Multi-leader–common-follower games arise when modelling two or more competitive firms, the leaders, that commit to their decisions prior to another group of ...
Mar 23, 2007 · Multi-leader-common-follower games arise when modeling two or more competitive firms, the leaders, that commit to their decisions prior to ...
Apr 22, 2005 · Multi-leader-follower games arise when modeling competition between two or more dominant firms and lead in a natural way to equilibrium ...
Nov 20, 2009 · Multi-leader–common-follower games arise when modelling two or more competitive firms, the leaders, that commit to their decisions prior to another group of ...
A characterization of the solution sets forMulti-leader–common-follower games arise when modelling two or more competitive firms that commit to their ...
Aug 1, 2010 · Multi-leader-common-follower games arise when modelling two or more competitive firms, the leaders, that commit to their decisions prior to ...
Oct 1, 2014 · Greetings to all. I am currently working in multi-leader-follower games and trying to model them in GAMS using EMP. In fact, in order to ...
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Abstract. We consider a two-stage game with k leaders having pessimistic attitude and one follower common to all leaders. Such a game, called CF game, ...
We then give some applications as well as solution methods of multi-leader-follower games. Keywords: Game theory, Nash equilibrium, multi-leader-follower game, ...