Papers by Jonas Jervell Indregard
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Kant famously claims that we have all freely chosen evil. This paper offers a novel account of th... more Kant famously claims that we have all freely chosen evil. This paper offers a novel account of the much-debated justification for this claim. I reconstruct Kant's argument from his affirmation that we all have a price-we can all succumb to temptation. I argue that this follows a priori from a theoretical principle of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely that all empirical powers have a finite, changeable degree, an intensive magnitude. Because of this, our reason can always be overpowered by sensible inclinations. Kant moreover holds that this necessary feature of our moral psychology should not have been the case: We ought to instead be like the divine human being, for whom the moral law yields a greater incentive than any possible temptation. On Kant's view, we are thus responsible for having a price, and the synthetic a priori fact that we do proves that we each made an initial choice of evil.
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2020
Does Kant hold that we can have intuitions independently of concepts? A striking passage from §13... more Does Kant hold that we can have intuitions independently of concepts? A striking passage from §13 of the Critique of Pure Reason appears to say so explicitly. However, it also conjures up a scenario where the categories are inapplicable to objects of intuition, a scenario presumably shown impossible by the following Transcendental Deduction. The seemingly non-conceptualist claim concerning intuition have therefore been read, by conceptualist interpreters of Kant, as similarly counterpossible. I argue that the passage in question best supports an underappreciated middle position where intuition requires a pre-conceptual use of the understanding. Such pre-conceptual use of the understanding faces both textual and systematic objections. I show that these objections can be rebutted.
What is it that makes a mental state conscious? Recent commentators have proposed that for Kant, ... more What is it that makes a mental state conscious? Recent commentators have proposed that for Kant, consciousness results from differentiation: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is distinguished, by means of our conceptual capacities, from other states and/or things. I argue instead that Kant's conception of state consciousness is sensory: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is accompanied by an inner sensation. Interpreting state consciousness as inner sensation reveals an underappreciated influence of Crusius on Kant's view, solves some long-standing puzzles concerning Kant's difficult doctrine of self-affection, and sheds light on his theory of inner experience.
According to Kant each person has an empirical character, which is ultimately grounded in one’s f... more According to Kant each person has an empirical character, which is ultimately grounded in one’s free choice. The popular Causal Laws interpretation of empirical character holds that it consists of the causal laws governing our psychology. I argue that this reading has difficulties explaining moral change, the ‘gradual reformation’ of our empirical character: Causal laws cannot change and hence cannot be gradually reformed. I propose an alternative Causal Powers interpretation of empirical character, where our empirical character consists of our mind’s causal powers. The resulting picture of empirical character allows for moral change and Kantian weakness of will.
Are the pure intuitions of space and time, for Kant, dependent upon the understanding's activity?... more Are the pure intuitions of space and time, for Kant, dependent upon the understanding's activity? This paper defends the recently popular Self-Affection Thesis (SAT): namely, that the pure intuitions require an activity of self-affection—an influence of the understanding on the inner sense. Two systematic objections to this thesis have been raised: The Independence objection claims that SAT undermines the independence of sensibility; the Compatibility objection claims that certain features of space and time are incompatible with being the products of the understanding's activity. I show that the resources to rebut these objections can be found in Kant's account of causal influence.
A well-known trilemma faces the interpretation of Kant’s theory of affection, namely whether the ... more A well-known trilemma faces the interpretation of Kant’s theory of affection, namely whether the objects that affect us are empirical, noumenal, or both. I argue that according to Kant, the things that affect us and cause representations in us are not empirical objects. I articulate what I call the Causal Power Argument, according to which empirical objects cannot affect us because they do not have the right kind of power to cause representations. All the causal powers that empirical objects have are moving powers, and such powers can only have spatial effects. According to Kant, however, the representations that arise in us as a result of the affection of our sensibility are non-spatial. I show that this argument is put forward by Kant in a number of passages, and figures as a decisive reason for rejecting empirical affection and instead endorsing affection by the things in themselves.
Dissertation by Jonas Jervell Indregard
The notion of being internally affected by oneself, or in short self-affection [Selbstaffektion],... more The notion of being internally affected by oneself, or in short self-affection [Selbstaffektion], is among the more obscure in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Indeed, the first to recognize this fact seems to have been Kant himself, who at one point in his Critique of Pure Reason indicates that there is a “paradox” related to self-affection, which he specifies in the following way: “We intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected, which seems to be contradictory, since we would have to relate to ourselves passively” (B152-153). The present dissertation aims to clarify Kant’s doctrine of self-affection by answering the following questions: What is self-affection? What is its role and importance within Kant’s theoretical philosophy?
Chapter 1 provides the metaphysical background from which to understand the conception of affection Kant is working with. Starting from the broadly Leibnizian framework of Alexander Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, in his critical period Kant had developed, as expressed in his lectures on metaphysics, an intricate and novel theory of powers. This theory, I will argue, is operative in and helps elucidate his published writings, importantly his view of affection and his distinction between sensibility as a receptive power and the understanding as a spontaneous power. Affection, on this view, should always be understood as a relation between two powers, in which one power determines the activity of the other. It is this novel view of affection that allows Kant to introduce the notion of self-affection: A relation between two powers (understanding and sensibility) of the same subject, in which one power (the understanding) determines the activity of the other (sensibility).
Chapter 2 motivates the theory of self-affection and displays its importance to Kant’s framework. I show how the doctrine of self-affection is presented as an essential ingredient in the Transcendental Deduction. Furthermore, I argue that a proper appreciation of this doctrine and its role can help resolve one of the main debates within contemporary Kant scholarship, namely the debate over whether Kant is a conceptualist or non-conceptualist with respect to intuition. Both of these sides have convincing arguments against the other position, and the debate appears to have reached something of an impasse. I show that when Kant’s doctrine of self-affection is properly understood, it allows a way out of the impasse: An interpretation on which self-affection is necessary for intuition can accommodate the main arguments of both sides of the debate.
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the representational status of the input provided by sensibility prior to and posterior to self-affection, in order to assess in detail the contribution that the influence of the understanding on sensibility makes. I consider the representations of non-rational animals, explicating and defending a consequence of the interpretation of self-affection that I have given, namely that animals lack intuitions. I proceed to give an account of intuitions, focused on what I take to be that essential difference between intuitions and the representations given prior to self-affection: That intuitions have an objective structure, that is, they are complex unities in which the parts of the intuition serve to characterize the unified whole. This is a structure shared by objects and by objective judgments.
M. A. Thesis by Jonas Jervell Indregard
duo.uio.no
In this thesis, I present and defend an interpretation of Kant's theory of inner sense. This theo... more In this thesis, I present and defend an interpretation of Kant's theory of inner sense. This theory is central to the Critique of Pure Reason, but it has proven difficult to grasp. I suggest that inner sense provides us with a point of view, and that this point of view is constituted by the ...
Papers in Norwegian by Jonas Jervell Indregard
In this paper, I introduce the argumentative strategy pursued by Quentin Meillassoux in After Fin... more In this paper, I introduce the argumentative strategy pursued by Quentin Meillassoux in After Finitude. I argue that this strategy should be seen as neo-Cartesian: Meillassoux's argument for the principle of factiality, like Descartes' argument for the cogito, attempts to establish apodictic certainty by arguing that a denial of the conclusion involves a pragmatic contradiction.
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Papers by Jonas Jervell Indregard
Dissertation by Jonas Jervell Indregard
Chapter 1 provides the metaphysical background from which to understand the conception of affection Kant is working with. Starting from the broadly Leibnizian framework of Alexander Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, in his critical period Kant had developed, as expressed in his lectures on metaphysics, an intricate and novel theory of powers. This theory, I will argue, is operative in and helps elucidate his published writings, importantly his view of affection and his distinction between sensibility as a receptive power and the understanding as a spontaneous power. Affection, on this view, should always be understood as a relation between two powers, in which one power determines the activity of the other. It is this novel view of affection that allows Kant to introduce the notion of self-affection: A relation between two powers (understanding and sensibility) of the same subject, in which one power (the understanding) determines the activity of the other (sensibility).
Chapter 2 motivates the theory of self-affection and displays its importance to Kant’s framework. I show how the doctrine of self-affection is presented as an essential ingredient in the Transcendental Deduction. Furthermore, I argue that a proper appreciation of this doctrine and its role can help resolve one of the main debates within contemporary Kant scholarship, namely the debate over whether Kant is a conceptualist or non-conceptualist with respect to intuition. Both of these sides have convincing arguments against the other position, and the debate appears to have reached something of an impasse. I show that when Kant’s doctrine of self-affection is properly understood, it allows a way out of the impasse: An interpretation on which self-affection is necessary for intuition can accommodate the main arguments of both sides of the debate.
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the representational status of the input provided by sensibility prior to and posterior to self-affection, in order to assess in detail the contribution that the influence of the understanding on sensibility makes. I consider the representations of non-rational animals, explicating and defending a consequence of the interpretation of self-affection that I have given, namely that animals lack intuitions. I proceed to give an account of intuitions, focused on what I take to be that essential difference between intuitions and the representations given prior to self-affection: That intuitions have an objective structure, that is, they are complex unities in which the parts of the intuition serve to characterize the unified whole. This is a structure shared by objects and by objective judgments.
M. A. Thesis by Jonas Jervell Indregard
Papers in Norwegian by Jonas Jervell Indregard
Chapter 1 provides the metaphysical background from which to understand the conception of affection Kant is working with. Starting from the broadly Leibnizian framework of Alexander Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, in his critical period Kant had developed, as expressed in his lectures on metaphysics, an intricate and novel theory of powers. This theory, I will argue, is operative in and helps elucidate his published writings, importantly his view of affection and his distinction between sensibility as a receptive power and the understanding as a spontaneous power. Affection, on this view, should always be understood as a relation between two powers, in which one power determines the activity of the other. It is this novel view of affection that allows Kant to introduce the notion of self-affection: A relation between two powers (understanding and sensibility) of the same subject, in which one power (the understanding) determines the activity of the other (sensibility).
Chapter 2 motivates the theory of self-affection and displays its importance to Kant’s framework. I show how the doctrine of self-affection is presented as an essential ingredient in the Transcendental Deduction. Furthermore, I argue that a proper appreciation of this doctrine and its role can help resolve one of the main debates within contemporary Kant scholarship, namely the debate over whether Kant is a conceptualist or non-conceptualist with respect to intuition. Both of these sides have convincing arguments against the other position, and the debate appears to have reached something of an impasse. I show that when Kant’s doctrine of self-affection is properly understood, it allows a way out of the impasse: An interpretation on which self-affection is necessary for intuition can accommodate the main arguments of both sides of the debate.
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the representational status of the input provided by sensibility prior to and posterior to self-affection, in order to assess in detail the contribution that the influence of the understanding on sensibility makes. I consider the representations of non-rational animals, explicating and defending a consequence of the interpretation of self-affection that I have given, namely that animals lack intuitions. I proceed to give an account of intuitions, focused on what I take to be that essential difference between intuitions and the representations given prior to self-affection: That intuitions have an objective structure, that is, they are complex unities in which the parts of the intuition serve to characterize the unified whole. This is a structure shared by objects and by objective judgments.