In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m. Moreover, our proof yields similar optimal bounds for two other optimization goals: the sum of completion times and the lp norm of the schedule.

May 1, 2012 · 2007. A lower bound of 1+phi for truthful scheduling mechanisms. Proc. 32nd Internat. Sympos. Math. Foundations Comput. Sci. (MFCS)], while the best upper bound remains unchanged. In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an ...

Jan 16, 2024 · Exact algorithms guarantee optimality, but are often very time consuming. This dissertation focuses on designing efficient exact algorithms that can solve larger problem instances with faster computational time.

We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms on m unrelated machines, to minimize some optimiza- tion goal. Nisan and Ronen (1999) consider the specific goal of makespan minimization, and show a lower bound of 2, and an upper bound of m. This large gap inspired many attempts that yielded positive ...

Abstract. We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms to minimize the makespan on m unrelated machines. In their seminal paper, Nisan and Ronen [14] showed a lower bound of 2, and an upper bound of m, thus leaving a large gap. They conjectured that their upper bound is tight, ...

In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m. This is the first concrete evidence to the correctness of the Nisan-Ronen ...

In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m. Moreover, ...

Jul 6, 2009 · In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m. This is the first concrete evidence to the correctness of the Nisan-Ronen ...

In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m. Moreover, ...

An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanism ; Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Business School ; Subject: Scheduling-Verfahren | Scheduling problem | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming ; Extent: Online-Ressource (12 S., 217,82 KB) ; Language: English.