Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship bet... more Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship between metaphysics and the lower sciences. Some like Simplicius and Zabarella have interpreted the passage as suggesting that metaphysics, as a regina scientiarum (queen of the science) proves the principles of the lower sciences. Other commentators, like Aquinas and Fonseca, argue that metaphysics hands down the principles of the lower sciences but doesn't prove them. In favor of the second interpretation is Aristotle's remark at Posterior Analytics A9 76a 16, that the proper principles of the sciences are not proven. However, Avicenna develops a new conception of the subordination of the sciences in his last logical work, the Remarks and Admonitions Logic, which allows for the subordination of the lower sciences to metaphysics. He also evidences this pattern of subordination between the sciences in his monumental Metaphysics of the Šifā'. This paper shows how Avicenna's interpretation constitutes a middle position between the dominant interpretations of Met. E1 (VI 1), and shows how the principles of the lower sciences are proven in metaphysics as the proper accidents of being. This paper also responds to some of potential objections which might be raised to Avicenna's account.
THIS PAPER DISCUSSES AVICENNA’S concept of ambiguity/analogy and argues that while Avicenna doesn... more THIS PAPER DISCUSSES AVICENNA’S concept of ambiguity/analogy and argues that while Avicenna doesn’t mention it explicitly there is an analogy of the predication of being between creatures and God, the Necessary of Existence. A consequence of this analogical predication is that for Avicenna, like Aquinas, God does not fall under the subject of metaphysics common being or being qua being.1 If the predication were univocal as some scholars contend such as Timothy Noone and Olga Lizzini,2 then God would fall under the subject of metaphysics, common being as he does according to Ramon Guerrero and John Wippel.3 This paper has three parts. First, it discusses the comparison between Avicenna and Aristotle on pros hen equivocation/analogy. Second, it discusses the texts within Avicenna which suggest an analogical predication and which can reasonably be seen as establishing a transcendental predication between God and creatures. Finally, it develops the consequences of Avicenna’s view for the relationship between God and the subject of metaphysics common being or being qua being and argues that God does not fall under common being.
Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship bet... more Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship between metaphysics and the lower sciences. Some like Simplicius and Zabarella have interpreted the passage as suggesting that metaphysics, as a regina scientiarum (queen of the science) proves the principles of the lower sciences. Other commentators, like Aquinas and Fonseca, argue that metaphysics hands down the principles of the lower sciences but doesn't prove them. In favor of the second interpretation is Aristotle's remark at Posterior Analytics A9 76a 16, that the proper principles of the sciences are not proven. However, Avicenna develops a new conception of the subordination of the sciences in his last logical work, the Remarks and Admonitions Logic, which allows for the subordination of the lower sciences to metaphysics. He also evidences this pattern of subordination between the sciences in his monumental Metaphysics of the Šifā'. This paper shows how Avicenna's interpretation constitutes a middle position between the dominant interpretations of Met. E1 (VI 1), and shows how the principles of the lower sciences are proven in metaphysics as the proper accidents of being. This paper also responds to some of potential objections which might be raised to Avicenna's account.
Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship between met... more Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship between metaphysics and the lower sciences. Some like Simplicius and Zabarella have interpreted the passage as suggesting that metaphysics, as a regina scientiarum (queen of the science) proves the principles of the lower sciences. Other commentators, like Aquinas and Fonseca, argue that metaphysics hands down the principles of the lower sciences but doesn't prove them. In favor of the second interpretation is Aristotle's remark at Posterior Analytics A9 76a 16, that the proper principles of the sciences are not proven. However, Avicenna develops a new conception of the subordination of the sciences in his last logical work, the Remarks and Admonitions Logic, which allows for the subordination of the lower sciences to metaphysics. He also evidences this pattern of subordination between the sciences in his monumental Metaphysics of the Šifā'. This paper shows how Avicenna's interpretation constitutes a middle position between the dominant interpretations of Met. E1 (VI 1), and shows how the principles of the lower sciences are proven in metaphysics as the proper accidents of being. This paper also responds to some of potential objections which might be raised to Avicenna's account.
This paper argues that, in spite of interpretations to the contrary, Avicenna and Aquinas are fun... more This paper argues that, in spite of interpretations to the contrary, Avicenna and Aquinas are fundamentally agreed as to subject and principles of metaphysics. The first part shows the philosophers' common metaphysical starting points in the realm of assent and the realm of conceptualization as well as their common use of the distinction between principles common by causality and common by predication to provide the overall structure for their metaphysics (Avicenna, Physics of the Shifa' 1.2.8–10; Aquinas, De Trin. V.4). The second part argues that both philosophers have similar descriptions of God and common being and thus similar views on the relation between God and the subject of metaphysics; and the third part, by surveying some remarks by Avicenna on Sufism and the use of the Qur'ān's description of God's attributes, argues that Avicenna is not forced by his naturalistic theory of prophecy to include God under the subject of metaphysics.
This paper argues that, in spite of interpretations to the contrary, Avicenna and Aquinas are fun... more This paper argues that, in spite of interpretations to the contrary, Avicenna and Aquinas are fundamentally agreed as to subject and principles of metaphysics. The first part shows the philosophers' common metaphysical starting points in the realm of assent and the realm of conceptualization as well as their common use of the distinction between principles common by causality and common by predication to provide the overall structure for their metaphysics (Avicenna, Physics of the Shifa' 1.2.8–10; Aquinas, De Trin. V.4). The second part argues that both philosophers have similar descriptions of God and common being and thus similar views on the relation between God and the subject of metaphysics; and the third part, by surveying some remarks by Avicenna on Sufism and the use of the Qur'ān's description of God's attributes, argues that Avicenna is not forced by his naturalistic theory of prophecy to include God under the subject of metaphysics.
This paper takes it starting point from the basic assertions of Martha Nussbaum’s 1997 paper “Is ... more This paper takes it starting point from the basic assertions of Martha Nussbaum’s 1997 paper “Is Nietzsche a political thinker?". In the paper she argues that seven criteria are necessary for a serious political philosophy: 1) understanding of material need; 2) procedural justification; 3) liberty and its worth; 4) racial, ethnic and religious difference; 5) gender and family; 6) justice between nations; and 7) moral psychology. She argues, that on the first six criteria, Nietzsche has nothing to offer but does make significant contributions on the seventh. In her estimation, then, we should forget about Nietzsche as a political thinker and instead focus on the enlightenment political philosophers he found to be so boring instead. Her basic conclusion is threefold: either Nietzsche is a racialist, inegalitarian, misogynistic, and elitist, he is puerile, or he is incoherent (Nussbaum 6-9). In opposition to Nussbaum's appraisal of Nietzsche's political thought, I argue that he is in fact a serious political thinker. To present the case I focus on the inclusion of Nussbaum's six criteria in Nietzsche's Zarathustra. My focus on this work is motivated by Nussbaum's own recognition that in this work Nietzsche makes numerous allusions to Plato's Republic, a seminal work of political thought in the tradition. Surprisingly, however, Nussbaum doesn't consider Zarathustra in her appraisal of the lack of political thought in Nietzsche.
Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship bet... more Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship between metaphysics and the lower sciences. Some like Simplicius and Zabarella have interpreted the passage as suggesting that metaphysics, as a regina scientiarum (queen of the science) proves the principles of the lower sciences. Other commentators, like Aquinas and Fonseca, argue that metaphysics hands down the principles of the lower sciences but doesn't prove them. In favor of the second interpretation is Aristotle's remark at Posterior Analytics A9 76a 16, that the proper principles of the sciences are not proven. However, Avicenna develops a new conception of the subordination of the sciences in his last logical work, the Remarks and Admonitions Logic, which allows for the subordination of the lower sciences to metaphysics. He also evidences this pattern of subordination between the sciences in his monumental Metaphysics of the Šifā'. This paper shows how Avicenna's interpretation constitutes a middle position between the dominant interpretations of Met. E1 (VI 1), and shows how the principles of the lower sciences are proven in metaphysics as the proper accidents of being. This paper also responds to some of potential objections which might be raised to Avicenna's account.
THIS PAPER DISCUSSES AVICENNA’S concept of ambiguity/analogy and argues that while Avicenna doesn... more THIS PAPER DISCUSSES AVICENNA’S concept of ambiguity/analogy and argues that while Avicenna doesn’t mention it explicitly there is an analogy of the predication of being between creatures and God, the Necessary of Existence. A consequence of this analogical predication is that for Avicenna, like Aquinas, God does not fall under the subject of metaphysics common being or being qua being.1 If the predication were univocal as some scholars contend such as Timothy Noone and Olga Lizzini,2 then God would fall under the subject of metaphysics, common being as he does according to Ramon Guerrero and John Wippel.3 This paper has three parts. First, it discusses the comparison between Avicenna and Aristotle on pros hen equivocation/analogy. Second, it discusses the texts within Avicenna which suggest an analogical predication and which can reasonably be seen as establishing a transcendental predication between God and creatures. Finally, it develops the consequences of Avicenna’s view for the relationship between God and the subject of metaphysics common being or being qua being and argues that God does not fall under common being.
Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship bet... more Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship between metaphysics and the lower sciences. Some like Simplicius and Zabarella have interpreted the passage as suggesting that metaphysics, as a regina scientiarum (queen of the science) proves the principles of the lower sciences. Other commentators, like Aquinas and Fonseca, argue that metaphysics hands down the principles of the lower sciences but doesn't prove them. In favor of the second interpretation is Aristotle's remark at Posterior Analytics A9 76a 16, that the proper principles of the sciences are not proven. However, Avicenna develops a new conception of the subordination of the sciences in his last logical work, the Remarks and Admonitions Logic, which allows for the subordination of the lower sciences to metaphysics. He also evidences this pattern of subordination between the sciences in his monumental Metaphysics of the Šifā'. This paper shows how Avicenna's interpretation constitutes a middle position between the dominant interpretations of Met. E1 (VI 1), and shows how the principles of the lower sciences are proven in metaphysics as the proper accidents of being. This paper also responds to some of potential objections which might be raised to Avicenna's account.
Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship between met... more Aristotle's Met. E1 (VI 1) is the locus classicus for discussions of the relationship between metaphysics and the lower sciences. Some like Simplicius and Zabarella have interpreted the passage as suggesting that metaphysics, as a regina scientiarum (queen of the science) proves the principles of the lower sciences. Other commentators, like Aquinas and Fonseca, argue that metaphysics hands down the principles of the lower sciences but doesn't prove them. In favor of the second interpretation is Aristotle's remark at Posterior Analytics A9 76a 16, that the proper principles of the sciences are not proven. However, Avicenna develops a new conception of the subordination of the sciences in his last logical work, the Remarks and Admonitions Logic, which allows for the subordination of the lower sciences to metaphysics. He also evidences this pattern of subordination between the sciences in his monumental Metaphysics of the Šifā'. This paper shows how Avicenna's interpretation constitutes a middle position between the dominant interpretations of Met. E1 (VI 1), and shows how the principles of the lower sciences are proven in metaphysics as the proper accidents of being. This paper also responds to some of potential objections which might be raised to Avicenna's account.
This paper argues that, in spite of interpretations to the contrary, Avicenna and Aquinas are fun... more This paper argues that, in spite of interpretations to the contrary, Avicenna and Aquinas are fundamentally agreed as to subject and principles of metaphysics. The first part shows the philosophers' common metaphysical starting points in the realm of assent and the realm of conceptualization as well as their common use of the distinction between principles common by causality and common by predication to provide the overall structure for their metaphysics (Avicenna, Physics of the Shifa' 1.2.8–10; Aquinas, De Trin. V.4). The second part argues that both philosophers have similar descriptions of God and common being and thus similar views on the relation between God and the subject of metaphysics; and the third part, by surveying some remarks by Avicenna on Sufism and the use of the Qur'ān's description of God's attributes, argues that Avicenna is not forced by his naturalistic theory of prophecy to include God under the subject of metaphysics.
This paper argues that, in spite of interpretations to the contrary, Avicenna and Aquinas are fun... more This paper argues that, in spite of interpretations to the contrary, Avicenna and Aquinas are fundamentally agreed as to subject and principles of metaphysics. The first part shows the philosophers' common metaphysical starting points in the realm of assent and the realm of conceptualization as well as their common use of the distinction between principles common by causality and common by predication to provide the overall structure for their metaphysics (Avicenna, Physics of the Shifa' 1.2.8–10; Aquinas, De Trin. V.4). The second part argues that both philosophers have similar descriptions of God and common being and thus similar views on the relation between God and the subject of metaphysics; and the third part, by surveying some remarks by Avicenna on Sufism and the use of the Qur'ān's description of God's attributes, argues that Avicenna is not forced by his naturalistic theory of prophecy to include God under the subject of metaphysics.
This paper takes it starting point from the basic assertions of Martha Nussbaum’s 1997 paper “Is ... more This paper takes it starting point from the basic assertions of Martha Nussbaum’s 1997 paper “Is Nietzsche a political thinker?". In the paper she argues that seven criteria are necessary for a serious political philosophy: 1) understanding of material need; 2) procedural justification; 3) liberty and its worth; 4) racial, ethnic and religious difference; 5) gender and family; 6) justice between nations; and 7) moral psychology. She argues, that on the first six criteria, Nietzsche has nothing to offer but does make significant contributions on the seventh. In her estimation, then, we should forget about Nietzsche as a political thinker and instead focus on the enlightenment political philosophers he found to be so boring instead. Her basic conclusion is threefold: either Nietzsche is a racialist, inegalitarian, misogynistic, and elitist, he is puerile, or he is incoherent (Nussbaum 6-9). In opposition to Nussbaum's appraisal of Nietzsche's political thought, I argue that he is in fact a serious political thinker. To present the case I focus on the inclusion of Nussbaum's six criteria in Nietzsche's Zarathustra. My focus on this work is motivated by Nussbaum's own recognition that in this work Nietzsche makes numerous allusions to Plato's Republic, a seminal work of political thought in the tradition. Surprisingly, however, Nussbaum doesn't consider Zarathustra in her appraisal of the lack of political thought in Nietzsche.
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