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In this paper, we propose Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions (FAST), in which there is no trusted auctioneer and where rational adversaries are always incentivized to complete protocol execution through a secret collateral deposit.
Jun 18, 2022
Mar 3, 2021 · In this work, we propose efficient protocols for both first and second-price sealed-bid auctions with fairness against rational adversaries, ...
In this work, we propose efficient protocols for both first and second price sealed bid auctions with fairness against rational adversaries, leveraging secret ...
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Jun 20, 2022 · In this work, we propose efficient protocols for both first and second-price sealed-bid auctions with fairness against rational adversaries, ...
Original language, English. Title of host publication, Applied Cryptography and Network Security : 20th International Conference, ACNS 2022, Rome, Italy, ...
In our approach, the bidders jointly compute the winner of the auction while preserving the privacy of losing bids and ensuring that cheaters are financially ...
[13] proposed FAST (Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions) with the same motivation as ours. That is, the deposit reveals information about the bid, and ...
[10] proposed FAST (Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions) with the same motivation as ours. That is, the deposit reveals information about the bid, and ...
[10] proposed FAST (Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions) with the same motivation as ours. That is, the deposit reveals information about the bid, and ...