, I discuss ways in which the nature of philosophical inquiry and debate may provide uniquely strong opportunities for person‐perception to hinder progress toward egalitarian treatment of interlocutors. And third, I argue that a diversity of perspectives in philosophy is essential not only for reasons of social justice, but also for philosophical progress. Efforts to improve philosophy should therefore countenance the role of person...
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2018
Neuroethics is typically conceived of as consisting of two traditions: the ethics of neuroscience... more Neuroethics is typically conceived of as consisting of two traditions: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of moral judgment. However, recent work has sought to draw philosophical and ethical implications from the neuroscience of moral judgment. Such work, which concerns normative moral neuroscience (NMN), is sufficiently distinct and complex to deserve recognition as a third tradition of neuroethics. Recognizing it as such can reduce confusion among researchers, eliminating conflations among both critics and proponents of NMN. This article identifies and unpacks some of the most prominent goals, characteristic assumptions, and unique arguments in NMN and addresses some of the strongest objections NMN faces. The paper synthesizes these considerations into a set of heuristics, or loose discovery principles, that can help overcome obstacles in and attenuate resistance to NMN. These heuristics may simultaneously help identify those projects in NMN that are most likely to be...
Neuroethics is typically conceived of as consisting of two traditions: the ethics of neuroscience... more Neuroethics is typically conceived of as consisting of two traditions: the ethics of neuroscience, and the neuroscience of moral judgment. However, recent work has sought to draw philosophical and ethical implications from the neuroscience of moral judgment. Such work, which concerns normative moral neuroscience (NMN), is sufficiently distinct and complex to deserve recognition as a third tradition of neuroethics. Recognizing it as such can reduce confusion among researchers, eliminating conflations among both critics and proponents of NMN. This article identifies and unpacks some of the most prominent goals, characteristic assumptions, and unique arguments in NMN, and addresses some of the strongest objections NMN faces. The paper synthesizes these considerations into a set of heuristics, or loose discovery principles, that can help overcome obstacles in and attenuate resistance to NMN. These heuristics may simultaneously help identify those projects in NMN that are most likely to be fruitful and help fortify them.
I argue that free will is a nominal construct developed and deployed post hoc in an effort to pro... more I argue that free will is a nominal construct developed and deployed post hoc in an effort to provide cohesive narratives in support of a priori moral-judgmental dispositions. In a reversal of traditional course, I defend the view that there are no circumstances under which attributions of moral responsibility for an act can, should, or do depend on prior ascriptions of free will. Conversely, I claim that free will belief depends entirely on the apperceived possibility of moral responsibility. Orthodoxy dictates an agency-first thesis, according to which free will is necessarily antecedent to moral responsibility. However, I present a number of arguments against this view, and in favor of an agency-last stance, according to which the concept of free will is dependent upon that of moral responsibility. I provide further support for my case in the form of new empirical evidence regarding the stable mode of inference used to attribute free will across moral contexts. These experimental results can be interpreted to imply the deflation of one of the longest-standing veridical paradoxes in experimental philosophy. Furthermore, the sole conceptual scheme found to be capable of modeling the experimental results is also capable of illuminating several classic works in the analytic philosophy of moral agency.
Critical reflection on the available neuropsychological evidence suggests that the roles of emoti... more Critical reflection on the available neuropsychological evidence suggests that the roles of emotion and reason in moral judgment may not be distinct. This casts significant doubt on our current understanding of moral judgment, and therefore also on all philosophical theories based on that understanding. Most notably, it raises doubts about both sentimentalism and rationalism, which historically have often been treated as exclusive and exhaustive theories regarding the nature of moral concepts. As an alternative, I endorse pluralism with regard to the emotional and rational nature of moral concepts.
Does evidence of a biomechanical cause of psychopathy reduce sentencing to the same extent for ma... more Does evidence of a biomechanical cause of psychopathy reduce sentencing to the same extent for male and female judges? A recent experiment found that when psychiatric evidence of criminal psychopathy was supplemented by evidence of an underlying biomechanism, judges assigned shorter average sentences and were more likely to cite at least one mitigating factor of psychopathy in accompanying written opinions. But it remains unclear whether the absence of neurobiological evidence justifies the retention of longer sentences, and unclear whether the opinions of this judicial sample are widely held, or reflect the unique demographics of the U.S. state trial judiciary. Specifically, previous research has found systematic differences in the credence that men and women give to different kinds of scientific explanations, and this research suggests that the discovered scientism among U.S. state trial judges may be moderated by the gender ratio of that population, which is skewed heavily toward men. Here, a reanalysis of the data in which this effect was first revealed found no effect of biomechanism on female judges' sentencing or opinions. These results suggest that it is worth further investigating whether the overrepresentation of men on the bench may lead to a hard-scientific bias in U.S. state courts. Additionally, the findings highlight the need to develop a scientific understanding of the social forces that give rise to these gender differences in the first place, and reveal problems with a concept that I develop and critique called the principle of epistemic caution. Acknowledgements: I am extraordinarily grateful to Lisa Aspinwall, Teneille Brown, and James Tabery for reanalyzing and sharing their data, and for their comments on and continued support of this project. They wish to express no public opinion at this time regarding my interpretation of their data. I am also grateful to Jennifer Mangels, Jesse Prinz, Hagop Sarkissian, and Ron Whiteman for their comments on previous drafts. Finally, I must thank two anonymous referees and the editor, John Banja, for their extraordinarily helpful and detailed critiques of earlier versions of the manuscript.
A popular press article about phrenology and belief-altering magnets and a 9-year-old who castrat... more A popular press article about phrenology and belief-altering magnets and a 9-year-old who castrated an 8-year-old in 1834. What more could you want? Full text available on Slate's website:
Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disci... more Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disciplines? Here, I address both factual and theoretical matters relating to the causes, effects, and potential redress of the lack of women in philosophy.
First, I debunk extant claims that women are more likely than men to disagree with their philosophy professors and male peers; that women are more sensitive to disagreements in the philosophy classroom than men are; and that the gender imbalance in philosophy is no worse than in many cognate disciplines. Second, I discuss ways in which the nature of philosophical inquiry and debate may provide uniquely strong opportunities for person-perception to hinder progress toward egalitarian treatment of interlocutors. And third, I argue that a diversity of perspectives in philosophy is essential not only for reasons of social justice, but also for philosophical progress.
Efforts to improve philosophy should therefore countenance the role of person-perception in the practice of philosophical debate. For philosophy to become more diverse, the steps the profession takes to achieve that goal will have to go beyond—and not merely match—the steps taken to increase the numbers of women and otherwise underrepresented individuals in other fields.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20 (5-6)., Jun 2013
This paper identifies several ways in which personality informs philosophical belief. In the pres... more This paper identifies several ways in which personality informs philosophical belief. In the present study, individuals holding doctorates in philosophy were given a personality inventory and asked to respond to nine philosophical questions, seven of which produced significant sample sizes. Personality predicted response to three of these seven questions, suggesting that philosophers’ beliefs are determined in part by their personalities. This is taken as evidence that philosophy is intrinsically subjective, a claim which is herein developed more completely and defended against several objections.
Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions abo... more Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief (contra Singer 1972; Greene 2008). This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions are more reliable than ‘impersonal’ intuitions, and vice versa. Thus, Singer’s (2005) evolutionary debunking argument proves too much, and should not be taken seriously. However, Singer’s debunking argument is typical of an entire class of arguments that seeks to debunk normative principles by reference to evolution. This entire class of argument, I argue, there...
Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disci... more Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disciplines? Here, I address both factual and theoretical matters relating to the causes, effects, and potential redress of the lack of women in philosophy. First, I debunk extant claims that women are more likely than men to disagree with their philosophy professors and male peers; that women are more sensitive to disagreements in the philosophy classroom than men are; and that the gender imbalance in philosophy is no worse than in many cognate disciplines. Second, I discuss ways in which the nature of philosophical inquiry and debate may provide uniquely strong opportunities for person‐perception to hinder progress toward egalitarian treatment of interlocutors. And third, I argue that a diversity of perspectives in philosophy is essential not only for reasons of social justice, but also for philosophical progress. Efforts to improve philosophy should therefore countenance the role of person...
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2018
Neuroethics is typically conceived of as consisting of two traditions: the ethics of neuroscience... more Neuroethics is typically conceived of as consisting of two traditions: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of moral judgment. However, recent work has sought to draw philosophical and ethical implications from the neuroscience of moral judgment. Such work, which concerns normative moral neuroscience (NMN), is sufficiently distinct and complex to deserve recognition as a third tradition of neuroethics. Recognizing it as such can reduce confusion among researchers, eliminating conflations among both critics and proponents of NMN. This article identifies and unpacks some of the most prominent goals, characteristic assumptions, and unique arguments in NMN and addresses some of the strongest objections NMN faces. The paper synthesizes these considerations into a set of heuristics, or loose discovery principles, that can help overcome obstacles in and attenuate resistance to NMN. These heuristics may simultaneously help identify those projects in NMN that are most likely to be...
Neuroethics is typically conceived of as consisting of two traditions: the ethics of neuroscience... more Neuroethics is typically conceived of as consisting of two traditions: the ethics of neuroscience, and the neuroscience of moral judgment. However, recent work has sought to draw philosophical and ethical implications from the neuroscience of moral judgment. Such work, which concerns normative moral neuroscience (NMN), is sufficiently distinct and complex to deserve recognition as a third tradition of neuroethics. Recognizing it as such can reduce confusion among researchers, eliminating conflations among both critics and proponents of NMN. This article identifies and unpacks some of the most prominent goals, characteristic assumptions, and unique arguments in NMN, and addresses some of the strongest objections NMN faces. The paper synthesizes these considerations into a set of heuristics, or loose discovery principles, that can help overcome obstacles in and attenuate resistance to NMN. These heuristics may simultaneously help identify those projects in NMN that are most likely to be fruitful and help fortify them.
I argue that free will is a nominal construct developed and deployed post hoc in an effort to pro... more I argue that free will is a nominal construct developed and deployed post hoc in an effort to provide cohesive narratives in support of a priori moral-judgmental dispositions. In a reversal of traditional course, I defend the view that there are no circumstances under which attributions of moral responsibility for an act can, should, or do depend on prior ascriptions of free will. Conversely, I claim that free will belief depends entirely on the apperceived possibility of moral responsibility. Orthodoxy dictates an agency-first thesis, according to which free will is necessarily antecedent to moral responsibility. However, I present a number of arguments against this view, and in favor of an agency-last stance, according to which the concept of free will is dependent upon that of moral responsibility. I provide further support for my case in the form of new empirical evidence regarding the stable mode of inference used to attribute free will across moral contexts. These experimental results can be interpreted to imply the deflation of one of the longest-standing veridical paradoxes in experimental philosophy. Furthermore, the sole conceptual scheme found to be capable of modeling the experimental results is also capable of illuminating several classic works in the analytic philosophy of moral agency.
Critical reflection on the available neuropsychological evidence suggests that the roles of emoti... more Critical reflection on the available neuropsychological evidence suggests that the roles of emotion and reason in moral judgment may not be distinct. This casts significant doubt on our current understanding of moral judgment, and therefore also on all philosophical theories based on that understanding. Most notably, it raises doubts about both sentimentalism and rationalism, which historically have often been treated as exclusive and exhaustive theories regarding the nature of moral concepts. As an alternative, I endorse pluralism with regard to the emotional and rational nature of moral concepts.
Does evidence of a biomechanical cause of psychopathy reduce sentencing to the same extent for ma... more Does evidence of a biomechanical cause of psychopathy reduce sentencing to the same extent for male and female judges? A recent experiment found that when psychiatric evidence of criminal psychopathy was supplemented by evidence of an underlying biomechanism, judges assigned shorter average sentences and were more likely to cite at least one mitigating factor of psychopathy in accompanying written opinions. But it remains unclear whether the absence of neurobiological evidence justifies the retention of longer sentences, and unclear whether the opinions of this judicial sample are widely held, or reflect the unique demographics of the U.S. state trial judiciary. Specifically, previous research has found systematic differences in the credence that men and women give to different kinds of scientific explanations, and this research suggests that the discovered scientism among U.S. state trial judges may be moderated by the gender ratio of that population, which is skewed heavily toward men. Here, a reanalysis of the data in which this effect was first revealed found no effect of biomechanism on female judges' sentencing or opinions. These results suggest that it is worth further investigating whether the overrepresentation of men on the bench may lead to a hard-scientific bias in U.S. state courts. Additionally, the findings highlight the need to develop a scientific understanding of the social forces that give rise to these gender differences in the first place, and reveal problems with a concept that I develop and critique called the principle of epistemic caution. Acknowledgements: I am extraordinarily grateful to Lisa Aspinwall, Teneille Brown, and James Tabery for reanalyzing and sharing their data, and for their comments on and continued support of this project. They wish to express no public opinion at this time regarding my interpretation of their data. I am also grateful to Jennifer Mangels, Jesse Prinz, Hagop Sarkissian, and Ron Whiteman for their comments on previous drafts. Finally, I must thank two anonymous referees and the editor, John Banja, for their extraordinarily helpful and detailed critiques of earlier versions of the manuscript.
A popular press article about phrenology and belief-altering magnets and a 9-year-old who castrat... more A popular press article about phrenology and belief-altering magnets and a 9-year-old who castrated an 8-year-old in 1834. What more could you want? Full text available on Slate's website:
Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disci... more Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disciplines? Here, I address both factual and theoretical matters relating to the causes, effects, and potential redress of the lack of women in philosophy.
First, I debunk extant claims that women are more likely than men to disagree with their philosophy professors and male peers; that women are more sensitive to disagreements in the philosophy classroom than men are; and that the gender imbalance in philosophy is no worse than in many cognate disciplines. Second, I discuss ways in which the nature of philosophical inquiry and debate may provide uniquely strong opportunities for person-perception to hinder progress toward egalitarian treatment of interlocutors. And third, I argue that a diversity of perspectives in philosophy is essential not only for reasons of social justice, but also for philosophical progress.
Efforts to improve philosophy should therefore countenance the role of person-perception in the practice of philosophical debate. For philosophy to become more diverse, the steps the profession takes to achieve that goal will have to go beyond—and not merely match—the steps taken to increase the numbers of women and otherwise underrepresented individuals in other fields.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20 (5-6)., Jun 2013
This paper identifies several ways in which personality informs philosophical belief. In the pres... more This paper identifies several ways in which personality informs philosophical belief. In the present study, individuals holding doctorates in philosophy were given a personality inventory and asked to respond to nine philosophical questions, seven of which produced significant sample sizes. Personality predicted response to three of these seven questions, suggesting that philosophers’ beliefs are determined in part by their personalities. This is taken as evidence that philosophy is intrinsically subjective, a claim which is herein developed more completely and defended against several objections.
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Papers by Geoffrey Holtzman
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/12/how_phrenology_was_used_in_the_1834_trial_of_9_year_old_major_mitchell.html
First, I debunk extant claims that women are more likely than men to disagree with their philosophy professors and male peers; that women are more sensitive to disagreements in the philosophy classroom than men are; and that the gender imbalance in philosophy is no worse than in many cognate disciplines. Second, I discuss ways in which the nature of philosophical inquiry and debate may provide uniquely strong opportunities for person-perception to hinder progress toward egalitarian treatment of interlocutors. And third, I argue that a diversity of perspectives in philosophy is essential not only for reasons of social justice, but also for philosophical progress.
Efforts to improve philosophy should therefore countenance the role of person-perception in the practice of philosophical debate. For philosophy to become more diverse, the steps the profession takes to achieve that goal will have to go beyond—and not merely match—the steps taken to increase the numbers of women and otherwise underrepresented individuals in other fields.
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/12/how_phrenology_was_used_in_the_1834_trial_of_9_year_old_major_mitchell.html
First, I debunk extant claims that women are more likely than men to disagree with their philosophy professors and male peers; that women are more sensitive to disagreements in the philosophy classroom than men are; and that the gender imbalance in philosophy is no worse than in many cognate disciplines. Second, I discuss ways in which the nature of philosophical inquiry and debate may provide uniquely strong opportunities for person-perception to hinder progress toward egalitarian treatment of interlocutors. And third, I argue that a diversity of perspectives in philosophy is essential not only for reasons of social justice, but also for philosophical progress.
Efforts to improve philosophy should therefore countenance the role of person-perception in the practice of philosophical debate. For philosophy to become more diverse, the steps the profession takes to achieve that goal will have to go beyond—and not merely match—the steps taken to increase the numbers of women and otherwise underrepresented individuals in other fields.