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Mar 22, 2022 · Abstract:First-price auctions have many desirable properties, including uniquely possessing some, like credibility. However, first-price ...
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Apr 25, 2022 · We provide an almost complete picture of the conditions under which they are “truthful in the large,” and exhibit some surprising boundaries.
This is the first rigorous study of the extent to which large multi-unit first price auctions are susceptible to manipulation, and provides an almost ...
The tâtonnement process is inherently a price taking process. An auctioneer calls out a price and traders respond with a quantity signal. This tâtonnement ( ...
When agents (bidders) have multi-demand preferences, uniform price auctions are generally not immune to agents' strategic manipulation, and they may achieve an ...
A first-price auction model reduces complexity in the auction process and reduces the revenue gap for publishers. There are multiple advantages to first-price ...
Missing: Manipulability | Show results with:Manipulability
Abstract. Asymmetric first price auctions are notoriously intractable. We provide a new set of tools for thinking about such auctions, One key.
Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new approach to analyzing asymmet- ric first price auctions. Specifically, we examine winning probabilities,.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) regret theory in auctions. We manipulate the saliency of regret by varying the feedback information provided at the end of the ...