16 Population Policy and the Clash of Cultures Judith Lichtenberg When people talk about populati... more 16 Population Policy and the Clash of Cultures Judith Lichtenberg When people talk about population as something for which" policies" are needed, they are likely to be talking about population policy for developing countries. According to one recent report, 123 developing countries have ...
By definition, the president of the United States is a leader. But leadership signifies something... more By definition, the president of the United States is a leader. But leadership signifies something apart from the obvious rights and appurtenances accompanying the office. What do we want to know when we ask what presidential leadership is? I do not believe there is a single question we are trying to answer, and I think a variety of confusions lurk in the questions we pose and the answers we offer to them. Here I try to sort out some of the questions, answers, and confusions. I begin with some basic puzzles.
“Risk communication,” as the various chapters of this book demonstrate, names both a practice and... more “Risk communication,” as the various chapters of this book demonstrate, names both a practice and an area of research. The practice — which encompasses warnings, reassurances, predictions, threats, disclaimers, explanations, excuses, and many other activities — is very old. But with the exception of natural hazard warnings and health education, the research area is new.
We have many good reasons to abolish life without parole sentences
(LWOP, known in some countries... more We have many good reasons to abolish life without parole sentences (LWOP, known in some countries as whole life sentences) and no good reasons not to. After reviewing the current state of LWOP sentences in the United States, I argue that the only rationale for punishment that can hope to justify them is retributivism. But even if retributivism is a sound principle, it in no way entails life without parole. One reason is that unless one believes, like Kant, that appropriate punishments must be carried out whatever the circumstances, we must acknowledge that other considerations are relevant to determining punishments. Furthermore, retributivism does not dictate particular punishments, and so the question remains which are reasonable and appropriate.
Even retributivists, then, can reject life without parole. But showing why it’s wrong requires a positive case for abolition as well. I offer several reasons. First, shortening and tempering sentences need not trivialize the gravity of the crimes to which they respond, as some suggest, because the expressive meaning of sentences is malleable. Second, most if not all people are not fully culpable for their criminal acts, and we should mitigate their punishment accordingly. Third, abolishing life without parole—and indeed all life sentences—is likely to bring many benefits: to prisoners, their loved ones, the community in general, and to those who decide for abolition and who carry it out. Among these is the promotion of certain attitudes it is good for people to have—what, following Ryan Preston-Roedder, I call faith in humanity. Finally, there’s a certain pointlessness in continuing to punish a person who has undergone changes of character that distance him greatly from the person who committed the crime many decades earlier.
16 Population Policy and the Clash of Cultures Judith Lichtenberg When people talk about populati... more 16 Population Policy and the Clash of Cultures Judith Lichtenberg When people talk about population as something for which" policies" are needed, they are likely to be talking about population policy for developing countries. According to one recent report, 123 developing countries have ...
By definition, the president of the United States is a leader. But leadership signifies something... more By definition, the president of the United States is a leader. But leadership signifies something apart from the obvious rights and appurtenances accompanying the office. What do we want to know when we ask what presidential leadership is? I do not believe there is a single question we are trying to answer, and I think a variety of confusions lurk in the questions we pose and the answers we offer to them. Here I try to sort out some of the questions, answers, and confusions. I begin with some basic puzzles.
“Risk communication,” as the various chapters of this book demonstrate, names both a practice and... more “Risk communication,” as the various chapters of this book demonstrate, names both a practice and an area of research. The practice — which encompasses warnings, reassurances, predictions, threats, disclaimers, explanations, excuses, and many other activities — is very old. But with the exception of natural hazard warnings and health education, the research area is new.
We have many good reasons to abolish life without parole sentences
(LWOP, known in some countries... more We have many good reasons to abolish life without parole sentences (LWOP, known in some countries as whole life sentences) and no good reasons not to. After reviewing the current state of LWOP sentences in the United States, I argue that the only rationale for punishment that can hope to justify them is retributivism. But even if retributivism is a sound principle, it in no way entails life without parole. One reason is that unless one believes, like Kant, that appropriate punishments must be carried out whatever the circumstances, we must acknowledge that other considerations are relevant to determining punishments. Furthermore, retributivism does not dictate particular punishments, and so the question remains which are reasonable and appropriate.
Even retributivists, then, can reject life without parole. But showing why it’s wrong requires a positive case for abolition as well. I offer several reasons. First, shortening and tempering sentences need not trivialize the gravity of the crimes to which they respond, as some suggest, because the expressive meaning of sentences is malleable. Second, most if not all people are not fully culpable for their criminal acts, and we should mitigate their punishment accordingly. Third, abolishing life without parole—and indeed all life sentences—is likely to bring many benefits: to prisoners, their loved ones, the community in general, and to those who decide for abolition and who carry it out. Among these is the promotion of certain attitudes it is good for people to have—what, following Ryan Preston-Roedder, I call faith in humanity. Finally, there’s a certain pointlessness in continuing to punish a person who has undergone changes of character that distance him greatly from the person who committed the crime many decades earlier.
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Papers by Judith Lichtenberg
(LWOP, known in some countries as whole life sentences) and no good
reasons not to. After reviewing the current state of LWOP sentences in the
United States, I argue that the only rationale for punishment that can hope
to justify them is retributivism. But even if retributivism is a sound
principle, it in no way entails life without parole. One reason is that unless
one believes, like Kant, that appropriate punishments must be carried out
whatever the circumstances, we must acknowledge that other
considerations are relevant to determining punishments. Furthermore,
retributivism does not dictate particular punishments, and so the question
remains which are reasonable and appropriate.
Even retributivists, then, can reject life without parole. But showing
why it’s wrong requires a positive case for abolition as well. I offer
several reasons. First, shortening and tempering sentences need not
trivialize the gravity of the crimes to which they respond, as some suggest,
because the expressive meaning of sentences is malleable. Second, most if not all people are not fully culpable for their criminal acts, and we should
mitigate their punishment accordingly. Third, abolishing life without
parole—and indeed all life sentences—is likely to bring many benefits: to
prisoners, their loved ones, the community in general, and to those who
decide for abolition and who carry it out. Among these is the promotion of
certain attitudes it is good for people to have—what, following Ryan
Preston-Roedder, I call faith in humanity. Finally, there’s a certain
pointlessness in continuing to punish a person who has undergone
changes of character that distance him greatly from the person who
committed the crime many decades earlier.
(LWOP, known in some countries as whole life sentences) and no good
reasons not to. After reviewing the current state of LWOP sentences in the
United States, I argue that the only rationale for punishment that can hope
to justify them is retributivism. But even if retributivism is a sound
principle, it in no way entails life without parole. One reason is that unless
one believes, like Kant, that appropriate punishments must be carried out
whatever the circumstances, we must acknowledge that other
considerations are relevant to determining punishments. Furthermore,
retributivism does not dictate particular punishments, and so the question
remains which are reasonable and appropriate.
Even retributivists, then, can reject life without parole. But showing
why it’s wrong requires a positive case for abolition as well. I offer
several reasons. First, shortening and tempering sentences need not
trivialize the gravity of the crimes to which they respond, as some suggest,
because the expressive meaning of sentences is malleable. Second, most if not all people are not fully culpable for their criminal acts, and we should
mitigate their punishment accordingly. Third, abolishing life without
parole—and indeed all life sentences—is likely to bring many benefits: to
prisoners, their loved ones, the community in general, and to those who
decide for abolition and who carry it out. Among these is the promotion of
certain attitudes it is good for people to have—what, following Ryan
Preston-Roedder, I call faith in humanity. Finally, there’s a certain
pointlessness in continuing to punish a person who has undergone
changes of character that distance him greatly from the person who
committed the crime many decades earlier.