Mar 18, 2020 · We demonstrate that a data seller's optimal revenue increases as firms can pay to prevent allocations to others.

First, we establish that in the presence of externalities, the maximum revenue a data seller can collect increases, even if the overall allocation decreases.

Mar 1, 2023 · We first reduce the combinatorial problem of allocating and pricing multiple datasets to the auction of a single digital good by modeling utility for data.

Oct 13, 2024 · Given the data valuation and externality model we introduce, we design a data auction for the setting of a monopolistic data seller and n ...

Towards Data Auctions with Externalities · Anish Agarwal, M. Dahleh, +1 author. Maryann Rui · Published in Social Science Research… 18 March 2020 · Economics, ...

Oct 23, 2024 · Crucially, this is what enables us to model the negative externalities experienced by a firm resulting from other firms' allocations. We obtain ...

Mar 18, 2020 · Crucially, this is what enables us to model the negative externalities experienced by a firm resulting from other firms' allocations. We obtain ...

This paper asks how to design a revenue maximizing auction in the presence of post-auction market competition and asymmetric information. In this situation ...

Mar 24, 2020 · Anish Agarwal, Munther A. Dahleh, Thibaut Horel, Maryann Rui: Towards Data Auctions with Externalities. CoRR abs/2003.08345 (2020).

In this work, we capture the problem of allocating and pricing multiple data sets within the framework of an auction of a single digital, or freely replicable, ...