We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game in which players 1 and 2 place down finite state automata with states respectively and the payoff is the ...

We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game in which players 1 and 2 place down finite state automata with states respectively and the payoff is the ...

Apr 28, 2008 · Abstract. Let G = hI,J,gi be a two-person zero-sum game. We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game G(k, m) in which player 1 and 2.

Let G= be a two-person zero-sum game. We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game G(k,m) in which players 1 and 2 place down finite state automata with ...

Abraham Neyman and Spencer, Joel . 2010. “Complexity And Effective Prediction”. Games And Economic Behavior, Pp. 165-168.

We study the complexity of a coordinated play when allowing for a few mismatches. We prove the existence of a constant C such that if (m log m /n) >= C, almost ...

We em- pirically document the virtue of complexity in U.S. equity market return prediction. Our findings establish the rationale for modeling expected returns ...

We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game G(k,m) in which player 1 and 2 place down finite state automata with k,m states respectively.

We describe the spatial pattern predictor (SPP), a cost-effective hardware mechanism that accurately predicts reference patterns within a spatial group (i.e., a ...

Abraham Neyman & Joel Spencer, 2006. "Complexity and Effective Prediction," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000527, UCLA Department of Economics.