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raw | patch | inline | side by side (parent: ff6ce9a)
| author | Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> | |
| Mon, 28 Dec 2020 22:44:17 +0000 (17:44 -0500) | ||
| committer | Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> | |
| Mon, 28 Dec 2020 22:44:17 +0000 (17:44 -0500) |
Unrecoverable errors detected by GSSAPI encryption can't just be
reported with elog(ERROR) or elog(FATAL), because attempting to
send the error report to the client is likely to lead to infinite
recursion or loss of protocol sync. Instead make this code do what
the SSL encryption code has long done, which is to just report any
such failure to the server log (with elevel COMMERROR), then pretend
we've lost the connection by returning errno = ECONNRESET.
Along the way, fix confusion about whether message translation is done
by pg_GSS_error() or its callers (the latter should do it), and make
the backend version of that function work more like the frontend
version.
Avoid allocating the port->gss struct until it's needed; we surely
don't need to allocate it in the postmaster.
Improve logging of "connection authorized" messages with GSS enabled.
(As part of this, I back-patched the code changes from dc11f31a1.)
Make BackendStatusShmemSize() account for the GSS-related space that
will be allocated by CreateSharedBackendStatus(). This omission
could possibly cause out-of-shared-memory problems with very high
max_connections settings.
Remove arbitrary, pointless restriction that only GSS authentication
can be used on a GSS-encrypted connection.
Improve documentation; notably, document the fact that libpq now
prefers GSS encryption over SSL encryption if both are possible.
Per report from Mikael Gustavsson. Back-patch to v12 where
this code was introduced.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/e5b0b6ed05764324a2f3fe7acfc766d5@smhi.se
reported with elog(ERROR) or elog(FATAL), because attempting to
send the error report to the client is likely to lead to infinite
recursion or loss of protocol sync. Instead make this code do what
the SSL encryption code has long done, which is to just report any
such failure to the server log (with elevel COMMERROR), then pretend
we've lost the connection by returning errno = ECONNRESET.
Along the way, fix confusion about whether message translation is done
by pg_GSS_error() or its callers (the latter should do it), and make
the backend version of that function work more like the frontend
version.
Avoid allocating the port->gss struct until it's needed; we surely
don't need to allocate it in the postmaster.
Improve logging of "connection authorized" messages with GSS enabled.
(As part of this, I back-patched the code changes from dc11f31a1.)
Make BackendStatusShmemSize() account for the GSS-related space that
will be allocated by CreateSharedBackendStatus(). This omission
could possibly cause out-of-shared-memory problems with very high
max_connections settings.
Remove arbitrary, pointless restriction that only GSS authentication
can be used on a GSS-encrypted connection.
Improve documentation; notably, document the fact that libpq now
prefers GSS encryption over SSL encryption if both are possible.
Per report from Mikael Gustavsson. Back-patch to v12 where
this code was introduced.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/e5b0b6ed05764324a2f3fe7acfc766d5@smhi.se
15 files changed:
index a0a9ac9eed55164e44b600766b73b3bf27868753..9a5c9318cee42001a202d4e290f2951d43ee6d6c 100644 (file)
the <literal>hostgssenc</literal> record is ignored except for logging
a warning that it cannot match any connections.
</para>
-
- <para>
- Note that the only supported
- <link linkend="auth-methods">authentication methods</link> for use
- with <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption
- are <literal>gss</literal>, <literal>reject</literal>,
- and <literal>trust</literal>.
- </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<productname>GSSAPI</productname> is an industry-standard protocol
for secure authentication defined in
<ulink url="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2743">RFC 2743</ulink>.
-
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname>
- supports <productname>GSSAPI</productname> for use as either an encrypted,
- authenticated layer, or for authentication only.
+ supports <productname>GSSAPI</productname> for authentication,
+ communications encryption, or both.
<productname>GSSAPI</productname> provides automatic authentication
(single sign-on) for systems that support it. The authentication itself is
secure. If <productname>GSSAPI</productname> encryption
- (see <literal>hostgssenc</literal>) or <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption are
+ or <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption is
used, the data sent along the database connection will be encrypted;
otherwise, it will not.
</para>
<para>
When <productname>GSSAPI</productname> uses
- <productname>Kerberos</productname>, it uses a standard principal
- in the format
+ <productname>Kerberos</productname>, it uses a standard service
+ principal (authentication identity) name in the format
<literal><replaceable>servicename</replaceable>/<replaceable>hostname</replaceable>@<replaceable>realm</replaceable></literal>.
- The PostgreSQL server will accept any principal that is included in the keytab used by
- the server, but care needs to be taken to specify the correct principal details when
- making the connection from the client using the <literal>krbsrvname</literal> connection parameter. (See
- also <xref linkend="libpq-paramkeywords"/>.) The installation default can be
- changed from the default <literal>postgres</literal> at build time using
- <literal>./configure --with-krb-srvnam=</literal><replaceable>whatever</replaceable>.
- In most environments,
- this parameter never needs to be changed.
- Some Kerberos implementations might require a different service name,
- such as Microsoft Active Directory which requires the service name
- to be in upper case (<literal>POSTGRES</literal>).
- </para>
- <para>
- <replaceable>hostname</replaceable> is the fully qualified host name of the
- server machine. The service principal's realm is the preferred realm
- of the server machine.
- </para>
-
- <para>
- Client principals can be mapped to different <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>
- database user names with <filename>pg_ident.conf</filename>. For example,
+ The principal name used by a particular installation is not encoded in
+ the <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> server in any way; rather it
+ is specified in the <firstterm>keytab</firstterm> file that the server
+ reads to determine its identity. If multiple principals are listed in
+ the keytab file, the server will accept any one of them.
+ The server's realm name is the preferred realm specified in the Kerberos
+ configuration file(s) accessible to the server.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ When connecting, the client must know the principal name of the server
+ it intends to connect to. The <replaceable>servicename</replaceable>
+ part of the principal is ordinarily <literal>postgres</literal>,
+ but another value can be selected via <application>libpq</application>'s
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-krbsrvname"/> connection parameter.
+ The <replaceable>hostname</replaceable> part is the fully qualified
+ host name that <application>libpq</application> is told to connect to.
+ The realm name is the preferred realm specified in the Kerberos
+ configuration file(s) accessible to the client.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The client will also have a principal name for its own identity
+ (and it must have a valid ticket for this principal). To
+ use <productname>GSSAPI</productname> for authentication, the client
+ principal must be associated with
+ a <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> database user name.
+ The <filename>pg_ident.conf</filename> configuration file can be used
+ to map principals to user names; for example,
<literal>pgusername@realm</literal> could be mapped to just <literal>pgusername</literal>.
Alternatively, you can use the full <literal>username@realm</literal> principal as
the role name in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> without any mapping.
</para>
<para>
- <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> also supports a parameter to strip the realm from
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> also supports mapping
+ client principals to user names by just stripping the realm from
the principal. This method is supported for backwards compatibility and is
strongly discouraged as it is then impossible to distinguish different users
with the same user name but coming from different realms. To enable this,
</para>
<para>
- Make sure that your server keytab file is readable (and preferably
- only readable, not writable) by the <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>
- server account. (See also <xref linkend="postgres-user"/>.) The location
- of the key file is specified by the <xref
+ The location of the server's keytab file is specified by the <xref
linkend="guc-krb-server-keyfile"/> configuration
parameter. The default is
- <filename>/usr/local/pgsql/etc/krb5.keytab</filename> (or whatever
- directory was specified as <varname>sysconfdir</varname> at build time).
+ <filename>FILE:/usr/local/pgsql/etc/krb5.keytab</filename>
+ (where the directory part is whatever was specified
+ as <varname>sysconfdir</varname> at build time).
For security reasons, it is recommended to use a separate keytab
just for the <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> server rather
- than opening up permissions on the system keytab file.
+ than allowing the server to read the system keytab file.
+ Make sure that your server keytab file is readable (and preferably
+ only readable, not writable) by the <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>
+ server account. (See also <xref linkend="postgres-user"/>.)
</para>
+
<para>
- The keytab file is generated by the Kerberos software; see the
- Kerberos documentation for details. The following example is
- for MIT-compatible Kerberos 5 implementations:
+ The keytab file is generated using the Kerberos software; see the
+ Kerberos documentation for details. The following example shows
+ doing this using the <application>kadmin</application> tool of
+ MIT-compatible Kerberos 5 implementations:
<screen>
-<prompt>kadmin% </prompt><userinput>ank -randkey postgres/server.my.domain.org</userinput>
+<prompt>kadmin% </prompt><userinput>addprinc -randkey postgres/server.my.domain.org</userinput>
<prompt>kadmin% </prompt><userinput>ktadd -k krb5.keytab postgres/server.my.domain.org</userinput>
</screen>
</para>
<para>
- When connecting to the database make sure you have a ticket for a
- principal matching the requested database user name. For example, for
- database user name <literal>fred</literal>, principal
- <literal>fred@EXAMPLE.COM</literal> would be able to connect. To also allow
- principal <literal>fred/users.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM</literal>, use a user name
- map, as described in <xref linkend="auth-username-maps"/>.
- </para>
-
- <para>
- The following configuration options are supported for <productname>GSSAPI</productname>:
+ The following authentication options are supported for
+ the <productname>GSSAPI</productname> authentication method:
<variablelist>
<varlistentry>
<term><literal>include_realm</literal></term>
<term><literal>map</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- Allows for mapping between system and database user names. See
+ Allows mapping from client principals to database user names. See
<xref linkend="auth-username-maps"/> for details. For a GSSAPI/Kerberos
principal, such as <literal>username@EXAMPLE.COM</literal> (or, less
commonly, <literal>username/hostbased@EXAMPLE.COM</literal>), the
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ In addition to these settings, which can be different for
+ different <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> entries, there is the
+ server-wide <xref linkend="guc-krb-caseins-users"/> configuration
+ parameter. If that is set to true, client principals are matched to
+ user map entries case-insensitively. <literal>krb_realm</literal>, if
+ set, is also matched case-insensitively.
+ </para>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="sspi-auth">
index 67c5d4c36bd6d83f87deff43139d3b1d2316492d..a5db58d46806cef8f7df21026b278996aa4f9ce4 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
connection.<indexterm><primary>SSL</primary><secondary
sortas="libpq">with libpq</secondary></indexterm>
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ Note that if <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption is possible,
+ that will be used in preference to <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ encryption, regardless of the value of <literal>sslmode</literal>.
+ To force use of <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption in an
+ environment that has working <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym>
+ infrastructure (such as a Kerberos server), also
+ set <literal>gssencmode</literal> to <literal>disable</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
This must match the service name specified in the server
configuration for Kerberos authentication to succeed. (See also
<xref linkend="gssapi-auth"/>.)
+ The default value is normally <literal>postgres</literal>,
+ but that can be changed when
+ building <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> via
+ the <option>--with-krb-srvnam</option> option
+ of <application>configure</application>.
+ In most environments, this parameter never needs to be changed.
+ Some Kerberos implementations might require a different service name,
+ such as Microsoft Active Directory which requires the service name
+ to be in upper case (<literal>POSTGRES</literal>).
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
index 4899bacda7b0bdc027136c0209144d4b72430928..98b42bb2692310f4b0c553363579301908827741 100644 (file)
<acronym>SSL</acronym>-encrypted. To continue after
<literal>N</literal>, send the usual StartupMessage and proceed without
encryption.
+ (Alternatively, it is permissible to issue a GSSENCRequest message
+ after an <literal>N</literal> response to try to
+ use <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption instead
+ of <acronym>SSL</acronym>.)
</para>
<para>
result from the server, until it returns no output. When sending the
results of <function>gss_init_sec_context()</function> to the server,
prepend the length of the message as a four byte integer in network byte
- order. If this is successful, then use <function>gss_wrap()</function> to
- encrypt the usual StartupMessage and all subsequent data, prepending the
- length of the result from <function>gss_wrap()</function> as a four byte
- integer in network byte order to the actual encrypted payload. Note that
- the server will only accept encrypted packets from the client which are less
- than 16kB; <function>gss_wrap_size_limit()</function> should be used by the
- client to determine the size of the unencrypted message which will fit
- within this limit and larger messages should be broken up into multiple
- <function>gss_wrap()</function> calls. Typical segments are 8kB of
- unencrypted data, resulting in encrypted packets of slightly larger than 8kB
- but well within the 16kB maximum. The server can be expected to not send
- encrypted packets of larger than 16kB to the client. To continue after
+ order.
+ To continue after
<literal>N</literal>, send the usual StartupMessage and proceed without
encryption.
+ (Alternatively, it is permissible to issue an SSLRequest message
+ after an <literal>N</literal> response to try to
+ use <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption instead
+ of <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym>.)
</para>
<para>
support to <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>. In this case the
connection must be closed, but the frontend might choose to open a fresh
connection and proceed without requesting <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym>
- encryption. Given the length limits specified above, the ErrorMessage can
- not be confused with a proper response from the server with an appropriate
- length.
+ encryption.
</para>
<para>
opened to send a CancelRequest message.
</para>
+ <para>
+ Once <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption has been successfully
+ established, use <function>gss_wrap()</function> to
+ encrypt the usual StartupMessage and all subsequent data, prepending the
+ length of the result from <function>gss_wrap()</function> as a four byte
+ integer in network byte order to the actual encrypted payload. Note that
+ the server will only accept encrypted packets from the client which are less
+ than 16kB; <function>gss_wrap_size_limit()</function> should be used by the
+ client to determine the size of the unencrypted message which will fit
+ within this limit and larger messages should be broken up into multiple
+ <function>gss_wrap()</function> calls. Typical segments are 8kB of
+ unencrypted data, resulting in encrypted packets of slightly larger than 8kB
+ but well within the 16kB maximum. The server can be expected to not send
+ encrypted packets of larger than 16kB to the client.
+ </para>
+
<para>
While the protocol itself does not provide a way for the server to
force <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption, the administrator can
index 17e938148c5cd84a7f0999b052644d5e4bf04e64..283352d3a4abe379df0c7129661a6a2f28652835 100644 (file)
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> also has native support for
using <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> to encrypt client/server communications for
increased security. Support requires that a <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym>
- implementation (such as MIT krb5) is installed on both client and server
+ implementation (such as MIT Kerberos) is installed on both client and server
systems, and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
</para>
some or all connections.
</para>
+ <para>
+ When using <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> for encryption, it is common to
+ use <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> for authentication as well, since the
+ underlying mechanism will determine both client and server identities
+ (according to the <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> implementation) in any
+ case. But this is not required;
+ another <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> authentication method
+ can be chosen to perform additional verification.
+ </para>
+
<para>
Other than configuration of the negotiation
behavior, <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption requires no setup beyond
index 3d80930968517ff053130539aa9f0d51b5f29419..d4ec965934afc9178f8caf6c1912edac83c6007c 100644 (file)
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
errmsg("connection requires a valid client certificate")));
}
-#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
- if (port->gss->enc && port->hba->auth_method != uaReject &&
- port->hba->auth_method != uaImplicitReject &&
- port->hba->auth_method != uaTrust &&
- port->hba->auth_method != uaGSS)
- {
- ereport(FATAL, (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("GSSAPI encryption can only be used with gss, trust, or reject authentication methods")));
- }
-#endif
-
/*
* Now proceed to do the actual authentication check
*/
case uaGSS:
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+ /* We might or might not have the gss workspace already */
+ if (port->gss == NULL)
+ port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *)
+ MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext,
+ sizeof(pg_gssinfo));
port->gss->auth = true;
+
+ /*
+ * If GSS state was set up while enabling encryption, we can just
+ * check the client's principal. Otherwise, ask for it.
+ */
if (port->gss->enc)
status = pg_GSS_checkauth(port);
else
case uaSSPI:
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
+ if (port->gss == NULL)
+ port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *)
+ MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext,
+ sizeof(pg_gssinfo));
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SSPI, NULL, 0);
status = pg_SSPI_recvauth(port);
#else
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
{
gss_delete_sec_context(&lmin_s, &port->gss->ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- pg_GSS_error(ERROR,
- _("accepting GSS security context failed"),
+ pg_GSS_error(_("accepting GSS security context failed"),
maj_stat, min_stat);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
*/
maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, port->gss->name, &gbuf, NULL);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
- pg_GSS_error(ERROR,
- _("retrieving GSS user name failed"),
+ {
+ pg_GSS_error(_("retrieving GSS user name failed"),
maj_stat, min_stat);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
/*
* Copy the original name of the authenticated principal into our backend
index ef9b8ebd6d42ecc2df38bbda7db3c256b0dee8e9..be5d051c2027ad58e5cf8d5f49c1cff28872ae9b 100644 (file)
#include "libpq/be-gssapi-common.h"
/*
- * Helper function for getting all strings of a GSSAPI error (of specified
- * stat). Call once for GSS_CODE and once for MECH_CODE.
+ * Fetch all errors of a specific type and append to "s" (buffer of size len).
+ * If we obtain more than one string, separate them with spaces.
+ * Call once for GSS_CODE and once for MECH_CODE.
*/
static void
pg_GSS_error_int(char *s, size_t len, OM_uint32 stat, int type)
OM_uint32 lmin_s,
msg_ctx = 0;
- gmsg.value = NULL;
- gmsg.length = 0;
+ s[0] = '\0'; /* just in case gss_display_status fails */
do
{
- gss_display_status(&lmin_s, stat, type,
- GSS_C_NO_OID, &msg_ctx, &gmsg);
- strlcpy(s + i, gmsg.value, len - i);
+ if (gss_display_status(&lmin_s, stat, type, GSS_C_NO_OID,
+ &msg_ctx, &gmsg) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ break;
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ if (i < len)
+ s[i] = ' ';
+ i++;
+ }
+ if (i < len)
+ strlcpy(s + i, gmsg.value, len - i);
i += gmsg.length;
gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gmsg);
}
- while (msg_ctx && i < len);
+ while (msg_ctx);
- if (msg_ctx || i == len)
- ereport(WARNING,
- (errmsg_internal("incomplete GSS error report")));
+ if (i >= len)
+ {
+ elog(COMMERROR, "incomplete GSS error report");
+ s[len - 1] = '\0'; /* ensure string is nul-terminated */
+ }
}
/*
- * Fetch and report all error messages from GSSAPI. To avoid allocation,
- * total error size is capped (at 128 bytes for each of major and minor). No
- * known mechanisms will produce error messages beyond this cap.
+ * Report the GSSAPI error described by maj_stat/min_stat.
+ *
+ * errmsg should be an already-translated primary error message.
+ * The GSSAPI info is appended as errdetail.
+ *
+ * The error is always reported with elevel COMMERROR; we daren't try to
+ * send it to the client, as that'd likely lead to infinite recursion
+ * when elog.c tries to write to the client.
+ *
+ * To avoid memory allocation, total error size is capped (at 128 bytes for
+ * each of major and minor). No known mechanisms will produce error messages
+ * beyond this cap.
*/
void
-pg_GSS_error(int severity, const char *errmsg,
+pg_GSS_error(const char *errmsg,
OM_uint32 maj_stat, OM_uint32 min_stat)
{
char msg_major[128],
* errmsg_internal, since translation of the first part must be done
* before calling this function anyway.
*/
- ereport(severity,
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
(errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
errdetail_internal("%s: %s", msg_major, msg_minor)));
}
index 5a73302b7b9ea65dc8a3d57d232d473ef54ce2c1..1747fccb143e217ded37c15d9a3df6d0568457e6 100644 (file)
#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "pgstat.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
/*
* transport negotiation is complete).
*
* On success, returns the number of data bytes consumed (possibly less than
- * len). On failure, returns -1 with errno set appropriately. (For fatal
- * errors, we may just elog and exit, if errno wouldn't be sufficient to
- * describe the error.) For retryable errors, caller should call again
- * (passing the same data) once the socket is ready.
+ * len). On failure, returns -1 with errno set appropriately. For retryable
+ * errors, caller should call again (passing the same data) once the socket
+ * is ready.
+ *
+ * Dealing with fatal errors here is a bit tricky: we can't invoke elog(FATAL)
+ * since it would try to write to the client, probably resulting in infinite
+ * recursion. Instead, use elog(COMMERROR) to log extra info about the
+ * failure if necessary, and then return an errno indicating connection loss.
*/
ssize_t
be_gssapi_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
* again, so if it offers a len less than that, something is wrong.
*/
if (len < PqGSSSendConsumed)
- elog(FATAL, "GSSAPI caller failed to retransmit all data needing to be retried");
-
+ {
+ elog(COMMERROR, "GSSAPI caller failed to retransmit all data needing to be retried");
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
/* Discount whatever source data we already encrypted. */
bytes_to_encrypt = len - PqGSSSendConsumed;
bytes_encrypted = PqGSSSendConsumed;
major = gss_wrap(&minor, gctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
&input, &conf_state, &output);
if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
- pg_GSS_error(FATAL, gettext_noop("GSSAPI wrap error"), major, minor);
-
+ {
+ pg_GSS_error(_("GSSAPI wrap error"), major, minor);
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
if (conf_state == 0)
- ereport(FATAL,
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
(errmsg("outgoing GSSAPI message would not use confidentiality")));
-
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
if (output.length > PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
- ereport(FATAL,
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
(errmsg("server tried to send oversize GSSAPI packet (%zu > %zu)",
(size_t) output.length,
PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
bytes_encrypted += input.length;
bytes_to_encrypt -= input.length;
* transport negotiation is complete).
*
* Returns the number of data bytes read, or on failure, returns -1
- * with errno set appropriately. (For fatal errors, we may just elog and
- * exit, if errno wouldn't be sufficient to describe the error.) For
- * retryable errors, caller should call again once the socket is ready.
+ * with errno set appropriately. For retryable errors, caller should call
+ * again once the socket is ready.
+ *
+ * We treat fatal errors the same as in be_gssapi_write(), even though the
+ * argument about infinite recursion doesn't apply here.
*/
ssize_t
be_gssapi_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
input.length = pg_ntoh32(*(uint32 *) PqGSSRecvBuffer);
if (input.length > PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
- ereport(FATAL,
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
(errmsg("oversize GSSAPI packet sent by the client (%zu > %zu)",
(size_t) input.length,
PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
/*
* Read as much of the packet as we are able to on this call into
major = gss_unwrap(&minor, gctx, &input, &output, &conf_state, NULL);
if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
- pg_GSS_error(FATAL, gettext_noop("GSSAPI unwrap error"),
- major, minor);
-
+ {
+ pg_GSS_error(_("GSSAPI unwrap error"), major, minor);
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
if (conf_state == 0)
- ereport(FATAL,
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
(errmsg("incoming GSSAPI message did not use confidentiality")));
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
memcpy(PqGSSResultBuffer, output.value, output.length);
PqGSSResultLength = output.length;
OM_uint32 major,
minor;
+ /*
+ * Allocate subsidiary Port data for GSSAPI operations.
+ */
+ port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *)
+ MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, sizeof(pg_gssinfo));
+
/*
* Allocate buffers and initialize state variables. By malloc'ing the
* buffers at this point, we avoid wasting static data space in processes
* Verify on our side that the client doesn't do something funny.
*/
if (input.length > PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE)
- ereport(FATAL,
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
(errmsg("oversize GSSAPI packet sent by the client (%zu > %d)",
(size_t) input.length,
PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE)));
+ return -1;
+ }
/*
* Get the rest of the packet so we can pass it to GSSAPI to accept
NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
{
- pg_GSS_error(ERROR, gettext_noop("could not accept GSSAPI security context"),
+ pg_GSS_error(_("could not accept GSSAPI security context"),
major, minor);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
return -1;
uint32 netlen = pg_hton32(output.length);
if (output.length > PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
- ereport(FATAL,
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
(errmsg("server tried to send oversize GSSAPI packet (%zu > %zu)",
(size_t) output.length,
PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
+ return -1;
+ }
memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer, (char *) &netlen, sizeof(uint32));
PqGSSSendLength += sizeof(uint32);
&PqGSSMaxPktSize);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- pg_GSS_error(FATAL, gettext_noop("GSSAPI size check error"),
- major, minor);
+ {
+ pg_GSS_error(_("GSSAPI size check error"), major, minor);
+ return -1;
+ }
port->gss->enc = true;
}
/*
- * Return the GSSAPI principal used for authentication on this connection.
+ * Return the GSSAPI principal used for authentication on this connection
+ * (NULL if we did not perform GSSAPI authentication).
*/
const char *
be_gssapi_get_princ(Port *port)
{
- if (!port || !port->gss->auth)
+ if (!port || !port->gss)
return NULL;
return port->gss->princ;
index 2ae507a90255a4f3f61faed8eb6d7f7b5bfdaf18..59bc02e79c68c8ce48e800ce5f97aaa2b1ec3d27 100644 (file)
else
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
- if (port->gss->enc)
+ if (port->gss && port->gss->enc)
{
n = be_gssapi_read(port, ptr, len);
waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
else
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
- if (port->gss->enc)
+ if (port->gss && port->gss->enc)
{
n = be_gssapi_write(port, ptr, len);
waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
index 0cc43977691dcf98174f48ba08a45cd3be2ef2ae..99319b273aa9a50ac9b160161c2a78665b29b56b 100644 (file)
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
*err_msg = "gssapi authentication is not supported on local sockets";
return NULL;
}
- if (parsedline->conntype == ctHostGSS &&
- parsedline->auth_method != uaGSS &&
- parsedline->auth_method != uaReject &&
- parsedline->auth_method != uaTrust)
- {
- ereport(elevel,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
- errmsg("GSSAPI encryption only supports gss, trust, or reject authentication"),
- errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
- line_num, HbaFileName)));
- *err_msg = "GSSAPI encryption only supports gss, trust, or reject authentication";
- return NULL;
- }
if (parsedline->conntype != ctLocal &&
parsedline->auth_method == uaPeer)
/* Check GSSAPI state */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
- if (port->gss->enc && hba->conntype == ctHostNoGSS)
+ if (port->gss && port->gss->enc &&
+ hba->conntype == ctHostNoGSS)
continue;
- else if (!port->gss->enc && hba->conntype == ctHostGSS)
+ else if (!(port->gss && port->gss->enc) &&
+ hba->conntype == ctHostGSS)
continue;
#else
if (hba->conntype == ctHostGSS)
index 0b511008fc837ff7ae227d56ca189cd4bb767e5e..3ea7c6167eb217304df2597bfce321f09d2fa489 100644 (file)
/* Nothing to do in a standalone backend, where MyProcPort is NULL. */
if (MyProcPort != NULL)
{
-#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI)
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
- OM_uint32 min_s;
-
/*
* Shutdown GSSAPI layer. This section does nothing when interrupting
* BackendInitialize(), because pg_GSS_recvauth() makes first use of
* "ctx" and "cred".
+ *
+ * Note that we don't bother to free MyProcPort->gss, since we're
+ * about to exit anyway.
*/
- if (MyProcPort->gss->ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
- gss_delete_sec_context(&min_s, &MyProcPort->gss->ctx, NULL);
+ if (MyProcPort->gss)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 min_s;
- if (MyProcPort->gss->cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
- gss_release_cred(&min_s, &MyProcPort->gss->cred);
-#endif /* ENABLE_GSS */
+ if (MyProcPort->gss->ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&min_s, &MyProcPort->gss->ctx, NULL);
- /*
- * GSS and SSPI share the port->gss struct. Since nowhere else does a
- * postmaster child free this, doing so is safe when interrupting
- * BackendInitialize().
- */
- free(MyProcPort->gss);
-#endif /* ENABLE_GSS || ENABLE_SSPI */
+ if (MyProcPort->gss->cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ gss_release_cred(&min_s, &MyProcPort->gss->cred);
+ }
+#endif /* ENABLE_GSS */
/*
* Cleanly shut down SSL layer. Nowhere else does a postmaster child
index d87d9d06ee250346c790755844dae5b0f7665cfe..123369f4faff4f9195b8cb9b987e6743dd65d0fe 100644 (file)
/* BackendSslStatusBuffer: */
size = add_size(size,
mul_size(sizeof(PgBackendSSLStatus), NumBackendStatSlots));
+#endif
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+ /* BackendGssStatusBuffer: */
+ size = add_size(size,
+ mul_size(sizeof(PgBackendGSSStatus), NumBackendStatSlots));
#endif
return size;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
if (MyProcPort && MyProcPort->gss != NULL)
{
+ const char *princ = be_gssapi_get_princ(MyProcPort);
+
lbeentry.st_gss = true;
lgssstatus.gss_auth = be_gssapi_get_auth(MyProcPort);
lgssstatus.gss_enc = be_gssapi_get_enc(MyProcPort);
-
- if (lgssstatus.gss_auth)
- strlcpy(lgssstatus.gss_princ, be_gssapi_get_princ(MyProcPort), NAMEDATALEN);
+ if (princ)
+ strlcpy(lgssstatus.gss_princ, princ, NAMEDATALEN);
}
else
{
index fff4227e0b609fc04a8ade4cef933222239921a1..b3ccd18cda6e519cf2ede4e2c8c51b87c0d524b0 100644 (file)
else if (proto == NEGOTIATE_GSS_CODE && !gss_done)
{
char GSSok = 'N';
+
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
/* No GSSAPI encryption when on Unix socket */
if (!IS_AF_UNIX(port->laddr.addr.ss_family))
return NULL;
}
- /*
- * Allocate GSSAPI specific state struct
- */
-#ifndef EXEC_BACKEND
-#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI)
- port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *) calloc(1, sizeof(pg_gssinfo));
- if (!port->gss)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("out of memory")));
- ExitPostmaster(1);
- }
-#endif
-#endif
-
return port;
}
/*
* ConnFree -- free a local connection data structure
+ *
+ * Caller has already closed the socket if any, so there's not much
+ * to do here.
*/
static void
ConnFree(Port *conn)
{
-#ifdef USE_SSL
- secure_close(conn);
-#endif
- if (conn->gss)
- free(conn->gss);
free(conn);
}
/* Setup as postmaster child */
InitPostmasterChild();
- /*
- * Set up memory area for GSS information. Mirrors the code in ConnCreate
- * for the non-exec case.
- */
-#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI)
- port.gss = (pg_gssinfo *) calloc(1, sizeof(pg_gssinfo));
- if (!port.gss)
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("out of memory")));
-#endif
-
/*
* If appropriate, physically re-attach to shared memory segment. We want
* to do this before going any further to ensure that we can attach at the
index 82d451569d620a9442274066060dfc36da12450a..9723e457ce9203252a7947b4bdd86357b9d52b3a 100644 (file)
be_tls_get_compression(port) ? _("on") : _("off"));
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
- if (be_gssapi_get_princ(port))
- appendStringInfo(&logmsg, _(" GSS (authenticated=%s, encrypted=%s, principal=%s)"),
- be_gssapi_get_auth(port) ? _("yes") : _("no"),
- be_gssapi_get_enc(port) ? _("yes") : _("no"),
- be_gssapi_get_princ(port));
+ if (port->gss)
+ {
+ const char *princ = be_gssapi_get_princ(port);
+
+ if (princ)
+ appendStringInfo(&logmsg,
+ _(" GSS (authenticated=%s, encrypted=%s, principal=%s)"),
+ be_gssapi_get_auth(port) ? _("yes") : _("no"),
+ be_gssapi_get_enc(port) ? _("yes") : _("no"),
+ princ);
+ else
+ appendStringInfo(&logmsg,
+ _(" GSS (authenticated=%s, encrypted=%s)"),
+ be_gssapi_get_auth(port) ? _("yes") : _("no"),
+ be_gssapi_get_enc(port) ? _("yes") : _("no"));
+ }
#endif
ereport(LOG, errmsg_internal("%s", logmsg.data));
index edf89675cf7710e8fde0cb289f9ff3dba2bc72d0..e1c23ac54593727fa4bf2550ce5591918f9743c4 100644 (file)
#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#endif
-void pg_GSS_error(int severity, const char *errmsg,
+extern void pg_GSS_error(const char *errmsg,
OM_uint32 maj_stat, OM_uint32 min_stat);
#endif /* BE_GSSAPI_COMMON_H */
index 0a23281ad59b511d6cbdddd138e8513d58c2d8e4..fa778e11921bc1f73c54099461eae28d22e42578 100644 (file)
#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI)
/*
- * If GSSAPI is supported, store GSSAPI information. Otherwise, store a
- * NULL pointer to make sure offsets in the struct remain the same.
+ * If GSSAPI is supported and used on this connection, store GSSAPI
+ * information. Even when GSSAPI is not compiled in, store a NULL pointer
+ * to keep struct offsets the same (for extension ABI compatibility).
*/
pg_gssinfo *gss;
#else