Assessing the Fairness of AI Systems: AI Practitioners' Processes, Challenges, and Needs for Support

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Various tools and practices have been developed to support practitioners in identifying, assessing, and mitigating fairness-related harms caused by AI systems. However, prior research has highlighted gaps between the intended design of these tools and practices and their use within particular contexts, including gaps caused by the role that organizational factors play in shaping fairness work. In this paper, we investigate these gaps for one such practice: disaggregated evaluations of AI systems, intended to uncover performance disparities between demographic groups. By conducting semi-structured interviews and structured workshops with thirty-three AI practitioners from ten teams at three technology companies, we identify practitioners' processes, challenges, and needs for support when designing disaggregated evaluations. We find that practitioners face challenges when choosing performance metrics, identifying the most relevant direct stakeholders and demographic groups on which to focus, and collecting datasets with which to conduct disaggregated evaluations. More generally, we identify impacts on fairness work stemming from a lack of engagement with direct stakeholders or domain experts, business imperatives that prioritize customers over marginalized groups, and the drive to deploy AI systems at scale.

CCS Concepts: • **Human-centered computing** → **Empirical studies in collaborative and social computing**; **Collaborative and social computing design and evaluation methods**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Artificial intelligence**.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: AI; machine learning; fairness; software development practices

1 INTRODUCTION

Artificial intelligence (AI) is now ubiquitous in both mundane and high-stakes domains, including education, healthcare, and finance, yet it is increasingly clear that AI systems can perform differently for different groups of people, typically performing worse for those groups that are already

marginalized within society [e.g., 18, 38, 55]. Too often, such performance disparities are uncovered only after AI systems have been deployed and even after people have already experienced fairness-related harms [32].

When the performance of an AI system is assessed in aggregate, poor performance for particular groups of people can be obscured. Disaggregated evaluations are intended to uncover such performance disparities by assessing performance separately for different demographic groups.[1] Disaggregated evaluations have been the foundation of much of the literature on assessing the fairness of AI systems [e.g., 18, 38, 54, 55], including work such as the Gender Shades project [18], which found differences in the performance of three commercially available gender classifiers for groups based on gender and skin tone, and related work from the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology on differences in the performance of face-based AI systems for groups based on sex, age, race, and other factors [54]. Disaggregated evaluations have also been used to uncover race-based performance disparities exhibited by healthcare systems [55] and commercially available speech-to-text systems [38].

To support practitioners in assessing the fairness of AI systems, Barocas et al. articulated a set of choices, considerations, and tradeoffs involved in designing disaggregated evaluations [7], including why, when, by whom, and how such evaluations should be designed and conducted, modeled after similar approaches in other industries such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's clinical trials. However, prior research suggests that practitioners may have difficulty adapting fairness tools and practices for use in their contexts [32]. Moreover, tools and practices that do not align with practitioners' workflows and organizational incentives may not be used as intended or even used at all [40, 44, 63, 65]. Although researchers have studied how practitioners use fairness toolkits [e.g., 40, 65], disaggregated evaluations have not yet been studied within the organizational contexts of practitioners working to assess the fairness of the AI systems that they are developing. As a result, it is not clear how their situated work practices influence disaggregated evaluations. To address this, we ask three research questions:

RQ1: What are practitioners' existing processes and challenges when designing disaggregated evaluations of their AI systems?

RQ2: What organizational support do practitioners need when designing disaggregated evaluations, and how do they communicate those needs to their leadership?

RQ3: How are practitioners' processes, challenges, and needs for support impacted by their organizational contexts?

To investigate these research questions, we conducted semi-structured interviews and structured workshops intended to walk participants through a process for designing disaggregated evaluations that we adapted from Barocas et al. [7]. Thirty-three practitioners took part in our study, from ten teams responsible for developing AI products and services (e.g., text prediction systems, chatbot systems, text summarization systems, fraud detection systems) at three technology companies, in a variety of roles (e.g., program or product managers, data scientists, user experience designers). We find that practitioners face challenges when designing disaggregated evaluations, including challenges when choosing performance metrics, identifying the most relevant direct stakeholders[2] and demographic groups on which to focus, and collecting datasets with which to conduct disaggregated evaluations. We also highlight how priorities for assessing the fairness of AI systems may compound existing inequities, despite practitioners' best intentions, and we identify

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[1]We note that although disaggregation is most often done based on demographic groups such as race, gender, and socioeconomic status, it is possible to disaggregate performance by any set of groups.

[2]Direct stakeholders are the people that use or operate an AI system, as well as anyone that could be directly affected by someone else's use of the system, by choice or not. In some cases, customers are direct stakeholders, while in other cases they are not.

tensions in practitioners' desires for their organizations to provide guidance about and resources for designing and conducting disaggregated evaluations.

This paper contributes to the growing literature on practitioners' needs when operationalizing fairness in the context of AI system development [e.g., 32] and to specific conversations within CSCW and adjacent communities around anticipating potential harms caused by sociotechnical systems [e.g., 14, 17, 73], including the role that organizational factors play in shaping fairness work [e.g., 44, 46, 47, 63]. We conclude by discussing some implications of our findings, including the impacts of business imperatives (such as those that prioritize customers over marginalized groups) on disaggregated evaluations. Finally, we discuss how the scale at which AI systems are deployed may impact disaggregated evaluations due to a lack of situated knowledge of what marginalization means in different geographic contexts.

2 RELATED WORK

2.1 Assessing the fairness of AI systems

Disaggregated evaluations are often designed and conducted by third parties that are external to the teams responsible for developing the AI systems to be evaluated.[3] Although there are good reasons for third parties to design and conduct disaggregated evaluations, including increased credibility (as there may be fewer reasons to believe that decisions were made so as to cast the AI systems in question in a more favorable light), there are also drawbacks to relying solely on this approach [7]. For example, third parties may not have access to detailed knowledge about AI systems' inner workings, perhaps due to trade secrecy laws [37], and may therefore overlook crucial components or features that might cause fairness-related harms [39]. In addition, unless third parties are given pre-deployment access, they can only conduct disaggregated evaluations of AI systems that have already been deployed and potentially even caused fairness-related harms [62]—or what Morley et al. referred to as a gap between diagnostic and prescriptive approaches [50].

To address this, Raji et al. proposed the SMACTR framework for internal auditing to close the "AI accountability gap" [62], with prompts and artifacts targeted at different stages of the AI development lifecycle. This framework is designed to promote internal auditing practices that might align evaluations of AI systems with organizations' principles and values. However, it is intended to be used by auditors that are internal to the organizations responsible for developing the AI systems in question, but external to the teams tasked with system development. This raises the question of how practitioners can use disaggregated evaluations to uncover performance disparities before system deployment, particularly given that incentives to ship AI products and services quickly may be at odds with the slow and careful work that is needed to design and conduct such evaluations [44, 51].

2.2 Anticipatory ethics in technology development

Practices that are intended to uncover potential fairness-related harms during the AI development lifecycle fit within a larger tradition of research from the HCI, STS, and design communities on anticipating potential harms, broadly construed, caused by sociotechnical systems.

This work has articulated how future-oriented discourses and practices may act as "anticipation work" [e.g., 19, 75], or the "complex behaviors and practices that define, enact, and maintain vision" to "define, orient, and accommodate to expectations of the future" [75]. Steinhardt and Jackson traced how individual and collective actors in oceanographic research do the mundane work of wrangling rules, procedures, protocols, and standards to anticipate potential downstream impacts

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[3]When disaggregated evaluations are designed and conducted by third parties, they are often referred to as audits, but following Barocas et al. [7], we avoid the use of this term.

of their research, across multiple temporal and geographic scales [75]. Although their work was not focused on AI systems or even technology, they discuss how anticipation work makes normative claims about the kinds of futures that those actors intend to bring about and, as such, is value-laden. Similarly, assessing the fairness of AI systems during the development lifecycle requires practitioners to perform anticipation work by considering potential harms to different groups of people.

Others have focused more explicitly on anticipatory ethics in technology development [e.g., 17, 24, 36, 72, 73]. Brey outlined an approach called anticipatory technology ethics, pointing out the uncertainty in identifying potential consequences of emerging technologies during research and development, and arguing for the importance of understanding use cases and deployment contexts for future applications in order to identify potential harms [17]. Building off of this, Shilton conducted ethnographic work to understand how technology developers put anticipatory technology ethics into practice, highlighting the role of "values levers" in prying open (i.e., prompting) conversations about particular ethical tensions in the development lifecycle.

In the AI community, the NeurIPS conference has required authors to identify potential negative impacts of their research contributions [61]. This practice echoes recent calls in the HCI community to remove the "rose-tinted glasses" of researchers' optimistic visions for their research in order to identify potential negative impacts [30]. Within AI, Nanayakkara et al. offered a typology of uncertainty in anticipatory ethics work [53] and Boyarskaya et al. conducted a survey of NeurIPS papers to understand AI researchers' "failures of imagination" in envisioning potential harms caused by their work [14]. However, these approaches to anticipatory ethics are often targeted at researchers (who may view their work as more theoretical or conceptual than applied), rather than at practitioners responsible for developing AI systems that will be deployed. Moreover, such approaches often frame the challenge as one for individuals, without grappling with the collaborative nature of work practices, embedded within organizational contexts.

2.3 Fairness work in organizational contexts

AI practitioners, like other social actors, are embedded within organizational contexts that shape the nature of their work practices, and that can contribute to gaps between the intended design of fairness tools and practices and their use [cf. 1]. There is a long tradition of research in the HCI and STS communities focusing on workplace studies that situate technology work practices within their organizational contexts [e.g., 68, 76]. In recent years, considerable research in CSCW has taken a situated approach to understanding how the work practices of data scientists [52, 57], AI developers [60], and software developers are shaped by the organizational contexts within which they are embedded [84–88]. For example, Passi and Sengers described collaborative, interdisciplinary teams of practitioners that "mak[e] data science systems work" [58], identifying organizational factors that empower business actors over other team members and business imperatives that prioritize particular normative goals over other goals.

In the context of fairness, several recent papers have focused on how organizational factors, including organizational cultures and incentives, can impact practitioners' efforts to conduct fairness work [e.g., 32, 33, 44, 46, 47, 56, 63]. For example, Madaio et al. highlighted how business imperatives to ship products and services on rapid timelines were not aligned with the timelines needed for fairness work, identifying perceived social costs and risks to promotion for practitioners that choose to raise fairness-related concerns [44]. Rakova et al. found similar misaligned incentives for fairness work [63], identifying emerging trends for practices such as proactive assessment and mitigation of fairness-related harms (similar to the SMACTR framework proposed by Raji et al. [62] and the fairness checklist proposed by Madaio et al. [44]).

Organizational factors impact every aspect of fairness work, from determining what fairness might mean for a particular AI system [56] to dataset annotation, where dynamics between annotators and other actors can impact annotators' labeling decisions [47], and beyond [e.g., 44, 63]. It is therefore difficult to, as some have claimed, "disentangle normative questions of product design... from empirical questions of system implementation" [5], given the ways in which practitioners' work practices are shaped by the organizational contexts within which they are embedded [e.g., 44, 47, 63].

3 METHODS

3.1 Study design

In order to investigate our research questions, we developed a two-phase study protocol for working with teams of AI practitioners over the course of three sessions (the second phase was divided into two sessions due to time constraints).[4] The study was approved by our institution's IRB. Participation was voluntary and all participants were compensated for their participation. Phase one consisted of a 30–60-minute semi-structured interview with a program or product manager (PM) on each team that we recruited. We conducted these interviews to understand teams' development practices for their AI systems and their current fairness work, if any. Phase two consisted of two 90-minute structured workshop sessions with multiple members of each PM's team. These workshop sessions were intended to help teams design disaggregated evaluations of their AI systems. The time between each team's two workshop sessions ranged from two to six weeks, depending on participants' schedules. At the end of the first workshop session, we encouraged participants to continue the design process (i.e., to choose performance metrics, as well as to identify the most relevant direct stakeholders and demographic groups on which to focus) on their own time. At the start of the second workshop session, we asked participants whether they had held any additional meetings to discuss the topics covered in the first workshop session. Although some teams described other ongoing fairness work, none had discussed the topics covered in the first workshop session.

3.1.1 Participants. We recruited participants working on AI products and services via a combination of purposive and snowball sampling. We used both direct emails and posts on message boards related to the fairness of AI systems. We asked each participant to send our recruitment email to other contacts and, in particular, to other members of their team in roles different to theirs so that multiple team members could participate in the workshop sessions together. We sought to recruit participants working on a variety of AI systems, though in practice many of our participants were members of teams developing language technologies, as discussed in section 5.3.

Thirty-three practitioners took part in our study, from ten teams at three technology companies of varying sizes, although only seven of the ten teams completed both phases. Participants had a variety of roles beyond PM, including technical roles (such as data scientist, applied scientist, and software developer), and design roles (such as user experience (UX) designer). Participating teams were responsible for developing AI products and services related to text suggestion, chatbots, text summarization, fraud detection, and more. Table 1 contains more details about participants and their teams. Specific details about their companies and their products and services have been abstracted to preserve anonymity, which was a condition of participation in the study.

3.1.2 Semi-structured interviews. As described above, phase one of our study consisted of a 30–60-minute semi-structured interview with a PM on each team that we recruited. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we conducted all interviews remotely on a video conferencing platform. Our interview protocol was informed by prior research on AI practitioners' fairness work [e.g., 32, 44] and was

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[4]We have included the protocol for the interviews and workshop sessions as supplementary material.

Team	Product or service	Phases	Participants	Roles
1	Resume skill identification	1, 2a, 2b	P1, P6, P9, P10, P11	PM, UX, T, UX, T
2	Text prediction	1, 2a, 2b	P3, P13, P14, P15	UX/PM, T, PM, PM
3	Chatbot	1, 2a, 2b	P16, P18, P19	TM, T, T
4	Text summarization	1, 2a, 2b	P7, P20, P21, P22, P29	PM, TM, PM, PM, TM
5	Meeting summarization	1, 2a, 2b	P8, P23, P24, P25, P26, P27, P28	PM, PM, T, T, T, T, T
6	Text clustering	1, 2a, 2b	P30, P31	TM, T
7	Fraud detection	1, 2a, 2b	P32, P33	T, TM
8	Text prediction	1	P2, P17	PM, TM
9	Security threat detection	1	P4	PM
10	Speech to text	1	P5	PM

Table 1. Participants and their teams. Roles included program or product manager (PM), user experience designer (UX), technical individual contributor roles (e.g., data scientist; T), and technical manager (TM).

designed to help us investigate our first research question and plan the workshop sessions in phase two. For example, we first asked each PM to describe their team's development practices (e.g., "Can you walk us through the process for designing this product or service?") and to focus on a particular component or feature of their AI system (e.g., "Which system component or feature would it make the most sense to focus on for planning a disaggregated evaluation?"). Then, we asked questions designed to help us understand their team's existing practices for assessing the fairness of their AI system (e.g., "Can you talk us through any discussions or planning your team has done for identifying or assessing fairness-related harms for your product or service?"). At the beginning of the interview, the PM was given an overview of the study and told what to expect in each of the sessions; at the end of the interview, they were given the opportunity to suggest other members of their team so that multiple team members could participate in the workshop sessions together.

3.1.3 Structured workshops. Phase two consisted of two 90-minute structured workshop sessions (also conducted on a video conferencing platform) with multiple members of each PM's team. Participants were provided with a slide deck in which to document their responses and collectively brainstorm ideas. Our goal for this phase was to understand how teams design disaggregated evaluations of their AI systems, based on the process proposed by Barocas et al. [7], described below. At the end of each workshop session, we asked participants a series of reflection questions, probing on what was challenging about the process, what organizational support they might need, and how the process might work in their organizational context. These reflection questions were informed by our prior research and experiences with AI practitioners, and were designed to help us investigate our second and third research questions.

3.2 Designing disaggregated evaluations

As described above, we used the workshop sessions to introduce participants to a process for designing disaggregated evaluations, based on the choices, considerations, and tradeoffs articulated by Barocas et al. [7]. This process consists of a series of questions to be answered when designing a disaggregated evaluation, including why, when, by whom, and how the evaluation should be designed and conducted. We determined answers to some of these questions in advance (e.g., the evaluation was to be designed by our participants in collaboration with one of the authors, who led the workshop sessions). Other questions were answered during the interviews (e.g., the component or feature on which to focus the evaluation), while the rest were answered during the workshop sessions. Below, we explain the parts of this process that are particularly important for our findings.

At a high level, the protocol for the workshop sessions consisted of prompts for each team to decide 1) what good performance meant for their AI system and how this might be operationalized via performance metrics, 2) which use cases and deployment contexts to consider, 3) which direct stakeholders and demographic groups would be most relevant to focus on, 4) what data would therefore be needed to conduct the disaggregated evaluation, and 5) how best to determine whether their system was behaving fairly using the chosen performance metrics, the identified direct stakeholders and demographic groups, and the proposed dataset. As most of our findings relate to the first, third, and fourth decisions, we provide more details about each of these below.

3.2.1 Choosing performance metrics. We first asked each team what good performance meant for their AI system, broadly construed. Then, we asked them to anchor this definition in specific performance metrics that could be used to conduct their disaggregated evaluation. To do this, we asked them whether there were performance metrics that they already used to assess the performance of their AI system, and then probed on what those metrics might miss, including any aspects of performance that may be more likely to exhibit disparities indicative of fairness-related harms. Although some teams identified standard performance metrics (e.g., word error rate for speech-to-text systems), others did not. We asked each team to revisit their list of performance metrics throughout both workshop sessions (adding new metrics as appropriate) and, ultimately, to choose one or more metrics on which to focus their disaggregated evaluation.

3.2.2 Identifying direct stakeholders and demographic groups. Having asked each team to decide which use cases and deployment contexts to consider, we then asked them to identify the direct stakeholders—that is, anyone that would use or operate their system, as well as anyone that could be directly affected by someone else's use of the system, by choice or not—that they thought were most likely to experience poor performance. For each of the identified direct stakeholders, we further asked which demographic groups might be most at risk of experiencing poor performance. We did this by providing examples of different demographic factors (e.g., race, age, gender) and asking participants to identify the demographic factors that they thought would be most relevant to consider. Then, for each factor, we asked them to identify the groups that they wanted to focus on. For example, having decided to consider age, a team might choose to focus on three age groups: under eighteen, eighteen to sixty-five, and over sixty-five.

3.2.3 Collecting datasets. Conducting a disaggregated evaluation requires access to an appropriate dataset with sufficient data points from each demographic group of interest, labeled so as to indicate group membership. In addition, the dataset must also capture realistic within-group variation and the data points must be labeled with relevant information about any other factors (e.g., lighting conditions) that might affect performance. We asked each team whether they already had access to an appropriate dataset with which to conduct their disaggregated evaluation or whether they would need to collect a new dataset. If a team said that they would need to collect a new dataset, we asked them how they might go about doing this.

3.3 Data analysis

To understand the most salient themes in the transcripts from our interviews and workshop sessions, we adopted an inductive thematic analysis approach [15]. Three of the authors conducted an open coding of the transcripts using the qualitative coding software Atlas.ti. They first coded the same transcript and discussed codes. After that, they then divided up the remaining transcripts among themselves and iteratively grouped the codes into a set of themes using virtual whiteboard software. As part of this iterative sense-making process, all five authors discussed the emerging themes, and three of the authors re-organized the codes (merging redundant codes as needed) and

structured the themes (i.e., into higher and lower levels) multiple times with input from the other authors. Throughout the coding process, two of the authors wrote reflective memos [e.g., 12, 41] to ask analytic questions of emerging thematic categories and to make connections across themes and across the phases of the study. These memos were informed by the authors' experiences conducting the interviews and workshop sessions, as well as by artifacts from the workshop sessions, including the notes that the authors took while conducting the sessions and the notes that participants took on the slide decks. In section 4, we discuss the findings identified from these codes, themes, and reflective memos.

3.4 Positionality

In the interest of reflexivity [16, 43], we acknowledge that our perspectives and approaches to research are shaped by our own experiences and positionality. Specifically, we are researchers living and working in the U.S., primarily working in industry[5] with years of experience working closely with AI practitioners on projects related to the fairness of AI systems. In addition, we come from a mix of disciplinary backgrounds, including AI and HCI, which we have drawn on to conduct prior research into sociotechnical approaches to identifying, assessing, and mitigating fairness-related harms caused by AI systems.

4 FINDINGS

We find that practitioners face challenges when designing disaggregated evaluations of AI systems, including challenges when choosing performance metrics, identifying the most relevant direct stakeholders and demographic groups on which to focus (due to a lack of engagement with direct stakeholders or domain experts), and collecting datasets with which to conduct disaggregated evaluations. We discuss how the heuristics that teams use to determine priorities for assessing the fairness of AI systems are shaped by business imperatives in ways that may compound existing inequities, despite practitioners' best intentions. Finally, we cover practitioners' needs for organizational support, including guidance on identifying direct stakeholders and demographic groups and strategies for collecting datasets, as well as tensions in organizational processes for advocating for resources for designing and conducting disaggregated evaluations.

4.1 Challenges when designing disaggregated evaluations

Below we describe some of the challenges surfaced by participants during the interviews and workshop sessions. As described above, the most salient themes relate to choosing performance metrics, identifying direct stakeholders and demographic groups, and collecting datasets with which to conduct disaggregated evaluations. In the absence of engagement with direct stakeholders or domain experts and in the absence of opportunities for data collection, participants described drawing on their own experiences and using their own data—approaches that may impact teams' abilities to effectively assess fairness-related harms experienced by people that do not resemble AI practitioners.

4.1.1 Challenges when choosing performance metrics. For some teams, choosing performance metrics was straightforward because they decided to use the same performance metrics that they already used to assess the aggregate performance of their AI systems. Some teams even noted that there were standard performance metrics for AI systems like theirs (e.g., word error rate for speech-to-text systems), making their decisions relatively easy [cf. 18, 38]. However, most teams did not have standard performance metrics. Choosing performance metrics was therefore a non-trivial task, requiring lengthy discussions during the workshop sessions about what good performance

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[5]Two of the authors are in academia, but they were interns in industry when we conducted the study.

meant for their AI systems, how aggregate performance was typically assessed, and whether or how this should change when designing a disaggregated evaluation.

In these cases, participants described how their typical approaches to assessing aggregate performance included metrics that they felt were inappropriate to use when assessing the fairness of their AI systems. For example, a UX PM on a team developing a text prediction system noted that their usual performance metrics focused on usage (i.e., the rate of acceptance of text predictions), but that they thought these metrics did not capture aspects of performance that may be more likely to exhibit disparities indicative of fairness-related harms. They told us, *"Today, our features are often judged by usage, but usage is not a success metric. Similarly, precision or recall, these model metrics are important, but they don't tell us whether we're actually achieving the outcomes that we want to achieve"* (P3, T2). For this team, differences in usage between demographic groups would not necessarily reveal anything about fairness-related harms, although such differences might be suggestive of other differences that, in turn, might reveal something about fairness-related harms.

To address this, some participants described how their teams were developing new performance metrics specifically for assessing the fairness of their AI systems, saying, for example, *"We need to start quantifying and optimizing towards not just success, but output quality and how catastrophic failures are. So we invented new metrics around quality"* (P3, T2). This team therefore wanted to use this new metric for their disaggregated evaluation. However, other teams that created new performance metrics had difficulty agreeing on whether they should use these new metrics for their disaggregated evaluations or whether they should use the metrics that they typically used to assess performance (T1, T2, T3, T5).

More generally, we find that decisions about performance metrics are shaped by business imperatives that prioritize some stakeholders (e.g., customers) over others (e.g., marginalized groups). Participants described how tensions that arose during discussions about choosing performance metrics—even for teams that had standard performance metrics (e.g., word error rate)—were often indicative of deeper disagreements about the goals of their AI systems. These tensions were exacerbated by a lack of engagement with direct stakeholders or domain experts, which we discuss in section 4.1.2.

For example, participants on a team developing a fraud detection system (T7) described *"a lot of tradeoffs in the project"* (P32, T7) between three primary types of stakeholders: the people whose transactions might be mistakenly labeled as fraudulent, the companies running the money-transfer platforms on which the fraud detection system was deployed, and local government fraud auditors that audit the money-transfer platforms' transactions. They told us how *"it came close to becoming a literal fight because fraud detection wanted a model as strict as possible and they wanted for us to focus on that metric, while the business part of the model wanted it to be more flexible [...] and didn't want to classify almost every client [as fraudulent]"* (P32, T7). These tensions between stakeholders with very different goals shaped the team's discussion about choosing performance metrics. As they told us:

> In a lot of cases we are able to [...] just take both requirements and get to some agreement. This was not exactly such a case, because I think it was a deeper conflict in the project itself [...] at the end we got [both stakeholders] to sit down together and we basically told them to make this work. So after that it was a bit easier, the tension was still in there, but at least we could work. (P32, T7)

Although P32 described being able to get two types of stakeholders to *"sit down together"* to *"get to some agreement"* about assessing the aggregate performance of their AI system, that conversation was not focused on fairness. Therefore, when discussing how to assess the fairness of their AI system, they found themselves unable to resolve the decision of which performance metrics to use

without consulting their stakeholders. Moreover, the conversation that P32 described did not involve any *direct* stakeholders—that is, the people whose transactions might be mistakenly labeled as fraudulent—a challenge commonly raised by participants, as discussed in the next section.

The technical manager on the team articulated the decision to prioritize customers (where customers means the companies running the money-transfer platforms on which the fraud detection system was deployed, not the people whose transactions might be mistakenly labeled as fraudulent) succinctly, saying that it wasn't the team's role to define the metric, but *"in our case the customer defines what is the best metric"* (P33, T7)—a situation that was exemplified when the other team member told us how they *"gave in to the commercial point of view"* (P32, T7). Decisions about performance metrics, as with other decisions made when assessing the fairness of AI systems, are therefore not value-neutral. Rather, they are shaped by the organizational contexts within which practitioners are embedded, including business imperatives.

4.1.2 Challenges when identifying direct stakeholders and demographic groups. Participants wanted to identify the direct stakeholders and demographic groups that might be most at risk of experiencing poor performance based on an understanding of what marginalization means for different demographic groups in the geographic contexts where their AI systems were deployed, and they wanted to do so by engaging with direct stakeholders and domain experts. For example, participants described how they wanted to engage with domain experts that had experience studying or working with different demographic groups, saying, *"I think that that's where we do need to bridge the people who are experts on this and know the processes we should be going through before we [...] decide on implementations with our opinions of what is important and who is harmed"* (P15, T2). This participant went on to say, *"For gender non-binary [...] We need to ensure we have the right people in the room who are experts on these harms and/or can provide authentic perspectives from lived experiences [...] I think the same could be said about speakers of underrepresented dialects as well"* (P15, T2). Other participants were explicit about the importance of engaging with experiential experts (i.e., people with relevant lived experiences) in addition to other domain experts, saying, *"I don't know what community members that speak that sociolect would want. But [designers' decisions] should agree with a native speaker of the chosen language"* (P7, T4).

Despite their desires to engage with direct stakeholders and domain experts, participants described how their typical development practices usually only involved customers and users, and not other direct stakeholders. Moreover, many teams only engaged with users when requesting feedback on their AI systems (e.g., via user testing) instead of engaging with users to inform their understanding of what marginalization means for different demographic groups or to inform other decisions made when designing disaggregated evaluations.

In the absence of processes for engaging with direct stakeholders or domain experts, participants suggested drawing on the personal experiences and identities represented on their teams to identify the most relevant direct stakeholders and demographic groups on which to focus. However, this approach is problematic given the homogeneous demographics of many AI teams [82]. A PM on a team developing a text prediction system described the situation as follows:

> The problems we identify are very much guided by the perspectives of the people on the team who are working on and thinking about these issues. In that sense I think there could be a disconnect between the scope of the harms the customers may be experiencing; and the scope of the harms our team is trying to identify, measure, and mitigate. (P15, T2)

For many teams, challenges around engaging with direct stakeholders or domain experts were rooted in organizational incentives for rapid deployment to new geographic contexts. As one product manager put it:

> *We don't have the luxury of saying, 'Oh, we are supporting this particular locale and this particular language in this particular circumstance.' No, no, no, we're doing it all! We're doing it all at once, and we are being asked to ship more faster. I mean, that is the pressure [...] and there will be tension for anything that slows that trajectory, because the gas pedal is to the metal.* (P7, T4)

As this participant described, incentives for deploying AI systems to new geographic contexts can lead to work practices that obscure or exacerbate, rather than mitigate, fairness-related harms. Below, we unpack these incentives further, including how they affect data collection, priorities for assessing the fairness of AI systems, and access to resources for designing and conducting disaggregated evaluations.

4.1.3   Challenges when collecting datasets. Participants described challenges when collecting datasets with which to conduct disaggregated evaluations, including tensions between their organizations' privacy requirements and the need for demographic data with which to disaggregate performance. One participant highlighted this gap by saying, *"So I guess I'm just having trouble getting over the hurdle that I don't think we have a real approved data collection method [for data that lets us evaluate fairness] at all"* (P9, T1). They recognized the restrictions that privacy requirements place on their fairness work as *"the competing interests between not collecting [personally identifiable] data in order to protect privacy, and having the right set of data that we've collected that is representative"* (P9, T1). For this team, as well as others, the importance of protecting personally identifiable information restricted their access to demographic data—a tension identified across multiple domains in prior research [2, 13]. These *"competing interests"* (P9, T1) place teams in a difficult bind, as their organizations' privacy requirements stand at at odds with increasing demands to assess the fairness of their AI systems.

Participants also reported a lack of expertise in collecting demographic data:

> *We don't have any existing precedent or framework for doing this. Right now it's completely exploratory like okay, we need demographic information in order to build fairer test sets and evaluate the potential for quality of service differences [...] should we pay to have a focus group or, you know, collect the data set in some way like that? And that's the level that it's at right now as far as I know, so, nowhere near scaling to other teams and other services to get us that information.* (P13, T2)

This participant, an applied scientist on a team developing a text prediction system, was grappling with a lack of existing methods, frameworks, or practices that they could draw on when collecting demographic data. Many teams had little experience collecting demographic data in general, while others lacked specific expertise in collecting demographic data for their use cases or deployment contexts. For some teams (e.g., T1), this was due to existing agreements with customers that meant that they would need to make substantial modifications to their engineering infrastructure or data-sharing policies. Participants shared experiences trying to develop a *"side channel data collection method"* (P9, T1), discussing exploratory approaches to data collection that might allow them to adhere to their organizations' privacy requirements, while still yielding demographic data with which to disaggregate performance. Participants told us that *"we barely have access to datasets to begin with, so we take anything that we can get basically"* (P29, T4).

In the absence of processes for collecting appropriate datasets, participants shared how they had used or might use data from their teams or organizations. Multiple teams discussed this approach (T1, T2, T5), with one participant telling us, *"One thing we're exploring now, at the very early stages of exploration, is seeing at least if we can start gathering some of this demographic information that internal [company] employees are sharing with us"* (P3, T2). Others on their team wondered about

this approach, asking, *"There's a question of should we try to do this internally and ask people if they'd be willing to voluntarily share and associate demographic information with some of their communication data?"* (P13, T2). On other teams, participants told us, *"Until [privacy issues] get reconciled, the only path forward that we have at the moment is to [...] send out a request to some fraction of [our company's] employees, and then ask them if they'd agree to provide demographic data"* (P24, T5).

However, much like drawing on the personal experiences and identities represented on teams to identify the most relevant direct stakeholders and demographic groups (see section 4.1.2), this approach is problematic. It is unlikely that the demographics of AI teams match the demographics of the direct stakeholders encountered in their uses cases or deployment contexts. One PM told us, *"Our hardest problem with regards to fairness is access to data to actually assess the fairness of the algorithm in a context that would actually look like [our deployment context]"* (P9, T1). As with the challenges described in section 4.1.2, this challenge was made worse by organizational incentives for *"pedal [...] to the metal"* deployment to new geographic contexts (P7, T4).

Participants from one team (T5) pointed out that data from their team would likely be English language data, which would not reflect the linguistic diversity of their deployment contexts. Other participants concurred, pointing out that such data would only include *"people who type like us, talk like us as the people who are building the systems"* (P13, T2), and would not be representative of the people most likely to experience poor performance, especially when business imperatives motivated deploying their AI systems to new geographic contexts. Although deployment expansion could potentially motivate discussions about disaggregated evaluations, including data collection, many teams instead felt pressures to deploy before assessing the fairness of their AI systems.

4.2 Priorities that compound existing inequities

During the workshop sessions, each team identified many more direct stakeholders than could be the focus of a single disaggregated evaluation (particularly given the variety of use cases and deployment contexts that they wanted to consider). As a result, we asked participants to discuss how they would prioritize these direct stakeholders, as well as how they would prioritize different demographic groups. Participants prioritized direct stakeholders and demographic groups based on the perceived severities of fairness-related harms, the perceived ease of data collection or of mitigating performance disparities, the perceived public relations (PR) or brand impacts of fairness-related harms on their organizations, and the needs of customers or markets—all heuristics that may compound existing inequities. Although we report our findings here as high-level themes, there was little agreement about priorities during the workshop sessions. As such, this was the part of our protocol that elicited the most back-and-forth discussion.

4.2.1 Perceived severities of fairness-related harms. Several participants wanted to prioritize direct stakeholders and demographic groups based on the severities of fairness-related harms, saying, *"So, severity level?"* (P1, T1) and *"I guess we could think of some measure of how bad it is for something to go wrong"* (P9, T1). Some teams discussed how they were not able to directly measure the severities of fairness-related harms caused by performance disparities, and would therefore need to use the *"perceived severity of the harm"* (P15, T2) as a proxy. Indeed, as described in section 4.1.2, many teams had no processes for engaging with direct stakeholders to understand their experiences with fairness-related harms.

Participants grappled with how to operationalize the perceived severities of fairness-related harms, with one applied scientist saying *"I think the scale of the impact is also very difficult to know without measuring it first"* (P19, T3), and another thinking out loud that they would need to *"kind of multiply that [harm] in a way by the percent or perceived breadth of users, the estimated amount, percent of users who fall within that group"* (P13, T2). Using such quantified approaches, teams

discussed prioritizing different direct stakeholders and demographic groups in terms of tradeoffs between benefits and harms, based on the perceived severities of the harms or the number of people likely to experience them. Some participants articulated the importance of understanding the impact of multiple microaggressions on marginalized groups, saying that they needed to identify *"the accumulated harm to that demographic or that group of people"* (P13, T2), while other participants thought about this in comparative terms, saying:

> *Either there's a potential to really help a group, like, a lot more than another, for example, or to cause more harm to a group, in which case you would want to prioritize minimizing that harm or if there's an opportunity to do a lot of good for one group and a little good for another group, that maybe you should prioritize the one that has the biggest impact.* (P19, T3)

The idea that harms can be quantified and compared with benefits belies the reality of AI systems, which have complex, messy impacts on a wide range of direct and indirect stakeholders that may experience harms and benefits in a multiplicity of hard-to-measure ways (cf. Jacobs and Wallach [35] on the difficulties of measuring constructs, including fairness, in the context of AI systems). Moreover, quantified approaches to prioritizing direct stakeholders and demographic groups may end up being majoritarian, where larger groups are prioritized over smaller, but perhaps more marginalized, groups. Grappling with this tension, one participant wondered, *"How big is this group? Like, what's the size of the user base in this group? So if it's like a very severe problem for a small group of users, versus a less severe problem for a large group of users. We have to think about, how do we measure that and how do we balance those two?"* (P23, T5). However, given teams' challenges around engaging with direct stakeholders or domain experts (see section 4.1), prioritization decisions based on teams' perceived severities of fairness-related harms may lead to disaggregated evaluations that do not focus on the most relevant direct stakeholders and demographic groups.

4.2.2 Perceived ease of data collection or of mitigating performance disparities. Participants on multiple teams (e.g., T1, T5) described how they would prioritize direct stakeholders and demographic groups for which they already had data or with whom they were already working in some capacity, saying, *"One that comes to mind is that we're already working with is [the accessibility group], right. So people who are going to dictate their resume [...] might be disadvantaged. So I feel like that's the highest priority"* (P1, T1).

In addition to prioritizing direct stakeholders and demographic groups based on the perceived ease of data collection, teams also discussed making prioritization decisions based on the perceived ease of mitigating performance disparities:[6]

> *I think another criteria that we sometimes use for prioritizing or addressing these things, is ease of mitigation implementation. So I know for British English [...] that was something that we could pretty quickly and easily address.* (P15, T2)

This was a popular approach, discussed by three of the seven teams (T1, T2, T5). However, implicit in P15's point (which they grappled with later on in the workshop sessions) is the fact that although poor performance for British English speakers may be relatively easy to mitigate, it is unlikely that British English speakers experience especially bad performance, nor are they a group that is typically marginalized by AI systems or more generally within society.

4.2.3 Perceived PR or brand impacts. Many teams asked what it would mean for their organization if particular direct stakeholders or demographic groups were found to experience poor performance. For example, continuing the conversation about poor performance for British English

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[6]We note that the workshop sessions were focused entirely on designing disaggregated evaluations and therefore did not cover mitigation of performance disparities; see section 3.2 for more details about the protocol for the workshop sessions.

speakers, one participant asked, *"Let's say that we had a low quality of service for British English speakers. Would that have a high, medium, or low impact, like PR impact on the company?"* (P13, T2). They went on to say:

> *The PR impact is in some ways loosely tied to the harms to individuals or groups, plus some aspects of what goes viral. I would venture to put African-American language speakers in a higher bucket for both of these. So maybe high on severity of harm to groups or individuals, and medium or high for PR impact.* (P13, T2)

This participant discussed prioritizing direct stakeholders and demographic groups based on the perceived severities of fairness-related harms, as described above, as well as the potential for performance disparities to go viral, leading to negative PR impacts, aligned with other discussions around "*the potential for harm to the company*" (P13, T2). Similarly, a software developer on a team developing a chatbot system told us, *"If a user interacts with the bot and finds something that is really offensive maybe they will post it on social media in the hopes that it might go viral. So we're trying to detect these things hopefully before they go viral"* (P18, T3). However, this approach prioritizes direct stakeholders and demographic groups that use social media and that are able to widely publicize their concerns.[7]

Some participants described priorities based on perceived brand impacts, with one participant saying *"If you think of this as a headline in a newspaper, that could be a way that we kind of think about some of these"* (P15, T2). Indeed, imagining newspaper headlines is a common way to think about fairness-related harms or values in technology development more generally [cf. 89]. Other participants drew on high-profile failures of AI systems in the news to inform their priorities. Participants cited the *"classic proxy bias example from the Amazon resume system"* (P1, T1) and other examples of fairness-related harms caused by competitors' AI systems (e.g., T2, T5, T8).

Participants on other teams shared similar views, saying, *"As a brand, [our company] does not want to associate with those [performance disparities] [...] the biggest risk that the feature has is like when you see [performance disparities], the company brand is associated with it"* (P2, T8). However, this approach of making prioritization decisions based on brand impacts is a tactic that may ignore concerns about direct stakeholders' experiences in order to uphold an organization's image [45]. One participant outlined how they navigate this, saying:

> *We just have to strategically pick like, 'hey, we think this is socially important right now; especially when it comes to a like gap in data, right? So, if there is one or two groups of people that we think are strategically important from a social perspective, and are likely to be underrepresented, or have different performance across multiple types of models.* (P7, T4)

These approaches are inherently backward looking, or *"reflexive and reactive"* (P13, T2), as they focus on performance disparities that are uncovered after AI systems have been deployed. In contrast, reflexive design (or "reflection in action" [69]) approaches encourage practitioners to reflect on values and impacts during the development lifecycle [71].

4.2.4   Needs of customers or markets. Finally, participants described prioritizing direct stakeholders and demographic groups based on the needs of customers and markets, thereby shaping disaggregated evaluations in ways that may compound existing inequities by reifying the social structures that lead to performance disparities in the first place. As one participant put it, *"If the organization is talking only about business performance, then the project is going to prioritize the groups that are the most important for the business"* (P32, T7). In section 4.1.1, we similarly discussed the ways that decisions about performance metrics are shaped by business imperatives that prioritize

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[7]https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/07/13/1028401/tiktok-censorship-mistakes-glitches-apologies-endless-cycle/

customers over marginalized groups. Participants on other teams shared similar sentiments, saying, *"I'm also cognizant that business stakeholders are often very focused on business outcomes in terms of dollar value rather than fairness or something else which is a 'good-to-have'"* (P30, T6).

Multiple participants told us that their organizations were focused on their customers and that this affected their engagement with direct stakeholders, in turn affecting prioritization. One PM said:

> *We keep saying that we are 'customer obsessed,' right? But we shouldn't just be saying, 'Oh, ninety-nine percent of our customers are white men who work in corporate America and we're going to talk to them and see what feature they want.'* (P3, T2)

This participant articulated the concern that their primary customers were members of demographic groups that were already over-represented and privileged in the geographic contexts in which their AI system was deployed, thereby unintentionally reifying existing social structures. Much like the majoritarian approaches described in section 4.2.1, prioritizing the needs of high-value customers might mean prioritizing the most powerful direct stakeholders and demographic groups that are less likely to be marginalized.

Participants on almost every team shared that their organizations used strategic market tiers to prioritize deployment to new geographic contexts. Indeed, many companies whose AI products and services are deployed around the world use tier-based deployment approaches [cf. 83]. As one PM shared:

> *We also need to think about internationalization. So scaling [this system] across markets is another thing that we look at. Often we start our language-based initiatives for the North American market. So for Canada and the United States. For the English language. And then we have tiers of language like Tier 1 languages, Tier 2 languages, Tier 3. Mostly that is from a business opportunity point of view. And then we scale.* (P3, T2)

In theory, tier-based deployment approaches might help teams focus their fairness work on a single geographic context[8] at a time, enabling them to learn from one context to the next. However, in practice, participants reported that their AI systems' deployments did not appear to depend on disaggregated evaluations, but were instead aligned with market strategies and opportunities. One technical manager described the situation, saying:

> *Sometimes you have a very clear market signal that you need to go into a certain domain, or a certain language, but sometimes the fact that you don't have any signal doesn't mean that you don't need to invest in adding a new language [...] I think it's much more like market opportunity in this space [...] So, it's opportunistic, some of it is strategic in nature.* (P29, T4)

As this participant described, for many teams, decisions about where to deploy their AI systems were sometimes strategic, based on *"market opportunity"* (P29, T4), and sometimes opportunistic, based on customer feedback (thereby raising questions about the impacts of prioritizing customers' needs, as discussed above) or other factors. Such deployment approaches may compound existing inequities across geographic contexts:

> *[Our system] is helping people be more productive. And if English-speaking languages, or tier 1 markets, are already ahead of the other markets in productivity, then us starting with these folks– and let's say a tier 3 language getting a feature that makes people more productive two years later means that opportunity gap will keep widening and widening,*

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[8]P3 went on to explain that although *"market doesn't mean language,"* strategic market tiers were often developed with geographic contexts in mind—an approach that may not map cleanly onto languages when applied to language technologies.

right? So there is a ethical aspect here that is not necessarily programmed into our business growth objectives. (P3, T2)

Assuming that this team's AI system will indeed help people to be more productive and that being more productive is a good thing, then, as P3 argued, the gap in opportunity between lower-tier and higher-tier markets will widen. Prioritizing direct stakeholders and demographic groups based on the needs of customers or markets may similarly compound existing inequities.

4.3 Needs for organizational support

Participants wanted their organizations to provide guidance about and resources for designing and conducting disaggregated evaluations. In particular, participants voiced the need for guidance on identifying the most relevant direct stakeholders and demographic groups on which to focus, as well as strategies for collecting datasets. Below, we identify tensions in participants' desired organizational support, as well as tensions in organizational processes for advocating for resources for designing and conducting disaggregated evaluations.

4.3.1 Guidance on identifying direct stakeholders and strategies for collecting datasets. Participants wanted guidance from their organizations on identifying the most relevant direct stakeholders and demographic groups on which to focus their disaggregated evaluations:

> *I would love to see coming top-down is [...] what are those different [demographic] factors and groups within each factor? [...] There is almost like an infinite list of factors... We need to be told like a company-wide list. Throw all the linguists and all the researchers at it and be, like, these are the list of [demographic] factors who we definitely want to guarantee fair and inclusive high quality of service for.* (P13, T2)

Participants recognized that the challenges they were facing were not specific to their AI systems, and were likely shared by other teams in their organizations. As a result, they noted that organization-wide guidance would help many teams all grappling with the same challenges. They told us that *"none of these are [product]-specific problems"* (P3, T2), and that they felt they were *"doing a lot of – not reinventing, but inventing of the wheel"* (P3, T2) and wanted their organizations to better support them in their fairness work. In many cases, participants felt that their teams didn't have expertise in the languages that their AI systems supported across the geographic contexts in which they were deployed, saying, *"We don't have any resources around what kind of harm language can generate [...] Most of these languages I don't even have expertise on, right?"* (P3, T2).

Participants also wanted guidance on the types of fairness-related harms that might be caused by their AI systems. They may have requested this guidance due to their teams' lack of processes for engaging with direct stakeholders or domain experts, as discussed in section 4.1.2. Equally, based on the uncertainty that we observed during the workshop sessions when discussing priorities (see section 4.2), participants may have requested this guidance because they wanted their organizations to relieve them of the responsibility of making prioritization decisions themselves.

Participants acknowledged that organization-wide guidance might be difficult to provide (despite the resources available to larger organizations) given the diversity of AI systems, use cases, and deployment contexts. That is, *"[fairness] is hard to provide company-wide guidance on because it does vary on a case by case basis of what is the task and scenario and, like, how is the UI structured"* (P13, T2). One approach suggested by participants was for organizations to create guidance (such as a list of demographic groups that might be most at risk of experiencing poor performance) that could then be adapted, supplemented, or prioritized by teams based on their specific circumstances:

> *I think that list should be global across all products, but then, like, morphological differences or a difference in skin color may not directly affect the way that you interact with*

the [product] UI but it could change your lived experience and you could still be served differently. So, like, some of them will be more relevant to certain services than others and that's where the prioritization should happen on the team's parts, but we need to be told, like, 'Here's a list. And if you don't have coverage or you haven't at least considered and prioritized these then you're missing a requirement.' (P13, T2)

This desire to be given organization-wide guidance (especially guidance relating to direct stakeholders and demographic groups) that could be tailored to teams' specific circumstances was echoed by other participants. Another participant on a team developing several related AI systems said:

It makes sense to think about these factors and groups globally, and then to sort of double check for each one of the model types [...] 'Okay, well, how would that actually get reflected in all these model types? And would it be equally so in all of the model types? (P7, T4)

Participants also expressed desires for organization-wide strategies for collecting datasets with which to conduct disaggregated evaluations. Several participants pointed out that discussions about data collection are *"going to be something that comes up consistently organizationally for [our company]. What is that data and how do we balance that data collection [with privacy]?"* (P9, T1). Participants felt that their organizations should help teams understand how to collect demographic data, addressing challenges at an organizational level, rather than at a team level. One participant explicitly suggested centralizing data collection efforts, saying that they wanted to:

Give sort of a vision pitch of there being a group within [the company] who is responsible for a data warehouse or data clearinghouse for datasets that other teams can use to assess the fairness and bias in their algorithms (P9, T1).

However, much like organization-wide guidance, organization-wide strategies for collecting datasets (including centralized data collection efforts) might be difficult to establish given the diversity of AI systems, use cases, and deployment contexts. Moreover, the economies of scale that motivate the deployment of AI systems to new geographic contexts based on strategic market tiers (as described in section 4.2.4) may lead to homogenized understandings of demographic groups that may not be reflective of all geographic contexts.

4.3.2 Resources. In addition to wanting their organizations to provide guidance about designing and conducting disaggregated evaluations, participants described needing to advocate for resources (e.g., money, time, personnel) for designing and conducting disaggregated evaluations. The need for resources to enable teams to prioritize fairness work has been identified in prior research [e.g., 44, 46, 63]. Here, we offer additional evidence and identify tensions in organizational processes for advocating for resources. Participants told us how, *"the main thing just comes down to funding [...] [VPs] should fund it and then it becomes much easier"* (P17, T8). One participant highlighted the need for resources to *"institutionaliz[e] the practices that we espouse"* (P7, T4). Participants on other teams agreed, saying *"we're trying to figure out where the bottlenecks are. What kind of resourcing you would need to achieve an outcome like that, but those outcomes ideally should not be bottom up at [our team] level. They should be top down, from [our organization]"* (P3, T2).

Many participants discussed their teams' processes for identifying such resource bottlenecks and how they used the resulting conversations to advocate for resources to support their fairness work. Without those resources, *"we can only do so much with what we're given"* (P6, T1) and, as another team told us, *"if anybody wants us to do additional testing, which requires additional data gathering or labeling of existing data, right now we don't have any budget set aside for that, so we need to proactively plan for that"* (P7, T4). In other words, despite organizations' stated fairness

principles and practitioners' best intentions when designing disaggregated evaluations, the reality of budgets for collecting datasets, as well as budgets for other activities (such as engaging with direct stakeholders and domain experts) constrain what teams are able to achieve.

Over and over, participants told us that their organizations' business imperatives dictated the resources available for their fairness work, and that resources were made available only when business imperatives aligned with the need for disaggregated evaluations. As one participant told us:

> *If we bring these concerns up with management which is focused on business goals, they are not very interested in having this conversation. I guess it's a trickle down effect. When we see that the business stakeholders at the top have really adopted this as important, then it trickles down and that is something which becomes important to our immediate managers as well. These are all very consumer- and business-focused companies. So obviously, if it hurts their interests, we see what happens to AI researchers, ethics teams and the like... but if there's executive buy-in, then this could trickle down to all levels, for all sizes of organizations, because these are primarily capitalistic, economic ventures.* (P30, T6)

The tension between business imperatives and fairness work (including disaggregated evaluations) arose throughout the workshop sessions, but was explicitly identified by one participant (P30) in reference to the firing of Google's AI ethics research team co-leads.[9] Along these lines, another participant that participated in a phase one interview, but whose team declined to participate in the subsequent workshop sessions, said:

> *For someone who's looking at like 'OK, I want to increase the market share production by X.' You're not moving the needle there, so then like how would you prioritize [disaggregated evaluations]? [...] Unless you have a clear buy-in, clear funding, it's very hard to get these things prioritized right?* (P17, T8)

Participants told us how they would advocate for resources for fairness work with their leadership, but explained that they would need evidence that their AI systems caused fairness-related harms in order to convince their leadership to actually provide resources. Several teams shared frustrations about this vicious cycle of needing evidence of performance disparities to secure resources to design and conduct disaggregated evaluations—the same evaluations that would provide the requested evidence of performance disparities. At the end of the second workshop session with one team, the PM mentioned that "*we should have a meeting where we could advocate for some of these things with [our VP] and make it really clear that he might have to shake some trees and change some minds*" (P9, T1). This participant described how they wanted to "*make evidence a criterion for supporting our assessment prioritization*" (P9, T1), but for them, that was more of an aspirational goal than a reality:

> *I do think that I like to go into discussions like that with the carrot and stick approach, saying 'Here are the things that can go wrong if we don't do this or that we should be worried about.' I feel like we've got an okay handle on that. But not for, like, 'Here's some examples where it's really gone right where, like, look, we've quantified some differences between groups. Here's a case study where it has worked. This is how they just collected a little more data and adjusted the training process to account for that'* (P9, T1).

That is, for this participant, and for others that were discussing how to advocate for resources for designing and conducting disaggregated evaluations, the *"dream state"* (P9, T1) was to have case studies or examples of AI systems where disaggregated evaluations worked—that is, where teams had found quantified evidence of performance disparities, enabling them to then mitigate those disparities. However, although this participant's team was aware of potential fairness-related harms

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[9]https://www.fastcompany.com/90608471/timnit-gebru-google-ai-ethics-equitable-tech-movement

caused by their AI system, they were concerned that without additional evidence, this would not be sufficient for them to secure the resources they needed to design and conduct disaggregated evaluations.

5 DISCUSSION

Prior research has proposed disaggregated evaluations of AI systems as a way to uncover performance disparities between demographic groups [e.g., 7]. However, technology work practices are shaped by the organizational contexts within which practitioners are embedded [e.g., 56, 58, 87], and fairness work is no exception in this regard [e.g., 44, 46, 47, 63]. Indeed, some research has suggested that first-party assessments of the impacts of AI systems may be particularly susceptible to organizational factors [51]. We therefore used a process for designing disaggregated evaluations that we adapted from Barocas et al. [7] to explore practitioners' existing processes and challenges when designing disaggregated evaluations of their AI systems (RQ1), their needs for organizational support (RQ2), and how their processes, challenges, and needs for support are impacted by their organizational contexts (RQ3). We find that practitioners face challenges when choosing performance metrics, identifying the most relevant direct stakeholders and demographic groups on which to focus (due to a lack of engagement with direct stakeholders or domain experts), and collecting datasets with which to conduct disaggregated evaluations. We discuss how the heuristics that teams use to determine priorities for assessing the fairness of AI systems may compound existing inequities. We find that practitioners want their organizations to provide guidance on identifying direct stakeholders and demographic groups and strategies for collecting datasets, and we identify tensions in organizational processes for advocating for resources for designing and conducting disaggregated evaluations.

In the rest of this paper, we discuss some implications of these findings. We extend prior research on the ways in which organizational factors, including organizational cultures and incentives, impact fairness work by discussing the implications of the ways in which practitioners' decisions when designing disaggregated evaluations are influenced by business imperatives such as tier-based deployment approaches and a tendency to prioritize customers over marginalized groups. We also discuss how the drive to deploy AI systems at scale impacts disaggregated evaluations. A lack of processes for understanding what marginalization means in different geographic contexts causes practitioners to draw on the personal experiences and identities represented on their teams or to use data from their teams or organizations. These approaches may compound existing inequities given the homogeneous demographics of many AI teams [82].

5.1 Implications of business imperatives that shape disaggregated evaluations

Traditions of user-centered design from the HCI community have long grappled with the political implications of the question, "For whom do computational systems (fail to) work?" Now, as the HCI and AI communities develop tools and practices to support practitioners in identifying, assessing, and mitigating fairness-related harms caused by AI systems, we must grapple with the political implications of who is involved in fairness work. Prior research has pointed out that incentives to ship AI products and services quickly may be at odds with the slow and careful nature of fairness work [e.g., 44, 63]. In this paper, we find that business imperatives shape decisions made by practitioners' when designing disaggregated evaluations, including decisions about performance metrics, direct stakeholders and demographic groups, and datasets.

As Suchman pointed out, the term user "opens out, on closer inspection, onto an extended field of alliances and contests" [76]. Popular approaches to identifying stakeholders from the HCI and design communities have expanded and problematized who is involved in technology development from users to stakeholders more generally, offering methods [e.g., 25, 90, 91], theories [e.g.,

26, 27], and frameworks [e.g., 78] for identifying stakeholders and understanding their values. In practice, the approaches that our participants took[10] to identifying direct stakeholders and demographic groups appear to have more in common with approaches for identifying stakeholders found in business operations and management research [e.g., 21, 48] than with approaches found in the HCI or design communities. In business operations (see De Gooyert et al. [21] for a review), stakeholders are identified and involved based on either an instrumental rationale (i.e., the belief that involving stakeholders will improve organizations' performance or profitability) or a moral rationale (i.e., the belief that involving stakeholders is the right thing to do). For many of our participants, the business imperatives that they described shaping their decisions appear to fit within instrumental approaches to identifying stakeholders, where high-value customers (or other stakeholders with the potential to improve organizations' performance or profitability) and stakeholders in higher-tier markets are prioritized over other stakeholders. Indeed, such priorities should make us skeptical that organization-wide guidance on identifying direct stakeholders and demographic groups or organization-wide strategies for collecting datasets will actually reflect the needs of marginalized groups.

More generally, fairness work that ignores the role played by business imperatives may inadvertently compound existing inequities. For example, strategic market tiers that inform deployment schedules may lead to disaggregated evaluations that follow similar approaches, in turn resulting in the deprioritization of direct stakeholders and demographic groups in lower-tier markets. Without processes for engaging with direct stakeholders or domain experts, practitioners draw on their personal experiences and identities, their perceptions about fairness-related harms (including the perceived severities of those harms), and even their own data—all workarounds that may perpetuate majoritarian structures of marginalization.

Within HCI, recent work on disability justice has critiqued the rhetoric around designing with empathy for marginalized groups, rather than involving them in the development lifecycle [10, 20]. By relying on the personal experiences and identities represented on AI teams, practitioners may overlook fairness-related harms, especially given the homogeneous demographics of many such teams [82]. One way to mitigate this is to recruit practitioners from a wider range of backgrounds, including from demographic groups that are currently under-represented in AI. Although having more diverse AI teams is critical, the "politics of inclusion" [22, 92] of relying on marginalized practitioners may not be sufficient to effect systemic change given the dominant structural forces [e.g., 64] that might lead to those practitioners being ignored, tokenized, or fired [22, 31, 92]. Recent calls to foster greater engagement with affected communities when developing sociotechnical systems may serve as a counter to business imperatives [e.g., 20, 80], although it is important to be wary about extractive, tokenistic approaches [e.g., 3, 4, 74], which can unfairly burden members of marginalized groups [59].

5.2 Implications of deploying AI systems at scale

Many of our participants reported challenges relating to the scale at which AI systems are deployed.[11] Participants on every team shared that they felt pressured to expand deployment to new geographic contexts, and we saw the impact of these pressures on nearly every decision made when designing disaggregated evaluations.

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[10]It is important to note that what we observed during the workshop sessions could not capture the entirety of teams' efforts around engaging with direct stakeholders. Whenever possible, we therefore asked participants to describe their typical processes for engaging with direct stakeholders. Our findings reflect the engagements that they described.
[11]We note that our focus on geographic scale is complementary to recent research grappling with other notions of scale (such as the size of training datasets [9] or the number of users [cf. 28]) which are out of scope for this paper.

Critical scholarship, including recent research in CSCW [e.g., 29, 42, 66, 81], has explored how scale is not simply an objective property of sociotechnical systems—for example, a quantified accounting of the number of inputs or users that a system has, or a tally of the different contexts in which a system is deployed. Indeed, as in our findings, it is often a non-trivial matter to even identify what context means for an AI system's deployment—does it refer to countries? geographic regions? strategic market tiers? Instead, we draw on the concept of scalar thinking from Tsing and others [42, 81] to refer to the discourses of scale that motivate and enable AI systems to "proliferate across contexts and over time" [66]. These discourses are part of larger forces within technology development that valorize the scalability of systems as a precursor to venture capital investment [29].

The expansionist rhetoric around AI systems raises serious questions for fairness work. To what extent can disaggregated evaluations conducted by teams embedded within technology companies reveal fairness-related harms caused by AI systems that are deployed to multiple geographic contexts? This question has a long historical resonance. Suchman argued that we must attend to the specificities of place in technology development practices, including its micropolitics and cultural imaginaries, to avoid the reproduction of "neocolonial geographies of center and periphery" (and, more generally, to resist such neat binaries of center and periphery, local and global) [77]. More recently, Sloane et al. argued that the ever-increasing drive to deploy AI systems at scale may be fundamentally at odds with calls to involve direct stakeholders in the development of those systems [74]. Our findings reveal implications of this tension, as many participants reported deploying AI systems in geographic contexts for which they have no processes for engaging with direct stakeholders or domain experts. As a result, they noted that they struggle to understand the impacts of their systems in those contexts and, therefore, how best to collect datasets with which to conduct disaggregated evaluations. The consequences of this can be dire. As leaked documents have revealed,[12] Facebook's hate speech detection system disproportionately failed to identify hate speech in languages other than English—a problem exacerbated by a lack of resources to support this work.[13]

The scalability of sociotechnical systems is often thought of in terms of the technical feasibility of deploying those systems to new contexts, relying on standardized technical infrastructures (e.g., cloud computing) and technologies of standardization like containers (in both the physical and digital senses of the term container) [cf. 34, 79]. One implication of our findings, however, is that human-centered requirements (such as, but not limited to, engagement with direct stakeholders) should be considered on an equal footing with technical feasibility. Tsing articulated a theory of nonscalability, or how to think about systems that change in response to local conditions as they grow [81]. Therefore, if scalable projects, broadly construed, are those that are able to grow without changing, then nonscalability suggests that (in this case) development practices for AI systems should change when expanding into new contexts, so as to respond to local conditions. These changes may involve data collection, model retraining, and, crucially, involving direct stakeholders in the development lifecycle (including in discussions about whether proposed AI systems should exist at all [cf. 6, 8]).

Future work should consider what it means for AI systems to be nonscalable [cf. 28, 81], so as to resist the "portability trap" of believing that one can simply port AI systems developed in and for one context to others [70]. This may involve developing AI systems (and disaggregated evaluations) in ways that are responsive to local values and norms, as in recent research to re-imagine the fairness of AI systems in India [67], research that has highlighted the risks of algorithmic colonization [11] and efforts toward decolonial AI [49], or, more generally, approaches for "designing for

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[12]https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/10/facebook-failed-the-world/620479/
[13]See also Timnit Gebru's ICLR 2021 talk: https://iclr.cc/virtual/2021/invited-talk/3718

the pluriverse" [23]. However, approaches to the development of AI systems that are responsive to local conditions will likely require slow and careful work that is fundamentally at odds with the *"pedal [...] to the metal"* (P7, T4) approach incentivized by business imperatives.

5.3 Limitations

Thirty-three practitioners took part in our study, from ten teams responsible for developing AI products or services at three technology companies. Ideally, we would have been able to provide more information about these teams and companies, but participants agreed to participate on the condition that details about their companies and their products and services would be abstracted to preserve anonymity. Our recruitment strategy (i.e., direct emails and posts on message boards related to the fairness of AI systems) and our positionality as researchers living and working in the U.S., primarily working in industry, with backgrounds in AI and HCI may have limited the range of practitioners that agreed to participate, suggesting that future work on this topic should take a broader recruitment strategy so as to recruit participants from a wider range of teams and companies. Our positionality may also have shaped how we approached our research questions, data collection, and data analysis. Future work conducted by people with other backgrounds and from other contexts, including people outside of academia or industry (e.g., community groups, government agencies, civil society organizations), is therefore crucial.

In addition, most participants in the workshop sessions were members of teams developing language technologies (six of the seven teams), although we we did conduct interviews with PMs from three additional teams working on other AI products and services that declined to participate in the subsequent workshop sessions. Although our findings suggest implications for teams developing AI systems other than language technologies and for companies beyond the three that participated, they may not be generalizable to all teams and companies. Future work should therefore involve larger-scale studies to validate or refute our findings, and, especially, studies involving practitioners whose organizations require them to design and conduct disaggregated evaluations rather than doing so voluntarily. Finally, our findings are based on the interviews and workshop sessions, which were conducted over a limited period of time. Future work should include longitudinal studies such as observational studies of teams designing and conducting disaggregated evaluations as part of their work practices.

5.4 Conclusion

As researchers and practitioners develop new tools and practices for identifying, assessing, and mitigating fairness-related harms caused by AI systems, it is critical to understand how these tools and practices are actually used. In this paper, we focus on one such practice: disaggregated evaluations of AI systems, intended to uncover performance disparities between demographic groups. Via semi-structured interviews and structured workshops with AI practitioners at multiple companies, we identify impacts on fairness work stemming from a lack of engagement with direct stakeholders or domain experts, business imperatives that prioritize customers over marginalized groups, and the drive to deploy AI systems at scale. Specifically, we find that practitioners face challenges when choosing performance metrics, identifying the most relevant direct stakeholders and demographic groups on which to focus, and collecting datasets with which to conduct disaggregated evaluations. These findings suggest the need for processes for engaging with direct stakeholders and domain experts prior to deployment to new geographic contexts, as well as counterbalances to business imperatives that can lead to pressures to deploy AI systems before assessing their fairness in contextually appropriate ways.

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